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Who judges the judges?
The general and common consensus is that the judges are not judged.
This, however, is not entirely true. Certainly the judge's work product gets a
good deal of appraisal, and this is also true of the Supreme Court. The
Harvard Law Review has an annual survey of Supreme Court decisions. In
relationship to the Tenth Circuit, the Denver Law Journal does a most effec-
tive job in its Annual Tenth Circuit Survey. The Annual Survey of the
Tenth Circuit has grown and developed until now it is an established and
well regarded institution.
What purpose is served by the annual survey?
First, does it make a public interest contribution?
Yes. It considers a large segment of the court's decisions. It brings these
to the attention of the profession as well as the public and does so in anno-
tated and lawyer-like form. This has value not only for the profession, but
also for the students who perform the work. Undoubtedly the entire legal
community derives value from this effort.
Second, is the work product valuable to the court?
Yes. Without it the court's opinions would in many instances escape
outside critical scrutiny and critical commentary. Judges' work products
should not be hidden under protective covering. Thus, critical scrutiny and
commentary, even though not always welcome to the author, has value and
is desirable.
Third, does the Annual Survey result in better court opinions?
Yes, to some degree. Perhaps the presence of the activity furnishes im-
petus to improved writing and analysis. It should have such an effect. The
individual judges read the comments with great interest. It in all likelihood
exerts at least subconscious effects on the opinion writers.
Fourth, does the staff observe a high professional standard in its com-
ments?
Generally, yes. There must be occasions when the individual writer un-
doubtedly wishes that there had been more time and more space to consider,
analyze and comment. Unhappily this is a limited edition effort and it can-
not be carried out in the depth and breadth of a case note or case comment.
In summary, then, this fine effort on the part of the staff is much more
than a student exercise. It shows generally a high standard of professional
work. The staff members are careful and conscientious in their statements
and usually the criticisms are carefully impersonal.
The staff is to be warmly commended for their high level of professional
performance. They show thoughtful, painstaking labor and devotion to the
quest for law and justice.
Speaking for this member of the court, we wish them good luck and
continued good hunting in this the Sixth Annual Survey.






JUDGE STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR
The newest appointee to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is Judge Stephanie K.









CHIEF JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War II he served as a Major
in the U.S. Army and was decorated with the
Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has been a
director of the Santa Fe National Bank, chair-
man of the Legal Committee of the New Mex-
ico Oil and Gas Association, and counsel for
the New Mexico Cattlegrowers' Association.
He has also been a regent of the Museum of
New Mexico and a director of the Santa Fe
Boy's Club. In 1962 he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President John F. Kennedy. He
has been Chief Judge since 1977.
JUDGE ROBERT H.
McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in 1927
where he has lived ever since. He received his
A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the University of
Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an Honor-
ary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
During World War II, Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney, a Colo-
rado district court judge, and was a member
of the Colorado Supreme Court for nine years
prior to his appointment to the Court of
Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the Judi-
cial Conference Committee on the Adminis-
tration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta Kappa,
Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta Phi, and
Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as a Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1970.
JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma governor,
Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family moved
to Oklahoma City in 1927. He served as a
First Lieutenant in the Army during World
War II. He then returned to complete his
undergraduate studies at the University of
Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in 1947. He
was graduated from Harvard Law School in
1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was an
attorney with the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he returned to
private practice in Oklahoma City where he
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit by Lyn-
don B. Johnson. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett, who
served as Wyoming's Congressman, Governor,
and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett was born in
1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He attended the
University of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War II.
After the War, he attended Saint Catherine's
College at Oxford University. He received his
LL.B. from the University of Wyoming in
1949. In 1973 he was given the Distinguished
Alumni Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Barrett
had been involved in private practice in Lusk
and had served as County and Prosecuting
Attorney for Niobrara County; Town Attor-
ney for the towns of Lusk and Manville; and
attorney for the Niobrara County Consoli-
dated School District. In 1967 he was
appointed by Governor Stanley K. Hathaway
to serve as Wyoming Attorney General and he
remained in that position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judicial
Conference Subcommittee on Federal Juris-
diction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review, and is a trustee of
Saint Joseph's Children's Home. He was
appointed to the Court in 1971.
JUDGE WILLIAM E. DOYLE
Judge Doyle was born in Denver in 1911
and received his A.B. from the University of
Colorado in 1940. He obtained his LL.B. and
J.D. degrees from George Washington Uni-
versity. He served as Deputy District Attor-
ney for Denver from 1938 until 1941, a
Colorado district court judge from 1948 until
1949, and Chief Deputy District Attorney
from 1949 until 1952. During 1959-61 he was
a Justice on the Colorado Supreme Court.
Judge Doyle has been a Visiting Professor
of Law at the University of Colorado and a
Professor of Law at the Westminster College
of Law (University of Denver College of Law)
in Denver. He is a former Chairman of the
Judicial Conference Committee to Implement
the Magistrates' Act and is presently a mem-
ber of the Judicial Conference Committee on
the Administration of the Bankruptcy System.
He is a member of the Order of the Coif, the
Order of Saint Ives, Pi Sigma Alpha, and Phi
Alpha Delta.
He was appointed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1971 following ten years
as a United States District Judge for the Dis-
trict of Colorado.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo, Kan-
sas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from the
University of Kansas in 1952 and was gradu-
ated magna cum laude from Harvard Law
School in 1955. He went on to be U.S. Cir-
cuit Judge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los Angeles
firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the capac-
ity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting professor
at Harvard Law School, The University of
Texas Law School, Stanford University, and
the University of Michigan. He was a com-
missioner for the U.S. District Court from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a mem-
ber of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the Coif,
Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta Kappa,
Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi, and Phi
Delta Phi. He has co-authored numerous
books on estate planning and administration.
In 1977 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He was
graduated from Brigham Young University in
1957 with high honors. He received his J.D.
from the University of Chicago and became
the law clerk for Justice Jessee A. Udall of the
Arizona Supreme Court in 1960. From 1961
to 1974, Judge McKay was with the firm of
Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, taking two years
out to serve as Director of the U.S. Peace
Corps in Malawi, Africa. He was a law pro-
fessor at Brigham Young University from
1974 until he was appointed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in 1977.
JUDGE STEPHANIE K.
SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle Creek,
Michigan, in 1940. She graduated from
Smith College, magna cum laude, in 1962 and
earned her J.D. from Harvard Law School in
1965. She was admitted to the Oklahoma bar
in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston, Texas, 1968-
1969. Most recently she has practiced with
the Tulsa firm of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders,
Daniel & Anderson, as an associate from 1971
to 1975 and as a partner from 1975 to 1979.
Judge Seymour is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa, and the American, Oklahoma, and
Tulsa County Bar associations. She served as
a bar examiner fro 1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour is the most recent person to
join the Tenth Circuit bench. She was
appointed by President Carter and was sworn
in November 16, 1979.
SENIOR JUDGE JOHN C.
PICKETT
Judge Pickett was born in Ravenna,
Nebraska, in 1896. He received his LL.B.
dgree from the University of Nebraska in
1922. In 1920, he was a pitcher for the Chi-
cago White Sox. During World War I he
served as a Second Lieutenant.
From 1935 until 1949 Judge Pickett was
Assistant United States Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming; in 1949, he was United
States Attorney. He is a past member of the
Judicial Conference and has served as Chair-
man of the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law.
Judge Pickett was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in 1949 and has been a Senior Judge since
January 1, 1966.
SENIOR JUDGE JEAN S.
BREITENSTEIN
Judge Breitenstein was born in Keokuk,
Iowa, in 1900. His family moved to Boulder,
Colorado, in 1907. After graduation from the
University of Colorado, where he received his
A.B. in 1922 and LL.B. in 1924, he served as a
Colorado Assistant Attorney General from
1925 until 1929. He was an Assistant United
States Attorney from 1930 until 1933.
Between 1933 and 1954 he practiced law in
Denver. In 1954 he became a United States
District Judge.
Judge Breitenstein has served as Chairman
of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Intercircuit Assignments and is a past presi-
dent of the Denver Law Club.
A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, and Phi Alpha Delta, Judge Breitenstein
holds LL.D. degrees from the University of
Colorado and the University of Denver. He
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1957 and became a Senior Judge
July 31, 1970.
SENIOR JUDGE DAVID T.
LEWIS
Judge Lewis was born in Salt Lake City,
Utah, in 1912. He received his B.A. degree
and his J.D. from the University of Utah. In
1971 he was awarded an Honorary Doctor of
Laws degree from his alma mater. During
World War II Judge Lewis served in the
Criminal Investigation Division of the Army
and in 1947-48 was a member of the Utah
Legislature. He was a Utah district judge
from 1950 to 1956.
Judge Lewis has been a member of the
Judicial Conference of the United States since
1970 and was elected Chairman of the Con-
ference of Chief Circuit Judges in 1974. He
was voted the "Judge of the Year" in 1974 by
the Utah State Bar Association.
Judge Lewis is a member of the Order of
the Coif and Phi Delta Phi. He was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit in 1956 by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He became
a Senior Judge December 3, 1977.
SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (Retired)
Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kansas,
in 1906. He received his LL.B. from Wash-
burn College in 1929. From 1929 to 1943 he
practiced law in Wamego, serving as an Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to 1936. He
was general counsel for the Kansas State Tax
Comission from 1937 to 1939 and Chairman
of the State Democratic Committee from
1946 to 1948. During World War II he was a
Captain in the U.S. Army. In 1945 he
assisted in the prosecution of General
Yamashita in Manila. He was a U.S. District
Judge from 1949 until 1961 when he was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Hill became a Senior Judge
April 1, 1977.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of cases involving administrative law issues were decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit during its 1978-79
term. Of the twenty cases discussed in this section, all of which primarily
involved administrative law, the government or administrative agency was
upheld in fifteen.
A major case in the administrative law area dealt with warrantless
searches. In Savz'na Home Industries, Inc. v. Secretay of Labor,I the court found
that the rule of Marshall o. Barlow's, Inc. 2 prohibiting warrantless searches
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19703 did not apply retro-
actively.
Other administrative law topics considered during the term included
procedural due process, jurisdiction, standing, and exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. Several federal agencies were represented in more than one
case. The agencies which were litigants in several unrelated cases were the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration, and the Department of the Interior.
II. ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Seemingly petty assertions of bureaucratic authority resulted in deci-
sions against the Department of the Interior and the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. Both agencies were overruled on the ground of
abuse of discretion. A third case discussed in this section involved the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
A. Winkler v. Andrus
In Wzkler v. Andrus,4 the plaintiff challenged a decision of the Interior
Board of Land Appeals, which had upheld on a technicality, the Depart-
ment of Interior's rejection of Winkler's bid for an oil and gas lease. Winkler
had completed the department's required entry card to make his bid and
had stamped it with the name of his insurance company, J.A. Winkler
Agency. Subsequently, the Bureau of Land Management rejected the bid
on the ground that the word "agency" implied that the bid was made by a
corporation and the paperwork required for a corporate bid had not been
completed. 5 The plaintiff maintained that he had inadvertently stamped
the bid card with his insurance agency stamp but had signed the card as an
1. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
2. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
4. 594 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1979).
5. Id at 776.
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individual. 6 The trial court found for.the Interior Board of Land Appeals.7
On appeal, the Court distinguished two earlier Tenth Circuit opinions,
Ballard E Spencer Trust, Inc. v. Morton8 and Shearn v. Andrus, 9 which were de-
cided in favor of the Department. In both cases, the opinion stated, serious
infractions of the regulations governing bid submissions were involved. ' 0 In
contrast, the court found that Winkler involved no actual violation of a regu-
lation, and the use of the word "agency" in the insurance company stamp
would "not in the least degree bring to mind a corporation."'"
In finding the board's decision to be arbitrary, Judge Doyle implied
that what was really at the heart of the dispute was a determination by the
government to uphold its initial finding, regardless of the facts. The opinion
stated that after the Department of the Interior discovered Winkler's
"agency" was not a corporation it tried to find an alternative ground for
refusing to consider his bid, "and did so as if it was determined to deny [the
bid] regardless of the facts."'
12
A possible explanation for the decision, Judge Doyle continued, was
found in the department's brief. Upholding the denial would minimize
challenges to rulings of the board in the future. The court stated that
"[jludicial decisions are not made so as to discourage assertion of rights in
court. . . . It is not sound to assume that a citizen will accept as the last
word an adverse ruling such as this; one which is founded on a trivial and
inconsequential point."'
3
The court noted in Winkler that provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA)' 4 were the basis for the court's jurisdiction to determine the
appeal.' 5 The comment is interesting when compared to a discussion of a
similar jurisdictional issue in Vukonich v. Civil Service Commission,' 6 decided by
the same court just a few months previously. The opinion in Vukonich stated
in a footnote' 7 that a 1977 Supreme Court opinion' 8 had held that the APA
no longer affords independent subject matter jurisdiction for judicial review
of agency actions.' 9 In comparison, the court in Wik/ler ignored the jurisdic-
tional problem.
B. Health Systems Agency of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Norman
As in Winkler, an inflexible approach to an agency's rules provided the
6. Id at 776-77.
7. Id. at 777.
8. 544 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1976).
9. No. 77-1228 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 1977).
10. 594 F.2d at 777.
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id at 778.
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
15. 594 F.2d at 776.
16. 589 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1978). The jurisdictional issue in Vukonich is discussed in PART
III: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION.
17. Id at 496 n.1.
18. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
19. 589 F.2d at 496 n.1 (1978).
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basis for overruling a government decision in Health Systems Agency of
Oklahoma, Inc. v. Norman .
20
The plaintiff, a nonprofit private corporation, sought to be designated
as a planning, policymaking, and advisory body for Oklahoma health pro-
grams. 2 ' Under a federal law, 22 the designation was required to receive fed-
eral grants through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW). The plaintiff was required under HEW rules to submit an applica-
tion for designation as the planning agency by January 19, 1976. Although
the application was in final form by the required date, a printing delay made
it virtually impossible to submit it to the HEW regional office in Dallas,
Texas by the close of business on the deadline date.
2 3
HEW approved an extension of the deadline until 8 a.m. the next day.
An employee of the plaintiff flew to Dallas, arriving after midnight. He
asked the hotel to awaken him at 6:30 a.m.; however, this was not done and
the employee overslept. The failure to awaken on time caused a 55-minute
delay in submission of the application. An HEW representative said the
application would not be considered with those that had been submitted on
time, but it might be considered later. HEW claimed it had no provision for
waiving its own deadline.
2 4
Citing a Supreme Court case, 25 Judge McKay stated the general rule is
that a court or an administrative body always has the discretion to relax its
own procedural rules. 26 The date fixed for the submission of the applica-
tions was "wholly arbitrary. '2 7 The court noted that HEW had directed its
regional offices to interpret the deadline without undue rigidity so applica-
tions in final form by the deadline would be accepted, even though they
were not turned in on time.
28
Noting that there had been a "lengthy and troubled history on the mat-
ter," the court directed the HEW regional office to make detailed findings
when it reconsidered the case. 29 The government .rgued that, if the court
found for the plaintiff, the only appropriate measure of recovery would be
the plaintiff's costs in preparing its application. The Tenth Circuit ruled
instead that HEW was required to accept the application, process it, and
consider the application of the plaintiff along with that of the successful
agency. The applications were to be considered on remand on the basis of
their merits in light of events at the time of the original consideration by
HEW.
30
The opinion conceded that recovery of preparation costs is ordinarily
the proper measure of damages in an action based on agency noncompliance
20. 589 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1978).
21. Id at 493.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 300(k) (1976).
23. 589 F.2d at 488.
24. Id at 488-89.
25. American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532 (1970).
26. 589 F.2d at 489.
27. Id at 490.
28. Id at 491.
29. Id at 492.
30. Id at 492-93.
19801
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with bidding provisions. However, the court thought that the plaintiff was
entitled to more consideration than would be given an ordinary bidder on a
contract for profit. The opinion noted that the plaintiff was an "advisory
body somewhat unique to our political system. . . . A Health Systems
Agency is virtually quasi-governmental in function and is therefore vastly
different from a government contractor or grant recipient. '3 1 In distinguish-
ing the case from those in which the amounts of damages were found to be
bidders' preparation costs, the court cited a 1971 District of Columbia Court
of Appeals decision 32 in which the court found that injunctive relief was
available to a disappointed bidder.
33
In a footnote which may be of prospective significance to many agen-
cies, the court placed an affirmative duty on the government in dealing with
the public. "In this day of bureaucratic proliferation, . . . it would be virtu-
ally impossible for private individuals to find the information that would
permit them reliably to deal with public officials. The government is in the
best position to find such information and bring it forward."
34
C Cape Air Freight, Inc. v. United States
In Cape Air Freighi, Inc. v. United States,35 the Tenth Circuit set aside
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which had adopted
an administrative law judge's (ALJ) findings without modification. The
court found the orders erroneous, arbitrary, and unreasonable, 36 and found
that the ICC had abused its discretion in refusing to accept an offer of settle-
ment made by Cape and accepted by the ICC's Bureau of Enforcement.
37
After the agency's enforcement bureau had agreed to accept the settlement,
the ALJ denied the offer and the ICC entered cease and desist orders as the
ALJ had recommended.
38
Proceedings before the agency began with a petition filed by nine motor
carriers, all competitors of the plaintiff, seeking cancellation or modification
of Cape certificates on the ground that Cape had not actually operated
under them, but was a franchising operation. 39 After hearings, the ALJ ren-
dered an initial decision which held that Cape had been operating unlaw-
fully by utilizing "agents" in the performance of its transportation services
without maintaining substantial responsibility and control in violation of the
Interstate Commerce Act.4° Cape was ordered to discontinue all use of
agents, and directed to use only employees, terminals, and vehicles under its
control and supervision. The ICC affirmed the initial decision and Cape
appealed.
4 '
31. Id at 493.
32. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. 589 F.2d at 493.
34. I at 491 n.7.
35. 586 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1978).
36. Id at 181.
37. Id at 182.
38. Id at 172.
39. d at 176.
40. 49 U.S.C. §§ 303, 306, 309, 316 (1976).
41. 586 F.2d at 177.
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Cape moved for dismissal of the complaint based on its settlement offer,
which had included a provision for changing Cape's working arrangements
with "agents" to give the company substantial control and responsibility.
The changes related to banking, equipment identification, insurance, em-
ployee supervision, and document execution. A previous ICC order had dis-
missed other allegations against Cape. Among them was one alleging Cape's
"willful failure" to comply with the Act. Only allegations of Cape's failure
to exercise control and responsibility over its agents had been sustained.
4 2
Intervening complainants refused Cape's offer of settlement and again
requested revocation of Cape's certificates based on investigations by the Bu-
reau of Enforcement. The ALJ's initial decision referred to changes pro-
posed by Cape but concluded that they were insufficient to institute control
and responsibility. The ALJ found Cape's use of agents to be in violation of
the Act and ordered that all such operations cease.
43
The Tenth Circuit reduced the issues to two: 1) Cape's alleged failure
to exercise adequate control over its operations, and 2) the refusal of the ICC
to accept the settlement offer.44 The Tenth Circuit found the ICC require-
ments of control and responsibility valid and enforceable. In addition, it
upheld ICC findings that Cape failed to exercise necessary control and ruled
that the violations were supported by substantial evidence.
45
Despite the finding that the control and responsibility requirements
were valid, the Tenth Circuit found the ICC order upholding the ALJ's deci-
sion to be an abuse of discretion. The court based this finding on the ration-
ale that the discretion exercised by the ICC in determining the proper
remedy should have taken into account the entire record.46 The court over-
ruled the ICC's total prohibition against the use of agents. Judge Barrett
found that the Interstate Commerce Act establishes the right of a carrier to
augment its equipment and personnel through lease agreements.
47
Citing Gilberiville Trucking Co., Inc. v. United States,48 in which the
Supreme Court observed the power of the ICC to be corrective, not puni-
tive,49 the Tenth Circuit expressed its belief that the agency's acceptance of
the settlement offer would have accomplished the required remedial goal.
The effect of the cease and desist order was to deny the plaintiff the use of
agents under any circumstances. The ICC was directed to undertake pro-
ceedings to accept Cape's offer subject to directives deemed necessary to
eliminate Cape's failure to exercise control and responsibility as required by
42. Id at 173.
43. Id at 177.
44. Id at 178.
45. Id. at 180.
46. 586 F.2d at 180, 181-82. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156 (1962).
47. 586 F.2d at 181 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 304(e) (1976)). See generally American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953); Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Pitt
County Transp. Co., 492 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1975); Alford v.
Major, 470 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1972); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc., 465 F.2d
710 (5th Cir. 1972).
48. 371 U.S. 115 (1962).
49. Id at 129-30. See also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944).
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the Interstate Commerce Act. 50
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION
A government clerk whose promised promotion was snatched away only
moments before a celebration party, lost her attempt to force the Civil Serv-
ice Commission (CSC) to grant her a hearing5 ' in Vukonich v. Civ1l Service
Commission. 52 While noting that the employee's disappointment was caused
by a "running dispute" between the CSC and the Environmental Protection
Agency, the worker's employer,53 the court found that the clerk was not enti-
tled to a hearing before being denied the promotion. Judge McKay stated
that, since Civil Service appointments take effect only after completion of a
standard form that had not been filled out in the plaintiff's case, there had
been no promotion. Therefore, the court did not reach the issue of whether
a hearing was required.5 4 In support of its ruling, the court cited a federal
regulation that requires hearings only in cases in which there is removal,
suspension, furlough without pay, or reduction in rank or pay of a federal
worker.
55
The plaintiff had alleged jurisdiction only under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). The court dealt with this jurisdictional issue in a foot-
note. 56 After the plaintiffs case had been brought, the Supreme Court in
Califano v. Sanders,57 held that the APA does not provide a basis for in-
dependent subject matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit found that the
failure to allege another basis of jurisdiction was not fatal because jurisdic-
tion could be based on the federal question statute,58 even though it was not
alleged in the complaint. In support of its independent finding of jurisdic-
tion, the court cited a Second Circuit decision.
59
50. 586 F.2d at 180-82.
51. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974), in which the Supreme Court found the
government is entitled to the "widest latitude" in matters involving its employees. For a discus-
sion of the "watered down" due process required in government employee discharge cases, see
Martin, The Improper Discharge of a Federal Employee by a Constitutionally Permissible Process. The OEO
Case, 28 AD. L. REV. 27 (1976); Comment, Constitutional Law: No Hearing Required Pror to Dsmis-
salfor Cause of Nonprobationag, Federal Employee, 59 MINN. L. REV. 421 (1974).
52. 589 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1978).
53. Id. at 495-96.
54. Id at 496-97.
55. Id. at 497 (citing 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.101-.202 (1978)).
56. 589 F.2d at 496 n. 1. Jurisdiction was alleged on the basis of the appeals provisions of
the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
57. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). The statute provides that district courts have jurisdiction in
cases arising under federal law. The statute states that there is no requirement that more than
$10,000 be in controversy in cases involving federal officers or agencies acting in their official
capacities.
59. 589 F.2d at 496 n.1 (citing Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113, 1115 n.1 (2d Cir.
1977)). Ste also Hoefferle Truck Sales, Inc. v. Divco-Wayne Corp., 523 F.2d 543, 549 (7th Cir.
1975); Paynes v. Lee, 377 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1967); Quality Beverage Co. v. Sun-Drop Sales
Corp. of America, 291 F. Supp. 92, 95 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
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IV. FAA PILOT RULES
Two pilots were unsuccessful in their separate attempts to upset deci-
sions of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
4. Loomis v. McLucas
The 70-year-old plaintiff in Loomis v. McLucas,6° whose application for a
private pilot's license had been denied. in 1975, had lost a previous appeal to
the same court in 1977.61 The Tenth Circuit, in the 1977 decision, affirmed
the FAA's denial of a license on medical grounds after the plaintiff had un-
dergone surgery and received an artificial heart valve.
6 2
After repeated attempts to obtain a flying certificate, the plaintiff filed
an action in federal district court, seeking a writ of mandamus 63 to force the
FAA to reissue the license. The district court dimissed the action.
64
Judge Logan stated that federal statutes require an appeal from an ad-
verse determination of the FAA to be made directly to the Courts of Ap-
peals. 65 Neither the former pilot's advanced age nor the delay cuased by a
crowded Court of Appeals docket were found to be enough to permit the
court to ignore the statutory appeals process.66 The Tenth Circuit noted
that there were no important constitutional issues raised that would justify
the Tenth Circuit hearing the case prematurely. The court also found it
could not excuse exhaustion of appropriate judicial remedies, since no irrep-
arable harm was threatened.
6 7
B. Gray v. FAA
In Gray v. FAA, 68 the court rejected arguments against an FAA rule
requiring mandatory retirement for commercial airline pilots. The regula-
tion, known as the Age-60 Rule,69 was promulgated to safeguard the public
from risks associated with diminished ability in older pilots. 70 Gray, who
flew for Continental Airlines, had petitioned the FAA for an exemption from
the rule. He contended his physical condition justified the exemption, which
was denied by the agency. The plaintiff alleged that it was an abuse of dis-
cretion to deny the exemption, 7 and that the federal air surgeon had
demonstrated bias against exempting pilots from the Age-60 Rule. 72
Judge McKay noted that the Second and Seventh Circuits had found
60. 598 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1979).
61. Loomis v. McLucas, 553 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1977).
62. 598 F.2d at 1201.
63. The plaintiff sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976), which gives district courts
original jurisdiction in actions "in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of
the United States ... to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."
64. 598 F.2d at 1201.
65. 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1976) provides that FAA appeals be made to the Courts of Appeals.
66. 598 F.2d at 1201.
67. Id at 1202.
68. 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979).
69. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1979).
70. 24 Fed. Reg. 9767 (1959).
71. 594 F.2d at 794.
72. Id at 795.
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against pilots who had challenged the rule on exactly the same grounds as
Gray. 73 However, while upholding the agency, Judge McKay noted that
failure to grant exemptions could become an abuse of discretion in the fu-
ture. "At some point, the state of the medical art may become so compel-
lingly supportive of a capacity to determine functional age equivalents in
individual cases that it would be an abuse of discretion not to grant an ex-
emption.
'74
V. EXHAUSTION AND RIPENESS
The Tenth Circuit rejected a challenge to federal regulations prohibit-
ing discrimination on the basis of gender when it found in St. Regis Paper Co.
v. Marshall,75 that the plaintiff, a private employer, had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.76 St. Regis sought review of the regulations, poli-
cies and practices of the Secretary of Labor, the General Services Adminis-
tration (GSA), and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP).77
The GSA had ruled that St. Regis had deviated from its affirmative
action program in the employment of women at its Libby, Montana plant,
and advised the company that it could be passed over for future government
contracts. However, the government had agreed not to pass over the plain-
tiff for any contract while the matter was pending before the agency. The
plaintiff filed an action in the district court prior to the time that an admin-
istrative hearing was held.
78
Citing Myers v. Bethlehem Corp. ,79 the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of
the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.8 0 In resolution of
the plaintiffs argument that the issues raised questions of statutory interpre-
tation and the constitutionality of federal regulations,8 ' Judge Lewis stated
that agency review is desirable even when pure questions of law are involved
in an appeal from an administrative decision. A Seventh Circuit decision,
Unroyal, Inc. v. Marshall,82 was cited in support of this rationale. The court
also stated that prior interpretation of a statute by an agency is necessary as
an aid to the court on judicial review.8 3 Such interpretation by the agency
provides a better record for the court to review.
84
The Tenth Circuit also rejected an argument that the plaintiff would be
73. Id at 795 (citing Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979), and Starr v. FAA,
589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978)).
74. 594 F.2d at 795.
75. 591 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1979).
76. For discussions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, see K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 20.01-.08 (1976); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW §§ 165-75 (1976).
77. 591 F.2d at 612.
78. Id at 613.
79. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
80. 591 F.2d at 614.
81. Id at 614.
82. 579 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1978).
83. 591 F.2d at 614.
84. Id (citing McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 430 U.S.
933 (1977)). See also McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971).
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subjected to needless expense if required to pursue an administrative rem-
edy. Referring to a Ninth Circuit decision, 5 the court stated that expense
was no excuse for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.8 6 In addition,
the court found that the issue was not ripe for judicial decision, since "fur-
ther and adequate administrative relief has been requested but not ex-
hausted."
8 7
St. Regis argued that it would be subjected to irreparable injury other
than expense. The injury alleged was that some federal employees had
stated to government contracting officers that St. Regis was not eligible for
government contracts. The court found that assurances by the OFCCP di-
rector that the plaintiff would not be passed over were enough to assure that
there would be no irreparable injury.88
VI. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR DECISIONS
The Department of the Interior was upheld in two unrelated decisions,
and overruled on the grounds of abuse of discretion in a third case, W4inkler v.
Andis,8 9 discussed in PART II.
A. Johnson v. Kleppe
The Tenth Circuit ruled inJohnson v. Kleppe9° that determinations made
by the Secretary of the Interior concerning the legal heirs of Indians dying
intestate are not subject to judicial review.9 ' The plaintiffs, who were rela-
tives determined to be ineligible to inherit by intestate succession, contended
the secretary had misinterpreted Oklahoma intestacy laws relating to inheri-
tance by relatives of the half blood. The court agreed with the Department
of the Interior that a federal statute requires that the determination of the
secretary be final. 92 Judge McWilliams cited a 1926 Supreme Court case
93
in finding the action should be dismissed because the court did not have
jurisdiction.
94
The plaintiffs argued that jurisdiction was appropriate under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA). 95 While recognizing that the modern
view favors judicial review,96 the court quoted from the APA to establish
that the act does not apply where precluded by statute.
97
85. California v. FTC, 549 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1977).
86. ee Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Aircraft &
Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947).
87. 591 F.2d at 614-15.
88. Id at 615.
89. 594 F.2d 775. See text accompanying notes 4-19 supra.
90. 596 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1979).
91. Id at 951.
92. 25 U.S.C. § 372 (1976) provides that the secretary's decision "shall be final and conclu-
sive."
93. First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U.S. 243 (1926).
94. 596 F.2d at 952.
95. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
96. 596 F.2d at 952. Se Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
97. 596 F.2d at 952 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976)).
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B. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States
A Colorado special district was unsuccessful in its attempt to require the
Department of the Interior and other defendants98 to include it in negotia-
tions for a contract to transport water in Colorado River Water Conservation Dis-
trict v. United States.99  The district had sought to be included in the
negotiations by submitting an environmental impact statement.10 0 The ne-
gotiations were for a contract under which the federal government would
carry water from the Western Slope of Colorado to the Eastern Slope
through the surplus capacity of a federal water project.' 0 1
In finding against the plaintiff, the court interpreted the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969102 as requiring participation by interested par-
ties only when a "major federal action" was involved. 10 3 Applying the
rational basis test, the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment
since there was a reasonable ground for the agency's determination that the
action, which was not final, did not warrant participation by interested par-
ties. However, had the action been a major one, the plaintiff would have
been permitted to file a statement.I°4
Quoting from a District of Columbia Circuit Court decision, 10 5 Judge
Barrett indicated that it would be burdensome to require agencies to permit
public participation in all actions of the government, particularly where, as
in the Colorado River, the agency action was preliminary, and participation
could prove to be "more disruptive than beneficial."'
10 6
VII. REVIEW OF MILITARY DECISIONS
Following precedent set by the Eighth and Second Circuits, 10 7 the court
found that only limited judicial review is permitted in appeals from military
decisions refusing to allow doctors to resign from the armed forces after re-
ceiving deferments to obtain post-graduate medical training.' 8 In Karlin v.
Reed, the plaintiff received a deferment under a voluntary medical military
98. Defendants also included the City and County of Denver, Colo., and the cities of Colo-
rado Springs, Colo., and Aurora, Colo. 593 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1977).
99. d. The case was decided in 1977. The court granted a motion to publish the opinion
in 1979. Letter from Howard K. Phillips, clerk of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, to recipi-
ents of the opinion (March 13, 1979).
100. On environmental impact statements, see Wright, New Judctal Requisttes for Informal
Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 AD. L. REV. 59 (1977);
Note, Appropriate Scope of an Environmental Impact Statement: The Interrelationship of Impacts, 1976
DUKE L.J. 623; Comment, Four Years of Environmental Impact Statements: A Review of Agenc Admin-
istration of NEPA, 8 AKRON L. REV. 545 (1975); Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact
Statements Under the National Environmental Policy Act:. A Defmitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
124 (1975).
101. 593 F.2d at 908.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
103. 593 F.2d at 909 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976)).
104. Id
105. Easton Util. Comm'n v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 424 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
106. 593 F.2d at 911.
107. West v. Chafee, 560 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1977); Applewick v. Hoffman, 540 F.2d 404 (8th
Cir. 1976); Ornato v. Hoffman, 546 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976); Roth v. Laird, 446 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.
1971).
108. Karlin v. Reed, 584 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1978).
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program, the Berry Plan, which permitted him to complete his residency
training before being ordered to active duty. After finishing his residency, he
took a job as a clinical researcher in cancer chemotherapy in Chicago. Kar-
lin's resignation from the military stated that his work was essential to the
community. The military had refused his resignation on the ground that his
services urgently were needed at an Air Force base in Texas. 10 9
Karlin filed a petition seeking writs of habeas corpus and mandamus,
and asserting jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. A pre-
liminary injunction was issued by the trial court, which found that the mili-
tary had acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The issue on appeal was the
applicable standard of review in cases involving the military decision-mak-
ing process. " 10
In finding that the military had acted properly, the court distinguished
the Berry Plan cases from those in which review was sought regarding Selec-
tive Service Board refusals to grant to civilians classifications as conscientious
objectors. I 'I Quoting from a Second Circuit opinion, 112 Chief Judge Seth
found that the decision was one that was purely within the purview of the
military and, therefore, not subject to judicial scrutiny. 1 3 The court also
cited, in support of its conclusion on the level of review, two Supreme Court
cases dealing with judicial review of military personnel matters, Parker v.
Levy 1 14 and Orofv. Willoughby. 1 5 In conducting its own personnel matters,
the military must state only adequate military reasons. The applicable
guidelines are the Department of Defenses's own regulations, which were
applied in considering Karlin's appeal through military channels." 
6
Although the opinion indicated there is a difference between the Berry
Plan cases and those involving conscientious objectors, it did not explain the
nature of that difference. In the conscientious objector cases, the distinguish-
ing fact appears to be that there is no doubt of the inductee's civilian status
since he has not enlisted in the armed forces in any manner. In contrast, in
the Berry Plan cases, there is an agreement between the doctor and the mili-
tary under which the physician has obligated himself to serve in the mili-
tary. 1i7 This agreement would appear to give the Berry Plan doctor the
status of a member of the military.
VIII. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF A REGULATORY SCHEME
A ski instructor lost an attempt to reverse a Department of Agriculture
decision denying him permission to operate a ski school on National Forest
109. Id. at 366.
110. Id at 366-67.
111. Id at 367. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
112. Roth v. Laird, 446 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1971).
113. 584 F.2d at 367.
114. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
115. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
116. 584 F.2d at 368. For a case in which a closer review was made of a military decision,
see Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
117. See West v. Chafee, 560 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1977).
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Service land near Aspen, Colorado in Sabrn v. Berglund." 8 The case was
before the Circuit for the second time. 1 9 Several of the plaintiff's arguments
had been rejected on the first appeal; 120 however, the case had been re-
manded to the district court to ascertain whether there was a rational basis
for the denial of the request for a special use permit. One issue which had
not been considered in the 1975 appeal was whether there was a violation of
the federal antitrust laws in denial of the permit.
12'
The plaintiff had sought a special permit for an area already under per-
mit for winter sports. The Forest Service rejected the request on the ground
that it would not authorize a ski school without the existing permitee's con-
sent. 
1 2 2
Citing an 1871 Supreme Court case, 123 the court stated that Congress
has plenary power over the federal public lands. And it has the ability to
delegate that power to the executive branch.' 24 Not only does the Secretary
have "extremely broad powers," stated Judge Doyle, but the Administrative
Procedure Act 1 25 "demands" only limited judicial review.
1 26
The court indicated there was no violation of antitrust laws because ski
areas compete with each other for the public's business. ' 2 7 However, even if
such competition were not sufficient, there are cases upholding regulatory
schemes when not operated competitively. Quoting from a treatise on anti-
trust law, the court found that a regulatory scheme generally supersedes the
antitrust laws.
128
The court was explicit in stating that it was not condoning the ski per-
mit system as "the best that could be conceived had there been more inten-
sive effort."' 29 However, even though the court might not condone the
system, it was not within the court's power to overturn the program on the
ground that it was not the best that could be conceived, since the power to
make such regulations had been delegated to the executive branch, not to
118. 585 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1978).
119. Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975), afd sub noni. Sabin v. Berglund, 585
F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1978). (The name of the case changed because there was a different individ-
ual serving as Secretary of Agriculture.)
120. 585 F.2d at 957.
121. Id The issue of whether antitrust laws or a regulatory scheme controls has arisen in
federal cases in which there is alleged an antitrust violation involving a regulated company or
industry. In such cases, the issue is whether primary jurisdiction to decide if there has been an
antitrust violation rests with the federal courts or with the regulatory agency. See K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 19.06 (1976); Botein, Prinayjuntrdiction: The Need
for Better Court/Ageny Interaction, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 867 (1976).
122. 585 F.2d at 955-56.
123. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1871).
124. 585 F.2d at 957-58 (citing in support of the delegation doctrine Best v. Humboldt
Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963) and Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970),
afsdsub nor. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
125. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
126. 585 F.2d at 959. Judge Doyle found such narrow review to be mandated by 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1976), which provides for a reviewing court to set aside agency action that is "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
127. 585 F.2d at 959.
128. Id at 960 (quoting from L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
(1977)).






The Tenth Circuit decided a significant case involving searches by ad-
ministrative agencies. '3 1 In Savina Home Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,132
the court found that the exclusionary rule1 33 did not apply retroactively to a
search' 34 conducted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) of 1970.135
Several constitutional issues were raised in Savzna,' 3 6 an action brought
by a contractor who had been cited for OSHA violations. 137 The most im-
portant of these were: 1) whether, considering the Supreme Court opinion
in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. ,a38 the exclusionary rule should be applied to
evidence seized in a warrantless OSHA search; and 2) if so, whether it should
be applied retroactively to a warrantless inspection that had occurred three
years prior to the Marshall decision.' 39 The Tenth Circuit found that the
rule did apply, but that its application was prospective only."40 The deci-
sion therefore marks a split of authority between the circuits, since the Ninth




131. On the topic of administrative searches generally, see McManis & McManis, Srcturn=g
Administrative Inspections. Is There any Warrantfor a Search Warrant, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 942 (1977);
Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: Whatever Happened to Camara and See?,
50 WASH. L. REV. 341 (1975).
132. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
133. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence illegally seized may not be used in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. The rule also has been applied in the context of administra-
tive searches. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967). The rule is based on the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
On the application of the rule in the criminal context, see LaFave, Improving Police Perform-
ance Through the Erclusunaqy Rule-Part Z. Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV.
391 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclu inaqy Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665
(1970); Thompson, Unconstitutional Search and Seizure and the Myth of Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE
DAME L. 457 (1967).
134. 594 F.2d at 1363-64.
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
136. 594 F.2d at 1358. In addition to the exclusionary rule issue, the court considered
whether there had been constitutional violations under the sixth amendment rights to confron-
tation, cross-examination, and trial by jury; whether there had been an unlawful delegation of
legislative and judicial authority; whether there had been a violation of due process; and
whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge the OSHA scheme. All issues were decided
against the plaintiff. Id at 1365-67.
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). See Dreusche, Fourth Amendment Implications of Warrantless
Occupational Safety and Health Act Inspections, 82 DICK. L. REV. 773 (1978); Levin, OSHA and the
Sixth Amentdment: When is a "Civil Penalty" Criminal in Ef ct,', 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013
(1978); Note, Warrantless Nonconsensual Searches Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1977).
138. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). Although the Court found in Marshall that an OSHA inspection
made without a warrant was a fourth amendment violation, it did not decide whether the
warrant requirement would be applied retroactively. A decision on retroactivity was not neces-
sary, since Barlow had refused to admit the OSHA inspector and, therefore, no evidence was
seized. Id at 310.
139. 594 F.2d at 1363.
140. Id at 1363-65.
141. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
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The court heavily relied on precedents in the criminal area in deciding
against retroactive application of the rule. Judge McKay noted that the rule
had never been applied retroactively by the Supreme Court.' 4 2 He further
noted that, considering the state of the law at the time of the inspection, the
inspector could not have known that a warrantless search was unconstitu-
tional. Citing United States v. Peltier,143 the court found that "actual or con-
structive knowledge" of the unconstitutionality of a search was essential to a
retroactive application of the exclusionary rule. 144
A three-pronged test has been employed in determining the retroactive
application of "new" constitutional rules. This test, as set out in Stoval o.
Denno, 145 requires the reviewing court to consider the purpose served by the
new rule, the extent of reliance on the prior standard, and the effect of a
retroactive application on the administration of justice. 46 Since the court
found that the Marshall rule did not apply retroactively, it did not reach the
issue of whether the search in Sav'na had been, as the government contended,
consensual.'
47
Another issue was whether the plaintiff had been given sufficient notice
of the OSHA standards involved in the citation. 148 The court found that,
because the standards were published in the Code of Federal Regulations,
and therefore were "a matter of public record," there had been no due proc-
ess violation. Furthermore, the plaintiff had received notice of the violations
through the citation and complaint issued by the inspector.' 49 The court
noted that it had rejected the same due process contentions in Clarkson Con-
struction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 150 and found
that Savina did not have standing to ask the court to reconsider its posi-
tion.' 5'
In Savina the court also found that the plaintiff did not have standing to
raise the issue of the legality of the penalty portion of the OSHA scheme,
since Savina had not been assessed the penalty permitted by the statutory
scheme. 152 The penalty provision permits the agency to increase an em-
ployer's fine when a citation is challenged. Citing Sierra Club v. Morton,' 53 the
court based its conclusion on the standing issue on the fact that Savina's first
amendment free speech rights were not "chilled" by the provision enough to
142. 594 F.2d at 1364 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 541).
143. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
144. 594 F.2d at 1364. For a case in which the rule was not applied retroactively, see Lin-
kletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
145. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
146. Id at 297. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); United States v. Reda, 563 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 973 (1978); United States v. Montgomery, 558 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1977).
147. 594 F.2d at 1361. The court stated in a footnote that the plaintiff had not been able to
develop its fourth amendment contentions regarding the nonconsensual nature of the search
because OHSRC had ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve constitutional issues. Id
at 1361 n.3.
148. Id. at 1365.
149. Id.
150. 531 F.2d 451, 456 (10th Cir. 1976).
151. 594 F.2d at 1366.
152. Id The penalty provision is at 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
153. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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discourage the petitioner from pursuing its appeal.' 5 4
The problem with this holding is that, if a petitioner who has not actu-
ally been assessed an increased fine is not allowed to challenge the statute,
then there may be no one with standing to do so. The agency's statutory
authority to assess the higher fine when an appeal is taken may indeed have
a chilling effect on some employers, who simply choose not to contest cita-
tions. These chilled employers therefore are not involved in any appeal
process. And, when citations are contested, the Commission may never in-
voke the penalty, which will mean that no "contesting" employers have
standing either. If this were the case, then there would be no employer with
standing to challenge the scheme. In finding that the petitioner lacked
standing to contest the penalty statute, the court avoided having to resolve
whether that portion of the Act was legal.
Savina also contended its sixth amendment rights of confrontation,
cross-examination, and trial by jury155 were infringed. In summarily dispos-
ing of the claims, Judge McKay noted that the plaintiff had cross-examined
the sole government witness at an administrative hearing, and that the jury
trial guarantee applies only in the criminal setting.156 The plaintiff also had
argued that the judicial and legislative branches' authority had been unlaw-
fully delegated in the OSHA scheme. The court, again finding for the gov-
ernment, noted that the "federal courts have long recognized as
constitutionally valid broad delegations of adjudicatory and rulemaking au-
thority to administrative agencies."'
15 7
X. THE ICC CASES
The Tenth Circuit decided three unrelated cases in which the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) was the defendant. A fourth case involving
the ICC, Cape Air Freight, Inc. v. United States,S is discussed in PART II.
A. Sterling Colorado Beef Co. v. United States
In Sterling Colorado Beef Co. v. United States, 159 the Tenth Circuit upheld
the district court reversal of an ICC decision to deny damages from railroad
companies to a Colorado meat packer for freight charges to the east coast.
The basis for the claim was a comparison of the rates charged the plaintiff
with those charged other shippers who were situated farther from Chicago
and the east coast. While the ICC found the rate charged the plaintiff to
154. 594 F.2d at 1366.
155. U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
156. 594 F.2d at 1366.
157. Id. at 1367. On delegation of power, see, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346
U.S. 86 (1953); Clarkson Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976); Frank Irey Jr.,
Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3rd Cir. 1975), afd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). Se also K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 2.00-.14 (1976); Fisher, Delegatig Power to the
President, 19 J. PUB. L. 251 (1970).
158. 586 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1978). The Tenth Circuit during its 1978-79 term decided two
cases with the same name, Cape Air Freight, Inc. o. United States. Although the parties were the
same, the issues were different and unrelated.
159. 599 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1979).
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Chicago was unlawful and, therefore, warranted damages, it denied relief for
rates to points east of Chicago, since Sterling did not show proof directed
specifically to those rates. By the time the case reached the Tenth Circuit,
the ICC had changed its position, indicating it agreed with the district court.
The appeal was taken by the railroads.16°
Chief Judge Seth noted that the issue was reduced to an application of a
Supreme Court case, Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sullivan. 161 The Tenth Cir-
cuit agreed with the trial court that the Great Northern decision is a recogni-
tion of the principle that damages cannot be recovered in the absence of
injury. However, in the instant case, there were damages that would justify
recovery, because the plaintiff was charged the same rate as other shippers
who were allowed to send shipments farther distances for the same rates,
injuring Sterling's competitive position.' 62 The court noted that its holding
actually supported the ICC's position, since, by the time the case was heard
on appeal, the Commission had acknowledged that the record at the agency
level supported Sterling's claim.63
B. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc. v. ICC
In Rocky Mountain Motor Tanff Bureau, Inc. v. ICC,'6 the court upheld an
ICC order165 restricting motor common carriers from applying pickup and
delivery charges to certain non-commercial locations, and requiring delivery
notification for shipments to such locations. Petitioners challenged the order
on the ground that the ICC utilized its rulemaking authority in a ratemak-
ing proceeding, rendering the rule invalid. Secondarily, the order's rational
basis was attacked.166
The Commission claimed it had the authority under the Interstate
Commerce Act 167 to investigate industry practices and make rules in the
public interest.' 68 Intervening motor tariff bureaus charged that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act' 69 required an evidentiary hearing because carri-
ers' rates were challenged. They argued that an adjudicatory hearing was
necessary to eliminate a rate already in effect.'
70
The court noted that the APA permits both rulemaking and adjudica-
tory proceedings before the ICC. Rulemaking is concerned with future and
general policies, while adjudicatory proceedings deal with past and present
rights of particular parties. Chief Judge Seth cited United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp. ,171 in which the Supreme Court held that section 556172 of
160. Id at 366.
161. 294 U.S. 458 (1935).
162. 599 F.2d at 367.
163. Id at 368.
164. 590 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1979).
165. Ex Parte No. MC-97, Investigation into actices of Motor Common Camrrs of Property on
Residential and Redtioered Shipments, now codified at 49 C.F.R § 1307.35(d) (1978).
166; 590 F.2d at 868-69.
167. 49 U.S.C. §§ 304(a)(1), (6), (b), and 308(a) (1976).
168. 590 F.2d at 868.
169. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(7) (1976).
170. 590 F.2d at 868.
171. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
172. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (1976).
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the APA demands an evidentiary hearing only when section 553173 triggers
it, which was not the case here. 174 The choice between rulemaking and ad-
judicatory prioceedings is primarily within the agency's discretion, the court
ruled, citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. 175 In the case at hand, the ICC was not
considering the lawfulness of the plaintiff's particular rates, but only consid-
ering generally whether any charges were permissible, 176 so the proceedings
chosen were properand within its authority.'
77
The court applied the substantial evidence rule, finding the agency's
holding clearly based on substantial evidence. The orders were reviewed
under the standard of Allegheny-Ludlum Steel 
78 and affirmed.1 79
C Cape Air Freight, Inc. v. United States
In Cape Air Freight, Inc. v. United States,180 the court affirmed an ICC
interpretation of a freight motor carrier certificate held by the plaintiff.' 8 '
The issue was whether the operations of Cape were within the authority
granted with respect to routes. 18 2 The court settled the question of whether
Cape was authorized radial or nonradial operations, 183 which determined
the area where transportation was authorized. The court upheld ICC cease
and desist orders 184 which indicated Cape had only radial authority.
Cape's argument for nonradial operations hinged on the placement of a
comma in a clause of its certificate that described its territory. The court
was unimpressed. Describing the result of the petitioner's argument as illogi-
cal because it would place a radial grant between two nonradial grants, the
court upheld the plain meaning interpretation of the ICC Review Board.18 5
Cape argued that the decision was inconsistent with past interpretations,
173. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
174. 590 F.2d at 868.
175. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
176. 590 F.2d at 868.
177. Id at 869. For a discussion of APA requirements for agency rulemaking, seeJudtut'a/
Review of thr Fats in Informal RuLkmaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750 (1975).
178. 406 U.S. 742, 749. The standard of review on appeal is: "We do not weigh the evi-
dence introduced before the Commission; we do not inquire into the wisdom of the regulations
that the Commission promulgates, and we inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by which
the Commission reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally sup-
ported."
179. 590 F.2d at 871.
180. 589 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1978).
181. Id at 481.
182. Id at 478.
183. The court distinguished radial from nonradial authority:
Radial authority permits the transportation of freight between points in two or more
geographically described areas but does not permit the transportation of freight be-
tween points located wholly within one of the described areas. This latter transporta-
tion is called cross-haul. For example, a grant of radial authority between points in
state A on the one hand, and, on the other hand, points in states B and C would
permit transportation between states A and B, and between states A and C. It would
not permit transportation between states B and C. A nonradial grant of authority
would permit cross-haul between states B and C. As can readily be seen, nonradial
authority is broader than radial authority.
589 F.2d at 479.
184. Id at 478.
185. Id at 480.
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and was arbitrary. It relied on T1 McCormack Trucking Co. v. United Sates,1 86
in which the absence of a comma determined the limited interpretation of a
phrase in a certificate and a district court held territorial descriptions to be
non-technical. 18 7 The Tenth Circuit designated the words in Cape's certifi-
cate to be words of art and the normal ICC practice.' 8 8
Judge Breitenstein wrote, "An administrative interpretation must be ac-
cepted unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong." Since the
Commission's decision was not "clearly erroneous," the court was required to
accept it. 189
XI. THE OSHA CASES
The Tenth Circuit decided five cases involving violations of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970.'90 Decisions of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) were upheld in
two cases. The Commission was reversed in one case, and upheld in part
and reversed in part in another. The fifth case, involving a warrantless in-
spection to search for OSHA violations,' 9 is discussed in PART IX.
A. H-30, Inc. v. Marshall
In H-30, Inc. v. Marshall,192 the Tenth Circuit, setting aside an OSHRC
order, held that the drilling industry practice of allowing employees to ride
an "elevator" attached to a traveling block used to lift pipe was not a recog-
nized hazard in the industry and therefore did not constitute a "serious vio-
lation"' 193 under the "general duty"'194 clause of the Act.
An OSHA inspector issued H-30, Inc. a citation on the basis that con-
struction crane standards in the building industry were applicable to drilling
rig operations in the oil well industry. 195 The inspector's reasoning was that
machinery used in both industries was mechanically or functionally simi-
lar. '9
Chief Judge Seth found that mere similarity in purpose of certain de-
vices used by two industries did not justify applying one industry's accept-
ance of a hazard to another. The court also based its vacating order on
evidence, substantiated by an administrative law judge's findings, that the
186. 251 F. Supp. 526 (D.N.J. 1966), explained on relnew, 298 F. Supp. 39 (D.N.J. 1969).
187. 251 F. Supp. at 531; 298 F. Supp. at 41.
188. 589 F.2d at 481. The Tenth Circuit found that the "words of art" interpretation had
been upheld, citing Cardinale Trucking Co. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J. 1964);
King Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 551 (D. Kan. 1963); ICC v. Southwest
Freight Lines, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mo. 1949), aJ'd, 184 F.2d 149 (8th Cir. 1950).
189. 589 F.2d at 581.
190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
191. Savina Home Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
192. 597 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1979).
193. A serious violation exists "if there is a substantial probability that death or serious
physical harm could result," provided the employer knew or should have known that the prac-
tice in question was a violation. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1976).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976). The general duty clause is applied to situations in which an
accepted standard in the industry concerned is present. 597 F.2d at 235.




agency did not have a uniform policy regarding such riding practices; in
some areas the practice was not considered hazardous, whereas in others ci-
tations were issued. 197
B. Kent Nowlin Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission
The OSHRC was reversed in part in Kent Nowhn Construction Co. v. Occu-
pational Safety & Health Review Commission,' 98 which dealt with the interpre-
tation of certain OSHA regulations. While overturning the Commission's
order for a minor violation of one regulation, the Circuit affirmed the order
for willful violation of another. 199
The petitioner was laying a sewer line in a cavity it had excavated along
a highway. Excavated materials were stored within two feet of the cavity's
edge. Although a ladder was provided, it was not positioned within a 25-
foot walking distance of all employees in the working areas of the cavity.
2 ° °
The issue raised with regard to the minor citation was whether the cav-
ity was considered an "excavation, ' 20 1 for which the regulations do not re-
quire a ladder, or a "trench," 20 2 for which the regulations require that a
ladder be placed "so as to require no more than 25 feet of lateral travel."
20 3
Basing its holding on the fact that there was disagreement among the
Department of Labor's compliance officers, the administrative law judge,
and OSHRC as to which definition was applicable to the cavity,20 4 the Cir-
cuit reversed the Commission's finding that there had been a serious viola-
tion. The court recognized that deference should be accorded to the
Secretary of Labor's interpretation of his own regulations, 20 5 but, citing
Usug v. Kennecott Copper Corp. ,206 indicated that employers should not have
to guess what is intended by a safety regulation. The court further stated
that a penalty should not be imposed for deviation from a standard "the
interpretation of which cannot be agreed upon by those responsible for com-
pelling compliance with it .... ,,207
The willful violation with which petitioner was charged resulted from
197. Id.
198. 593 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
199. Id. at 369.
200. Id
201. The term excavation is defined as: "Any manmade cavity or depression in the earth's
surface, including its sides, walls, or faces, formed by earth removal and producing unsupported
earth conditions by reasons of the excavation. If installed forms or similar structures reduce the
depth-to-width relationship, an excavation may become a trench." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.653(f)
(1978).
202. The term trench is defined as: "A narrow excavation made below the surface of the
ground. In general, the depth is greater than the width, but the width of a trench is not greater
than 15 feet." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.653(n) (1978).
203. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652 (h) (1978).
204. 593 F.2d at 370.
205. Id at 371. In support of this principle, the court cited Volkswagenwerk v. Fed. Mari-
time Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261 (1968) and Marathon Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 556 F.2d 982 (10th Cir.
1977).
206. 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977).
207. 593 F.2d at 371.
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excavated materials being left within two feet of the excavation's edge. A
rule required that all excavated matter be stored beyond two feet of the edge
of the excavation. 20 8 The plaintiff asserted that its noncompliance was not
willful nor was it a deliberate, knowing, or conscious abuse of the Act.
20 9
The petitioner contended that the two-foot requirement was both unsafe
and impractical, considering the traveled highway which remained open
during the laying of the sewer.
2 10
The court agreed with the Commission that, although the petitioner
acted without malice and demonstrated concern for its employees' safety,
willfulness may be found absent malicious intent, and upheld the Commis-
sion's finding that the petitioner, aware of the requirement, consciously and
deliberately failed to comply, which warranted a willful violation order.2 1 1
In a dissent, Judge Doyle concurred in the court's affirmance of the
Commission's willful violation order, but dissented from the court's reversal
of the non-serious violation.
21 2
C Jensen Construction Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission
In Jensen Construction Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission,21 3 the petitioner had been found guilty of two serious
violations of safety standards. Jensen argued two bases for setting aside
OSHRC's order: 1) the procedural ground that the Secretary of Labor
failed to comply with the requirement that a formal complaint be filed with
the Commission within twenty days of notice of contest, 2 ' 4 and 2) the sub-
stantive ground that the provisions of the safety regulation were too
vague.
2 1 5
Jensen was issued the citations for not providing protective fall equip-
ment to its employees, who were working 17 to 23 feet above an expressway
building an overpass bridge. Jensen's policy was to furnish safety equipment
only for fall distances in excess of 25 feet or under exceptional circumstances.
Jensen contested the citations, and the Secretary failed to file a formal com-
plaint with the Commission until 48 days after the receipt of contest. The
Secretary blamed the delay on a heavy caseload.
2 16
The Circuit held that, absent a showing of actual prejudice, dismissal
was too severe a sanction,2 17 especially where safety hazards were of consid-
erable magnitude. The court, distinguishing Cornell & Co. v. Occupational
208. In excavations which employees may be required to enter, excavated or other material
shall be effectively stored and retained at least 2 feet or more from the edge of the excavation.
29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(i)(1) (1978).




213. 597 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1979).
214. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.33(a) (1978).





Safety & Health Review Commission,2 18 in which a four-month delay caused
considerable prejudice, agreed with the administrative law judge that Jensen
failed to show any harm caused by the 28-day delay.
2 19
With regard to the vagueness question, the petitioner alleged that the
regulation requiring employees to wear appropriate safety equipment 2 20 was
so uncertain that unrestricted discretion was given the agency. 22 ' The court
stated that, since the words "near proximity" were upheld in a regulation
contested in Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commi'ssion,222 the
language in the present regulation should be upheld. Also, applying the lan-
guage in light of the petitioner's conduct, Judge McWilliams stated that,
since no protective equipment of any kind was furnished, the question of
equipment was irrelevant.
22 3
D. Southern Colorado Prestress Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission
The Tenth Circuit in Southern Colorado Prestress Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission,224 again upheld an order of the OSHRC for a
serious violation of a regulation concerning safety nets.
Prestress began with a citation issued by an OSHA inspector who ob-
served one of petitioner's employees working more than 25 feet above the
ground without a safety net below, and without other protective equip-
ment.22 5 Numerous issues were brought on appeal; the two procedural is-
sues involving the propriety of amending the citation and permitting the
testimony of an agency area director were resolved in favor of the govern-
ment. Judge Holloway stated that allowing amendment by the Commission
was not an abuse of discretion because the amended pleading was part of the
occurrence enumerated in the original pleading.22 6 With regard to the al-
lowance of the testimony of the issuing officer, attacked on the grounds of
surprise and bias, the court determined that the Commission's rule prohibit-
ing investigating officers from participating in or advising with respect to
OSHRC reports only barred exparte communication, not testimony in open
hearings.
22 7
Another issue raised was whether safety nets were required when any
non-net protective equipment was available, whether it was used or not. 228
The court held that the Fifth Circuit ruling in Brennan v. Southern Contractors
Sewite229 controlled. In Brennan, the court held, contrary to Commission
precedent, that the OSHA standard required the use of safety nets without
218. 573 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978).
219. 597 F.2d at 248.
220. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) (1978).
221. 597 F.2d at 248.
222. 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
223. 597 F.2d at 249.
224. 586 F.2d 1342 (1978).
225. Id at 1344.
226. Id at 1347 (quoting from FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (1977)).
227. Id at 1349.
228. Id at 1345.
229. 492 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1974).
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regard to the practicality or impracticality of other equipment. 23 0 The
Tenth Circuit adopted this reasoning, stating that only the defenses of "im-
possibility" or "greater hazard" could negate the violation.2 3 1 The defense
of "impossibility" includes both technological and economic infeasibility,
but financial burdensomeness alone is not enough to establish impossibil-
ity.232 The defense of "greater hazard" is maintained by proof that an ex-
isting work practice is safer than compliance with the regulation. 233 The
Commission found that safety nets could be erected by the workers, which,
albeit expensive, would not double the time required to erect the build-
ing.234 The Commission found that the danger to which the employees were
exposed in erecting the nets was slight compared to the hazards of working
with no nets. 235 The Circuit, determining that the agency's fact findings






231. 586 F.2d at 1350.








The Tenth Circuit considered four antitrust appeals during the period
covered by this survey. All four cases reached the court on appeal from de-
fendants' successful motions for summary judgment. Three of the cases are
routine in their application of well-established legal principles and will be
examined briefly in this overview; the final case is of much greater import
and will be discussed at length in the comment that follows.
I. FARNELL V. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLISHING COMPANY
Farnell, a former employee of the publishing company, brought this ac-
tion under the Sherman' and Clayton Acts. 2 He sought recovery of treble
damages for alleged antitrust injuries. The trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. 3 At issue was plain-
tiff's standing to sue. Farnell had been employed as a district manager
whose duties were performed in the company's circulation department. In
addition to his employment, in the capacity of an independent contractor,
he operated several vending machines that sold single copies of the com-
pany's newspaper. The company discontinued its dealings with independent
contractors, and on several occasions requested that Farnell cease his outside
operations. He refused and was eventually terminated for this and other
allegedly insubordinate conduct. Subsequently, he brought this action, al-
leging that his termination and the discontinuation of his single-copy sales
activities were the result of antitrust violations by his former employer.
4
Affirming the summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit applied a two-
pronged test to determine whether plaintiff had standing to sue. The court
found that the first requirement was met, in that plaintiff was injured in his
business or property. However, the court found that he failed to meet the
second requirement, in that he could show no connection between his al-
leged injuries and any violation of the antitrust laws. 5
II. FITZGERALD V. GENERAL DAIRIES, INC.
In Fitzgerald, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's granting of
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 6 At issue was whether the stat-
ute of limitations had run on the incidents and events providing the basis for
the action. Viewing the matter as a small series of isolated events, the dis-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 15 (1976).
3. Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978).
4. Id. at 500.
5. Id. at 501.
6. Fitzgerald v. General Dairies, Inc., 590 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1979).
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trict court found that the statute had run, and plaintiff was barred from
recovery.
However, because the plaintiff had alleged a continuing conspiracy, the
Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the matter for trial.7 Quite properly,
the court recognized that prevention of reentry into the market is evidence of
a continuing comspiracy. 8 Plaintiff had been a competitor of the defendants
until he was forced to file for bankruptcy. He claimed that were it not for
the defendants' conspiracy to keep him out, he might have reentered the mar-
ket. The court found that plaintiff had raised sufficient issues to justify the
granting of a trial.
III. NATRONA SERVICE, INC. V. CONTINENTAL OIL Co.
Plaintiff, Natrona Service, appealed the granting of summary judgment
to defendants, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff had
failed to show, after extensive discovery proceedings, that any valid cause of
action existed.9
It is interesting to note that plaintiff, an oil exploration service, had
enjoyed a market position amounting to a monopoly for many years. This is
evidenced by the fact that it was able to raise its prices twenty-five per cent
without losing a customer.' 0 The court noted that Natrona was really seek-
ing damages for profits it would have made had it not lost its monopoly on
the claim staking and validation business in Wyoming. As the court suc-
cinctly stated, "Anti-trust laws have been enacted for the protection and
preservation of competition, not for the protection of competitors."'I
IV. A JURISDICTIONAL BARRIER TO TIlE PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIOm
MAC ADJUSTMENT, INC. v. GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
INC.
A. Introduction
Because the boycott, a concerted refusal by some traders to deal with
other traders,12 is a particularly malignant form of antitrust injury, the law
has created a series of exceptions which enable the courts to deal swiftly and
effectively with the problem. Mac Adjustment, Inc. o. Gentral Adjustment Bureau,
Inc. 1 3 clearly illustrates the problems created when a court fails to recognize
the exceptions and attempts to apply the general law of antitrust to a specific
problem.
Mac, an independent insurance adjusting service, and its owner were
allegedly put out of business as a direct result of defendant's actions. Acting
in concert, the defendants apparently were successful in their attempts to
persuade Mac's clients to use another adjuster. Defendants purportedly rep-
7. Id. at 876.
8. Id.
9. Natrona Service, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 598 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1979).
10. Id.
It. Id. at 1297-98.
12. Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
13. 597 F.2d 1318 (10th Cir. 1979).
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resented that Mac was too generous in adjusting claims. After his business
had dwindled to almost nothing, Mac brought this action.
Both the trial court and the Tenth Circuit failed to recognize that the
private plaintiff who is injured by a boycott is not required to show that he is
engaged in interstate commerce, or that such commerce has in fact been
substantially affected by the alleged injury.14 The Tenth Circuit's decision
was further complicated by the court's attempt to reconcile its finding that
Mac was not within the "business of insurance" as it is defined by the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act 15 with its conception of the requirements of the Sher-
man Act.
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for further de-
termination of whether Mac was carrying on business in interstate com-
merce. 16 Before the matter reached trial, defendants petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari.
B. The Background
1. The Sherman Act
The private plaintiff who sought redress under the Sherman Act' 7 had
first to prove a resulting public injury in order to establish the court's juris-
diction in the matter. In 1911, the Supreme Court voiced the requirement
that the proscribed acts must be of "such a character as to give rise to the
inference or presumption that they had been entered into or done with the
intent to do wrong to the general public.""' The effect of this requirement
was to preclude recovery by small businesses because their injuries could not
be sufficiently large so as to affect the economy, despite the magnitude of the
effect on the business itself.
Standard Ol119 also established the "rule of reason" as the standard the
Court would use exclusively for the next seventeen years in antitrust litiga-
tion. Under this rule, if an arrangement such as price-fixing was reasonable,
the Court would find no antitrust violation.
The doctrine of per se illegality was first used in United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co. ,20 to declare illegal a price-fixing arrangement, despite its "rea-
sonableness." Under this doctrine, certain restraints would be held illegal in
themselves, regardless of whether the complainant could show a resulting
public injury.
The group boycott was held to be per se illegal in Klor's v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc.21 Klor's was a small retail appliance store, one of many such
14. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20 § 2, 59 Stat.
34).
16. 597 F.2d at 1323.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
18. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
19. Id. at 62.
20. 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927).
21. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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dealers in the San Francisco area. Defendant Broadway-Hale, a large de-
partment store chain, operated a store next door to that of Klor's. Both
stores competed in the sale of household appliances.
Klor's alleged that, in an attempt to handicap its ability to effectively
compete, defendant Broadway-Hale and ten appliance manufacturers and
distributors who were also named as defendants, conspired among them-
selves to ensure that the manufacturers and distributors would either refuse
to sell to Klor's, or to sell to it only at discriminatory prices and unfavorable
terms.2 2 Broadway-Hale was able to use its "monopolistic buying power" to
bring about this result, 23 and at the time Klor's brought suit this had already
resulted in "a great loss of profits, goodwill, reputation and prestige."
'24
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the dispute was nothing more
than a "purely private quarrel" 25 which failed to amount to a public wrong
proscribed by the Sherman Act.
In reversing, the Supreme Court emphasized that a boycott "is not to be
tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so
small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.
'"26
Klor's business was entirely intrastate in character. The Supreme Court
determined that because the manufacturing, distributing and selling of
household appliances was within interstate commerce, Klor's had estab-
lished the requisite jurisdiction. Under these guidelines, Mac would appear
to be able to satisfy the interstate commerce requirements of the Sherman
Act.
The basic premise of Klor's has been applied by the Supreme Court in a
situation where the complainant's business is almost entirely intrastate,
27
which is analogous to the Mac situation. And, the Supreme Court recently
relied on Klor's in a decision 28 involving the boycott exception to the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act.
29
Regardless of whether Mac was found to be within the business of insur-
ance, reliance by the Tenth Circuit on Klor's would have produced the cor-
rect solution to the enigma that the Mac case creates. The Tenth Circuit, by
equating involvement in interstate commerce with the business of insurance,
precluded Mac's recovery unless it could prove that it was indeed engaged in
interstate commerce. This holding therefore compels further examination of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as well as resulting case law.
2. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, the question as to whether
22. Id. at 209.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 210.
26. Id. at 213.
27. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
28. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976).
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the sale of insurance was a transaction in interstate commerce was already
well-settled. In fact, the Supreme Court, on four previous occasions,30 had
held such sales not to constitute commerce at all. It was not until 1943 that
the Court reversed this position, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association.3t
The Association, which had a membership of nearly two hundred fire
insurance companies and twenty-seven individuals, was charged with price
fixing under section 1 and monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 32 The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the dis-
trict court, which had sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground
that the business of insurance was not commerce, either interstate or intra-
state.
33
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was in-
tended to apply to the fire insurance business. 34 In the future, the business
of insurance would be considered interstate commerce.
Within nine months of the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, Congress
enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.3 5 The Act provided that the regula-
tion and taxation of the insurance industry would be left to the states, but
that federal antitrust legislation 36 would apply to the extent that state legis-
lation did not.37 However, an exception was made for acts or agreements of
boycott, coercion or intimidation.38 In these areas alone, the Sherman Act
would continue to apply.
More than twenty years elapsed before the Supreme Court began to
narrow the sweeping language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In SEC v.
National Securities, Inc. ,39 an injunction was sought to invalidate and unwind
a merger of insurance companies.
The Arizona insurance commissioner, believing he possessed the requi-
site regulatory authority, approved the merger. Despite the fact that an Ari-
zona statute conferred upon the commissioner the authority to approve or
disapprove mergers, the Court held that the "business of insurance" did not
include the power to investigate and regulate mergers. 4° The Court stated
that the purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to return to the states
the status quo enjoyed by them prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters deci-
sion. As the states never possessed the authority to regulate mergers, they
did not obtain it under the Act.
4 '
30. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. N.Y., 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 410 (1870); Liverpool & London Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870);
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
31. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
33. 322 U.S. at 536.
34. Id. at 539.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, §§ 1-
5).
36. Id. at § 1012(b).
37. Id.
38. Id. at § 1013(b).
39. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
40. Id. at 469.
41. Id. at 459.
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In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that the Securities and
Exchange Commission had the authority to regulate securities issues involv-
ing insurance companies, for such matters were not part of the insurance
business. The Court went further and itemized the matters properly within
the "business of insurance." The list included the fixing of rates, the selling
and advertising of policies, and the licensing of companies and their
agents.4 2 Also included was the relationship between the insurer and the
insured, the type of policy that could be issued, and its reliability, interpreta-
tion and enforcement.
43
The power of the states to regulate the relationship between insurer and
insured, as set forth in National SecuritiS 4 4 was significantly eroded in St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry.4 5 Plaintiffs, a group of physicians,
brought a class action under section 1 of the Sherman Act 46 alleging a boy-
cott by four insurance companies. They claimed that three of the companies
refused to sell them malpractice insurance, so as to compel them to submit to
"new ground rules of coverage set by the fourth."'4 7
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss,4 8 holding that
the boycott exemption to the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not include the
insurer-insured relationship. The First Circuit reversed,49 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, in order to resolve the conflicting interpretations of
section 3(b) of the Act that had been adopted by several circuits. 50
The Court held that the scope of section 3(b) was not limited to boy-
cotts of competing insurance companies or agents, but included any act
amounting to a boycott, including a boycott by insurance companies against
their insureds.
5 1
In view of the Court's extension of the boycott to include any such
act,52 it becomes apparent that Mac, an adjuster, would also be protected by
section 3(b), had he been found to be within the business of insurance.
C. The Case: Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.
1. Facts
This antitrust action was brought in the district court by Mac Adjust-
ment, Inc., and B. J. Gosting, its president.53 Plaintiffs alleged that defend-
ants, General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. and Property Loss Research Bureau,
acted in concert to induce insurance companies not to use Mac's independ-
42. Id. at 460.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
46. Id. at 533.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 536.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 536 n. 5.
51. Id. at 554.
52. Id. at 550.
53. 597 F.2d at 1320, Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., No. CIV-
76-0848-E, mem. op. at 2 n. I (W.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 1977).
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ent adjusting service. 54 Defendants were further alleged to have accom-
plished this by falsely representing that Mac was too generous in adjusting
losses. 55 Shortly after defendants made the allegedly false statements, plain-
tiff's business began to decline. This decline continued for about three years,
until the business was almost totally destroyed.
56
Mac and Gosting thereafter brought suit, claiming that they had been
injured as a result of a conspiracy, a section 1 Sherman Act violation. 57 Fol-
lowing an th imine hearing conducted solely for the purpose of eliciting evi-
dence of Mac's engagement in interstate commerce, 58 the district court
decided that it did not have jurisdiction in the matter. The decision was
reached because the court found that interstate commerce had not been sub-
stantially affected.
The trial court's holding that it did not have the requisite jurisdiction
because the acts that injured Mac did not have an effect on interstate com-
merce was appealed; however, its companion holding that these acts were
not in the business of insurance was not.
59
The Tenth Circuit subsequently held that as a consequence of the dis-
trict court holding that plaintiffs were not in the business of insurance, they
would now be required to establish that they were, a conclusion apparently
based on the court's misperception of the holding in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters,60 and of the district court holding itself, for the district
court did not hold that Mac was not engaged in interstate commerce.
The judgment of the district court was properly reversed, but the case
was remanded for the wrong reason-so that plaintiffs could prove at trial
that they were indeed engaged in interstate commerce. 6 1 Subsequently, de-
fendants petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.
6 2
2. Analysis
The progress of this case through the courts may almost be likened to a
comedy of errors. The first error was that of the trial court, in its granting of
summary judgment. As Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, indi-
cated, ". . . summary judgment is appropriate if. . .there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact. . "63 In addition, the Supreme Court's cau-
tion that summary judgment should be rarely granted in antitrust matters64
54. Id. at 1319.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1 declares illegal: "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states .... "
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), establishes a private treble damage action
for conduct proscribed by antitrust statutes.
58. 597 F.2d at 1318.
59. Id. at 1321.
60. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Court held that the sale of fire insurance policies was a
transaction within interstate commerce.
61. 597 F.2d at 1322.
62. Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cases
62,599 (petition for certiorari, U.S. S. Ct. No. 79-311).
63. 597 F.2d at 1322.
64. Id.; Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1961).
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was properly applied by the Tenth Circuit in Mac. Thus, the district court
erred in holding that the injuries complained of had no impact on interstate
commerce. This contention should have been considered after trial, not fol-
lowing a limited pretrial hearing. Yet, the trial court was correct in looking
at the impact of defendants' activities on interstate commerce rather than
Mac's engagement therein.
65
It is more difficult to ascertain the propriety of the district court's find-
ing that the activities of defendants were not in the "business of insurance"
as defined by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In view of the recent strictures
placed on this definition by the Supreme Court,66 this holding is probably
correct.
The problem with the decision was created not by the district court, but
by the Tenth Circuit because of its interpretation of the district court's hold-
ing. After determining that the district court had found Mac not to be
within the business of insurance,6 7 the Tenth Circuit held that it was now
necessary for Mac to show that it was, in order to satisfy the interstate com-
merce requirements of the Sherman Act.68
Inasmuch as there is ample precedent 69 to justify a holding that the
injured party in a boycott action need not prove his engagement in interstate
commerce, based on the doctrine of per se illegality, which allows the pre-
sumption of public injury, the Tenth Circuit created an unnecessary burden
for plaintiffs by equating the business of insurance with interstate commerce.
In view of the fact that Mac's activities were found not to be within the
business of insurance, the court could have proceeded directly to Klor's and
Radiant Burners, and considered the vital issue of the illegality of defendant's
actions.
Of course, had Mac been found to be in the business of insurance, re-
covery under the Sherman Act would not have been precluded, in view of
the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 70 However, the
Tenth Circuit appears to have placed Mac in a losing position, despite
whatever finding the district court might reach on remand.
Notwithstanding the fact that the case was remanded on such narrow
and faulty grounds that defendants were almost certain to prevail, 7' defend-
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1945).
66. Stgmeral'y Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) in
which the Court held that agreements between insurors and pharmacies were not within the
business of insurance. The Court further held that references to the meaning of the "business of
insurance" in the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act strongly suggest that Con-
gress understood the business of insurance to be the underwring and spreading of risk. See also
Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 440 U.S. 942 (1979) in which the D.C. Circuit's
holding that agreements between automobile casualty insurors and automobile repair shops
were within the business of insurance was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for
further consideration in the light of Group Lift.
67. 597 F.2d at 1321.
68. Id. at 1321-22.
69. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
70. 15 U.S.C. §.1013(b) (1976).
71. 597 F.2d at 1321-22.
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ants petitioned for certiorari on August 27, 1979.72 Perhaps they are at-
tempting to postpone the day when plaintiffs or the court will discover that
Klor's is directly on point.
Both plaintiffs and defendants in their briefs appear to have avoided the
real issue in this case. In their petition for certiorari defendants questioned
the propriety of the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court.
Their main question, however, asked "[w]hether the plaintiff in a Sherman
antitrust case must show, in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment
which challenges only the jurisdictional predicate of plaintiff's action, the
existence of a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to warrant the exer-
cise of federal jurisdiction." 73 Plaintiff, in its response, asked the Court to
deny certiorari because in its view the decision of the Tenth Circuit was
proper.
74
It is noteworthy that plaintiff apparently was not concerned with the
limited question to be decided on remand. Nor did plaintiff raise the ques-
tion of the applicability of the doctrine of per se illegality to the instant case.
Because the request for certiorari was based upon such a narrow issue, it
would appear that no question of sufficient import has been raised which
would justify its being granted. If so, the practitioner in the Tenth Circuit
may have to wait a bit longer for the day when the Circuit's conception of
the juridictional requirements for the plaintiff injured by a per se Sherman
Act violation is subject to question.
D. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Mac places a hurdle in the path of the
private plaintiff who is injured by a violation of the antitrust statutes at a
time when the general trend is to eliminate such restraints. In GulfOil Corp.
v. Copp Pav'ng Co., 75 the Supreme Court held that the private plaintiff who
brings an action under the Sherman Act need not himself be "within the
flow of interstate commerce,' 76 while the plaintiff who brings his action
under the Clayton Act 77 or the Robinson-Patman Act 78 must be. 79 Inas-
much as Mac alleged a Sherman Act violation, the Supreme Court's holding
in Copp would appear to relieve it of the burden of showing that it is engaged
in interstate commerce.
The Court in Copp further held that for the private plaintiff to sustain
his burden of proof he had to show that the effect on interstate commerce
was both substantial and adverse.8° However, in Hospital Building Co. v.
72. Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cases
62,599 (petition for certiorari, U.S. S. Ct. No. 79-311).
73. Brief for petitioners at 2.
74. Brief for respondents at 7.
75. 419 U.S. 187 (1974).
76. Id. at 195.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1976).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).




Trustees of Rex Hospa'al,8 1 the Court undertook to define these terms, with the
result of significantly relaxing the requirements for the plaintiff. Thus, a
substantial effect on interstate commerce was found, although plaintiff could
not show any effect on market prices. The required nexus with interstate
commerce was satisfied because plaintiff hospital bought supplies from out of
state distributors, received some patients from other states, obtained reve-
nues from other states, financed its expansion by borrowing from out of state
lenders, possessed an out of state parent company, and most important for
the purpose of this comment, received revenues from out of state insurance
companies.8 2 If similar guidelines had been applied in Mac, the necessary
effect on interstate commerce should not have been difficult to establish.
The Tenth Circuit included both Copp and Rex Hospital in its opinion in
Mac, and correctly recognized that they were useful indicators of "what is
necessary in order to satisfy the commerce requirement of the Sherman
Act"'8 3 but failed to distinguish between a private plaintiff's being engaged in
interstate commerce and his injury having a substantial efect on such com-
merce. Because Mac could not meet the first requirement, but would have
an excellent chance of meeting the second, the Tenth Circuit, by using Copp
and Rex Hospital in the wrong context severely limited Mac's chances of
eventual recovery.
Further evidence of the current trend toward reducing jurisdictional re-
quirements for the private antitrust plaintiff can be detected in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,8 4 where plaintiffs were a married couple who purchased a
home. They brought an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act8 5 alleg-
ing that the minimum fee schedule of the Bar violated the Act. The essence
of the charge was that the Bar was engaged in price fixing, a Sherman Act
violation that, like the boycott, is per se illegal. Plaintiffs' engagement in
interstate commerce was properly never at issue.
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barrg,8 6 plaintiffs, a group of
physicians, sued four insurance companies who boycotted them by attempt-
ing to compel them to purchase a new type of coverage offered by one of the
companies. Based on the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act,8 7 the plaintiffs prevailed. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, never
referred to plaintiffs' engagement in interstate commerce.
Had the Tenth Circuit followed the current trend in this area, the ques-
tion of Mac's engagement in interstate commerce would not have been
raised. The McCarran-Ferguson Act boycott exception88 apparently was
the red herring in the Mac case, and it drew the court's attention from the
real issue: whether a full trial was required in order to give Mac the neces-
sary opportunity to show that defendants' acts met the Sherman Act require-
81. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
82. Id. at 741.
83. 597 F.2d at 1322.
84. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
86. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).




ments, i.e., that they were a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade,8 9 and that their effect was to monopolize or attempt to monopolize
any part of interstate commerce.
9 °
Relying on this language, the Supreme Court in Klor's9 ' found that the
business of the defendants, 1'e., the "business of manufacturing, distributing
and selling household applainces" 9 2 was in interstate commerce and pro-
vided a sufficient nexus with that commerce so as to permit Klor's to recover.
The effect of Klor's, where the Court declared the boycott to be per se
illegal, was to dispense with the requirement that plaintiff prove public in-
jury. Because of the seriousness of the violation, public injury would be pre-
sumed. All the plaintiff in a boycott case had to show was some relationship
with interstate commerce.
The idea, enunciated first in Klor's, that the victim of a boycott need
not himself be engaged in interstate commerce, should have been applied
with equal force to Mac. Had Klor's never been decided, the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Mac would have been correct, but in the light of Klor's and the
cases following it, it appears that the Tenth Circuit should reevaluate its
position.
The effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Mac is to preclude recovery
for antitrust injury when the plaintiff's business is essentially local in nature,
and where the volume of business is small. A careful analysis of the econom-
ics of the holding leads inescapably to the conclusion that it is this very type
of plaintiff who is most in need of the protection of the antitrust laws.
Justice Jackson, in outlining the proper role of the court in antitrust
matters in International Salt Co. v. United States93 observed: "Under the law,
agreements are forbidden which 'tend to create a monopoly,' and it is imma-
terial that the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at
full gallop; nor does the law await arrival at the goal before condemning the
direction of the movement."
'94
The approach postulated by Justice Jackson was utilized by the
Supreme Court in Klor's, and it is relied on by courts today as the accepted
view. Had the Tenth Circuit accepted this approach, and relied on the prin-
ciple of per se illegality, as it was applied to the boycott in Klor's, the results
in Mac should have been different.
It is possible that, on remand, the required nexus with interstate com-
merce still could not have been established. While remand for the correct
reason still would not have assured a victory for the plaintiff, certainly the
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
91. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
92. Id. at 209.
93. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
94. Id. at 396.
1980]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
burden on Mac and the future private plaintiff who brings his case in the
Tenth Circuit's domain would have been a lighter one.
Petition for certiorari was denied on October 29, 1979. 95
Pamela E Schenkein




During the period covered by this Survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals selected for publication several bankruptcy decisions and a few deci-
sions in the other areas of commercial law, such as secured transactions and
consumer credit. A discussion of the bankruptcy cases provides the bulk of
this section. Because practitioners now have to contend with a new bank-
ruptcy code' effective for actions filed on or after October 1, 1979, references
will be made to provisions of the new Act whenever possible.
Perhaps the most noteworthy event for the Tenth Circuit in the area of
bankruptcy law was the functional overruling of an earlier opinion, Ra/y V.
Nicholas (In re Nicholas),2 by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v.
Felsen.3 Nicholas held that, under the principle of res judicata, a creditor
would not be permitted to "go behind" the record and judgment of a state
court and present extrinsic evidence to the bankruptcy judge in an attempt
to show that the debt underlying the state court judgment was based upon
fraud. 4 Nicholas was followed in Brown . Felsen (In re Felsen),5 an unpub-
lished Tenth Circuit opinion, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict between Niholas and subsequent opinions in other cir-
cuits. 6 The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata was inap-
plicable and that the bankruptcy court may look beyond the state court
record and judgment in making its determination of dischargeability. 7 This
conclusion is warranted, according to the Court, by the 1970 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act which clearly made the adjudication of dischargeability
a federal matter; the language of these amendments is inconsistent with an
application of the policy of res judicata.8 In the first opinion to be discussed
herein, Wilke v. Winters (In re Winters),9 the court of appeals distinguished
Nicholas.
1. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West Sp. Pamph. 1979).
2. 510 F.2d 160 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
3. 99 S. Ct. 2205 (1979).
4. 510 F.2d at 163.
5. No. 77-2035 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 1978) (Not for Routine Publication).
6. Four other circuits, in post-Nicholar decisions, had allowed the bankruptcy judge to "go
behind" a state court judgment and look at extrinsic evidence in making a determination of
dischargeability. See Bailey v. Wright, 584 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978); In re McMillan, 579 F.2d
289 (3d Cir. 1978); Houtman v. Mann, 568 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1978); and Hovermale v. Pigge,
539 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1976).
7. Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. at 2213.
8. Id. at 2211-12.
9. 586 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1978).
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I. BANKRUPTCY
A. Exceptzon to Dicharge
1. Fraud
In Wilke v. Winters (In re Winters), 10 the debtors appealed from a district
court order directing that, upon remand, the bankruptcy judge conduct a
hearing to determine the dischargeability of a debt upon which a judgment
for fraud was obtained in the absence of the debtors and their counsel. The
debtors' attorney had received permission to withdraw the day before trial
because his clients had not been in contact with him and had, in fact, moved
without providing him with a forwarding address. The bankruptcy court
had originally declared this judgment void for lack of due process; the credi-
tor appealed and the district court reversed on this issue, but held that the
judgment for fraud was not dispositive as to the dischargeability of the un-
derlying debt." l On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court of appeals af-
firmed. The debtors argued unsuccessfully that permitting the creditor to
present evidence regarding the fraudulent nature of the actions for which
judgment was awarded disregarded the holding of an earlier Tenth Circuit
opinion, Raly v. Nicholas (In re Niholas).12 The court of appeals dis-
tinguished Nicholas' 3 as a case in which the original judgment was not for
fraud, and hence, the creditor was not allowed to "go behind" the state court
judgment; however, in the instant case the judgment was based upon fraud.
Addressing itself at length to the judgment declared void by the bank-
ruptcy court, the court of appeals looked to two Colorado' 4 cases: Dalton v.
People' 5 and Thompson v. McCormick.' 6 In Dalton, the defendant was una-
ware, innocently, that his attorney had been permitted to withdraw. In
Thompson, the defendant had discharged his attorney and was totally unin-
formed since notice was served on the former counsel. It appears that the
court of appeals distinguished these cases from the instant one on the culpa-
bility issue: because the Winters had not kept their attorney informed as to
their whereabouts, they were responsible for the judgment entered against
them. The court relied upon the reasoning in Sunshine o. Robinson, in which a
judgment was obtained after counsel was allowed to withdraw immediately
10. Id.
11. The power of the bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of a debt is found
in I 1 U.S.C. § 35(c)(3) (1976) (added by Act of October 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 5-7, 84
Stat. 992). There is no such provision in the revised act; it was removed as unnecessary "in view
of the comprehensive grant of jurisdiction prescribed in . . . [28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)], which is
adequate to cover the full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy courts have today over dis-
chargeability and related issues under Bankruptcy Act § 17c." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 77, reprntted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5863.
12. 510 F.2d 160 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
13. NiMcholas, of course, may no longer be valid in light of Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. 2205
(1979). After Brown, a creditor may be allowed to allege and prove fraud regardless of the basis
for the state court judgment.
14. The fraud action originated in Weld County district court and the parties stipulated
that Colorado law governed. 586 F.2d at 1365.
15. 146 Colo. 15, 360 P.2d 113 (1961).
16. 138 Colo. 434, 335 P.2d 265 (1959).
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prior to trial, 7 and upheld the district court's judgment against Winters.
2. Willful and Malicious Conversion
The issue presented in Bank of Meeker v. McGinn's* (In re McGitnn's) 18 was
whether the sale of cattle in violation of a security agreement constituted a
willful and malicious conversion-thereby rendering the underlying debt an
exception to discharge in bankruptcy 19 -in view of the bank's "knowledgea-
ble acquiesence" 20 in the bankrupt's cattle trading and the bank's "failure to
take reasonable steps to protect its collateral .... ,,2" In affirming the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the court of appeals, per
Judge McKay, held that the conduct of the creditor bank defeated its
claims.
The security agreement between McGinnis and the bank forbade the
sale of the cattle without the written consent of bank; however, the testimony
before the bankruptcy court revealed the common understanding that the
collateral could be sold if the proceeds were used to reduce the loan balance.
In its testimony the bank denied knowledge of the bankrupt's cattle trading;
but the district court found, and the court of appeals agreed, that there was
sufficient evidence, such as deposits into McGinnis' account and increases in
the size of his herd, for the bank to be held to that knowledge. Relying upon
Bennett v. W. T Grant,22 the court of appeals concluded that the equity princi-
ples under which the bankruptcy court operates dictate that an exception to
discharge is unwarranted for a creditor in the position of the Bank of
Meeker.
The court summarily rejected the bank's contention that any unautho-
rized sale of collateral is per se a willful and malicious conversion. 23 Davis v.
Aetna Acceptance Co. 24 articulated the standard to which the court of appeals
17. 168 Colo. 409, 451 P.2d 757 (1969). Counsel withdrew because his clients were in
prison and he alleged an agreement whereby he was not to represent them at trial.
18. 586 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1978).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976). The revised Bankruptcy Act contains basically the same
provision. Any debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity" is excepted from discharge. II U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6) (West Sp.
Pamph. 1979). See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, repntied in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865.
20. 586 F.2d at 165.
21. Id.
22. 481 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In this case, there was a conditional sales
contract on some appliances, title to which remained in W.T. Grant. Bennett traded in the
appliances on a mobile home, after Grant refused to repossess them. The court, after noting
that the evidence showed this to be a willful and malicious conversion, stated that if the creditor
had known of the conversion and failed to act, the underlying debt should be discharged in
bankruptcy. Two recent cases concerning creditor conduct are In re Jantz, 2 BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 67,160 (W.D. Okla. June 15, 1979) (bank could not claim a willful and malicious
conversion because it had in the past permitted the use of the accounts receivable, in which it
had a security interest, for the payment of ongoing obligations) and In re Gawne, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 66, 535 (W.D. Wis. July 20, 1977) (a creditor who
had granted to the debtor the right to sell collateral without accountability could not claim a
willful and malicious conversion).
23. Creditors, of course, have argued for this rule before. See, e.g., In re Cote, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 66,349 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1977).
24. 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
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adhered: "[a] willful and malicious injury does not follow as of course from
every act of conversion, without reference to the circumstances .... There
may be an honest, but mistaken belief, engendered by a course of dealing,
that powers have been enlarged or incapacities removed."
2 5
B. Subordination of Claimis-Majority Shareholder
In Sinclair v. Barr (In re Mid- Town Produce Temtnal),26 the court of ap-
peals was asked to decide whether, under the equitable powers of the bank-
ruptcy court,2 7 a secured claim based upon an advance made to a failing
corporation and used to pay other secured creditors could be subordinated
merely because the advance was made by a dominant shareholder. The
bankruptcy court had disallowed the claim in its entirety; the district court
reversed on the disallowance issue, but subordinated the claim and denied
the security interest. The court of appeals, per Judge Logan, reversed and
remanded, holding that it would be contrary to sound business and social
policy not to permit a controlling shareholder to advance sums to a corpora-
tion and become a legitimate secured creditor absent, of course, evidence
that the loan was really a contribution to capital or that the transaction was
of such character as to invalidate the lien.
G. Sinclair, his wife, and their son, R. Sinclair, owned all the stock of
Mid-Town Produce in February 1975 when G. Sinclair deposited $20,000
into his son's personal account. R. Sinclair, in turn, paid the money to Mid-
Town so that the company's secured creditors could receive partial repay-
ment. A security agreement was executed, giving G. Sinclair a security in-
terest in Mid-Town's accounts receivable; this agreement was signed by R.
Sinclair as president, even though he did not become president until June
1975, at which time all the stock was transferred to him. G. Sinclair signed
the agreement in August 1975 and it was filed several days later. In Decem-
ber 1975, Mid-Town's bankruptcy proceedings began.
28
The threshold question, as the court of appeals saw it, was whether the
advance was a loan or a contribution to capital.29 Since facts relevant to this
inquiry were not available to the court on appeal, the case was remanded for
this determination. 30 However, the court went on to discuss, in terms of
subordination, the consequences if the advance were found to be debt rather
25. Id. at 332.
26. 599 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1979).
27. The courts have evolved the principles of equitable subordination by bankruptcy
judges. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295 (1939). It was the intent of the framers of the revised Bankruptcy Act to codify
this case law. See generall, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY 510.04 (15th ed. 1979). The revised
act reads in relevant part: "[Tihe court may-(1) under principles of equitable subordination,
subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another
claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest .... 11
U.S.C.A. § 510(c) (West Sp. Pamph. 1979).
28. 599 F.2d at 391.
29. 599 F.2d at 393.
30. The court said that two factors, inter ah'a, should be considered: the interest rate on the
loan and the repayment schedule. 599 F.2d at 393-94. The facts as presented by the Tenth
Circuit do not indicate whether undercapitalization is a problem. However, in the opinion, two
cases relied upon by the district court are distinguished from the instant case because they dealt
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than contribution to capital. In its discussion,3 ' the court appeared to ignore
the secured nature of the claim3 2 and focused upon the powers of the bank-
ruptcy court in utilizing the equitable subordination doctrine to postpone
payment of some creditors' claims. The court should have made clear in its
opinion that, in bankruptcy proceedings, security interests are invalidated, if
at all, if they were created in violation of the pertinent bankruptcy provi-
sions33 and not because of the exercise of the equitable subordination powers
of the bankruptcy court.
3 4
C. Chapter X-Notice to Creditors
In March of 1974, Gulf South Corporation and its subsidiaries, one of
which was Gulf South Advisors, Ltd. (GSA), filed a petition seeking reorgan-
ization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.35 May 31, 1974 was set as
the date after which creditors' claims would be barred if filed. The Kays,
who were owners of Gulf South Mortgage Investors (GSMI), of which GSA
was advisor, were not scheduled as creditors of GSA and hence were not
notified. Publication did appear in the Wall Street Journal and other newspa-
pers. In February of 1975, the Kays filed a plenary action alleging lob-5
violations by GSA and seeking damages. The lawsuit was stayed. Two
months later, the trustee, via his attorney, told the Kays to apply for permis-
sion to file a late claim. More than one year later the Kays filed this applica-
tion, which was turned down in November 1976 by the reorganization court.
At this time, the reorganization plan had not yet been filed.
On appeal from this rejection, the Kays argued, first, that they should
have been notified because they were GSMI owners and, second, that they
were entitled to receive actual notice of the reorganization and its develop-
ments once the trustee knew of their claim.
In Kay v. Hogan (In re Gulico Investment Corp. ),36 the court of appeals, per
Judge Doyle, rejected these arguments and said that notice to "all owners of
all the affiliated entities when the existence of their claims is unknown"37 is
with gross undercapitalization, Braddy v. Randolph, 352 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1965) and In re
Sterling House, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1973).
31. 599 F.2d at 393-94.
32. All of the opinions cited by the Sizdair court deal with the unsecured claims of major-
ity shareholders. E.g., Frasher v. Robinson, 458 F.2d 492 (10th Cir.), cert. dnid, 409 U.S. 1009
(1972); Spach v. Bryant, 309 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962); and Forbush v. Bartley, 78 F.2d 805 (5th
Cir. 1935).
33. A security interest will be invalidated if there is a violation of the Bankruptcy Act
preference provision, I I U.S.C. § 96 (1976), or the fraudulent transfer provision, I I U.S.C.
§ 107(l)(1) (1976).
34. This opinion appears to be a portent of the possible resolution of similar cases arising
under the equitable subordination provisions of the new Bankruptcy Act. Secured creditors
may become subject, due to creditor misconduct, to an application of the doctrine of equitable
subordination.
The new Act provides that the court may "order that any lien securing such a subordinated
claim be transferred to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(2) (West Sp. Pamph. 1979).
35. 1I U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976). In the revised Bankruptcy Act, the formerly separate
reorganization chapters are consolidated into one. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1174 (West Sp. Pamph.
1979).
36. 593 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1979).
37. 593 F.2d at 935.
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not necessary and that since the Kays were aware of the reorganization pro-
ceedings, they were obligated to pursue their claim. The court then distin-
guished three of the opinions relied upon by the frustrated creditors, City of
New York v. New York, N.H & HR. Co., 3 8 In re Intaco Puerto Rico, Inc.,39 and
"Harbor Tank Storage Co. 40 as cases in which the trustee failed to provide no-
tice after he became aware of a creditor's "unsatisfied meritorious claims."
'4 1
In the instant case, the trustee told the Kays that they should file a request
for permission to file a late claim; this was the Kays' notice, which they failed
to heed. The court was reluctant, on equitable grounds, to allow an exten-
sion to persons who had already delayed for two years without a sound rea-
son.
4 2
D. Chapter XAI-Opposition to Arrangement
In Gardens of Cortez v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. (In re Gardens of
Cortez),43 the court of appeals held that a bankruptcy judge may dismiss a
petition for a real property arrangement under Chapter XII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act-without giving the debtor an opportunity to present an alter-
native plan-if the debtor had already submitted one plan that was
unanimously rejected, and by the time of the hearing, the debtor had settled
his claims with the unsecured creditors, thereby leaving only one class of
creditors consisting of two secured parties, one of whom held 90% of the
secured indebtedness and who was unalterably opposed to any plan.
Relying upon two Ninth Circuit cases45 that held that dismissal is
proper if there are no classes assenting to a proposed plan and the likelihood
of acceptance is remote, the court thought inapplicable the earlier Tenth
Circuit opinion, Rader v. Boyd,46 offered in support by the debtor. Rader held
that there was nothing in the law to prevent a debtor from tendering an
alternative Chapter XII plan and that the court "in the wise exercise of its
38. 344 U.S. 293 (1953). In this railroad reorganization case, which held that notice by
publication was inadequate since property liens would be destroyed, the Court said that "even
creditors who have knowledge of a reorganization have a right to assume that the statutory
'reasonable notice' will be given to them before their claims are forever barred." Id. at 297.
39. 494 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1974). The creditor here had actual knowledge of the existence of
a Chapter X proceeding; however, the court said that "the fact that the creditor may, as here,
be generally aware of the pending reorganization, does not of itself impose upon him an affirma-
tive burden to intervene . . . and present his claim. The trustee cannot avoid his statutory
responsibility under Chapter X, to formally provide the required notice, simply because of a
creditor's possible familiarity with general aspects of the proceeding." Id. at 99.
40. 385 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1967). The attorneys of the creditors here communicated with
the trustee at various times during a Chapter X proceeding. The court said "a creditor has
every right to assume that he will be sent all the notices to which he is entitled under the Act."
Id. at 115.
41. 593 F.2d at 935.
42. Id.
43. 585 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1978).
44. 11 U.S.C. §§801-926 (1976).
45. Owners of"SW 8" Real Estate v. McQuaid, 513 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1975) and Taylor v.
Wood, 458 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1972). &eal.ro Kunze v. Prudential Ins. Co., 106 F.2d 917 (5th Cir.
1939).
46. 267 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1959). Rader was remanded because the bankruptcy judge did
not follow the proper procedure in his adjudication.
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discretion '4 7 may allow the debtor to propose as many plans as the judge
deems appropriate. In Gardens, however, the major secured creditor indi-
cated he would veto any plan; therefore, the profferring of another proposal
would be useless.
The second issue presented to the court of appeals concerned the appli-
cability of the "cram down" provision of the Bankruptcy Act. 48 The court
followed the line of cases that stand for the proposition that "cram down" is
inapplicable when the secured creditors are unanimously opposed.
49
E. Jurisdiction
United States v. Wilshire Apartments, Inc. 50 is being discussed in this section
because the court of appeals, inexplicably, used bankruptcy law principles
regarding summary jurisdiction to decide the case.
In July 1970, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) re-
corded its mortgage on the Wilshire property. Six years later, in January
1976, Medical Center State Bank lent Wilshire money secured in part by
certificates of deposit. The United States, to which Wilshire's mortgage had
been assigned by the FNMA, effected the appointment of a receiver for Wil-
shire in December 1976. At this time, the bank held $5370.75 in certificates
which, under the terms of its loan agreement, it applied to the loan; it then
submitted the balance, in the amount of $267.83, to the receiver. The
United States contended that the certificates should be turned over because
they were an asset of Wilshire at the time of the appointment of the receiver;
the bank, of course, argued that they were not an asset and cited Bowles v.
Czty National Bank & Trust Co. ,"' a recent Oklahoma case.
After several orders and responses, the district court for the District of
Oklahoma entered its order directing the bank to turn over to the receiver
the remaining certificates because they were an asset of Wilshire in Decem-
ber 1976. The bank complied and appealed.
47. Id. at 914.
48. This provision reads, in relevant part:
An arrangement-
(11) shall provide for any class of creditors which is affected by and does not
accept the arrangement by the two-thirds majority in amount required under this
chapter, adequate protection for the realization by them of the value of their debts
against the property dealt with by the arrangement and affected by such debts, either,
as provided in the arrangement or in the order confirming the arrangement ...
11 U.S.C. § 861 (11) (1976).
49. E.g., Meyer v. Rowen, 195 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1952); In re Herweg, 119 F.2d 941 (7th
Cir. 1941); In re Spicewood Assocs., 445 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Il1. 1977); In re Georgetown Apts., 3
BANKR. CT. DEC. 512 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 1977). Other cases hold that if any of the secured
creditors object, there can be no plan. Preas v. Kirkpatrick & Burns, 115 F.2d 802 (6th Cir.
1940); In re Bekare Realty Assocs., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. 646 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 1977). Cf, In re
Hobson Pike Assocs., Ltd., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. 1205 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 1977) and Massachu-
setts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marietta Cobb Apts. Co. (In re Marietta Cobb Apts. Co.), 3 BANKR.
CT. DEC. 720 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1977) (both holding that "cram-down" can be used against the
sole creditor if there is adequate protection.) See generally Gilbert & Massari, Chapter XII "Cram-
Down'--Bad Aledtine orJust Desserts.', 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1978).
50. 590 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1979).
51. 537 P.2d 1219 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975). The payee had used two $200,000 notes as secur-
ity for a loan and had endorsed them over to City Bank. The court held that, here, the payee's
receiver was not entitled to the two notes until the loan was paid off.
1980]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a plenary hearing on
the bank's claim. In its analysis, the court depended upon cases defining the
summary jurisdiction powers of the bankruptcy courts.5 2 The court con-
cluded that the district erred in ordering the bank to surrender the certifi-
cates in a summary proceeding, in light of possession by a third party with a
colorable claim adverse to the receiver.
The court also rejected the contention of the United States that the
turn-over directive was a non-appealable order.53 The economic assets of
Wilshire were very limited, and if the receiver were allowed to keep the cer-
tificates and pay other obligations with the funds, the bank might suffer "ir-
reparable loss and injury."'54 Therefore, the court reasoned, the order
materially affected the bank's rights and was appealable.
55
The concurring opinion of Judge McKay pointed out that bankruptcy
jurisdiction principles, while persuasive, are not controlling in the instant
case. 56 While noting that, here, the applicable rule is the same for receiver-
ship and bankruptcy proceedings, 57 the concurring opinion also looked to a
receivership case, Cusack v. Prudential Insurance Co. 58 Cusack held that a re-
ceiver could not utilize a summary proceeding to gain possession of property
held by third persons claiming adversely.
59
F. Secured Transactions in Bankruptcy Context
1. Filing Requirements
In Lentz v. Bank of Independence (In re Kerr),6° the court of appeals was
asked to decide whether, in light of 1975 amendments to the Kansas UCC
provisions,6 1 the earlier holding in Commerce Bank V. Chambers (In re Little-
john)62 should be abandoned. In Commerce Bank, the court of appeals held
52. Phelps v. United States, 421 U.S. 330 (1975); Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944);
Messenger v. Frontier Plumbing & Heating (In re Fox Metal Indus., Inc.), 453 F.2d 1128 (10th
Cir. 1972). These cases stand for the proposition that if a third party is in possession and claims
adversely to the receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, then the third party has the right to have his
claim adjudicated in a plenary action. See also Western Bd. of Adjusters v. Clements (In re
Desert Paint & Supply Co.), 479 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Bailes (In re Amer.
Southern Pub. Co.), 426 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 400 U.S. 903 (1970); Hollywood Nat'l
Bank v. Bumb, 409 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1969). The question of summary versus plenary jurisdic-
tion is academic now because the revised Act provides that the bankruptcy court has "exclusive
jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor. ... 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(e)
(West Sp. Pamph. 1979).
53. 590 F.2d at 881-82.
54. Id. at 882.
55. See, e.g., In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1977) (interlocutory orders arising in
bankruptcy proceedings are appealable if they do not arise in controversies in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings); Young Properties Corp. v. United Equity Corp., 534 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.), cert. denzed,
429 U.S. 830 (1976); Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp., 492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974) (in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, an interlocutory order that determines some right or duty is appealable).
56. 590 F.2d at 883.
57. Id.
58. 192 Okla. 218, 134 P.2d 984 (1943).
59. 192 Okla. at 221, 134 P.2d at 987. See also 2 R. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS § 632 (3d ed. 1959).
60. 598 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1979).
61. Ch. 32, 1975 Kan. Sess. Laws § 2 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8 4-9 -302( 3 )(c) (1965).
62. 519 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1975).
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that a lender's lien upon an automobile was perfected when the lender ef-
fected a notation of the lien on either the bill of sale or the former owner's
title. The court in Commerce Bank balanced the rather complicated transfer
of title process63 against the lender's concern for having a perfected security
interest and decided that the bank had done all it could to protect its inter-
est. "We cannot hold that the burden of assembling all these items is to be
placed upon the lienholder bank."
'64
In Lentz, which presented essentially the same factual situation as Com-
merce Bank, the bank did not fare as well as the lender. The purchasers in
Lentz did not apply for a Kansas title at all after buying their automobile in
August 1976. In November 1976, when they were adjudicated bankrupt, the
bankruptcy court and the district court held that, under Commerce Bank, the
bank's security interest had been perfected via the lien notation on the for-
mer owner's title. The Tenth Circuit reversed in light of a new statutory
perfecting procedure available to banks which lend money for automobile
purchases.
The 1975 amendments-which became effective after Commerce Bank
was decided 65 -provide an alternate, simple, and inexpensive method
whereby a lender could protect his lien in the interim between the purchase
of an automobile and the issuance of a new certificate of title: "the mailing
or delivery by a dealer or secured party to the appropriate state agency of a
notice of security interest as prescribed by K.S.A. 8-135 .... 66
Assuming that a statute that placed the status of a lender's lien in the
hands of the debtor was contrary to the philosophy of the UCC, the court of
appeals in Lentz reasoned that the Kansas legislature sought to remedy this
situation by amending its code to allow lenders the initiative in the perfec-
tion of their liens. The Lentz court construed the 1975 amendments as requir-
14g
6 7 the lender to use this alternative if it wants its liens perfected in the
interim between purchase and title application.
Commerce Bank presented many problems when it was decided, 68 many
of which were taken care of by the 1975 amendments and Lentz. The Lentz
case is a warning for all Kansas lenders that failure to remit this notice of
security agreement could mean an unperfected lien and an unsecured claim
in bankruptcy court.
2. Retention of Collateral
The creditor had sold a retail store to the bankrupts and maintained a
63. Documents that need to be presented are: "application for an original certificate of
title, a title fee, bill of sale showing the bank's lien, application for registration of the car, regis-
tration fee, proof of payment of personal property taxes, and evidence of tax assessment of the
automobile." 598 F.2d at 1207-08.
64. 519 F.2d at 358.
65. Chapter 32 of the 1975 Kansas session laws was effective Jan. 1, 1976. Commerce Bank
was decided June 25, 1975.
66. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-302(3)(c) (Supp. 1978).
67. 598 F.2d at 1209.
68. See generaly Comment, In re Littlejohn: Equitable Departure From State Certiate of Tile
Act Filing Requirements, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 726.
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security interest in the store assets. The bankrupts agreed to keep the inven-
tory at the level of the time of sale; it was also agreed that if the inventory
level declined, the creditor had the right to repossess. Less than two years
later, the bankrupts returned the store keys to With, the creditor, saying that
they were giving up trying to make the business successful; they refused to
listen to With's offer of help. With closed the store and reopened one week
later. The difference between the value of the inventory at time of sale and
upon repossession was approximately $12,000, the amount which which
With claimed should be excepted from discharge69 in bankruptcy proceed-
ings because of willful and malicious conversion.
The bankruptcy referee found that the decrease in inventory level and
accounts receivable was so excessive as to be characterized as prima facie
"willful and malicious;" 70 that a substantial inventory decrease had oc-
curred within the three months prior to the repossession; and that the bank-
rupts had wasted the assets and used the proceeds for themselves. 71 The
referee declared the debt non-dischargeable; the District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Mexico agreed and the Tenth Circuit affirmed in Wzih v.
Amador.
72
The court of appeals held that With "had a security interest in . . . the
inventory, the level of which the [bankrupts] had agreed to maintain at
$23,209.23. When the inventory was sold down to below that level, [With's]
security interest in the inventory was converted to that extent."'73 Because
this conversion could be characterized as willful and malicious, the con-
verted amount is a debt not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
The court rejected the bankrupts' contention that With had elected to
repossess and retain the collateral in full satisfaction of their obligation. The
court said that § 50A-9-505(2) 74 of the New Mexico statutes was not applica-
ble here because 1) the debtors had practically forced With to repossess by
foisting the keys upon him; 2) the total collateral repossessed was worth ap-
proximately one half of the amount still owed to With, so selling it would be
fruitless; and 3) it would be inequitable.
75
69. The pertinent language in the Bankruptcy Act is: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall
release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except
such as . . . are liabilities . . . for willful and malicious conversion of the property of another
.... .11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976).
70. With v. Amador (In re Amador), 596 F.2d 428, 430 (10th Cir. 1979).
71. Id.
72. 596 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1979).
73. Id. at 431.
74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-9-505(2) provides:
[A] secured party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the
debtor .... If the debtor or other person entitled to receive notification objects ...
the secured party must dispose of the collateral .... In the absence of such written
objection the secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's
obligation.
The identical provision is now found at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-505(2) (Michie 1978).
75. Generally, § 9-505(2) of the UCC does not operate to deny creditors their rights. See
Nelson v. Armstrong, 99 Idaho 422, 582 P.2d 1100 (1978) (creditor must manifest an intent to
retain the collateral); Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972) (because creditor did
not propose to retain the collateral and it would not be in his best interests to do so, the debt
was not extinguished); Jones v. Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 455, 228 N.W.2d 419 (1975) (§ 9-505(2)
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II. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Article Nine-Conversion by Auction Company
An interesting Article Nine case is Secunty National Bank v. Belleville Live-
stock Commission.7 6 The bank held security agreements with a cattle feeder
on almost a thousand head of cattle and the proceeds therefrom. The agree-
ment provided that the cattle could not be sold without the written consent
of the bank. There was deposition testimony indicating that the bank knew
Larkin, the cattle feeder, was buying and selling cattle at auction but failed
to remonstrate with him and also knew that the bank permitted the sales as
long as the proceeds were applied to the loan balance.77 The bank brought
an action in conversion 78 against three livestock auction companies and was
granted summary judgment in the District Court for the District of Kansas.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court held that the bank did not im-
pliedly waive its security interest via its course of conduct and failure to
remonstrate with the debtor. The court also held that the bank may have
waived its security interest through an express authorization to sell the cat-
tle, and thus, the auction companies-as agents of the debtor-could not be
guilty of conversion. Because there was a genuine issue as to whether the
bank consented to the sales, the court set aside the summary judgment and
remanded.
The court of appeals chose to rely upon North Central Kansas Production
Credit Association v. Washington Sales Co. ,79 in which the Kansas Supreme
Court said that an implied waiver of a security interest cannot be shown,
without more, from a creditor's failure to remonstrate with a debtor for vio-
lating the security agreement and the creditor's acceptance of the proceeds
of unauthorized sales.
The auction companies based their argument on Clovis National Bank v.
Thomas,80 an earlier New Mexico opinion, that held a course of dealing by a
bank effected the waiver of both the consent requirement and its security
interest in the cattle.81
Understandably, the court rejected Cloves 82 in favor of the recent Kan-
was "drafted for the benefit of the secured party .... A debtor who has been damaged by
improper retention of collateral finds his remedy in U.C.C. § 9-507(l) .... Id. at 461, 228
N.W.2d at 423). Contra, Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1973) (retention for a long
period of time of depreciating collateral, such as a motor vehicle, and personal use of it allows
the debtor to claim that the debt is extinguished) and Northern Financial Corp. v. Chatwood
Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (a debtor is not barred from
claiming that the creditor retained the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt even though the
creditor did not give notice that he was doing so). See generaly Annot., Construction and Operation
of UICC § 9-505(2) Authorizing Secured Party in Possession of Collateral to Retain It in Satisfaction of
Obliation, 55 A.L.R.3d 651 (1974).
76. No. 76-2113, 76-2114, 76-2115 (10th Cir., filed May 4, 1979).
77. Id. at 18-20.
78. See generally Annot., Personal Liability of Auctioneer to Owner or Mortgagee for Conversion, 96
A.L.R.2d 208 (1964).
79. 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35 (1979).
80. 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967).
81. See also Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 256 Ark. 1063, 511 S.W.2d 645 (1974)
and Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1973).
82. Clos created a legal disturbance and § 50A-9-306(2) of the New Mexico code was
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sas law found in Washington Sales. In Washington Sales, a finding of express
consent was based upon testimony by the president of the lending associa-
tion that he told the debtor that cattle sales were permissible as long as the
proceeds were applied to the loan balance. In Security National, the court
concluded that there was a material issue as to whether the bank expressly
consented to the sales; the bank representative testified that Larkin had sold
cattle previously on many occasions with the bank's consent.
III. OTHER DECISIONS BRIEFLY NOTED
A. Truth-In-Lending
In Gallegos v. Stokes,8 3 the Tenth Circuit held that the purchase of a
truck by a poorly educated widow who wanted to begin selling fresh produce
and who was able to buy the truck only by trading in her car and some
jewelry was a consumer credit transaction for purposes of the Truth-In-
Lending8 4 disclosure provisions.85 The court also held that a creditor who
did not have a review procedure or any other mechanism whereby calcula-
tion errors could be caught could not avail himself of the "bona fide error"
defense
8 6 to a Truth-In-Lending violation.
8 7
B. Miler Act
United States ex rel Olmstead Electric, Inc. v. Neosho Construction Co. 88 was a
Miller Act8 9 case in which the Tenth Circuit held that a supplier's claim was
amended in 1968 by the addition of this sentence: "A security interest in farm products and the
proceeds thereof shall not be considered waived by the secured party by any course of dealing
between the parties or by any trade usage." 1968 N.M. Laws ch. 12, § 2. Clovzs has not always
been followed; see, e.g., Colorado Bank & Trust Co. v. Western Slope Inv., Inc., 36 Colo. App.
149, 539 P.2d 501 (1975) (non-enforcement of provision requiring written consent to sell does
not effect a waiver of that provision) and Southwest Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167 (1979) (Non-enforced written consent provision;
however, the court reasoned that the bank's consent to sales was conditioned upon receipt of the
proceeds. "The UCC does not prevent a second party from attaching such a condition or limi-
tation to its consent to sales of collateral by a debtor. A sale by the debtor in violation of those
conditions is an unauthorized sale and the security interest, under § 9-306(2), continues in the
collateral." 593 P.2d at 169 (citations omitted)). Clovin has also been criticized for its holding
that the common law of waiver supplements the Code. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l
Bank, 426 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1970) ("Section 9-306(2) serves as a codification of the common
law of waiver." 426 F.2d at 1103-04.) and United States v. Greenwich Mill & Elevator Co., 291
F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (Clovts goes too far in its "continuance of the doctrine of
waiver." 291 F. Supp. at 614.)
83. 593 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1979).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1644 (1976).
85. 593 F.2d at 375.
86. A creditor who proves that "the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
error" is not liable under the Truth-In-Lending disclosure provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c)
(1976).
87. The court relied upon Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871 (7th
Cir. 1976). See also Detillo v. J.R. Moore Farm Supply Co., 449 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
88. 599 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1979).
89. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1976). The Miller Act provides financial protection to per-
sons who supply labor or materials to either the prime contractor or the subcontractor in the
performance of a government contract by requiring the posting of a payment bond by the
government contractor.
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barred because notice to the general contractor was provided more than
ninety days after the supplier's last unpaid shipment to the subcontractor.
9°
One month before he gave notice, the supplier had delivered to the general
contractor electrical supplies that had been ordered by the subcontractor.
The general contractor paid the supplier for the equipment, and thus, this
purchase was not to be included in any claims the supplier might have. Be-
cause there were no other unpaid shipments within the ninety days prior to
the supplier's notice, the supplier's claim was defeated for untimeliness.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Logan pointed out that there were only
two ways by which the supplier could have protected his claim: 1) refuse
payment from the general contractor so that a recent charge would be out-
standing or 2) give notice, routinely, whenever accounts are almost ninety
days old.9 1
C. Uniform Bill of Lading
The court, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railwa y v. Littleton Leasing &
Investment Co. ,92 held that letters9 3 to the carrier from the shipper in response
to "past-due" notices from the carrier's credit department for unpaid freight
charges did not constitute compliance with the written notice of claim re-
quirement of the uniform bill of lading which formed the parties' contract.
The dissent of Judge McKay indicates that he would characterize the letters
as in compliance because they did give notice of damage incurred, notwith-




90. The applicable notice provision is:
[A]ny person having direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor but no con-
tractual relationship express or implied with the contractor furnishing said payment
bond shall have a right of action upon the said payment bond upon giving written
notice to said contractor within ninety days from the date on which such person did or
performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the last of the material for
which such claim is made ...
40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1976).
91. 599 F.2d at 934.
92. 582 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1978).
93. One of the letters to the railway company's credit manager stated that several damage
claims were pending and another said that the shipper was awaiting credit memoranda before
making payment. The carrier's credit department's response to the first letter was that the
freight charges were separate from any damage claims that the shipper may have had; the
carrier's response to the second letter was that, according to their freight claim department, no
claims by the shipper were pending.





Actions brought under the nineteenth century Civil Rights Acts' or Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 dominated the field of constitutional
law considered by the Tenth Circuit last term. Of the major constitutional
law cases before the court, only two dealt with other issues.3 While none of
these cases were of monumental significance, the court did clarify several
previously cloudy areas of the statutes.
I. CASES UNDER THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 requires a showing that a
violation of a constitutional right occurred under color of state law. Other
sections of the acts 4 require a showing that the aggrieved party was a mem-
ber of a discriminated class. Questions arose last term as to who may be
sued, what immunities are available to defendants, what rights are afforded
constitutional protection, and what is state action. Two cases appealed to
the Tenth Circuit questioned the existence of a discriminated class under the
facts presented.5
A. Who May Be Sued and What Immunities Are Available?
During the last term of the United States Supreme Court, a landmark
decision was handed down. In Monell v. Department of Social Servi'ces,6 after
reviewing the legislative history of section 1983, 7 the Court held for the first
time that local governing bodies and local officials acting in their offficial
capacity are subject to suit under 1983.8 In doing so the Court in essence
overturned the earlier decision of Monroe v. Pape.9 However, in Monell the
Court specifically limited municipal liability to cases where "action pursuant
to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort."'"
Thus, a municipality may not be held liable under the theory of respondeat
superior merely because it employed a tortfeasor.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
3. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973);
Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978) (commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(b)-(c), 1986 (1976).
5. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979); Lessman v. McCor-
mick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979).
6. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7. Id. at 664-89.
8. Id. at 690.
9. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
10. 436 U.S. at 691.
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1. Stoddard v. School District No. I I'
In Sboddard, the Tenth Circuit confronted a situation similar to Monell.
Annabell Stoddard, a nontenured elementary school teacher in Cokeville,
Wyoming, was denied renewal of her teaching contract. She filed an action
under section 1983 alleging that the nonrenewal was constitutionally imper-
missible. Named as defendants were the school district, its board of trustees,
the superintendent and principal in their official capacities, two members of
the board in their individual capacities, and the principal in his individual
capacity.
The plaintiff alleged that in a conversation with the principal the real
reasons given for her dismissal were (1) recurring rumors that she was having
an affair, (2) dissatisfaction in the community because she played cards and
did not attend church regularly, and (3) her unattractive physical appear-
ance. The principal had also stated that he had been informed by phone
that there would be "hell to pay" if the plaintiffs contract were renewed.
Evidence adduced at the trial indicated that a member of the board had told
the principal over the phone that he was "definitely opposed" to rehiring the
plaintiff.
The jury was given both general verdict and special interrogatory
forms. On the general form, the jury returned a verdict only against the
school district, the members of the board in their official capacities, and the
superintendent in his official capacity. The plaintiff was awarded compensa-
tory damages of $33,000; punitive damages of $5,000; and attorney's fees of
$5,800. In answering one of the special interrogatories, the jury found that
the individual defendants, two members of the board and the principal, had
acted in bad faith for reasons that were constitutionally impermissible in not
renewing the plaintiffs contract. The trial court, acting pursuant to rule
49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 entered judgment against
these defendants in their individual capacities notwithstanding the general
verdict in their favor.
On defendants' subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the trial court held that the school district was not a "person" under
section 1983 and vacated the judgment against it. In addition, the court set
aside the award of punitive damages and attorney's fees.
On cross-appeal, the plaintiff argued successfully that under Monell she
had a right to have the verdict against the school district reinstated. The
defendants argued that even under Monell the district remained immune
from liability because all it did was employ a tortfeasor-the school princi-
pal. The Tenth Circuit, rejecting the defendants' argument, found that the
district had been held liable for the actions of the board of directors in its
official capacity. The court found no problem with the doctrine of respondeat
superzor because the only way that the district could act was through its
11. 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979).
12. Rule 49(b) reads in part: "When the answers [to special interrogatories] are consistent
with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be




board.1 3 The court also rejected the defendants' alternative argument that
the board was an arm of the state and therefore immune under the eleventh
amendment. The court, citing M. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle
14
and Unifwd School Dzstrict No. 480 v. Epperson,' 5 found that a Wyoming school
district is more like a city or county than an arm of the state.' 6 Therefore,
the school district was not protected by the eleventh amendment.
2. Bertot v. School District No. 117
The United States Supreme Court decision in Monell specifically re-
served the question of whether municipal officials and governments have
some type of qualified "official" immunity.' 8 Almost immediately after the
Monell decision was handed down, the Tenth Circuit was faced with this
question in Bertot v. School District No. 1. '9
This was the second time that the Bertot case had come before the Tenth
Circuit on appeal. 20 On the first appeal, the court held that a teacher has a
cause of action under section 1983 without a showing of a property or liberty
interest if the teacher was dismissed for exercising her first amendment
rights.2 1 The case had been remanded to the district court for determination
of the immunities and defenses available to the school board in its official
capacity against liability for monetary damages, including basic pay.
22
In its second Bertot opinion the Tenth Circuit concluded that the dismis-
sal of the plaintiff was a "decision officially adopted" by the board.23 There-
fore, applying Monell, the court found that the school board and the school
district were proper defendants under section 1983.
Having so held, the court then addressed the issue of qualified immu-
nity for the school district and the individual defendants in their official ca-
pacities. It found that "[tihe reasons for the application of the doctrine of
qualified immunity are as compelling when considering the members indi-
vidually as they are to the evaluation of the members acting collectively
... .It is apparent that conscientious board members will be just as con-
cerned that their decisions or actions might create a liability for damages on
the board or local entity as they would on themselves."' 24 Thus, the Tenth
13. 590 F.2d at 835.
14. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
15. 583 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1978). The court in Epperson primarily relied on two tests to
determine if a school board were an arm of the state: "(1) To what extent does the board...
function with substantial autonomy from the state government and, (2) to what extent is the
agency financed independently of the state treasury." Id. at 1121-22.
16. 590 F.2d 829, 835 (10th Cir. 1979).
17. No. 76-1169 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1978) (petition for rehearing granted). Reheard May
15, 1979. No decision had been handed down on the rehearing at the time this overview was
initially prepared. The decision on rehearing was.issued on Nov. 26, 1979. For a discussion of
the court's opinion on rehearing, see text accompanying notes 99-115 tnrna.
18. 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
19. No. 76-1169 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1978) (petition for rehearing granted).
20. Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
21. Id. at 1179.
22. Id. at 1185.
23. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 3 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1978).
24. Id. at 5.
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Circuit extended the same qualified immunity to local officials in their offi-
cial capacity as previously protected such officials in their individual capaci-
ties.
Chief Judge Seth, writing for the majority, relied on the California
Supreme Court decision in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District.25 The
Lopman court, however, disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's basic premise
that officials would be just as concerned about the liability of the govern-
mental agency as they are about their own personal liability. In the opinion
of the California court: "It is unlikely that officials would be as adversely
affected in the performance of their duties by the fear of liability on the part
of their employing agency as by the fear of personal liability. ' ' 26 Conse-
quently, the Lzpman court refused to find that the immunity of the school
district was coextensive with the immunity of its officials. Its rationale was
that the community as a whole "benefits from official action taken without
fear of personal liability, and it would be unjust in some circumstances to
require an individual injured by official wrongdoing to bear the burden of
his loss rather than to distribute it throughout the community. ' ' 27 In the
context of personnel cases, however, the court went on to say "[t]here is a
vital public interest in securing free and independent judgment of school
trustees . . . and trustees, being responsible for the fiscal well-being of their
districts, would be especially sensitive to the financial consequences of suits
for damages against the districts."'28 Thus, the California court concluded
that the good faith immunity did extend to the discretionary acts of school
boards within the scope of their official authority. Therefore, the school dis-
trict was not liable in tort for the alleged acts.
The Tenth Circuit further extended the Lipman decision to provide
qualified protection against liability for violations of constitutional rights.
Chief Judge Seth tried to distinguish a series of cases29 which, although not
thoroughly discussing the issue, held local governments liable for monetary
damages. To do so, he simply said: "Some courts have stated, but not neces-
sarily held, that qualified immunity should not be applied to a defendant
board. "30
In separate opinions, Judge Lewis and Judge Breitenstein differed with
the majority as to whether a court should assume the existence of no immu-
nity or a qualified immunity without legislative directives. Judge Lewis
found that the question of absolute immunity was of constitutional signifi-
cance-properly a judicial question-but that the extension of a qualified
immunity was a question for the legislature.3 ' Nevertheless, Judge Lewis
25. 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) (the California decision con-
cerned actions sounding in tort and breach of contract; no issue of constitutional rights was
involved).
26. Id. at 227, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
27. Id., 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
28. Id., 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
29. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Board of Jr. Col. Dist.
No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975); Hander v. San Jacinto Jr. Col., 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.
1975).
30. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 6 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 19.78).
31. Id., slip op. (Lewis, J., concurring).
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concurred with Chief Judge Seth in finding that the defendants should not
have been liable. His concurrence was based upon the jury's finding that the
defendants at all times acted in good faith.
32
Judge Breitenstein found that "no anomoly or inconsistency exists when
the same individuals who were found not liable in their individual capacities
are held liable for the same actions when sued in their official capacities."
'33
He recognized the need for spreading the economic cost of a violation over
the entire community. His primary concern was that providing qualified
immunity to officials in their official capacity would preclude any recovery
by a worthy plaintiff in many situations.
34
The majority opinion failed to recognize that the community benefits
from qualified immunity from personal liability for its officials. In doing so,
it failed to see the need for spreading the costs of this benefit throughout the
community and extended the doctrine of qualified immunity to municipal
employees in their official capacity. Thus, it eliminated the possibility of
monetary recovery by an aggrieved party for violation of his constitutional
rights when officials act in good faith.
B. What Rights are Constitutional4y Szgnitant?
Section 1983 requires that a constitutional right be violated by some
state action. In two cases before the Tenth Circuit last term the violation of
a constitutional right was the issue appealed.
1. Brenna v. Southern Colorado State College
35
A tenured professor sued his college after his contract was terminated
and a nontenured professor in the same department was retained. The
court, per Judge McKay, found that since Brenna was tenured he "had a
property interest deserving of the procedural and substantive protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
36
The court went on to find that there would have been no constitutional
violation if the procedure chosen for selecting terminations was reasonable
and if its results were not arbitrary or capricious. In Brenna, since budgetary
necessities had caused the layoffs and the decisions were based upon substan-
tive evidence, it was held that there had been no denial of a constitutional
right.
3 7
2. Lessman v. McCormick
38
In Lessman v. McCormick, the plaintiff was arrested at her Topeka, Kan-
sas, home by local police officers and taken to the station to pay an overdue
parking ticket. There she was detained until an official from the Topeka
32. Id.
33. Id., slip op. at 3 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting in part).
34. Id.
35. 589 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1978).
36. Id. at 476.
37. Id. at 477.
38. 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979).
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Bank and Trust Company came to talk to her about a loan she had with the
bank. Lessman contended that she had been arrested so that the bank could
intimidate her.
The trial court, in dismissing the action, held that since the arrest had
been technically lawful, the only unlawful detention occurred during the
time that it took the bank officer to arrive. The trial court then concluded
that this was an "insubstantial case" where the unlawful detention did not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and therefore no cause of action
existed under section 1983.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court decision on the grounds
that: "We do not consider the fact that the arrest was made upon a valid
warrant necessarily means that the time of false imprisonment begins only
after the fine was paid."'39 They found that this may be a "case of an arrest
not to collect on the overdue parking ticket, but to give improper aid to the
bank."'40 The Tenth Circuit then remanded the case to determine how
often, if ever, arrests are made to collect overdue fines.
C. What Constitutes State Action?
Section 1983 also requires that the violation of the constitutional right
be under color of state law. Two more cases in the Tenth Circuit clarified
this requirement.
1. Torres v. First State Bank
4 '
The plaintiff, an automobile dealer, had obtained financing through the
defendant bank. The plaintiff defaulted and the bank obtained a temporary
restraining order preventing him from "disposing of, conveying, or encum-
bering any property, real or personal, presently owned by him."'4 2 The de-
fendant demanded possession of the vehicles in which it had a security
interest, falsely claiming that right under the provisions of the temporary
restraining order. The plaintiff then brought this action on the grounds that
the temporary order deprived him of his right to due process by restraining
him from disposing of any property, not just the property in which the bank
had an interest.
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the dismissal of the action, held that
there was insufficient state action to bring suit under section 1983. The stat-
ute under which the order was granted was not attacked. The controversy
was between private litigants. One of the parties claimed he was injured by
the decision of the state court; however, the temporary restraining order was
immediately open to modification by the court upon application by the
plaintiff and subject to appeal. In affirming the dismissal of the action,
Judge Logan quoted from an earlier Tenth Circuit opinion:4 3 "'To hold
otherwise would open the door wide to every aggrieved litigant in a state
39. Id. at 610-11.
40. Id. at 611.
41. 588 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1978).
42. Id. at 1324.
43. Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948).
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court proceedings, and set up the federal courts as arbiter of the correctness
of every state court decision.' "44
2. T & W InVestment Co. V. Kurz
45
In T & W Investment Co., the Tenth Circuit was again faced with the
question of state action arising in the state courts, but it declined to address
the issue. A corporation brought suit against the court appointed receiver of
a wholly owned subsidiary for violating its due process rights. The Tenth
Circuit disposed of the case solely on the immunity question, sidestepping
the issue of state action. Citing Kermit Construction Corp. v. Banco Credito y
Ahorro Ponceno,4 6 the Tenth Circuit held that a receiver who carries out the
orders of the judge shares the judge's absolute immunity.
47
D. What Constitutes a Discriminated Class?
Sections 1981, 1985(b)-(c), and 1986 of the nineteenth century Civil
Rights Acts require that the aggrieved party be a member of a discriminated
class and that his rights be violated because of such membership. Two cases
before the Tenth Circuit last term help define what constitutes a discrimi-
nated class under these sections.
1. Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 48
The plaintiff filed an action under section 1981 against his former em-
ployer and his union. He had been dismissed because of charges of theft of
Safeway property. After his acquittal on the theft charges, Safeway offered
to rehire him but without back pay. Manzanares alleged that he was a
member of a discriminated class-Mexican-Americans-and that Anglo em-
ployees of the company had confessed to stealing and nevertheless had been
retained.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dimiss on the grounds
that relief under section 1981 is available only for discrimination on the basis
of race or color and not on the basis of national origin.
Tenth Circuit Chief Judge Seth reversed and remanded the case for
trial. While section 1981 only says that "all persons" shall have the rights
and benefits of "white citizens," this language does not limit its protections
to the technical or restrictive definition of race. The court cited its own
opinion in Valdez v. Van Landngham:49
The issue is whether a Spanish surname constitutes a racial class
which is protected by section 1981. The term "race" in our lan-
guage has evolved to encompass some non-racial but ethnic groups.
This Circuit has recognized Spanish speaking or Spanish-surnamed
Americans as a minority for purposes of sections 1981, 1983, and
44. 588 F.2d at 1326 (quoting Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d at 707).
45. 588 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1978).
46. 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976).
47. M. at 3.
48. 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979).




Thus the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its position that in certain situations na-
tional origin may be a sufficient class to give rise to protections under section
1981.
2. Lessman v. McCormtck
5 1
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that a bank, its employees, and the
police conspired to deprive her of her constitutional rights in violation of
sections 1985(b)-(c) and 1986. To bring the action under these sections, Ms.
Lessman claimed to be a member of a discriminated class; ze., all debtors.
The Tenth Circuit, noting that such a class had never before been recog-
nized and that it would be the "largest class in America," rejected the plain-
tiffs claims under these sections and affirmed the dismissal by the district
court.
5 2
II. CASES UNDER TITLE VII
The Tenth Circuit struggled with cases under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Difficult questions arose on what constitutes a prima
facie showing of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas53 test, what
remedies are available under the Act, and how the 1972 amendments 54 are
to be applied.
A. What Constitutes a Prima Facie Case?
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,5 5 the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced the procedure to be followed at trial for establishing a case under
Title VII:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of the complainant's qualifications . . . . The
burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.
56
50. 593 F.2d at 970.
51. 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 608. For a discussion of the issue of whether the police action invaded plaintiff's
constitutional rights, see text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
53. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
54. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). The relevant
changes made by the amendments were the inclusion within the term "person" governments,
governmental agencies, and political subdivisions; the authorization of the EEOC to intervene
in civil actions brought under § 2000e-5 when the respondent is other than a government, gov-
ernmental agency, or political subdivision; the authorization to refer matters to the Attorney
General for such respondents; the extension of time periods for filing charges under the Act; and
the subjection of the federal government to Title VII.
55. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56. Id. at 802.
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1. Diggs v. Western Electric Co. 57 and EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co. 58
Two cases before the Tenth Circuit last term concerned claims involv-
ing discriminatory hiring practices. In Dz'ggs v. Western Electric Co. ,59 it ap-
peared at first glance that the trial court did not follow the McDonnell
Douglas test. The plaintiff had applied to the defendant three times for em-
ployment and was rejected each time. Neither the trial court nor the Tenth
Circuit specifically found a prima facie case. The Tenth Circuit only found
that the evidence of discrimination was "sketchy." 6 The plaintiffs case es-
tablished that she was black, that Western Electric was hiring at the time of
her application, and that she was not hired. Her qualifications remained an
issue.
In defense Western Electric showed that since 1967 it had maintained
an affirmative action program which had been audited and approved by the
government on a regular basis. "The evidence also showed that there was no
pattern of employment discrimination by Western, and that actually its em-
ployment of members of minority groups exceeded the percentage of minor-
ity members in the Oklahoma City area work force."'6 1 Furthermore, the
employees of Western Electric who had interviewed the plaintiff testified
that she had no manufacturing experience and that she had wanted to start
work on the day shift while Western Electric's contract with the union re-
quired workers to start on the night shift.
After presentation of the employer's case, the Tenth Circuit found that
Western Electric had met its burden of articulating nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for the plaintiffs rejection without first requiring the plaintiff to estab-
lish a prima facie case.
In EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 6 2 the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the
district court's finding of a prima facie case. A complaint was filed by the
EEOC on behalf of three Spanish-surnamed complainants claiming that re-
quiring a high school diploma (or a GED equivalent) and a passing grade on
an aptitude test prior to approval of these employment standards by the
EEOC constituted a violation of Title VII.
From May 1969 to July 1973, Navajo used a test administered by the
New Mexico Employment Security Commission to determine qualified ap-
plicants. In 1973 it was notified that the test was considered invalid by the
EEOC and consequently substituted another aptitude test. Since 1975, sta-
tistical adjustments had been made to equalize the raw scores of Spanish-
surnamed Americans and Anglos.
The trial court concluded that with the statistical adjustments there was
no discriminatory impact on minorities. Nevertheless, because the educa-
tional requirement and aptitude test had not received EEOC approval, the
57. 587 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir. 1978).
58. 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979).
59. 587 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir. 1978).
60. Id. at 1071.
61. Id. at 1071-72.
62. 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979).
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trial court granted injunctions barring their use by Navajo and awarded
damages to the complainants.
The Tenth Circuit stated that a prima facie case is established "when it
is demonstrated that a defendant's employee selection practices, while per-
haps facially neutral and lacking in intent to discriminate, have a discrimi-
natory effect or disparate impact on minority hiring."63 In this case,
however, the employment requirements eliminated a greater number of
Spanish-surnamed Americans, but the actual percentage of such persons
hired was statistically favorable to Spanish-surnamed Americans.
The Tenth Circuit, in reversing the lower court, held that the questions
of disparity in educational requirements and the pass ratio on an aptitude
test do not arise until "there is discrimination in fact in actual numbers
hired."'64 Quoting from Hester v. Southern Railway,6 5 the court said:
"[N]onvalidated tests and subjective hiring procedures are not vio-
lative of Title VIIper se. Title VII comes into play only when such
practices result in discrimination . . . .The missing ingredient in
the proof here was the necessary showing of discrimination. With-
out such proof the district court lacked authority to enjoin the fur-
ther use of the testing and interviewing procedures . "..."66
If Navajo is to be followed, a new element seems to have been added to
the prima facie requirement-actual discrimination in numbers. However,
in another case the Tenth Circuit held that "It]he prima facie showing is not
the equivalent of a factual finding of discrimination." 6 7 The distinction ap-
pears to be that actual discrimination must be found for an attack against
the general hiring practices of a company, while it need not be shown for an
isolated incident of alleged discrimination against an individual.
2. James v. Newspaper Agency Corp. I
The question of what constitutes a prima facie case again arose in the
James case, thistime in the context of alleged discrimination in promotions.
The plaintiff brought suit against her former employer alleging that she had
been passed over for promotion because of her sex. At trial, after the plain-
tiff's case, the judge denied the defendant's motion for dismissal. After the
presentation of the defense, the lower court concluded that the plaintiff had
not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she had not been pro-
moted because of her sex.
In Rich v. Martin Marietta,69 the Tenth Circuit had set forth a procedure
for dealing with promotion cases similar to the McDonnell Douglas test:
"Once a plaintiff has shown that he is qualified, he need only show a dis-
criminatory impact and that he was among the class of employees who could
have been considered for promotion. Defendant may, of course, rebut this
63. Id. at 990.
64. Id. at 991.
65. 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. 593 F.2d at 991-92 (quoting 497 F.2d at 1381).
67. Silberhorn v. General Iron Works Co., 584 F.2d 970, 971 (10th Cir. 1978).
68. 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).
69. 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
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prima facie showing . . .70
Judge McWilliams, writing for the Tenth Circuit majority, believed
that the James case had met the guidelines of McDonnell Douglas and Rzch.
The denial of the defendant's motion for dismissal was in effect the trial
court's finding of a prima facie case. The defendant then rebutted this
prima facie showing. On this basis, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial
court's decision.
Judge McKay, in his partially dissenting opinion, disagreed. He be-
lieved that the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove her
case was a departure from the McDonnell Douglas approach. In support of his
position, he quoted from Bhzard o. Fielding:7 1 " 'It may be that the district
court will find, after three steps, what it found after one step.' . . . Nonethe-
less, I . . . 'do not feel free . . . to say that the McDonnell Douglas approach
can be dispensed with.' "72
It would appear, however, as the majority found, that the general pro-
cedures of McDonnell Douglas had been met and that a remand for retrial
along its precise wording would not have proven useful.
B. What Remedies are Available?
Another area with which the Tenth Circuit struggled was the remedies
available to an aggrieved party under Title VII. Particularly troublesome
were the questions of back pay and attorney's fees.
1. Comacho v. Colorado Electronic Technical College, Inc. 73
In Comacho, the plaintiff brought a successful Title VII action against
her former employer. The trial court awarded the plaintiff back pay for 56
1/2 months reduced by the amount she had earned during that period. The
defendant appealed on the grounds that two years prior to the date of the
judgment it had offered to reinstate the plaintiff without back pay. It ar-
gued that any award of back pay should have been cut off as of that date.
In a per curiam opinion, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's
award of damages. "Congress clearly intended that the remedies employed
would 'make whole' as nearly as possible any person injured under the
Act. . . . An offer of reinstatement without back pay does not 'make whole'
the person injured by an illegal firing."
'74
2. Carreathers o. Alexander
75
In a case similar to Comacho, the Tenth Circuit considered the retroac-
tive application of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. In 1962, Carreathers
was employed at the GS-2 level after working for the Internal Revenue Serv-
70. Id. at 348.
71. 572 F.2d 13, 15 (lst Cir. 1978).
72. James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 584 (10th Cir. 1979).
73. 590 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 889.
75. 587 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1978).
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ice for thirty years. In 1963, after filing a complaint based on his lack of
promotion, he was promoted to GS-3. He was promoted to GS-4 in 1968,
where he remained until this complaint was filed in 1972. The EEOC found
that Carreathers had been discriminated against, and the Internal Revenue
Service admitted the discrimination. Consequently, the IRS promoted him
to the GS-5 level retroactive to 1971.
After the agency's action was reviewed and approved by the Civil Serv-
ice Commission, the plaintiff sought further relief. No additional adminis-
trative relief was granted, and the plaintiff filed suit in district court. The
trial court ordered the IRS to provide job training for the plaintiff and
awarded the plaintiff $4,673.60 in back pay plus attorneys' fees and costs.
No back pay was awarded for any period prior to the effective date of the
1972 amendments to Title VII.
On appeal the plaintiff sought three things: (1) a trial de novo before
the district court; 76 (2) a retroactive application of the 1972 amendments in
order to recover back pay for the period prior to their enactment; and (3) a
finding that the award of attorneys' fees was unreasonable.
77
Prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court 78 and the Tenth
circuit 79 had held that the 1972 amendments may have a retroactive appli-
cation if the complaint was pending administratively or judicially on their
effective date. This filing requirement was designed to safeguard against
contrived claims. In Huntley v. Department of Health, Educatzon & Welfare,80 the
Fifth Circuit held, however, that the Act was applicable to violations prior to
the amendments without the necessity of a prior filing. Therefore, it be-
lieved that the amendments were more the recognition of a remedy rather
than the creation of a new right.
The Tenth Circuit specifically declined to follow the Huntley decision. 8 '
Judge Doyle, writing for the majority, saw Carreathers as a unique case strong
on equities. As a result of the statute of limitations in the Act,8 2 retroactive
application of the amendments in Carreathers would be effective for less than
two years. The discrimination admitted by the IRS occurred over a much
longer period of time. Furthermore, the plaintiff had not slept on his rights
but had filed complaints twice prior to 1972.
Thus, while the Tenth Circuit was reluctant to open the door to all past
employment practices of government agencies, it recognized that in this
unique case the plaintiff was especially worthy. The remedy which the trial
court had awarded the plaintiff had not made him "whole" as Title VII
76. The Tenth Circuit concluded that, since the IRS had already admitted the discrimina-
tion, no useful purpose would be served by having a trial de novo on the facts in the district
court. However, a trial de novo might be available if the district court found that plaintiff had
a sufficient basis for his claim of harassment. Id. at 1050.
77. The Tenth Circuit concluded that an award of attorneys' fees amounting to $35 per
hour for an experienced lawyer and $30 per hour for a less experienced lawyer was not unrea-
sonably low. Id. at 1052.
78. Place v. Weinberger, 426 U.S. 932 (1976).
79. Weakhee v. Powell, 532 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1976).
80. 550 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1977).
81. Carreathers v. Alexander, 587 F.2d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1978).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
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intended. The Tenth Circuit recognized that it could not make the plaintiff
whole either, but awarded him what it could under a liberal interpretation
of the Act. The court retroactively applied the 1972 amendments for the
maximum allowable period, somewhat less than two years. The plaintiff
thus received additional back pay for those years which had previously been
denied by the trial court.
C. Requirements Under the 1972 Amendments: EEOC v. Zia Co.
8 3
Another perplexing problem arose out of the 1972 amendments in
EEOC v. Za Co.84 The amendments allowed the EEOC for the first time to
file suit in district court for a violation of Title VII. The Act has a prerequi-
site to filing suit: "[T]he Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion."
85
The primary defendant, the Zia Company, was under contract to the
Atomic Energy Commission. Consequently, conciliation between the EEOC
and Zia required the approval of the AEC. The EEOC sent Zia a proposed
conciliation agreement containing the following "boilerplate" clause:
"The Commission shall determine whether the Respondent has
complied with the terms of this agreement. In the event the Com-
mission shall determine that the Respondent has failed or refused
to comply with the terms of this Agreement, the Commission shall
• . . notify the Respondent . . . . If within thirty days . . . the
Respondent has failed to comply with the terms of this Agreement,
or show good cause why he should not comply, all waivers, releases
and cdvenants not to sue shall be null and void, and such failure or
refusal to comply shall be deemed primafacie evidence of breach of
this Agreement."
'86
After negotiations this paragraph was modified to eliminate the conclu-
siveness of the Commission's findings upon a trial court. Zia then agreed to
the conciliation and forwarded the agreement to the AEC for approval. The
AEC refused to approve this agreement and negotiations then began directly
between the EEOC and the AEC at the regional level. After these proved
fruitless, counsel for the EEOC sent failure of conciliation notices to all par-
ties and forwarded the case to its litigation department.
Negotiations were then initiated at the Washington level between the
EEOC and the AEC. In January 1974, the general counsel for the AEC
recommended approval of the conciliation agreement. Subsequently, the of-
ficials at Zia attempted to reopen conciliation talks. They were advised by
the EEOC that the case was no longer in the conciliation stage and that a
complaint had been filed in district court. The EEOC's complaint prayed
for many claims which were never a part of the conciliation discussions, such
as back pay for all improperly laid off employees from 1965 to the date of the
83. 583 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978).
84. Id.
85. "42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
86. EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1978).
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complaint. EEOC's trial counsel informed Zia that these new claims would
have to be resolved before an out of court settlement could be made.
In the district court, the judge found:
"that at the time referral of the case was made to the Denver Liti-
gation Center the local EEOC official knew or should have known
that the AEC and the EEOC were negotiating a conciliation agree-
ment at the Washington level; and that the regional EEOC officials
improperly refused to continue to conciliate in good faith."
He found "the essential condition precedent of the exhaustion
of efforts to conciliate has not been accomplished . .. I do not
think I have any jurisdiction at all to grant any relief in this case
because of the total failure to comply with the statutory man-
date."
8 7
However, the trial judge did address the merits of the case and found that
the plaintiff had failed to prove any discrimination by the defendants.
On the question of the district court's jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit
held that "the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the cause of action.
The inquiry into the duty of 'good faith' on the part of the EEOC is relevant
to whether the court should entertain the claim, or stay the proceedings for
further conciliation effort, not to its power over the cause."88 The case was
remanded for further conciliation negotiations subject to suit in the district
court if the negotiations failed.
III. OTHER CASES
A. Coleman v. Darden
8 9
In another employment related case, a plaintiff brought suit under the
Rehabilitation Act of 197390 and the fifth amendment. The defendants
were various officials of the EEOC. Coleman, although completely blind,
received an undergraduate degree from Louisiana State University and a
law degree from the University of Denver. During law school, he was em-
ployed by the EEOC as a part-time case analyst for one year and then pro-
moted to law clerk. He understood that if he did not gain admission to the
bar within fourteen months of this promotion, he would be terminated. He
was not admitted to the bar during the requisite period; consequently, he
was terminated.
Coleman did not question this termination, but rather the rejection of
his application for the position of research analyst. He contended that he
was denied his constitutional right to due process under the fifth amendment
because the defendants created an irrebuttable presumption that he could
not perform the job of research analyst because of his blindness. He further
alleged that his rejection was a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all
of the plaintiff's claims.
87. Id. at 532.
88. Id. at 533.
89. 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
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1. The Fifth Amendment Claim
The Tenth Circuit held that the conclusive presumption doctrine was
inapplicable to an employment situation such as this. Whenever an appli-
cant is rejected from a job, there is a presumption that someone else could
have performed the job more successfully. Such presumptions are "a fact of
business life" and do not mean "that 'trial periods' should be required for all,
or even all handicapped applicants . . .91
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit rejected Coleman's due process claim
on the ground that he did not have a sufficient property or liberty interest in
obtaining the desired employment. 9 2 Since Coleman could not show a legal
entitlement to the position, his due process rights had not been violated.
2. The Statutory Claims
The Tenth Circuit likewise found grounds to reject each of Coleman's
statutory claims. The Tenth Circuit joined the four other circuits which
have decided the issue when it held that a private cause of action may be
implied from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 9 3 However, it held that under
the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, federal agencies are not
proper defendants. Thus, Coleman's suit against the EEOC was not action-
able.
Coleman had further contended that the Administrative Procedure
Act 94 gave him a right to judicial review of the agency's action. The Tenth
Circuit again agreed with him but found that the applicable standard of
review allowed reversal only if the action was arbitrary or capricious. "The
Court's function is exhausted where a rational basis is found for the agency
action taken." 95 Coleman had worked for the EEOC for over two years, and
the agency was aware of his abilities. This fact showed the court that the
EEOC was not adverse to hiring visually handicapped persons and that the
defendants had rational grounds for not rehiring Coleman. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the trial court's dismissal on all counts.
B. Hardage v. Atkins
96
Hardage v. Atkins was the only purely constitutional case to come before
the Tenth Circuit last term. Title 63, section 2764 of the Oklahoma statutes
banned the shipment of solid waste into Oklahoma from any other state
unless the other state had entered into a reciprocal agreement with
91. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 1979).
92. Id. at 538.
93. Davis v. Southeastern Community Col., 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cer. granted, 99
S. Ct. 830 (1979); United Handicapped Fed. v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
95. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 539 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting from Sabin v. Butz,
515 F.2d 1061, 1067 (10th Cir. 1975)).
96. 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978).
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Oklahoma.9 7 Hardage owned and operated a disposal facility in Oklahoma
and sought customers from Texas which had not entered into the necessary
reciprocal agreement.
The trial court held that solid waste material was not commerce and
therefore not subject to the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. The trial court, however, went on to say that if solid waste were com-
merce, the Oklahoma statute would be unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that a recent United States
Supreme Court decision had decided the status of solid waste material. In
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 the Court held that solid waste material was
commerce and that a ban on its shipment into a state was a violation of the
commerce clause. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court
and held the Oklahoma statute invalid.
IV. GOOD FAITH IMMUNITY FOR LOCAL ENTITIES RECONSIDERED
The Tenth Circuit has reversed en banc the decision of the three-judge
panel in Bertot v. School Dzstrct No. 1,99 which has been previously discussed
in depth in this overview. 100 At the time of the rehearing, Chief Judge Seth
was the only judge from the original panel remaining on the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The only issue before the court on rehearing was the scope of the immu-
nity of school officials and the commensurate liability of the school dis-
trict.' 0 1 Other issues decided by the three-judge panel were not raised on
rehearing. 102
The majority opinion on rehearing, written by Judge McKay, empha-
sized three points, each of which was attacked in the dissenting opinions of
Chief Judge Seth and Judge Barrett. First, the majority found that common
law immunities are applicable to section 1983 actions against local gov-
erning bodies. '0 3 Next the court characterized back pay as an element of
equitable relief rather than compensatory damages.' 0 4 Finally, Judge Mc-
Kay emphasized that the infringement of the plaintiff's first amendment
rights "provide[d] further justification for insuring that full relief is available
to the appellant and that the unconstitutional behavior of the appellees, no
matter how well intentioned, is deterred."'
0 5
97. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2764 (West Supp. 1978) reads in part:
The Division shall disapprove any plan which entails the shipping of controlled indus-
trial waste into the State of Oklahoma, unless the state of origin of such waste has
enacted substantially similar standards for controlled industrial waste disposal as, and
has entered into a reciprocity agreement with, the State of Oklahoma.
98. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
99. No. 76-1169 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 1979).
100. See text accompanying notes 17-34 supra.
101. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 2 n.1, 4 n.3.
102. See, e.g., id. at 4 n.3 in which the court en banc disposed of the eleventh amendment
issue by noting its agreement with the three-judge panel.
103. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 4-8.
104. Id. at 9-10.
105. Id. at 13.
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The rationale of the majority was that at common law the good faith
immunity only protected officials in their individual capacities from personal
liability. Public entities were not granted the same common law immunity
although some entities were protected by the eleventh amendment.' 0 6 The
court refused to write into section 1983 any immunity not recognized at
common law. Since common law allowed recovery of monetary damages
from public entities in appropriate cases, the court held that Congress did
not intend "good faith individual immunity to preclude recovery alto-
gether."' 0 7 Thus, the immunity of the school district is not coextensive with
the immunity of the officials as individuals.
Chief Judge Seth disagreed with the majority's holding on the applica-
bility of common law immunities under section 1983. In doing so, he relied
on the rationale rather than the holding of lmbler v. Pachiman 108 for the prop-
osition that the question is not whether common law immunities apply in an
action against a municipality, but whether considerations of public policy
underlying those immunities "'countenance' immunity under section
1983." 109 Again specifically refusing to distinguish between officials in their
individual and official capacities,i i0 the Chief Judge concluded that public
policy required good faith immunity protection for the school board since
future board decisions could be influenced by the possibility of monetary
liability to the district.
In his separate dissent, Judge Barrett was concerned with the economic
danger to local governing bodies from the majority's holding that "equitable
relief is not precluded by a good faith defense.'ii Judge Barrett further
rejected the majority's distinction between back pay as equitable relief and
compensatory damages. i2 In his opinion, removal of the good faith defense
exposed local entities to dire financial liability for compensatory damages.
Both dissenting judges took issue with the majority's view that the first
amendment implications made the school board's action even more repre-
hensible and thus subject to absolute liability. For the dissenters, the fact
that constitutional rights were involved weighed in favor of a good faith
immunity for the board rather than vice-versa. Quoting from the Bertot II
opinion, Judge Barrett emphasized that " 'we cannot say that the defendants knew
or reasonably should have known that their actions would vitolate constitutional
rights.' '1 13 Since it is difficult to make a "rough predication about the scope
of constitutional rights" as the majority would require the school district to
106. Id. at 5.
107. Id. at 7.
108. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Bertot MI1 majority opinion cited Imbler's holding as support
for incorporation of common law immunities into § 1983. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 4.
109. No. 76-1169, slip op. at I (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2. See also text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
Ill. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 9.
112. Id., slip op. at 4 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 2-3 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting 522 F.2d 1171, 114-85 (10th Cir. 1975))
(emphasis added by Judge Barrett).
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do,'1 t4 the dissenters argued that the school board or the district as such
should not be held liable for making an erroneous prediction.' 
15
Jeremiah B Barry
114. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 14.
115. Id., slip op. at 3 (Seth, C.J., dissenting); id., slip op. at 2-3 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Both
dissenting judges emphasized that the board had followed the Tenth Circuit's own prediction in
Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970), where a
similar claim of failure to renew a nontenured teacher's contract on constitutionally impermissi-
ble grounds was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
Bertot I1 majority, however, found that the board's reliance on Jones only went to the issue of
good faith which had been conceded by the parties on appeal. No. 76-1169, slip op. at 12-13.
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CASE NOTE
CARY V BOARD OF EDUCATION: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT THE
HIGH SCHOOL LEVEL
INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom, now recognized as one of the protected first amend-
ment interests, is a relative newcomer in the catalogue of safeguarded
rights.I Perhaps because it encompasses so many varying interests, its devel-
opment has been piecemeal. 2 While the federal courts have been eager to
recognize the existence of academic freedom, those courts that have grappled
with issues involving this interest have not been able to define its contours.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Car v. Board of Education,3 au-
thored a recent chapter in the continuing development of academic freedom.
A case of first impression, 4 Cag has the potential of foreclosing any right of
high school teachers to select and supplement materials used in their own
classes. Car was a civil rights action 5 in which five high school teachers in
the Aurora, Colorado schools sought a declaratory judgment that their rights
were violated when the school board banned ten books.6 All the books had
been used previously.
7
The trial court found that, although the teachers did have a constitu-
tional right to use the books,8 the right had been waived by the plaintiffs
1. For a comparison of the treatment of academic freedom in two twentieth century cases
decided 41 years apart, see Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927) and Epperson v.
Ark., 393 U.S. 97 (1968), discussed in notes 41-53 and accompanying text infta. See also Van
Alstyne, The Constilutzna/ Rzghts of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841, 841-47 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Teachers Rights]. See note 41 infia.
2. In addition to teachers and students, other groups often are involved in academic free-
dom controversies. Parents often have been the plaintiffs.in actions involving educational is-
sues. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W.V. 1975), in which the plaintiff-
parents claimed their rights were violated because school textbooks undermined their religious
beliefs and invaded their families' privacy because they were anti-Christian in content. 388 F.
Supp. at 94-95.
See note 88 intha for a discussion of the categories of cases that may be viewed as related to
academic freedom.
3. 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
4. Id. at 542.
5. The plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § !343 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977),
afdon other grounds, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
6. 598 F.2d at 536.
7. Id. at 537. The books that were banned had been used in three elective courses for
junior and senior high school students. Id. Those that had been used in contemporary litera-
ture classes were: THE EXORCIST by William P. Blatty; A CLOCKWORK ORANGE, Anthony
Burgess; THE REINCARNATION OF PETER PROUD, Max Ehrlich. Banned from use in contem-
porary poetry classes were: NEw AMERICAN POETRY, Donald Allen; THE YAGE LETrERS, Wil-
liam Burroughs and Allen Ginsberg; CONEY ISLAND OF THE MIND, Lawrence Ferlinghetti;
STARTING FROM SAN FRANCISCO, Lawrence Ferlinghetti; KADDISH AND OTHER POEMS, Allen
Ginsberg; LUNCH POEMS, Frank O'Hara. Outlawed for use in American masters classes was
ROSEMARY'S BABY by Ira Levin. 598 F.2d at 537 n.l.
8. 427 F. Supp. at 953.
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through a collective bargaining agreement between the teachers' union and
the school board.9 The Tenth Circuit, though affirming, found the teachers
had no right to use materials which the board did not approve.o It based its
decision on the rationale that under Colorado law the school board has ple-
nary power over curricular selection."1
I. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Recognition of the idea that learning and teaching-receiving and
transmitting knowledge-are protected interests has been greatest in the
area of higher education; latitude has been widest when the rights of univer-
sity or college professors and students have been involved. 12 When the rights
at stake, however, have been those of teachers whose students are at the ele-
mentary and secondary level, the courts have assumed that the schools are
acting to a large extent in the role of tn laco parentis.1
3
In fact, deference to the rights of parents is the cornerstone of the
Supreme Court's emerging recognition of the special interests of the aca-
demic community in two companion cases that mark the beginning of the
modern trend.' 4 The Court found, in Meyer v. Nebraska 5 and Bartels v.
Iowa,' 6 that the state did not have the right to prohibit the teaching of for-
eign languages.' 7 While the Court indicated that foreign language teachers
had an interest in pursuing their profession,' 8 it relied in large part on the
9. Id. at 955-56.
10. 598 F.2d at 544.
11. Id. at 543.
12. See Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What
They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Publh School Teachers] and
Note, Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1049-50, 1067-68 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
13. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), a~fdan other grounds, 448
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 122-28 and accompanying text infra.
14. In Waugh v. Mississippi University, 237 U.S. 589 (1915), which was decided only eight
years prior to the cases marking the beginning of the modern trend, the Court found that the
fourteenth amendment did not prohibit the state legislature from outlawing Greek letter frater-
nities at a state university. Id. at 596. The Court based its holding on a finding that it was
reasonable for a legislature to establish a disciplinary rule designed to make certain the atten-
tion of students was not diverted from their studies. Id. at 596-97.
In a turn-of-the-century case, Ward v. Bd. of Regents, 138 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1905), the
discharge of a college professor was upheld without any discussion of constitutional considera-
tions. The circuit found valid a statute giving the board of regents plenary power to remove
professors. Id. at 376. "Questions concerning the efficiency of a teacher . . . his usefulness, his
relations to the student body and to the other members of the faculty, are so complicated and
delicate that they are peculiarly for the consideration of the governing authorities of the institu-
tion." Id. at 377.
As recently as 1937, it was noted in a law journal article that, in teacher discharge cases,
courts did not discuss academic freedom. Note, Academic Freedom and the Law, 46 YALE L. J. 670,
672 (1937). The article also stated that university professors had been dismissed because of their
opinions and that "many are inhibited in what they say and write on socially controversial
issues, and in their political activity as citizens, by the fear of academic reprisals." Id. at 670.
For a collection of Supreme Court cases relating to education, see THE SUPREME COURT
AND EDUCATION (Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1976).
15. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For a discussion of Meyer by an author who believes the holding
of the case is extremely limited, see Public School Teachers, supra note 12, at 1305-09.
16. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
17. 262 U.S. at 403, 262 U.S. at 411.
18. 262 U.S. at 400-01.
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rationale that parents have a right to educate their children in a manner of
the parents' choosing, and therefore a right to hire a teacher of their
choice.' 9 And, while indicating that the state had gone too far in prohibit-
ing the teaching of foreign languages, the Court held that the state can make
regulations for schools, including prescribing the curriculum for state
schools.
20
Parental rights also played a key role in West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Bamette,2 1 which was another of the stepping stones in the emer-
gence of recognition of the rights of members of the academic community.
In striking down a resolution requiring children to salute the United States
flag,22 the Court held that the first amendment rights of both children and
their parents had been violated. 23 As in Meyer, academic freedom was not
mentioned. Instead, the Court found the flag salute to be a form of expres-
sion that the state could not prescribe without infringing on the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the first amendment.24 The Court went on to
state that boards of education do not have such absolute control over their
schools that they are immune from constitutional dictates. Respect for con-
stitutional guarantees is necessary to avoid "strangl[ing] the free mind[s]" of
school children.25 In noting that Barnette overruled a decision it had made
just three years earlier in Minersoille School District v. Gobit's,26 the Court
stated that there are circumstances in which courts can overrule decisions of
local school boards.
2 7
The next major steps in the recognition of academic freedom as a pro-
tected interest occurred in a series of cases dealing with the constitutionality
of loyalty programs. Although one of many cases dealing with loyalty pro-
grams involving public employees generally,28 Sweezy o. New Hampshire29 in-
dicated that there are special considerations when an alleged constitutional
violation involves a teacher. The Court termed the need for freedom in the
university community "essential" and stated that "[t]eachers and students
19. Id. at 400-02.
20. Id. at 402.
21. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
22. Id. at 642.
23. Id. at 630-31, 642.
24. Id. at 632-33.
25. Id. at 637.
26. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
27. 319 U.S. at 637. The power of school boards is statutory. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-
109 (1)(t)(1973) requires school boards to select textbooks. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-110(r)
(1973) permits boards to remove materials that are "immoral or pernicious." R.I. GEN LAWS
§ 16-2-16 (1969) gives local school committees the power to designate curriculum and select
texts. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 20-7-602 (1978) provides that the district superintendent or
principal is to choose books, subject to the approval of school trustees. MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 20-7-111 (1978) allows a state board to specify the "basic instructional program," with
local boards of trustees empowered to approve "other instruction."
28. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). For other cases involving teach-
ers and loyalty programs, see, e.g., Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See
generalo Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of The Oath?, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 193.
29. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). For a discussion of Sweezy and the application of the case to
elementary and secondary teachers, see Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to
Teach, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1183-84 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Right to Teach).
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must always remain free to inquire, to study and evaluate, to gain new ma-
turity and understanding . .. 30
An issue similar to the one in Sweezy was involved in a case decided
three years later in Shelton v. Tucker.3 I The plaintiff was a public school
teacher 32 who challenged the constitutionality of a state law requiring dis-
closure by teachers of all organizations to which they had belonged or con-
tributed within five years of filing an annual affadavit. 33 The Court found
that protection of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms was "nowhere more
vital [than] in the community of American schools."'34 However, while rec-
ognizing that freedom of association was particularly important in the aca-
demic setting, the Court reaffirmed its holdings in two earlier cases in which
it had found that the state has a strong interest in insuring that teachers are
competent.
35
A third case involving a teacher who objected to a loyalty program was
Kqtsh'an v. Board of Regents,36 in which the Court overturned 37 a New York
law that disqualified from employment anyone who joined a group advocat-
ing the overthrow of government by force.38 The Court stated that the
country was deeply committed to protecting academic freedom. The first
amendment did not allow laws "that cast a pall of orthodoxy" over the class-
room, which the Court found to be "peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas.' "39 The Court went on to state that the country's future depends on
providing young people a wide exposure to a variety of concepts, rather than
limiting students to the ideas only of those in authority. 4°
The year after Keiysh'an, the Court had an opportunity to deal with a
controversy involving curriculum. Epperson v. Arkansas4 1 was a challenge to
an anti-evolution statute that prohibited teaching of the theory of evolu-
30. 354 U.S. at 250.
31. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
32. Id. at 482.
33. Id. at 480.
34. Id. at 487.
35. Id. at 485 (citing Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) and Beilan v. Bd. of
Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 406 (1958)). In Adler, the Court upheld a New York law disqualifying
teachers who belonged to subversive organizations that were included in a list made by the state
board of regents. 342 U.S. at 493. In Beilan, the Court upheld the removal of a teacher who
had refused to answer questions about communist activities. 357 U.S. at 409. The teacher's
discharge, however, was based on incompetency and insubordination, not on loyalty grounds.
357 U.S. at 406.
While Sweezy, She/ton, Adler and Beilan all involved teachers, the cases primarily dealt with
loyalty programs, which involved the issue of freedom of association. See J. NOWAK, R. RO-
TUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794-801 (1978).
36. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
37. Id. at 609-10.
38. Id. at 593.
39. Id. at 603. The origin of the term "marketplace of ideas" was not indicated in Ktyi-
shan. It was first coined after a Supreme Court decision by Justice Holmes, dissenting in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). The theory did not originate with Holmes.
See, e.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 11 (1859).
40. 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
41. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). For a discussion of Epperson from the point of view of an author
who disagrees with the rationale of the case, see Pubic School Teachers, supra note 14, at 1309-16.
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tion.42 The Court found the law unconstitutional because it was a violation
of the first amendment prohibitions on establishment of religion or on denial
of the free exercise of religion. Although it based its decision on the religious
dictates of the first amendment, the Court found that the state was not free
to impose on teachers conditions restrictive of their first amendment free-
doms. 43 The Court indicated that it would not hesitate to intervene when
the state imposed arbitrary restrictions "upon the freedom of teachers to
teach and of students to learn."
4 4
While the Court indicated that teachers and students are entitled to
constitutional protections, it cautioned, however, that the decision was not
an attempt to deal with "the multitude of controversies that beset our cam-
puses today."'45 Instead, Epperson resolved the issue of the teaching ban
within the narrow confines of the first amendment's religious freedom guar-
antees. 46 The Court also stated that, for the most part, public education is
to be controlled by state and local authorities. Courts will not intervene in
conflicts arising in schools when the issues involved do not sharply implicate
basic constitutional values.
4 7
In a separate concurrence, Justice Black indicated that he was more
adamant than the majority in his belief that the control of education was
almost wholly within the power of the states. Schools should be free to
choose their own curricula so long as such action "does not palpably conflict
with a clear constitutional command." He could find no reason a state
would be prohibited from "withdraw[ing] from its curriculum any subject
deemed too emotional and controversial for its public schools." Instead of
basing the decision on religious freedom, Justice Black stated he would have
struck down the Arkansas statute on vagueness grounds.
48
In a portion of the concurrence quoted verbatim in Cagy,49 Justice Black
stated that it was questionable whether academic freedom would permit a
teacher to breach his contract by straying from the subjects approved by
school officials. 50 Furthermore, he expressed doubts about the wisdom of the
Supreme Court supervising and censoring the curricula of schools "in every
hamlet and city in the United States."
'5 '
Justice Stewart, concurring in Epperson, emphatically asserted that
states are free to designate school curricula.5 2 Stewart, who also was quoted
42. 393 U.S. at 98. An anti-evolution statute was the issue in a famous early twentieth
century case, Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), which has generated a great
deal of literature, both legal and nonlegal. See note I supra. See also Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws
and the Public Schools. A Second Connumption?, 27 VAND. L. REv. 209 (1974) and Right to Teach,
supra note 29, at 1176. Nonlegal literature includes L. ALLEN, BRYAN AND DARROW AT DAY-
TON (1967) and J. LAWRENCE & R. LEE, INHERIT THE WIND (1955).
43. 393 U.S. at 103-07 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603, 605-606).
44. 393 U.S. at 105 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390).
45. 393 U.S. at 105-06.
46. Id. at 103.
47. Id. at 104.
48. Id. at 112-13.
49. 598 F.2d at 540.
50. 393 U.S. at 113-14.
51. Id. at 114.
52. Id. at 115.
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in the Car decision, based his concurrence on the rationale that a state could
not constitutionally forbid a teacher to mention the theory of evolution.
However, he stated that the state is free to mandate that particular subjects
be excluded. For example, the state could dictate that Spanish would be the
only foreign language taught, but could not constitutionally punish a
teacher for informing the students that other languages are spoken.
5 3
The rights of both teachers and students were addressed by the Court a
few months after the Epperson decision in Tinker v. Des Moines School Ditlrt,
5 4
in which the Court found that the plaintiffs, public school students, could
not be suspended for wearing armbands because their conduct was protected
by the free speech clause of the first amendment.55 But while the Court
found that students and teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"' 56 it reaffirmed its
earlier holding that state and school officials have wide discretion in running
the schools. 57 This authority will yield only when there is a clear indication
of danger, and it is not enough for school authorities merely to show that
suppression of expression is grounded on a wish to avoid "discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 58
The Court went on to state that, while officials may avoid material dis-
ruptions, the schools are not "enclaves of totalitarianism" in which the stu-
dents may be regarded as "closed-circuit recipients" of only the ideas the
authorities think appropriate. 59 Among the purposes of a school is commu-
nication among students, 6° an indication that students have the right to re-
ceive information, as well as the right to express their own ideas.
In a dissent cited in the Caqy decision, 6 1 Justice Black stated that a
teacher does not have a "complete right" to free expression when instructing
elementary and high school students. 62 Black again 63 found that teachers
are hired to teach a specified curriculum, and are obligated to adhere to it.
6 4
Justice Stewart, in a separate concurrence, indicated that children do
not have first amendment rights equal to those of adults. Analogizing a
child to "someone in a captive audience," Justice Stewart indicated a child's
individual choice, in some circumstances, would be less than that of an
adult.
65
Tinker was the last of the major extensions of a general right of aca-
demic freedom. Although the Burger Court has had the opportunity to ad-
53. Id. at 115-116.
54. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For a discussion of Thker, see Miller, Teachers'Freedom of Expression
Wtuht'n the Classroom- .4 Search for Standards, 8 GA. L. REV. 837, 849-56 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Standards].
55. 393 U.S. at 505-06.
56. Id. at 506.
57. Id. at 507.
58. Id. at 509.
59. Id. at 511.
60. Id. at 512.
61. 598 F.2d at 540.
62. 393 U.S. at 521.
63. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
64. 393 U.S. at 522.
65. Id. at 515.
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dress the issue of academic freedom, it has declined to do so. 66 In fact, the
Burger Court only once has used the phrase "academic freedom" in its opin-
ions dealing with educational issues.
6 7
In San Antonio Independent School Distn'ct v. Rodr'guez,6' the Court found
there was no constitutional infirmity69 in a state education financing plan in
which there were wide disparities between local districts in expenditures.
70
Texas' aid to education plan had been attacked on the grounds that it dis-
criminated on the basis of wealth. 7 ' While stating that education is proba-
bly the most important function of local government, 72 the Court held that
there is no constitutional right to an education. 73 "[T]he undisputed impor-
tance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation.
'74
In Healy v. James,75 petitioners were college students who claimed their
first amendment rights of freedom of expression and association were vio-
lated when the president of the school refused to grant official recognition to
a chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society. 76 While reaffirming
some of the major themes of its previous decisions recognizing the rights of
members of the academic community, 77 the Court was unwilling to find that
the students had a right to official campus recognition. 78 Instead, the case
was remanded for a determination of whether or not the petitioners would
abide by reasonable campus regulations.
79
While the Court in Healy stated that institutions of higher education are
not immune from the first amendment, it also reiterated the position it had
taken in Tinker, that school authorities have great authority in controlling
conduct of students.80 The Court relied on Shelton in finding that a college is
a particularly appropriate place for a free interchange of ideas, and stated it
was not a new idea that the country is dedicated to protecting academic
freedom.
8 '
The rights of high school students were at issue in Goss v. Lopez,8 2 in
which the Court found by a 5-4 margin that due process requires school
officials to conduct informal, on-the-spot hearings before suspending stu-
66. The Burger Court denied certiorari in three academic freedom cases and affirmed
without opinion a third. All three lower court holdings curtailed academic freedom. See notes
156-59 and accompanying text thfa.
67. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
68. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
69. Id. at 58-59.
70. Id. at 9-17.
71. Id. at 19-20.
72. Id. at 29 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
73. 411 U.S. at 33.
74. Id.
75. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
76. Id. at 172-77.
77. Id. at 180-81.
78. Id. at 194.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 180 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507).
81. Id. (citing Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487).
82. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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dents for 10 days or less.8 3 While academic freedom was not mentioned, the
Court again restated its view that students do not lose their constitutional
rights by virtue of attending school. However, it tempered this recognition
of rights by finding the authority of school officials to be "very broad."
8 4
The Court noted that the lower federal courts had uniformly held the due
process clause applicable to expulsions of students from state institutions.
8 5
While Goss marked the extension of constitutional protections to high
school students, the case also can be interpreted as signalling a possible fu-
ture retreat by the Court in the area of the rights of members of the aca-
demic community. Not only was Goss a 5-4 decision, but one of the
majority was Justice Douglas, who retired later in the year. His replace-
ment, Justice Stevens, often has voted with the four Goss dissenters, Justices
Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.
8 6
To summarize, the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of academic
freedom in a variety of settings. While it has recognied that constitutional
rights apply to students and teachers, the court also, however, has stated that
control is vested primarily in the local school authorities, and particularly in
school boards. Although the Court has indicated that academic freedom
exists, it has done little to define the extent of that freedom, beyond indicat-
ing that traditional constitutional safeguards apply to members of the aca-
demic community.
In particular, the Court has not defined the limits of the state's powers
in the area of curriculum contols, which was the issue addressed in Cat,. Of
the modern Supreme Court cases recognizing the right of academic freedom,
only Epperson8 7 has dealt with the issue of how far the state may go in forbid-
ding the teaching of particular topics. And Epperson could be interpreted as
standing only for the proposition that a state, while it has road power to
control curriculum, cannot infringe on religious freedom through a law that
establishes a particular religion by promoting that religion's doctrine via its
schools.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Although the Supreme Court has defined the contours of academic free-
dom only in broad terms, many of the lower federal courts have attempted
to provide more substantive guidelines for the rights of members of the aca-
demic community.8 8 In doing so, the courts have lacked consistency. In the
83. Id. at 581.
84. Id. at 574 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-07; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
85. 419 U.S. at 576-78 n.8.
86. For cases in which Stevens has voted with the Goss dissenters, see, e.g., United States v.
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). Contra,
Houchins, Sheriff v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
87. See notes 41-53 and accompanying text supra.
88. Several difficulties arise in defining the parameters of academic freedom. First, the
freedom applies to several groups. See note 2 supra. In addition, there are a number of types of
cases involving issues that may be viewed as related, at least peripherally, to academic freedom:
1. Cases involving the right of school authorities to remove or ban books used in
the school library and curriculum. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School
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area of curricular controls, in fact, there is a split in the circuits. 89
There are hundreds of federal court decisions dealing with educational
issues. Many of these involve the due process rights of students and teach-
ers.90 Those cases are beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on con-
trol of curriculum and teaching methods. Within this area, two recent cases
have involved the removal of books from school libraries. Most of the con-
troversies have arisen, however, when high school teachers have been fired
for using materials deemed improper by school authorities. A third group of
opinions included in this section relates to the need for school authorities to
supply reasons for their actions, thus establishing a record for review.
A. The Pre-Academtc Freedom Cases
The curriculum cases did not arise in a vacuum. Prior to the decisions
concerning teaching materials, there were many federal court opinions deal-
ing with other issues involving school authorities and education, for exam-
Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), discussed in notes 178-79 and accompanying text
infra.
2. Curriculum content cases, including those in which teachers were discharged
for using teaching materials or methods that school authorities found to be obscene or
inappropriate. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), discussed in
notes 100-10 and accompanying text infra.
3. Discharge cases in which teachers claim procedural due process violations.
See, e.g., Ahern v. Bd. of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); Prebble v. Brodrick, 535
F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976).
4. Cases in which students have alleged that there have been due process viola-
tions in some action taken against them. See, e.g., Goss, discussed at text accompanying
notes 82-85 supra.
5. Cases in which teachers have alleged their rights to free expression and free
assembly have been violated. See, e.g., Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.
1978); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the free
speech rights of teachers when the speech involves extramural activities, see 81bic
School Teachers, supra note 12, at 1303-05. See also (by the same author) Goldstein,
Academic Freedom: Its Meaning and Underl'yng Premises as Seen Through the American Experi-
ence, 11 ISRAEL L. REV. 52 (1976).
6. Cases in which students have alleged their rights of free expression and assem-
bly have been violated. See, e.g., Tiker, discussed at text accompanying notes 54-65;
Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
965 (1970). See also Abbott, Due Process and Seconda School Dismissals, 20 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 378 (1969); Van Alstyne, Thejudicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20
U. FLA. L. REV. 290 (1968). A landmark case in which a court of appeals found that
an expelled student was entitled to certain rights as a matter of procedural due process
was Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961). Among the lawyers arguing the case for the plaintiffs was Thurgood Marshall,
who was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1967.
7. Cases in which the method of taxation to support schools is alleged to be
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Rodriguez, discussed in text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
8. Those in which the spending of public money for parochial schools or the
children attending such schools is alleged to be a violation of the first amendment
establishment clause prohibiting the establishment of a religion. See, e.g. Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
89. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), discussed at notes 100-110 and
accompanying text itfa. In Keefe, the court found unconstitutional the firing of a teacher who
had used a "vulgar term" during a discussion of a magazine article he had assigned. 418 F.2d at
361-62. But see Brubaker v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), a don rehearing en banc, 502
F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975), discussed at notes 134-45 and accom-
panying text infra.
90. See note 88 supra.
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pie, the procedural due process rights of students. 9 1 Recognition of the
rights of teachers and students, however, is relatively new. As recently as the
mid-1960s, some courts still were reluctant to recognize the constitutional
free speech rights of teachers. In a 1965 case, Parker v. Board of Education of
Prince George's County, Md ,92 the Fourth Circuit stated it need not rule on the
validity of a discharged teacher's first amendment claims because the in-
structor was a probationary teacher. 93 The plaintiff had assigned a book
included in an approved school book list, Brave New World by Aldous Hux-
ley. He was told his contract would not be renewed after a parent com-
plained about the assignment. 94 Academic freedom was not mentioned in
either the district or appeals courts' decisions.
Nor was academic freedom discussed in two cases decided the next year
by the Fifth Circuit. 95 The cases involved the wearing of freedom buttons
indicating support of the civil rights movement. 96 In one case, the wearing
of the buttons was found to be free speech protected by the first amend-
ment. 97 In the other, the circuit court held school authorities could prohibit
the wearing of the buttons where school discipline was undermined. 98 The
cases were predecessors to Tinker, and were cited extensively by the Supreme
Court in that decision three years later.99
B. The Teaching Method and Curriculum Content Cases
The existence of a teacher's academic freedom to teach was said to be
conceded by the school authorities in a First Circuit decision handed down a
few months after the Supreme Court's Tinker opinion. °° In Keefe v. Ge-
anakos,10 1 a teacher was suspended after he led a class discussion of a "dirty"
word that appeared in an Atlantic Monthly article assigned to senior English
class students. 10 2  Finding no precedent with which it agreed, the court
stated bluntly that it was not impressed with the reasoning of the Fourth
Circuit in Parker. 10 3 Since there were at least five books in the school library
containing the same word, it would be inconsistent for the school authorities
91. E.g., Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961); Hammond v. S.C. State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
92. 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966). For an example of a
decision in which a court held that first amendment claims must be considered, see Pred v. Bd.
of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969), discussed in notes 198-199 and accompanying
text in7fta.
93. 348 F.2d at 465.
94. 237 F.Supp. 222, 224-25 (D. Md.), a'd per curiam, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
95. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of
Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
96. 363 F.2d at 746; 363 F.2d at 750.
97. 363 F.2d at 747-49.
98. 363 F.2d at 754.
99. 393 U.S. at 505-13.
100. Tinker was decided in 1969. See notes 54-65 and accompanying text supra.
101. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969). For an extended discussion of Keefe, see Nahmod, Contro-
versy in the Classroom." The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1032, 1036-37 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Controversj].
102. 418 F.2d at 360-61. The word was described by the court as a "vulgar term for an
incestuous son." Id. at 361.
103. Id. at 362. Parker is discussed in text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
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to fire a teacher for discussing it in class. 1'
Further, the Keefe court noted that the word was "currently used." If
the students had to be protected from such language, the court would "fear
f6r their future." Conceding that the word would offend some parents, the
court surmised that the term was not unknown to many high school seniors.
The circuit stated that it agreed with the school authorities, however, that
obscenity standards should be variable-what would be obscene for students
would not be obscene for adults.'
0 5
While noting that school authorities have the right to regulate speech in
the classroom, 10 6 the First Circuit found the magazine article to be "schol-
arly, thoughtful and thought-provoking."'0 7 Furthermore, there would be a
chilling effect if the state were allowed to engage in such "rigorous censor-
ship."1
0 8
The Keefe court made this ground-breaking decision in the absence of
any guidelines, except for reference to opinions that the court recognized as
dealing with academic freedom generally.' 09 Nor did the circuit court try to
formulate a test to be used in the future. Instead, the appeals court evalu-
ated the material used and the discussion by the teacher of the offending
word, and virtually took judicial notice of the fact that the article and dis-
cussion were appropriate for high school seniors."t 0
In Parducci v. Rutland,"' decided a few months after Keefe,' 12 a federal
district court adopted a rationale similar to that of the First Circuit. The
teacher, whose ability was unquestioned, was fired after she refused to stop
assigning a story, "Welcome to the Monkey House," by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.,
to her junior English classes." 13 Finding that there were books on an ap-
proved list and in the school library containing language more offensive than
that used in the Vonnegut story,"14 the court relied on two Supreme Court
decisions, Roth v. United States'15 and Ginsberg," t 6 to determine whether the
104. 418 F.2d at 362-63.
105. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). In Gtnberg, the Supreme
Court found that the state is not constitutionally prohibited from applying different standards
for the sale of obscene material to minors than it does for adult sales. The Court based its
decision on the rationale that the state's authority to control minors' conduct is more extensive
than its authority over adults. Id. at 637-43.
The Gtnsberg "variable obscenity" test is based on the premise that the adults "who have
this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed
to aid discharge of that responsibility," as well as the government's interest in protecting minors.
Id. at 639-40.
106. Id. at 362.
107. Id. at 361.
108. Id. at 362.
109. d.
110. The court stated that it did not need affidavits to find the article "scholarly, thoughtful
and though-provoking." Id. at 361.
11I. 316 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ala. 1970). For an extended discussion of Parducci, see Contro-
versy, supra note 101, at 1036-41.
112. The court cited the portion of Keefe in which the First Circuit discussed the common
use of the "dirty" word involved and the fear of school authorities that parents might be of-
fended. 316 F. Supp. at 356 (citing 418 F.2d at 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969)).
113. 316 F. Supp. at 353-54. See note 169 infta.
114. Id. at 356-57.
115. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
116. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See note 105 supra. For a discussion of the applicability of the
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story was obscene.' 17
In addition to the obscene nature of the material, the court considered
the appropriateness of the story for students who were high school juniors. It
also relied heavily on evidence that the assignment had not threatened or
caused disruption of the educational process.' 18 The court did not explicitly
state that it was formulating a three-pronged test consisting of the material's
appropriateness, its obscene nature, and interference with school discipline.
The rationale came closer, however, to formulating a test for evaluating cur-
riculum controversies than did most of the other opinions dealing with simi-
lar issues.
Although the Parducci court indicated that teachers should be given lati-
tude in choosing teaching materials, it based its holding in part on the un-
fairness of discharging a teacher for conduct not previously prohibited by
school authorities. The court also noted that it was not commenting "upon
the advisability of requiring school administrators to promulgate rules and
regulations .... ,1,i9 These comments indicate that the court would have
found that school officials have the authority to promulgate rules governing
teaching materials.
The most extensive effort by any federal court to devise guidelines for
resolving curriculum disputes was attempted by a federal district court in
Mailloux v. Key. 120 The district court's test for evaluating the acceptability
of teaching materials was not affirmed on appeal, even though the First Cir-
cuit did uphold the portion of the trial court's opinion finding the firing of a
teacher impermissible on the ground that rules governing teacher conduct
were too vague.
12 1
The plaintiff in Mailoux had written the word "fuck" on the blackboard
during a discussion of a novel in his English class of high school juniors. The
word was not used in the novel, nor was it spoken during the class. There
was an unsupported allegation that the teacher had asked a girl to define the
word. There were no school regulations governing the use of such words.
Experts testified the word was relevant and served an educational purpose,
but school authorities testified to the contrary. The trial court found that,
under the circumstances, the word was not inappropriate.
22
Relying on Keefe and Parducci, the district court found that a public
school teacher not only has a right to freedom of speech inside and outside of
the classroom, but also a measure of academic freedom in his classroom
teaching. ' 2 3 The court defined the issue as whether a secondary teacher had
a right to choose a method that was not necessary, not shown by the weight
Ginsberg obscenity test to the classroom setting, see Controversy, supra note 101, at 1050-53.
117. 316 F. Supp. at 355-56.
118. Id. at 356.
119. Id at 356-57.
120. 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), a'd on other grounds, 448 F.2d at 1242 (Ist Cir. 1971). For
a discussion of Matloux, see Public School Teachers, supra note 12, at 1324-31.
121. 448 F.2d at 1243. The case was before the First Circuit twice. See note 127 infra.
122. 323 F. Supp. at 1387-90.
123. Id. at 1390.
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of opinion as permissible, and not obviously proper, but was relevant, and in
the opinion of experts served a serious educational purpose. The court found
that this qualified right was the central tenant of academic freedom.124 The
court limited its holding, however, by finding that when a teacher uses such
a method, he may be fired if he has been given advance notice that the
method is prohibited.'
25
The court also distinguished the rights of secondary teachers from those
of college professors. Not only is a secondary teacher less skilled, but he is
hired to concentrate on "transmitting basic knowledge" and is expected to
indoctrinate students in the mores of society, the court held. While high
schools are not inflexible, neither are they "open forums" for the exchange of
ideas. 126
In affirming the decision on the vagueness grounds, the First Circuit
stated in a brief opinion that, while the district court's effort to formulate
guidelines was "sensitive," this test would cause more problems than it
would solve. The circuit could find no substitute for "a case-by-case inquiry
into whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably suf-
ficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech."'
127
Curriculum was only one of several issues presented in the first of two
cases considered by the Seventh Circuit, Clark v. Holmes,' 28 which involved
the firing of a temporary, nontenured university teacher. The plaintiff had
been warned that he counselled too many students, overemphasized sex in
health classes, 129 counselled students with his door shut, and criticized other
faculty members in discussions with students. His superiors had disapproved
of all of these practices. The court found for the university, primarily on the
ground that the state has wide discretion in deciding whom to employ as a
teacher.1
3 0
In discussing the curriculum issue, the court found that academic free-
dom is not "a license for uncontrolled expression at variance" with estab-
lished curriculum. 131 The circuit also distinguished the teacher's comments
from those made by public employees speaking as citizens, rather than in
their roles as government workers. 132 Further, the court found that a
124. Id. at 1392.
125. Id.
126. 323 F.2d at 1392.
127. 448 F.2d at 1243. The case was before the First Circuit for the second time, having
been dismissed without prejudice earlier in the year. 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1971). The first
appeal was brought by school authorities, who were unsuccessful in an attempt to obtain a stay
of the district court's preliminary injunction requiring that the plaintiff be returned to work
pending trial. In upholding the district court's issuance of the stay order, the circuit indicated
that factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of teaching materials include
the age and sophistication of students, relevance of the educational purpose, and context and
manner of presentation. 436 F.2d at 566.
128. 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. dented, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
129. The overemphasis on sex in the teacher's health course was the only curricular issue in
the case.
130. 474 F.2d at 929-31.
131. Id. at 931.
132. Id. at 931-32. The Seventh Circuit distinguished several cases on the ground that they
involved teachers who were fired for speaking about public issues. In particular, the court
found the fact pattern in Clark to be distinguishable from that in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
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teacher may be limited in what he teaches by the need to maintain discipline
in the classroom, by a need for confidentiality between the teacher and other
members of the faculty, or because the teacher's conduct interferes with his
duty to teach.
33
In the second of the two Seventh Circuit opinions, Brubaker V. Board of
Education,' 34 the court upheld the discharge of three eighth grade teachers
on the ground they had distributed "obscene and improper" materials to
students. The teachers had distributed brochures about a documentary
movie depicting Woodstock, a 1969 rock music festival. There were refer-
ences in the brochure to drugs, sex, and what the court called "vulgari-
ties."1
3 5
Two of the teachers claimed that the brochure was relevant to the sub-
jects they taught. The class of one of the plaintiffs, who taught language
arts, had been studying the history of rock music. 136 Another appellant
taught industrial arts and said the brochure contributed to the students' in-
terest in constructing musical instruments. The third teacher made no
claims about the relevancy of the material. She did not, however, distribute
the brochure directly to the students. Instead, she gave it to the other two
plaintiffs, placed some copies in the teachers' lounge, and displayed a poster
from the brochure in her classroom.1
37
The circuit quoted extensively from the testimony of two "eminently
educated" experts who found the materials to be both relevant and appro-
priate.' 38 It also found that a member of the staff of the state Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction was qualified to testify as an expert. The staff
member stated that the brochure, which had no educational value, was in-
appropriate for elementary school students.' 39 After excerpting from the ex-
perts' testimony at length, the court indicated that there was no need for
expert testimony, since the controverted material was in evidence. 140
Although the court did not indicate what test it was using or even state
explicitly that it had found the material to be obscene with respect to junior
high students, the opinion clearly indicated that the court was shocked. In
addition to terming the material "vulgar," the court asked: "It is probably a
fair inference that by second or third year high school (sic) most American
U.S. 563 (1968), in which the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional to fire a teacher who
had written a letter to a newspaper criticizing the school board. The Court found that the state
did not have any significantly greater interest in regulating its employees' speech than in regu-
lating the expression of other citizens when the speech was comment on public issues. 391 U.S.
at 568.
133. 474 F.2d at 931. The Seventh Circuit stated that the legitimate state interests that
could be used as a basis for limiting a teacher's speech were suggested by tckering, discussed in
note 132 supra.
134. 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), aj'd on rehearing en bane, 502 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denzed, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
135. 502 F.2d at 975-76.
136. The court appeared to be puzzled as to the reason rock music history was a topic
studied in a language arts class. "We are not advised what rock music has to do with Language
Arts .... " Id. at 978.
137. Id. at 977-78.
138. Id. at 980-81.
139. Id. at 982.
140. Id at 984.
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males have become familiar with, and at times employ, these and like words.
Is it only a forlorn hope, however, that most of our young ladies will never
employ that kind of speech?" 14' The court also indicated it thought the
teachers should have expressed "regret" over the matter.' 42
In a dissent, Judge Fairchild stated that the brochure was not obscene.
Noting that "[t]he use of profanity does not tranform the controversial into
the obscene," he found that academic freedom gives a teacher some latitude
in selecting material. He also commented that the appropriateness of a dis-
cussion topic could not be judged solely by the topic of the course. A success-
ful teacher may relate to his students through a philosophical discussion,
since "academic freedom is the exchange of ideas which promote education
in its broadest sense."
14 3
The difficulty with the Brubaker opinion is that the Seventh Circuit gave
no reasons for upholding the discharge, other than the clear indication that
the judges were shocked. Although the court devoted extensive space to ex-
cerpts from the testimony of the experts who supported the use of the
brochure, it did not state why the experts' opinions were disregarded. The
opinion is mostly a recitation of the facts 144 with almost no rationale. The
court excuses this failure on the ground that its conclusion "emerges so
clearly that we decline to add . . . to the already abundant literature on the
subject . . . ." Just where the court found such a wealth of material on the
subject is a mystery, since the opinion cited only one other curriculum case,
AMai/loux. 145
The teaching of a controversial unit on race relations and other topics
led to the firing of a high school teacher of civics and political science in
Sterzt'ng v. Fort Bend Independent School Dzstrct..146 In finding that the Texas
teacher's rights had been violated, the district court stated that a teacher
must be able to adapt his course to modern times. While there may be some
limits placed on a teacher's methods, he should not have to risk dismissal for
including controversial issues in his curriculum. In what is the strongest of
any statement of the right of a teacher to designate course content, the court
said that "[a] responsible teacher must have freedom to use the tools of his
141. Id. at 976. The court also stated that the poetry in the brochure could be interpreted
as a "beckoning" for students to "throw off the dull discipline imposed on them by the moral
environment of their home life, and in exchange to enter into a new world of love and freedom
...to take their clothes off and to get an early start in the use of ... vulgarities ....
Among the words that appeared to shock the court were "shit" and "fucking." Id.
142. Id. at 982.
143. Id. at 991-92.
144. Id. at 983. The court indicated it was supplying such detailed factual background to
"expose the correctness" of its decision.
145. Id. at 984-85 (citing Malloux, 436 F.2d at 566, 448 F.2d at 1243, discussed at notes 120-
27 and accompanying text supra).
146. 376 F. Supp. 657, 658-60 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated and remanded, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1974). The appeal was brought solely on the ground that the district judge, while awarding
monetary damages, had denied reinstatement of the teacher. The Fifth Circuit remanded for
reconsideration of the remedy, finding that it was impermissible for the trial court to consider
that reinstatement would be "too antagonistic." While not ordering reinstatement, the court of
appeals commented: "Enforcement of constitutional rights frequently has disturbing conse-




profession as he sees fit." The court termed such freedom of choice a sub-
stantive right. 1
47
The Serzing court placed on the school authorities the burden of mak-
ing sure that sensitive subjects are handled properly. The court suggested
that a school district, rather than manacling its teachers because it fears con-
troversial subjects will be treated improperly, should hire instructors who are
capable of teaching responsibly. It also indicated that it was relying on
favorable expert opinion concerning the acceptability of the materials, the
fact there was shown to be an educational purpose, and the procedural right
of a teacher to use a method not prohibited by school regulations. Although
indicating that its holding was based in part on the fact the teaching method
was not proscribed, the court seemed to imply that a school district would
not have the right to forbid the teaching of topics "within the ambit of ac-
cepted professional standards."'
148
A statutorily imposed curriculum control was unsuccessfully challenged
in Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Education, 149 in which a three-judge district
court panel upheld a law prohibiting the discussion of birth control in public
schools. '50 While finding that a teacher had the right to raise the issue of the
constitutionality of the law on his own behalf, the panel held that he did not
have standing to assert students' rights to learn about birth control.1 '
In a strongly worded opinion, the court, while stating that the right of
the state is not absolute,' 52 found that the first amendment does not give a
teacher a right to instruct "beyond the scope of the established curriculum."
It is perfectly proper, the panel held, for the state to establish a. curriculum
either by law, as it did in the birth control statute, or by delegating the
responsibility to local school boards.1
53
Parents who do not agree with the state's choice of curriculum have the
choice of sending their children to private schools, the Mercer court reasoned.
In addition, the banned information could be "left for grasping from other
sources, such as the family, peers or other institutions."' 54 The court seemed
to imply that, because the information was available elsewhere, it was not
unconstitutional for the state to prohibit its teaching, a justification that ap-
pears to be contrary to the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the area of
restraints on expression.'
55
But perhaps the most significant aspect of the Mercer case is its affirm-
147. 376 F. Supp. at 661-62.
148. Id. at 662. In addition to the academic freedom ground, the court based its holding on
procedural due process grounds, since the teacher was not given notice of the charges against
him or a chance to rebut them. Id. at 660. The court also chided the school authorities for not
learning firsthand about the teaching methods involved, indicating that instead the court had
relied on "hearsay remarks." Id. at 661.
149. 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), afd, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
150. Id. at 582, 587.
151. Id. at 584.
152. Id. at 585 (citing Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107, discussed in notes 41-53 and accompanying
text supra).
153. 379 F. Supp. at 585.
154. Id. at 586.
155. Eg., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n. 4 (1974); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
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ance by the Burger Court. 156 Although upheld without opinion, Mercer is
the only one of the lower court decisions dealing with curriculum controls
that was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied by the
Court in three other curriculum decisions that were clearly restrictive of aca-
demic freedom, Brubaker, 15 7 Presidents Council, Distrit 25 v. Community School
Board No. 25,158 and Clark . Holmes.' 59
A teaching method was at issue in Wilson v. Chancellor,'6° in which a
district court found that the right of academic freedom encompasses the de-
cision of high school teachers to use outside speakers. Wilson is unusual
among the cases considering teaching methods because there had been no
teacher discharge. The court held that, even in the absence of actual or
threatened loss of employment, proscriptions on teaching methods impliedly
indicate a threat of sanction, thereby restricting the teacher's freedom of ex-
pression. 161
Noting that few courts had considered the extent to which academic
freedom is protected by the first amendment, the opinion stated that secon-
dary school teachers are to be accorded less free rein than university profes-
sors. It based this difference on the assumption that professors are involved
on a quest for knowledge, while secondary teachers merely disseminate infor-
mation.1 6 2 Furthermore, the court found school boards should be allowed
wide discretion in making decisions. A court should not intervene merely on
the basis that the school board's decision appears unwise. If the board has
violated someone's constitutional rights, however, then courts are required to
intervene. 
16 3
C. The Book Banni'ng Cases
During the same year that the Seventh Circuit decided that it was per-
missible to fire a college teacher for including too much about sex in his
health classes, the Second Circuit put its stamp of approval on the removal
of books from junior high school libraries in Presidents Council, District 25 V.
Communty School Board No. 25.164 The case is similar to both Cay and Wilson
in that no teacher was fired. Instead, the plaintiff was an organization of
presidents and past presidents of parent and parent-teacher groups, three
students, seven additional parents, two teachers, a librarian and a princi-
pal.16 5 The action was brought after the school board voted to remove a
156. 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
157. Discussed in notes 134-145 and accompanying text supra.
158. Discussed in notes 164-177 and accompanying text infra.
159. Discussed in notes 128-33 and accompanying text supra.
160. 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976). Attorneys fees were awarded to the plaintiffs, a stu-
dent and a teacher, in a subsequent opinion. 425 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (D. Or. 1977).
161. 418 F. Supp. at 1361-63.
162. Se Pubh& School Teachers, note 12 supra.
163. 418 F. Supp. at 1362.
164. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), ceri. dened, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
165. This alliance of plaintiffs was the most inclusive of any plaintiff group in any of the
cases presented in this paper. The opponents of the book ban undoubtedly thought their
chances of success would be heightened if all segments of the community were represented. If,
for example, parents' rights were not found to be violated, those of teachers or students might
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book containing obscenities and sex. 166
The circuit, quoting from the portion of Epperson that indicated courts
should not interfere in the day-to-day operations of schools,1 6 7 found there
had been nothing more than a "miniscule" infringement on the constitu-
tional rights of any of the plaintiffs,1 68 however, it did not discuss the sepa-
rate rights of each of the groups involved. Instead, the circuit reasoned that
some authority has to select the books for school libraries. The court was
unconvinced by any claim of constitutional violations: "shouts of book
burning, witch hunting and violation of academic freedom" did not elevate
an issue involving daily operation of schools to a controversy of constitu-
tional level. The circuit stated that the infringement would have to be much
more severe to excuse "the intrusions of three or even nine federal jurists
making curriculum or library choices for the community of scholars."'
169
The court did not indicate what would constitute an infringement of suffi-
cient magnitude.
The court was equally unmoved by the plaintiffs' argument that the
initial selection or rejection of a book was different from removing volumes
from the shelves:
This concept of a book acquiring tenure by shelving is indeed novel
and unsupportable under any theory of constitutional law we can
discover. It would seem clear to us that books which become obso-
lete or irrelevant or where improperly selected initally, for
whatever reason, can be removed by the same authority which was
empowered to make the selection in the first place.17
0
Keefe' y ' and Parducci*'72 were distinguished on the ground that they in-
volved the discharge of teachers, and therefore presented due process consid-
erations. Further, the Presidents Council court clearly stated that it was
disagreeing with the holdings in those two cases to the extent that the courts
had found that first amendment rights are violated when a court disagrees
with school authorities about the material assigned by a teacher.
173
In a lone dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 174 Justice
Douglas indicated he would find that the school authorities had violated the
first amendment rights of school children "to hear, to learn, to know." Not-
ing that academic freedom had been upheld against various attacks, 175 Jus-
be. However, the Second Circuit did not address the rights of each group separately. 457 F.2d
289.
166. 457 F.2d at 290. The book was DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS, by Piri Thomas.
167. 393 U.S. at 104. The circuit quoted the portion of the opinion stating that courts
cannot intervene in local school affairs unless constitutional rights are sharply implicated. 457
F.2d at 291.
168. 457 F.2d at 290-92.
169. Id. at 292. For a discussion of the role of the courts in resolving controversies in the
schools, see Rzght to Teach, supra note 29, at 1194-99.
170. 457 F.2d at 293.
171. See notes 101-10 and accompanying text supra.
172. Se notes 111-119 and accompanying text supra.
173. 457 F.2d at 293-94.
174. 409 U.S. 998 (1975).
175. Id. at 999 (citing Kqishian, 385 U.S. 589; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952);




tice Douglas implied that it was improper for a school board to make such a
decision on the basis that its own "sensibilities" had been offended. He
thought the purposes of education should include eliminating prejudices and
teaching children to solve the world's problems. Further, he stated that, un-
der Tker,17 6 such restrictions on first amendment rights should be invoked
only when there were disciplinary problems. 1
77
The Sixth Circuit, deciding an almost identical issue, held in Minarcini'v.
Strongsoille Czty School District 178 that the first amendment rights of teachers
and students had been violated' 79 by the removal of books from the library
and a ban on further teaching or shelving of the books. The outlawed novels
were Catch 22 by Joseph Heller, God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater by Kurt Von-
negut, and Cat's Cradle, also by Vonnegut. 8 0 The district court found for
the defendants, based on Presidents Council. The Sixth Circuit found that the
holding in Presidents Council'81 was not broad enough to allow the school
board "to destroy" books "without concern for the first amendment." Fur-
thermore, the court stated it would not follow Presidents Council if its holding
were that broad.' 8 2 The removal of books from a library is a much more
serious restraint on academic freedom that the armband wearing that was
constitutionally protected in Tinker, the court found. Neither the school
board nor the state of Ohio could place conditions on library use "related
solely to the social or political tastes of school board members."' 8 3 In the
absence of an explanation, the court assumed the books were removed be-
cause board members found the content objectionable, and because the
board assumed it had censorship power.' 8 4 The circuit found that the privi-
lege of using a school library was not subject to the whims of school boards
who want to eliminate books on the basis of content. However, it indicated
that a school board could, without violating constitutional rights, stop stock-
ing a book that had worn out or was obsolete, or because of limited shelf
space.' 
8 5
Although the rationale in Minarcini clearly supports a broad right of
176. See notes 54-65 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the application of the
Tinker test to classroom activities, see Conrover, supra note 101, at 1038-41.
177. 409 U.S. at 999.
178. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
179. Id. at 581-82. Although the opinion addressed the rights of both students and teachers,
the plaintiffs did not include any teachers. The suit was a class action brought on behalf of five
students. Id. at 579.
For other cases in which the rights of students to receive information was at issue, see, e.g.,
Shanhy v. NE Independent SchoolDist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Bayer v. Kinzier, 383 F. Supp.
1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), afd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975), in which courts held school officials
could not restrain distribution of student newspapers containing birth control information. Con-
tra, Trachiman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1977).
180. 541 F.2d at 579. Vonnegut's works appear to have a propensity to shock local school
boards. Use of a story by Vonnegut led to the plaintiff's discharge in Parducci, discussed at notes
111-19 and accompanying text supra.
181. 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
182. 541 F.2d at 581 (quoting 457 F.2d at 293).
183. 541 F.2d at 582 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. Compare the assumption of the Tenth Circuit in Cag, in which the court assumed
that, in the absence of reasons, the book ban would be presumed to be based on permissible
grounds. 598 F.2d at 537, 544.
185. 541 F.2d at 581.
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academic freedom, that freedom is not without limits. The court stated that
the school faculty could not make its textbook choices prevail over the selec-
tions of the school board, which was empowered under Ohio law to choose
textbooks.1 8 6 The limiting language is somewhat contradictory, considering
the court's strong stand on teachers' rights elsewhere in the opinion.
In fashioning a remedy, the court ordered the school board to invalidate
resolutions that would have prohibited discussion of the books or use of the
works as supplemental reading.' 8 7 It also ordered the board to replace the
banned volumes, using the first money available.'
88
D. Academic Freedom Cases Indicating a Need for a Record
Some of the opinions discussed previously in which curriculum content
and book banning were at issue indicated a need for the school board to state
its reasons or to rely on articulated standards in taking action relating to
selection or proscription of materials. In Parducci, the district court was con-
cerned with a "total absence of standards."' 89 The situation that resulted in
the discharge of the plaintiff illustrates "how easily arbitrary discrimination
can occur when public officials are given unfettered discretion to decide
what books should be taught and what books should be banned," the court
stated. 19
In Minarcini, the Sixth Circuit found that, since books were banned in
the absence of reasons "neutral in first amendment terms," the court should
assume the board had acted as a censor, outlawing the volumes on the basis
of content.' 9 ' In fact, as in Cag,1 9 2 the only explanation given for the
Mi'narcini book ban was a negative minority report of a textbook committee.
The secretary for the Minarcini committee had indicated one of the contro-
versial books was "garbage."' 193 No explanation was given at all by the
board itself when it banned the books. 194
The Wilson court found that school authorities must have established
standards before imposing a prior restraint. 19 5 Wilson involved the banning
of political speakers by school officials.' 96 The court found that the invalid-
ity of such prior restraints is strongly presumed. '
97
The need for a board to furnish reasons for not rehiring teachers who
have first amendment claims also has been established. For example, in Pred
v. Board of Public Instruction,198 the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim that school
authorities could simply let a teacher's contract expire without supplying
186. Id. at 579-80.
187. Id. at 584.
188. Id. at 584.
189. 316 F. Supp. at 357, discussed in notes 111-19 and accompanying text supra.
190. 316 F. Supp. at 358.
191. 541 F.2d at 582, discussed in notes 167-77 and accompanying text supra.
192. 598 F.2d at 537, 427 F. Supp. at 947-48. Se text accompanying notes 256-63 in a.
193. 541 F.2d at 581.
194. Id. at 580-81.
195. 418 F. Supp. at 1364, discussed in text accompanying notes 160-63 supra.
196. 418 F. Supp. at 1361.
197. Id. at 1364.
198. 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
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reasons when a first amendment claim was involved. 199
These cases are cited as illustrative of the principle that, in the area of
academic freedom, as well as in other areas of the law, courts usually expect
to find that reasons have been supplied to justify official action. This princi-
ple is probably most firmly established in the area of administrative law.2° °
However, it is not inapplicable to Cag,, since under Colorado law, rules ap-
plying to agencies appear to be applicable to local school boards.
2 0'
E. Summag,
There is a split among the circuits in the curriculum content and book
banning cases. The First Circuit, in Mailloux and Keefe, the two cases involv-
ing "dirty words" has taken a position protective of academic teachers'
rights, as did the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini, the book banning case. The
Seventh Circuit, in Holmes, the sex counseling case, and Brubaker, in which
teachers had distributed the Woodstock brochure, has shown an unwilling-
ness to find first amendment violations in the actions of school authorities.
The Sixth Circuit, in Presidents Council, the case in which a book ban was
upheld, also has shown a readiness to reject constitutional claims. The split
is particularly noticable in the area of book bans, in which the Sixth and
First Circuits came to the opposite conclusions in deciding almost identical
issues.
Among the four federal district courts that have considered these issues,
one has taken a strong position that the state may make almost any choices it
wishes in restricting curriculum. The other three have placed some constitu-
tional limitations on the state's power.
The courts that have considered the need for findings have indicated
that, where first amendment claims are raised, a school board should supply
reasons to justify its action.
199. Id. at 855-59. For a discussion of the procedural due process rights afforded to dis-
charged teachers, see Teachers Rights, supra note 1, at 858-74.
200. See, e.g., Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); SEC v. Che-
nery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 (1944); Chicago v.
FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972); Medical Com. for Human
Rts v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 973 (1971), dismissedas moot, 404
U.S. 403 (1972); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
613 (1938).
201. COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-32-109 (1)(r) (1973) requires a local board to comply with
Article 4 of Title 24 of COLO. REV. STAT., which is the Administrative Procedure Act. CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 24-4-102 (3) (1973) defines an agency as any board, bureau, commission, depart-
ment, institution, division, section, or officer of the state. The definition, while specifically ex-
cluding some entities, does not mention school boards. In addition, the Colorado Supreme
Court treated a local school board as an agency in Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County
School Dist., 191 Colo. 411, 553 P.2d 793 (1976).






All of the books banned in Caqy202 were optional reading materials used
in elective courses for high school juniors and seniors. The courses were Con-
temporary Literature, Contemporary Poetry, and American Masters. Pursu-
ant to a policy adopted the previous year, a textbook evaluation committee
was formed to make recommendations to the school board. 20 3 The commit-
tee was composed of school district employees, including teachers, parents,
and students.2 ° 4 The year the books were banned was the first year the com-
mittee had operated. Previously, the school board had no policy regarding
review of teaching materials, 20 5 although Colorado law required school
boards to select textbooks. 20 6 The prior procedure was for language arts
coordinators to review and approve book purchase requests made by teach-
ers.
2 0 7
A majority of the committee recommended that 1,285 books be ap-
proved by the board. A minority report listed ten books that the dissenting
committee members believed should be rejected. Six of the ten singled out
by the minority were among the books outlawed by the school board.
20 8
Nine of the banned books had been used in courses for at least three years.
The tenth book had been in use for two years.20 9 The parties to the lawsuit
stipulated that the board's action meant that teachers could be dismissed for
insubordination for adding the books to their course reading lists, assigning
the books to students, giving students credit for reading them, reading the
volumes aloud or causing them to be read aloud, or discussing the works at
"such length as to amount to a constructive assignment of the materials. ' 210
Permitted activities were commenting on the books, recommending them to
students, and discussing the works with students outside of class. 21 1 The
board did not order that the books be removed from school libraries.
2 12
There was no obscenity issue in the case: The five plaintiff-teachers and
the defendant school board2 13 agreed that the works were not obscene.
2 14
202. See note 7 supra for a listing of the banned works.
203. 598 F.2d at 537, 427 F. Supp. at 945.
204. There is some confusion about the membership of the committee. The district court
opinion states that students, parents, and school board members were on the panel. 427 F.
Supp. at 947. The court of appeals decision states that the membership included teachers,
administrators, parents, and students. 598 F.2d at 537. The brief of the defendants states that
the committee was composed of teachers, parents, and students. Brief for Defendants-Appellees
and Cross-Appellants at 3, 598 F.2d 535 [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Brief].
205. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants at 7, 598 F.2d 535 [herein-
after cited as Defendants' Reply Brief).
206. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109 (1)(t) (1973). CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-110 (l)(r)
(1973) permits school boards to remove materials that are "immoral or pernicious." See note 27
sup ra.
207. Defendants Reply Brief at 7 (quoting from the record at 150-51, 427 F. Supp. 945).
208. 598 F.2d at 537.
209. Brief of Appellants and Cross-Appellees at 4, 598 F.2d 535 (citing the record at 10, 427
F. Supp. 945) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Brief).
210. 598 F.2d at 538.
211. Defendants' Reply Brief at 10.
212. 427 F. Supp. at 947.
213. The school board was named as a defendant, along with four members of the panel
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They also stipulated that the board had not made a systematic effort to ex-
clude any one system of thought or philosophy, and that it would be possible
constitutionally for a decision to be made to study the books in high school
classes. 
2 15
The book banning was not the only controversy in which the Aurora
board was involved. Three members of the board had been elected on a
"Christian slate" the previous year. 2 16 Just a few months prior to the book
banning, the school board had reviewed and revised the district's sex educa-
tion program. 2 17 Another proposal considered by the board was a motion to
support the repeal of the Colorado Equal Rights Amendment. 21" About a
year after the book banning, the board defeated a motion to require that
each school day begin with a period of silent meditation or prayer.
21 9
The general thrust of some of the board's proposals had been to estab-
lish an atmosphere in which religious concerns appeared paramount. In
fact, one member of the board indicated that his religious convictions were
of prime importance in all his decisions. Another stated that, while his reli-
gious beliefs governed everything he did, he was not attempting to force
them on others. 2 2 0 However, the issue of whether the board's actions in ban-
ning the books constituted an establishment of a particular religion in viola-
tion of the first amendment was not argued by the plaintiffs.
22 '
The teachers defined the issue as whether the state could prohibit them
individually: Doyle K. Seawright, Douglas A. Johnson, DeWitte C. Gordon, and Glenna G.
James. 598 F.2d at 536.
The fifth member of the board, William Davis, was not named as a defendant. The Rev.
Davis was the only member of the board who voted against banning all 10 books. Minutes,
Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. 28-J, Aurora, Colo. Board of Education, Jan. 12, 1976. (The
minutes are available for public inspection at the Aurora School Administration building, 1085
Peoria St., Aurora, Colo.).
Prior to the board's action, Rev. Davis urged other board members to consider the legal
aspects of banning books "for reasons that are not clearly and soundly academic." The Denver
Post, Jan. 13, 1976, at 19. (All citations to articles in The Denver Post were written by the
author who was a newspaper reporter at the time of the book banning and regularly reported
the school board's actions).
214. 598 F.2d at 538.
215. Id.
216. The Denver Post, Nov. 5, 1975 at 16 (Zone 2 Section).
See also Taryle, Aurora Bd of Educ. Stages 'Best Show in Town,' The Denver Post, May 2, 1976,
at 23. (This signed editorial criticized some members of the school board for an inability to
assume a leadership role in the community because of a focus on religion and "fundamentalist
philosophy." It was also written by the author).
217. The Denver Post, Dec. 10, 1975 at 4 (Zone 2 Section). The president of the school
board, Doyle K. Seawright, had stated shortly after his election in May 1975 that he thought
boys and girls should be separated for sex education instruction. The Denver Post, May 21,
1975 at 22 (Zone 2 Section).
218. The Denver Post, Oct. 25, 1976, at 21. The motion to support the repeal of the Colo-
rado Equal Rights Amendment was turned down by the board 3-2.
219. The Denver Post, Jan. 12, 1977 at 3 (Zone 2 Section).
220. the Denver Post, April 7, 1976 at 6 (Zone 2 Section).
221. Plaintiffs' Brief and Combined Answer and Reply Brief of Appellants and Cross-Ap-
pellees, 598 F.2d 535, [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Reply Brief]. The plaintiffs were repre-
sented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colo., Inc., Denver, Colo.
For a case in which the issue of the establishment of a religion in violation of the first
amendment was crucial, see Epperson, discussed at notes 41-53 and accompanying text supra.
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from using non-obscene books222 based on "the personal predilections" of
school board members. Further, they contended that, when elective courses
were involved, it was constitutionally improper to uphold the ban, since the
board had no explanation other than a dislike for the material coupled with
a claim of absolute discretion to restrict conduct in the classroom. To rule
that the board had such a broad power would, the plaintiffs asserted, make
academic freedom "a nullity.
223
The school board defined the issue as whether the first amendment re-
quired the school board to allow textbook decisions to be made by individual
secondary teachers, despite a state law mandating the local school boards to
select books.224 In addition, the board indicated in its brief that the decision
to ban the books had been made because the board "believes these books to
be inappropriate," 225 hardly an enlightening explanation.
In finding for the board of education, the court of appeals held that it
was legitimate for the school district's curriculum to reflect the value system
of parents and taxpayers. It was proper for the state to delegate textbook
control to the board, and, while the board could not tailor the curriculum to
reflect a religious viewpoint, it was otherwise free to control instruction as it
saw fit. The school board was acting within its rights, even though the deci-
sion was political and influenced by its members' personal views.
226
B. The Tenth Circuit's Rationale
Although the Tenth Circuit, quoting from the briefs of the parties,
noted that the teachers and the board had defined the issue differently,22 7 it
did not explicitly resolve this difference by supplying its own statement of
the issue. It would have been possible for the court to focus more sharply the
issue to provide guidance for future school boards and courts considering this
sort of problem. The court could have stated the issue, for example, as did
the Second Circuit in Presidents CounciT,228 to be whether the constitutional
infringement was great enough to warrant an intrusion into the daily opera-
tions of a school district. It could then have devised a standard for measur-
ing the magnitude of such infringements.
The only constitutional prohibition suggested is provided in Judge Lo-
gan's statement that a school board cannot select books in a way that will
promote a religious viewpoint. Absent such a religious motivation, school
boards appear free to ban books, even though they have been used previ-
ously, and even though the decision is political and "influenced by the per-
sonal views" of board members.
229
The opinion cited decisions from other federal courts, including the
222. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 4.
223. Id. at 11-12.
224. Defendants' Brief at 10.
225. Id. at n. 1.
226. 598 F.2d at 543-44. Colorado statutes delegate control of curriculum and textbook
selection to local school boards. See notes 27 & 206 supra.
227. 598 F.2d at 542-43.
228. Discussed in notes 164-73 and accompanying text supra.
229. 598 F.2d at 544.
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landmark Supreme Court opinions dealing with academic freedom. How-
ever, in indicating the Supreme Court precedents which it found controlling,
the court, more often than not, failed to rely on majority opinions.
In citing Meyer,230 the court quoted from the dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Holmes, who would have found it was reasonable to ban the teaching of
foreign languages. 2 31 The circuit also quoted the opinions of Justices Stew-
art and Black in Epperson,2 32 a case in which the two Justices, while concur-
ring, did not join in the majority opinion. 233 Justice Black concurred only
on the ground that he could have found the anti-evolution law void for
vagueness. 234 He would not have found that the law violated the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment. Further, he could not "imagine" a rea-
son a state would be without power to withhold from its schools' curricula
"any subject deemed too emotional and controversial .... "235 Justice
Stewart found the law so vague as to be invalid under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
236
The Tenth Circuit also quoted a portion of Justice Frankfurter's con-
currence in Wieman v. Updegra9i, 237 indicating that teachers have the "special
task" of furthering critical inquiry and "open-mindedness" by their students.
The circuit court did not indicate, however, how its decision would enable
teachers to carry out that task.
The Cao , court also quoted the portion of the Tinker majority opinion
which stated that the first amendment does not allow school officials to take
action casting " 'a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom' " without compel-
ling reasons.2 38 In a later irreconcilable portion of the opinion, the Tenth
Circuit found that it was legitimate for a school board to censor curriculum
so as "to reflect the value system and educational emphasis which are the
collective will of those whose children are being educated and who are pay-
ing the costs." 239 This justification hardly seems to be of the nature man-
dated by the Supreme Court in Tinker. Equally unconvincing is the circuit's
statement that a board could justify its course offerings on the ground the
subjects to be taught were chosen with an eye toward promoting a "particu-
lar viewpoint."
'240
The circuit stated that secondary teachers have the freedoms previously
indicated by the Supreme Court. It also found that teachers cannot be
"made to simply read from a script prepared or approved by the board."'24 1
Yet, in the same opinion, the court found that a school board had absolute
authority to ban the study of any material it wished, without supplying a
230. Discussed in text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
231. 262 U.S. at 412.
232. Discussed in text accompanying notes 41-53 supra.
233. 598 F.2d at 540-41 (quoting from 393 U.S. at 113-16).
234. 393 U.S. at 114.
235. Id. at 112-13.
236. Id. at 116.
237. 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952).
238. 598 F.2d at 539.





constitutionally valid reason. Carried to its logical extreme, this rule would
appear to permit a board of education to select only one book for each class,
prohibiting the use of any other materials. Such a requirement would cer-
tainly appear to come close to relegating teachers to the role of script read-
ers, despite the court's statement to the contrary.
In the portion of Cay dealing with Supreme Court precedents, the
Tenth Circuit stated that most of the cases have "arisen at the university
level . .. ",242 This certainly is not true of the High Court opinions cited
by the circuit. Of the nine Supreme Court cases dealing with academic free-
dom to which the Tenth Circuit refers, only two- Kevishian and Wieman-
arose in a college or university setting. The other seven all involved contro-
versies in elementary or secondary schools. 243 Nor do the modern lower fed-
eral court decisions, either those cited 244 or others not treated in Car,
predominately involve university professors. In fact, most of the cases deal-
ing with curricular controls appear to have arisen in the secondary school
setting.2 4 5 Of the fourteen lower court decisions 246 cited by the circuit, thir-
teen involve the rights of secondary and elementary teachers and students.
Only one arose at an institution of higher education.
247
The problem with the Tenth Circuit's attempt to distinguish the secon-
dary school controversies from those arising in the university setting is that,
while the court indicates there is a difference, it does not address that differ-
ence in any way. Nor does it indicate any precedent of any court that would
aid in establishing guidelines for evaluating the claims of either secondary
teachers or university professors. If this difference is essential, as the court of
appeals implied, then the circuit should have delineated the difference. The
court appears to justify its holding in Cary on the basis that the case involved
high school students. While some differences in approach undoubtedly can
be justified on this basis,248 the court did not clearly indicate how much it
242. Id. at 539.
243. The seven Supreme Court cases cited which dealt with controversies at the elementary
and secondary levels were Tinker, Shelton, Meyer, Bartels, Epperson, Barnette, and Rodriguez, id. at
539-43, discussed in notes 16-87 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of academic
freedom in higher education, see Kutner, The Freedom of Academic Freedom. A Legal Dilemma, 48
CHI-KENT L. REV. 168 (1971).
244. 598 F.2d at 541-43.
245. The lower federal court opinions in which curricular or teaching method controls were
at issue are discussed in notes 100-163 and accompanying text supra.
246. Of the fourteen lower federal court cases cited by the Tenth Circuit, eleven are dis-
cussed in notes 88-201 and accompanying text supra. Adams v. Campbell County School Dist.,
is discussed in text accompanying notes 253-58 in/a.
The remaining two cases cited involve what may be termed "outrageous conduct" by high
school teachers. In Moore v. School Bd. of Gulf County, 364 F. Supp. 355, 358-59 (N.D. Fla.
1973), the discharged teacher had related his personal sexual experiences to students during
class. In Ahern v. Bd. of School Dist. of Grand Island, 456 F.2d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1972), the
teacher was fired after she turned over control of her classes to students, referred to a substitute
teacher as a "bitch" in front of students, and ignored administrator's instructions.
247. Clark v. Holmes, discussed at notes 128-33 and accompanying text inf/a.
248. See Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Or. 1976), in which the court
distinguishes the role of college professors from that of elementary and secondary teachers on
the ground that the former engage in a search for knowledge, while the latter "merely dissemi-
nate knowledge." See also Developments, supra note 12 at 1053.
The Second Circuit, in James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1042 (1972), stated that the role of an elementary and secondary teacher is indoctrinative.
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relied on this factor.
One of the cited lower court opinions, Parker, appears not to be a viable
precedent today. 249 The case was cited with a group of others in which
teachers were fired. Judge Logan indicated that the cases in which courts
found in favor of teachers could be distinguished because they were situa-
tions in which school authorities did not have a general policy proscribing
the use of the materials involved. None of these precedents were discussed.
In citing both the cases in which discharges were upheld and those in which
the decisions of school authorities were overturned, the circuit did not indi-
cate that it was following either group, beyond distinguishing the pro-
teacher cases in one sentence. 250 Nor did the court explain why it chose to
disregard the discharge cases in which courts found, on academic freedom
grounds, that there was a right of teachers to some choice in selecting teach-
ing methods and curricular content. 25' The opinion did not even explicitly
indicate that it was choosing to follow precedents such as Presidents Council
and Brubaker, rather than those like Minarcini and Keefe. The Cagy rationale
would have been stronger if the court had indicated which of the other cir-
cuits it was following and given its reasons for doing so, as did the Sixth
Circuit in Presidents Council .
2 5 2
The circuit indicates that it is following its own precedent, established
in Adams v. Campbell County School District,25 3 the only Tenth Circuit prece-
dent cited in Cag. In Adams, high school teachers whose contracts were not
renewed argued that they were fired in violation of their first amendment
rights because of the wearing of an arm band to mourn soldiers killed in
Vietnam, and discussing the war and flag burning, and because they were
suspected of assisting in publication of an underground newspaper. The Ad-
ams trial court accepted the defendants' explanation that the non-renewal of
the contracts was due to poor teaching practices, and not because the plain-
tiffs had exercised their first amendment rights.254 The Tenth Circuit, while
finding the trial court's findings to be supported,2 5 5 stated that teachers
"[u]ndoubtedly .. .have some freedom in the [teaching] techniques to be
employed . . . ." However, this freedom is not without limits, "at least at
the secondary level." '2 56 It is this portion of Adams that is quoted in Cagy.
2 5 7
However, it is interesting that the circuit relied on a teacher discharge case
in Adams, while rejecting other discharge cases, those in which teachers were
reinstated, on the ground that they involved situations in which school au-
thorities did not have a general policy prohibiting the use of the materials at
However, despite a statement that school boards have wide latitude in matters of discipline, the
court found that the board did not have the "unfettered discretion to violate fundamental con-
stitutional rights." Id. at 575. The circuit found that the board could not fire a teacher who
wore an armband in protest of the Vietnam war without infringing on those rights. Id. at 568.
249. See, e.g., Kqrhtman, discussed in notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
250. 598 F.2d at 541-42.
251. Id.
252. See text accompanying note 173 supra.
253. 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975).
254. Id. at 1244-45.
255. Id. at 1248.
256. Id. at 1247.
257. 598 F.2d at 543-44.
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issue. The Cay court does not mention the portion of Adams that indicates
some kind of findings are necessary, at least in teacher discharge cases in
which first amendment rights are asserted. The Adams court found that it
was permissible for the school board to adopt the recommendations of school
administrators rather than supplying its own findings. 258 This indicates that
some kind of a statement of reasons for the board's action is needed. Apply-
ing the findings requirement to a situation in which there has been no dis-
charge, as other courts have done,259 the board should have stated reasons
for the ban. While the board in Cag might have been able to adopt the
reasons of the textbook committee's minority faction to explain its ban of six
of the ten books, there were four books that the board culled itself, which
were, incidently, not discussed in the minority report. 260 Therefore, no ex-
planation was given for the banning of four of the volumes.
Judge Doyle, in a brief concurrence, 261 indicated that he would not
approve arbitrary choices of books. He further noted that the majority opin-
ion could be read as prohibiting such selections. Judge Doyle went on to
state:
The approach which I prefer would be that the exclusion of books
for secondary school students is not to be an arbitrary exclusion.
Therefore, reasons have to be given so that there can be court re-
view. If they [the books] are excluded because the Board member
disapproves for a subjective reason, I would say that this is an un-
lawful and unconstitutional invasion of the classroom.
262
The judge's concurrence made a valid point. While the court of appeals
might have decided that the book ban was constitutionally permissible after
reviewing the board's reasons for its action, the Tenth Circuit should not
have given judicial approval to an action that might have been arbitrary or
based on some other constitutionally impermissible ground. Although the
parties agreed that the board's action was not the result of an attempt to
exclude a particular theory or type of book, 263 it would seem that, in the face
of a constitutional claim alleging censorship, the court should have asked for
more in the way of justification of the action.
V. THE SEARCH FOR GUIDELINES: A SUGGESTED TEST
Courts have failed to establish guidelines for evaluating secondary cur-
ricular and textbook decisions made by local school authorities. The test
suggested below is intended to be broad enough to be used in both the book
banning controversies and in the teacher discharge situations.
264
The proposed test is a method of inquiry for resolving whether contro-
258. 511 F.2d at 1245.
259. Minarcani and Wilson are discussed in notes 191-97, 178-88, and 160-63 mnfra.
260. 598 F.2d at 537.
261. Id. at 544 (Doyle, J., concurring).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. It is assumed at the outset that a court, in applying the proposed test, would not reach
such an inquiry if the school board has based its decision on a coinstitutionally prohibited
ground. For example, the test would not be used in a case in which it were established that
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verted secondary materials can be subjected to censorship by school officials.
This subjective test has two major prongs: the maturity of the students and
the appropriateness of the materials. Two questions should be asked by a
court when it attempts to resolve a controversy involving teaching materials
or methods:
1) Were the students to whom the material or teaching method
was directed generaly mature enough to handle the material and/or
method without any adverse effects?; and
2) Was the material or method appropriate in the classroom or
school setting in which it was used?
If the answer to both questions is yes, then the board's ban on the use of
the materials or discharge of a teacher should be reversed. When the answer
to either question is no, then the school board's action should be upheld.
The two prongs of the test are discussed separately below. In addition,
there are several other factors that a court could consider in borderline cases
in which it is difficult to answer either or both questions.
A. The Maturity of the Students
While there have been significant changes in secondary education dur-
ing the past several decades, 265 it has been recognized that there still is less
academic freedom at the high school level than in higher education.
266
While there have been indications that secondary teachers are expected to
officials had based their decision on a desire to further the tenets of a particular religion. See the
discussion of Epperson in notes 41-53 and accompanying text supra.
For another author's suggestion of a test to be used in evaluating claims relating to
teacher's in-class expression, see Standards, supra note 54 at 857-97.
265. Dring the same time that academic freedom has become recognized as a constitution-
ally protected interest, rapid changes have occurred in elementary and secondary education.
See J. BRUBACHER, A HISTORY OF THE PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION 633-34 (1947) (cited in the
Amici Curiae Brief of National Education Ass'n, Colorado Educational Ass'n, and the Aurora
Educational Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as BRUBACHER]; CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE SCHOOL 116-17 (1962). Many more courses are offered in high schools than were a century
ago. R. HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 342 (1963). The number of
students who go to college has increased significantly in recent decades. HISTORICAL STATIS-
TICS OF THE U.S., COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL ED. PT. I at 379 (1975); AMERI-
CAN COUNCIL ON EDUC., FACT BOOK ON HIGHER EDUCATION, table 76.79 (1976). As a result,
high schools increasingly have assumed the burden of college preparation, offering electives
similar to courses formerly offered only on college campuses. G. HILLOCKS, ALTERNATIVES IN
ENGLISH: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ELECTIVE PROGRAMS 29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hill-
ocks]. See also Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 10 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
Changes also have occurred in the qualifications of teachers, and in their use of materials.
Nineteenth century teachers concentrated on the basic facts, were not well trained, and did not
assert the right of academic freedom. BRUBACHER, supra at 633-34. However, the situation
changed in the twentieth century. By 1971, only 1.1 percent of U.S. secondary teachers did not
have a college degree, while more than a third had a masters degree. NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUC. STATISTICS Table 53 at 56 (1976). These teachers in-
creasingly found it necessary to use a wide range of materials, rather than limiting themselves to
only one standardized text. Since the early 1940s, when paperback books became more avail-
able, such books have become a resource for teachers, with some instructors choosing to assign
them in their classes directly, rather than relying on them only for outside study. A. APPLEBEE,
TRADITION AND REFORM IN THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH: A HISTORY 207 (1974); J. LYNCH &
B. EVANS, HIGH SCHOOL ENGLISH TEXTBOOKS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 61-62 (1963).
266. While there have been significant changes in education, it has been recognized that
there still is less academic freedom at the high school level than in higher education. See Develop-
ments, supra note 12 at 1050, 1098. The Tenth Circuit recognized this distinction in Adams when
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concentrate on transmitting basic information, there also has been recogni-
tion that minors, as they approach college age, should not be overly pro-
tected. Some courts have implied that the increased maturity of today's
students is a factor which should be considered in evaluating what teaching
materials or methods may be used.
26 7
Although age is one aspect of maturity, the latter should be used as the
standard because it is flexible. If the next generation of secondary students
mature faster than did their parents, the standard will change. Also, matur-
ity is intended to take into account the sophistication of the community, 268
since it is to be expected that students in some communities-probably more
urbanized areas--mature intellectually at a faster rate than those in others.
In considering the level of maturity, the courts should attempt, how-
ever, to focus closely on the students themselves, rather than the conceptions
of their parents in this regard. In some instances, school board members and
parents may be shocked by materials or methods that would not offend or
harm their children in the least. Courts also should make certain that a
school board is not arguing for low level of maturity on the part of students
to excuse a decision made on the basis of the political, social, or personal
tastes of board members.
269
It should be noted that, in the library book cases, the maturity of the
students is likely to be the controlling factor. This is because the second
prong of the test, appropriateness, is likely to be impossible to either establish
or disprove. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the removal of a
book could be justified on the ground that the volume is inappropriate for
any topic that could be discussed in any course offered in the school.
it stated that secondary teachers have "some freedom" in teaching methods, but do not have an
unlimited right to determine course content. 511 F.2d at 1247.
The Mailloux court indicated that, at the secondary level, school authorities are more
clearly acting in a role of n loco parentis, since most students are minors. The court commented
that secondary schools are more closely governed, and their faculty members do not have the
wide discretion of college professors. Most members of the community expect secondary teach-
ers to concentrate on transmitting information and, at least to some extent, "indoctrinate" chil-
dren in societal values. 323 F. Supp. at 1392. See the discussion of Mailloux at notes 120-26 and
accompanying text supra.
267. The Keefe court did not believe that high school seniors had to be safeguarded from
reading obscene words. If the students needed such shielding, "we would fear for their future,"
the court stated. 418 F.2d at 361. See the discussion of Keefe at notes 101-10 and accompanying
text supra. The WiIson court noted that modern-day high school students are "suprisingly so-
phisticated, intelligent, and discerning." 418 F. Supp. at 1368. Such students are "far from easy
prey" and will not be harmed by exposure to nontraditional or even Unamerican theories of
thought. Id. at 1368, 1361. The Second Circuit, in James v. Bd. of Educ., noted that 18-year-
olds have the right to vote and commented that it would be "foolhardy to shield our children
from political debate and issues until the eve of their first venture into the voting booth." 461
F.2d 574. See note 248 supra for a discussion ofJames.
268. Cf Adams, 511 F.2d at 1247, in which the Tenth Circuit recognized that the approach
to evaluating first amendment claims at the secondary level might depend, at least in part, on
the community standards. The court stated that, in a small community such as the one in-
volved, school authorities "have a right to emphasize a more orthodox approach .... " Id.
269. This problem was indicated as a concern by the court in Mzarcini, discussed at notes
178-88 and accompanying text supra. 541 F.2d at 582.
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B. Appropriateness of the Teaching Material or Method
The second major area of inquiry, appropriateness of the material or
method, often-but not always-will be the same as relevance to the course
topic. Both relevance and appropriateness have been used as standards by
the courts in evaluating curricular restraints. 270 Appropriateness is used
rather than relevance because the latter would appear to indicate the accept-
ability of materials only when they are shown to have a direct relationship to
the course title or to a specific topic of inquiry in a specific class. Appropri-
ateness in the classroom or school setting is intended to be broader so as to
include, for example, a discussion that might arise as a result of a legitimate
question asked by a student. The term also indicates considerations of the
obscenity or non-obscenity of materials or methods, since those of an obscene
nature would appear to be per se inappropriate.
2 7 1
C. Other Factors to Consider
The maturity-appropriateness test incorporates most of the considera-
tions that should be weighed in resolving curricular and book disputes at the
secondary level, but the two prongs are not exclusive. In borderline cases,
there are other factors that could tip the scales.
One such consideration is the testimony of experts, if any.27 2 Such testi-
mony would most likely indicate the experts' opinions as to the students'
maturity and the appropriateness of the material or method. Another fac-
tor, which ordinarily would be applied only in the teacher discharge cases, is
the disruptive effect of the use of the materials or methods.273 This factor
usually would not be considered in book banning cases, since it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which the stocking of a book in the school library or
classroom would disrupt school discipline.
Still another consideration in some cases will be whether the contro-
verted materials or method is used in an elective class or in a required
270. In Mailloux, discussed in notes 120-26 and accompanying text supra, the district court
recognized that the use of a "taboo word" was "relevant" to the teaching of high school English.
323 F. Supp. 1389. In an Eighth Circuit case, a mathematics teacher's comments about Army
recruiters were said to be "irrelevant" to the class curriculum. Birdwell v. Hazelwood, 491 F.2d
490, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1974). The court in Parducci, discussed in notes 111-19 and accompanying
text in/ia, indicated that it found a story assigned by a teacher to be "appropriate for high
school students ...." 316 F. Supp. at 356. The Wison court found that the use of political
speakers was not "inappropriate." 418 F. Supp. at 1364. See notes 160-63 and accompanying
text supra.
271. Some courts have applied the Supreme Court's obscenity standard as enunciated in
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629. See discussion at note 105 supra. For cases in which courts have applied
Ginsberg to secondary curricular disputes, see Keefe and Parducci, discussed in notes 100-19 and
accompanying text supra.
272. For a case in which the opinions of experts were disregarded, see Brubaker, discussed at
notes 134-45 and accompanying text supra. Contra, Sterring discussed in notes 146-48 and accom-
panying text supra.
273. The Supreme Court indicated in Tinker that actual or threatened disruption of school
discipline is to be weighed in considering the validity of prior restraints in the school setting. See
discussion at notes 54-65 and accompanying text supra. For a case in which disruptiveness was
considered, see Keefe, discussed at notes 101-10 supra.
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course. 2 74 This factor is relevant because students and their parents can con-
trol whether the student enrolls in an elective course, thereby eliminating a
situation in which a student is forced to be exposed to ideas or words that he
or his parents find offensive. Similarly, when the controversy involves mater-
ials, the court can consider whether or not the student is offered a meaning-
ful opportunity to select alternative materials to fulfill course
requirements.
2 75
A final factor which could be weighed is whether the offending material
or method is used in a college preparatory course. This is relevant because
many school districts today offer classes with subject matter similar to that
studied at the college level as a way of preparing students for a higher educa-
tion.27 6 Since the content of these courses more closely resembles the college
curriculum than it does the typical high school offering, it would seem logi-
cal to allow more latitude to teachers.
It is time for the courts to apply a uniform means of resolving disputes
involving teaching materials and methods at the secondary level. The use of
such a test for weighing the competing interests in curricular controversies
would help to establish the contours for the important new right of academic




274. All of the banned books in Caty were proposed for use in elective courses. 598 F.2d at
537.
275. It is assumed that, if a student or his parents objected to materials, the student would
be excused from the assignment. In Cary, any student could request and receive an alternate
assignment. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 30.
276. HILOCKS, supra note 265, at 29-30.
277. Set note 39 supra.
* The author wishes to thank Prof. William M. Beaney of the University of Denver
College of Law for his generous assistance and criticism. The author also would like to thank
Robert J. Truhlar for his assistance.
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OVERVIEW
This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey is comprised of a selection of
the major cases decided last term dealing with criminal law and procedure.
Since the Tenth Circuit decided more than fifty criminal cases during our
survey period, this section is at best a sampling of cases. Thus, the reader
should not expect to find treatment of every criminal case handed down by
the appellate court. Likewise, the reader who expects an indepth analysis of
each of the cases presented will be disappointed. Rather, this section at-
tempts to deal with the most important and interesting cases in a way which
will assist the practitioner in meaningful research in a given area of law.
The section is divided into six categories: Sixth Amendment, Fourth
Amendment, Statutory Interpretation, Fifth Amendment, Post-trial Pro-
ceedings, and Trial Matters.
I. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Speedy Trial
In United States v. Askew,I the Tenth Circuit dealt with the defendant's
claim that he had been deprived of his sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial. The defendant was indicted in December 1974 on three counts of in-
terstate transportation of forged securities. 2 He was tried and convicted on
all counts in May, 1977, about two and a half years after the initial indict-
ment.
3
The trial court had granted the defendant a number of continuances
based on his poor health. Further, Askew was ordered to provide the Gov-
ernment with handwriting exemplars in June, 1975. His refusal to do so
resulted in the trial court finding him in contempt.4 In February, 1977, the
defendant moved for a dismissal of the charges, alleging that he had been
deprived his right to a speedy trial. The motion was denied and the Govern-
ment subsequently decided to try the case without the benefit of the re-
quested handwriting samples.
The Tenth Circuit, citing Barker v. Wingo, 5 held that the defendant had
not been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Noting that the defendant
had caused the greater part of the delay in bringing the case to trial, the
1. 584 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. deneid, 99 S. Ct. 1054 (1979).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
3. 584 F.2d at 961-62.
4. Id. at 962.
5. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Under Barker the Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case ap-
proach in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial.
The Court cited four factors which are to be considered in the determination: (1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the
prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530. See also Rudstein, The Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v.
Wingo in the Lower Courts, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 11.
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court emphasized that he had produced no evidence at his trial and had
made "no showing that his defense was at all prejudiced by the delay."
'6
Defendant's alleged ill health and his refusal to comply with the trial court's
order for production of the exemplars were the primary reasons for the de-
lay. However, the court conceded that the proceedings were delayed at one
point due to the unavailability of government witnesses and "conflicting ob-
ligations" of the prosecutor. The court held, citing Barker, that these reasons
were sufficient to justify some delay. 7 In denying the defendant's sixth
amendment claim, the court held that the "total circumstances presented"
did not rise to the level of a deprivation of the defendants right to a speedy
trial.8
B. Confrontation
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Roberts,9 faced the question of
whether the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him ° was
violated by the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The two defend-
ants were tried jointly for importing heroin and for conspiring to import
heroin.'e At trial, tape recordings of telephone conversations between de-
fendant Roberts and an unindicted coconspirator were introduced into evi-
dence against both Roberts and defendant Freeman. In the course of the
conversations several passing references concerning Freeman were made by
Roberts. Freeman's attorney objected to the introduction of the tapes, but
on grounds other than the constitutional issue raised here on appeal.
12
The Tenth Circuit, in holding that the conversations were admissible
against Freeman, distinguished Bruton on the basis that in the instant case,
unlike Bruton, the coconspirator exception 13 to the hearsay rule rendered the
statements admissible. The court reasoned that any testimony which is ad-
missible via an exception to the hearsay rule falls outside the purview of
Bruton. The court noted, however, that the hearsay rule cannot be viewed as
a substitute for the confrontation clause.'
4
6. 584 F.2d at 963. Normally the appellant may not claim denial of his right to a speedy
trial when he is the cause of the delay. See United States v. Key, 458 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 927 (1972).
7. 584 F.2d at 962.
8. Id. at 963. See also United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1047 (1974). The court also relied on the fact that the appellant had not been incar-
cerated during most of the time the charge was pending. 584 F.2d at 962. See also Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532.
9. 583 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 862 (1979).
10. This right was set forth by the Supreme Court in Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
11. 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 962(a), 963 (1976).
12. 583 F.2d at 1175. The court commented that normally a confrontation clause objec-
tion must be raised at trial in order for the issue to be preserved for appellate review. See Nolan
v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1041 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970). How-
ever, since the Government failed to challenge the appellant's claim on preservation grounds,
the Tenth Circuit proceeded to the merits. See United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
13. 583 F.2d at 1175.
14. Id. at 1175-76. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); United States v.
Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974). See generally Baker, The
Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and Due IProcess-A Proposal for Deterntning When Hearsay
May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529-57 (1974).
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After examining the trial record, the Tenth Circuit found that Free-
man's rights under the confrontation clause had been adequately protected.
In so holding, the court pointed to the fact that the tapes contained only a
few references to Freeman; that previous testimony had already established a
sufficient nexus between the crimes charged and Freeman's involvement in
them; that the evidence provided ample basis for "the jury to test the believ-
ability of Robert's references to Freema;" and that no reason could be in-
ferred from the record that would indicate why Roberts would have
misrepresented Freeman's involvement in the importation ring. 15 Indeed,
the court noted that any possible questions or ambiguity created by the
taped references to Freeman could only have assisted his case "in the face of
strong independent evidence of guilt.'
16
C. Right to Counsel
In Baldwin v. Benson' 7 the Tenth Circuit, construing 18 U.S.C. section
4214 and 18 U.S.C. section 3006,18 significantly enlarged the right to counsel
of federal parolees at parole revocation proceedings and overruled several of
its previously unpublished decisions. Both petitioners in Baldwin had re-
quested that counsel be appointed for them before or at the time of the hear-
ing to revoke parole. Both requests were denied, based upon the
interpretation that section 4214 was to be read "in accordance with" section
3006A.' 9 The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the sixth
amendment requires the federal government to provide counsel to an indi-
gent defendant at "every stage of a criminal proceeding which involves sub-
stantial rights." 20 The court noted, however, that the Supreme Court had
held 2' that parole revocation proceedings are not part of criminal prosecu-
tions to the extent that appointment of counsel is required.2 2 Yet the Tenth
Circuit was quick to point out that Mornss antedated the enactment of
section 4212.23
Relying primarily upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mood v.
Daggett,24 the legislative history of the Parole Act,2 5 and the language of
section 4214(b),2 6 the court held that a parolee is entitled to appointed coun-
15. 583 F.2d at 1176-77.
16. Id. at 1177.
17. 584 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1978).
18. Section 3006A(g) specifically authorizes the trial court to exercise its discretion in de-
termining whether to appoint counsel for the parolee.
19. 584 F.2d at 955.
20. Id. (citing Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938)).
21. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
22. 584 F.2d at 955. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 480.
23. 584 F.2d at 956.
24. 429 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1976).
25. 584 F.2d 956-57.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(2)(B) (1976) reads:
[O]pportunity for the parolee to be represented by an attorney (retained by the
parolee, or if he is financially unable to retain counsel), counsel shall be provided
pursuant to section 3006(A) or, if he so chooses, a representative as provided by rules




sel if properly requested. 27 The Tenth Circuit, seizing upon the phrase
"shall be provided counsel," stated that the "new parole act undertakes to
provide for due process at every stage of the proceedings, and in this connec-
tion it provides for the right to counsel at each stage."'28 The court also
noted that the new act requires that notice be given to the parolee of the
pending revocation proceeding and that, where requested, counsel be pro-
vided, not only at the revocation hearing, but with respect to other actions
taken incident to such revocation.
29
In closing, the court noted a line of its decisions, many of which were
unpublished, which had reached a contrary conclusion. The Tenth Circuit




In United States v. Stevens 3' the Tenth Circuit ruled that the consent to
search given by the defendant to police officers was voluntary and thus evi-
dence obtained by the search was admissible at defendant's trial for posses-
sion of an unregistered firearm. 32 The facts in the case indicated that police,
in response to a call, went to a motel room where the defendant was staying.
The officers informed the defendant that they had been told a person in the
motel had a shotgun and had threatened to kill someone. The policemen
then asked the defendant if they could "look around for the shotgun." The
defendant gave his consent and the officers found the shotgun in a suitcase
under some clothing.
33
Prior to trial the defendant moved to suppress the firearm, alleging that
it was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. The defendant attempted to
buttress this contention by emphasizing his youth, his lack of education, and
the fact that he was neither advised nor was he aware that he could resist the
search and insist that a search warrant be obtained. 34 The government, con-
ceding the lack of a search warrant, relied upon the defendant's consent to
the search. Defendant's motion to suppress was denied by the trial court,
but was raised again at trial when the gun was offered into evidence. Again
the trial court overruled the objection, the gun was admitted into evidence,
and the defendant was convicted.
35
The Tenth Circuit, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,3 6 noted that the Gov-
ernment, in the consent search context, is not required to show that the de-
27. 584 F.2d at 957-58.
28. Id. at 957.
29. Id. at 958.
30. Id. at 959. See Robinson v. Benson, 570 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1978); Cotner v. United
States, 409 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1969).
31. 595 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1979).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976).
33. 595 F.2d at 570. The appellant later testified he gave his consent only after officers had
begun the search.
34. Id. at 570-71.
35. Id. at 570.
36. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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fendant knew he could refuse to give his consent, nor that he was advised of
his right to refuse consent. 37 Rather, the court turned its inquiry to the issue
of the voluntariness of the consent and looked to the totality of the circum-
stances. Quoting Schneckloth the court held that: "Voluntariness is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the
subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account,
the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequi-
site to establishing a voluntary consent."' 38 The appellate court, relying
upon the above quoted language, ruled that the decision of the trial court
was in accord with the principles enunciated in Schneckloth.
39
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming Stevens' conviction, then distinguished
United States v. Rodriguez,40 as a situation involving acquiescence by a person
who spoke little English in the face of a claim of lawful authority, and Vt'/ano
v. Unt'edStates,4 ' in which the consent was tainted by the fact the defendant
was in custody at the time of the consent, and by several factors amounting
to express coercion.
B. Warrantless Searches
In Uni'ted States v. Erb,42 the Tenth Circuit validated a warrantless "lim-
ited protective search" of a private residence conducted by federal drug
agents who suspected that the manufacture of narcotics was taking place.
The court found the existence of both probable cause for the search and
exigent circumstances sufficient to vitiate the necessity of obtaining a search
warrant.
43
In Erb, a reliable informant had told drug agents that a certain Corwin
was engaged in the manufacture of drugs. One evening, agents followed
Corwin and were lead to a residential structure in Denver, Colorado. Al-
most immediately upon arrival, the agents detected the strong odor of ether,
a substance often used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, ema-
nating from the residence. Various persons, including Corwin, entered and
left the house during the course of the officer's observation. 44 At about 1
a.m., approximately three hours after the drug agents had begun their sur-
veillance of the home, one of the agents contacted the reliable informant by
telephone. The informant told the officer that the manufacture of drugs was
under way inside the house and was scheduled to be completed by 8 a.m.
that day. Shortly after 2:30 a.m. Corwin again arrived at the residence. The
agents became concerned that the manufacturing process was nearing com-
pletion more rapidly than they had expected. They believed that Corwin
had arrived to pick up his "share" of the drugs.45 Officers also feared that
37. 595 F.2d at 571.
38. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49).
39. 595 F.2d at 571.
40. 525 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1975).
41. 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962).
42. 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1979).
43. Id. at 417.
44. d. at 414-15.
45. Id. at 415.
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the drug manufacturing mechanisms and materials, which they believed the
home contained, were about to be dismantled and removed. The agents
discussed the situation and came to the conclusion that a search warrant for
the home could not be obtained for about five hours, far too late to seize the
drug laboratory intact. During all of this time the officers were unable to see
anything taking place inside the residence.
46
Shortly before 3 a.m. the officers forcibly entered the home, arrested the
occupants, secured the premises, insured that the chemicals posed no threat
of explosion, and then, with the arrested persons, left the house.4 7 Some
drug agents remained outside the home, to prevent any tampering with ei-
ther the house or the laboratory within, until a search warrant for the prem-
ises was obtained and executed. 48 At the appellants' trial, the laboratory
items and assorted chemicals, commonly used in the manufacture of drugs,
were introduced into evidence against the defendants.
The Tenth Circuit found, on the basis of the facts set out above, that (1)
the officers had probable cause to make the forced entry, arrest the appel-
lants, and secure the premises; and (2) the exigent circumstances present
here justified them doing so without a search warrant. 49 Further, the court
emphasized that after securing the premises the agents had obtained a
search warrant before seizing the lab equipment and chemicals. Thus, the
court reasoned, no violence had been done to the fourth amendment. 50
Without squarely dealing with the issue, the court also stated, citing
United States v. Watson,5 that government agents, armed with probable
cause, may, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, search public
places without a search warrant. While not explicitly so holding, the court
noted that although the building in the instant case was a house, it could
hardly be considered a "family abode or dwelling" in view of the fact the
structure was being used for the clandestine manufacture of a controlled sub-
stance. 52 Therefore, the court implied that Watson might be applicable in
circumstances like those present in Erb.
In a concurring opinion, Judge McKay balked at the idea that this
holding of the court might be construed as stating that a warrantless search
of a private residence might be justified absent exigent circumstances5 3 or
that the place searched in Erb could be construed to be a public building.
54
C. Statements of the Accused
In Gamble v. Oklahoma,55 the Tenth Circuit granted the petitioner habeas
46. Id.
47. Id. at 415-16.
48. Id. at 416.
49. Id. at 417.
50. Id. at 417-18.
51. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). The public place in Watson was, however, a restaurant. Id.
52. Id. at 420. See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
53. 596 F.2d at 422 (McKay, J., concurring).
54. Judge McKay commented that he did not believe the court's decision went as far as
holding the house in Erb was a public place. Thus, the judge apparently felt that the court's
discussion of Watson was merely dictum. Id.
55. 583 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1978).
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corpus relief after determining that statements made by him, extracted in
the context of a fourth amendment violation, had been improperly intro-
duced against him at his trial in state court. The facts indicated that the
petitioner had been illegally arrested and transported by police at gunpoint
to his home. Here the officers, pursuant to a search warrant which they had
previously obtained, searched the home. The search turned up evidence of
drug dealing, and the officers also found a locked brief case. 56 The police
asked petitioner for the key to the case. After first denying any knowledge of
the key, the petitioner made "inculpatory statements" to officers, telling
them where they could find the key. The case was opened and found to
contain drug related evidence which was damaging to the petitioner.57 The
law enforcement officers then asked the petitioner if there were any other
drugs in the house, adding that if they did not receive the petitioner's coop-
eration in the search they "would tear the house apart,"58 and the petitioner
then made further inculpatory statements which lead the officers to addi-
tional drug-related evidence. Sometime during the search the officers for-
mally arrested the petitioner and read him a Miranda warning.
59
The Oklahoma courts suppressed the statements made by the petitioner
prior to the time that he had received the Miranda warning. They held,
however, that his statements following the Miranda warning were admissible
against him. 6° The petitioner was convicted of unlawful possession of drugs
and unlawful possession of drugs with the intent to distribute them. Upon
reaching the merits of the case, 6 ' the Tenth Circuit noted that although the
evidence challenged here consisted in part of oral statements made by the
accused, he was nevertheless entitled to fourth amendment protection.
62
The court also stated that the situation in the instant case was controlled by
Brown v. IlInoi 63 which had held that Miranda warnings alone could not
obviate the taint of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
64
Since from the record before the court it appeared that the Oklahoma courts
had not followed, and perhaps even ignored Brown, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the federal district court's order that Oklahoma either release the
petitioner or give him a new trial.
6 5
56. Id. at 1162-63.
57. Id. at 1163.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court does not indicate just when the Miranda warnings were given to the
appellant. Compare the statement of facts given by the Oklahoma court on the petitioner's direct
appeal in Gamble v. State, 546 P.2d 1336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
60. 583 F.2d at 1163.
61. Before reaching the merits, the court determined that the constitutional issue had not
been fully and fairly litigated by the parties in the state courts. Thus, the petitioner was allowed
to raise his substantive claim in federal court. Id. at 1163-64. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 312-13 (1963). See also Note, Appyzng Stone v. Powell: Full and Fair Lit'gation of a Fourth
Amendment Habeas Corpus Claim, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 319 (1978).
62. With reference to the rule that oral statements are entitled to protection under the
fourth amendment, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975).
63. 422 U.S. 590.
64. Id. at 603-04. See Note, Criminal Lau---Giving of Mianda Warning Does Not Per Se Purge the
Taint of an Unlawful Arrest and Render Post Arrest Statements Admissible, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 513-20
(1975).




A. 18 US C §922
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Kilburn,66had occasion to interpret
18 U.S.C. § 922(h)67 in light of an alleged intrastate purchase of a firearm.
The appellant had been convicted of receiving a firearm after a previous
felony conviction in violation of the statute. On appeal he argued that, since
his roundabout purchase of the weapon had taken place entirely within the
state of Utah, the purchase and possession of the gun was a totally intrastate
transaction thus rendering section 922 inapplicable.
68
Following Barrett v. United States,69 the Tenth Circuit rejected this nar-
row reading of the statute. The court held that a showing that the firearm
had moved at any time in interstate commerce was sufficient to meet the
jurisdictional requirement of the statute and to sustain a conviction under
it.
70
In United States v. Brzoticky,7 1 the Tenth Circuit interpreted the prior
conviction provision of section 922(h). 72 The trial court dismissed the case,
holding that, since the prior conviction of the defendant in a state court had
been secured by a nolo contendere plea which was expunged before the appel-
lant's trial in federal court, section 922(h) did not apply. The Tenth Circuit,
in setting aside the dismissal and remanding the case to the trial court, first
noted that state law rather than federal law controlled the question of
whether appellant had a prior conviction within the meaning of section 922.
Thus, the court turned to Colorado law and held that under that state's law
a nolo plea results in a "conviction" for the accused. 73 The court then deter-
mined that, because the expungement of the appellant's previous conviction
took place after the section 922 charges were filed against him, he could still
be considered, for the purchase of the charges at bar, to have a prior convic-
tion.
74
66. 596 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. atem'd, 99 S. Ct. 1517 (1979).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; (or)
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed
to any mental institution; to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
68. 596 F.2d at 931. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) [construing § 922(h)'s
predecessor, a statute similar to § 922(h)].
69. 423 U.S. 212 (1975).
70. 596 F.2d 933-34. The court also discussed the relationship of § 922 to provisions of
Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a). Id.
at 932-34; 423 U.S. at 216. For a discussion of the latter see Note, The Government Must Specifwally
Allege and Prove That Possession of Firearms is "In Commerce or Affecting Commerce" Under Title VII of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 9 Hous. L. REV. 160 (1971); Note, Interstate
Commerce Nexus Requirement Definedfor Firearm Possession by Felons, 29 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1977-
78).
71. 588 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1978).
72. See note 67 supra.
73. 588 F.2d at 775.
74. Id.
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Judge Doyle concurred only in the result reached by the majority. The
judge argued that federal law controlled, criticizing the majority's reasoning
since it allowed, in his opinion, "the state definition of conviction to deter-
mine whether an element in a federal crime has been proven."' 75 Then,
turning to federal law, Judge Doyle determined that the appellant's nolo plea
was a conviction for the purposes of section 922.76
B. 18 USC § 641
In United States v. Leavitt7 7 the appellants were convicted of the theft of
logs from the government. 78 The men ran a timber business and had a con-
tract for the purchase of logs from the federal government. Among their
grounds for appeal, defendants alleged that, based upon their contract with
the government, theft from the government was legally impossible in the
case since (1) the government did not own the logs at the time they were
taken by the appellants; or in the alternative, (2) the government had con-
sented to the taking of the timber.
79
After examining the relevant portion of the contract in question, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the title to the logs had not passed to the de-
fendants, and therefore, the appellants' first claim failed.8 0 Turning to the
second contention the court stated, citing Morissette v. United States,," that
they would not be bound by the common law definitions of theft, but where
theft was defined broadly, as in the instant case, it should be construed by
the courts. In ruling on the second point against the appellants the court
held that the government, by merely consenting to the possession of its prop-
erty by the appellants, had not thereby consented to their theft of the prop-
erty.
8 2
75. Id. (Doyle, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 776-78. See also United States v. Place, 561 F.2d 213 (10th Cir.), cert. dentid, 434
U.S. 1000 (1977).
77. 599 F.2d 355 (10th Cir. 1979).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976) provides in part: "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or
knowingly converts to his use or the use of another,, any record, voucher, money, or thing of
value of the United States or any department or agency thereof,. . . [s]hall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both ... At the Leavitt-Johnson
trial the Government's evidence indicated that the appellants had converted logs worth about
$29,000. 599 F.2d at 359.
79. 599 F.2d at 359-60.
80. Id. at 359-60. A portion of the contract read:
All right, title, and interest in and to any Included Timber shall remain in Forest
Service until it has been cut, Scaled, removed from Sale Area or other designated
cutting area and paid for, at which time title shall vest in purchaser. For purposes of
this Subsection, timber cut under cash deposit, Effective Purchaser Credit or payment
guarantee under B4.3 shall be considered to have been paid for.
Id. at 359. This language coupled with the appellants' having obtained $30,000 surety bond
was the basis of the appellants' legal impossibility argument which was rejected by the court.
81. 342 U.S. 246, 271 (1952).
82. 599 F.2d at 360. The appellants also argued that the Government's criminal case must
fail and that it was instead limited to a suit for breach of contract. The Tenth Circuit found
this argument to be without merit. Id. at 360-61. See also United States v. Dupee, 569 F.2d
1061 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 268 U.S. 220 (1925).
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C. 16 US.C § 703
In United States v. Conners,8 3 appellant, in the course of a Colorado Re-
trievers Club field trial, shot and killed a number of mallards which had
flown uninvited into a lake thus invading and disrupting the contest. He
was convicted of killing migratory birds. The Tenth Circuit looked to inter-
national treaties between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan and to
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regulations to determine if under 16 U.S.C.
§ 70384 the birds protected were required to be "wild" or merely "captive-
reared." The court seized upon the fact that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service's regulations defining "migratory game birds" made specific refer-
ence to wild ducks.8 5 Then the court remanded the case to the trial court for
a determination of whether the dead ducks had been wild, in which case the
appellant's conviction would be affirmed, or whether they had been captive-
reared, in which case the appellant's conviction could not stand. In doing so,
the court distinguished United States v. Richards86 on the basis that in the
latter case the birds in question were falconidae, and therefore not members
of the duck family.
8 7
Judge Holloway stated in dissent that he would draw no fine distinc-
tion, as the majority did, between the terms "wild" and "captive-reared."'88
D. 18 US C § 841()
Noting that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and that ambi-
guities are to be resolved in favor of the accused, the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Schwanke, 89 dealt with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 844.9o The ap-
pellants were charged and convicted of destroying a building by the use of
83. 606 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1979).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976) reads in part:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in
this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to
pursue, hunt, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter,
barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment . .. any migratory bird . . *
included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain
for the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat. 1702), the
United States and the United Mexican States for the protection of migratory birds
and game mammals concluded February 7, 1936, and the United States and the Gov-
ernment of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinc-
tion, and their environment concluded March 4, 1972.
85. 606 F.2d at 272. The court also pointed to similar language contained in the treaties.
Id. at 271.
86. 583 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1978).
87. 606 F.2d at 272 n.4.
88. Id. at 273-74. (Holloway, J., dissenting).
89. 598 F.2d 575, 579 (10th Cir. 1979). See alro United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411
(1973).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1976) reads:
(i) Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy,
by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used
in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000
or both; and if personal injury results shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty
years or fined not more than $20,000, or both; and if death results shall also be subject
to imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment
as provided in section 34 of this title.
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an explosive. Pursuant to the statute's provisions two of the defendants'
sentences were enhanced since the one defendant who had physically de-
stroyed the building had injured himself in doing so.9 1 Analogizing the case
to those involving the felony-murder doctrine,9 2 the court concluded that
the punishment could not be enhanced in situations where the only individ-
ual injured by the blast was the person responsible for the building's de-
mise.
93
In a footnote, Judge Barrett dissented from the above holding, basing
his analysis upon the relevant language of the statute. Thus, he believed the
term " 'if personal injury results' could not be equated with the term 'injured
person.' "94
Before reaching the issue discussed above, the majority determined that
the destroyed building, located in Oklahoma, was protected by federal law.
This was so because the building had housed a store which had purchased
candy, gum, and vegetables from Arkansas. Thus, the interstate commerce
provision of section 844 had been satisfied since Congress had the power to
regulate interstate commerce even though the effect on interstate commerce
was de minimis.
9 5
E. 8 USC. § 641
The argument advanced by the appellant in United States v. Larsen96 was
that he had been convicted of theft of government property under a general
statute, providing for a stiff punishment, when a more specific statute made
the same activity a misdemeanor with a less serious punishment. 9 7 The ap-
pellant was conviicted of stealing government timber under the general theft
statute and argued that the existence of a specific statute precluded prosecu-
tion under the more general statute. The Tenth Circuit cited the well
known rule that the same transaction may constitute two or more offenses as
long as each offense requires some proof of an element not required in the
91. 598 F.2d at 578-79.
92. See, e.g., People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928); Commonwealth v. Redline,
391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). For discussions of the felony-murder doctrine and the con-
cept of vicarious criminal liability, see generally Comment, Criminal Law--Homicde-Feony-Mur-
der-Felons can be Held Responsible Under the NewJerse Murder Statute for the Death of an Innocent Party
Killed by Police Attemfpting to Apprehend the Felons, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 591 (1970); Cnminal Law-
Murder-Flony Murder Rule, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 122 (1970); Felony Murder-Felon Not Responsiblefor
Accidental Death of Bystander Shot by Pohce, 74 DICK. L. REv. 756 (1970); and Criminal Law-
Felony-Murder- Vicarious Liablity--A Felon Can Be Held Responsible For a Murder Committed by a Fear-
Motivated Victim)--Responsibihity is Based on a Theory of Vicarious Liabilit and Not Felony-Murder, 3 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 158 (1971).
93. 598 F.2d at 579.
94. Id. at 580 n.3.
95. Id. at 578.
96. 596 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1979).
97. For a reading of the theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976), see note 78 supra. The statute
covering the unlawful cutting of government timber, 18 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976), reads in part:
Whoever cuts, or wantonly destroys any timber growing on the public lands of the
United States; or
Whoever removes any timber from said public lands, with intent to export or to dis-
pose of the same; ....
Shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
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other98 and affirmed the appellant's conviction. Further, the court empha-
sized the fact that the statutes, as separate and distinct laws, were aimed at
different evils.99
F. 15 U.S.C § 1644
Whether federal jurisdiction is conferred, bringing section 1644100 into
play, when intrastate purchases are made with a credit card stolen in the
same state where the purchases were made, but the goods purchased have
moved in interstate commerce, was the question presented in United States v.
Lomax.5 0' In Lomax, the defendant had used a credit card stolen in Kansas
to make a number of purchases in that state. At trial, the government
showed that the invoices for the items purchases with the stolen card had
been sent to a credit card records center in Kansas City, Missouri. Before
affirming the appellant's conviction the Tenth Circuit noted, as had the
Supreme Court in United States v. Maze, 0 2 the staggering proportions and
costs to which the fraudulent credit card problem had grown. 103
Relying on the broad language of the statute and upon the fact that
there had been at least a minimal affect on interstate commerce, the court
held that this effect on interstate commerce was sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion under the statute. 104
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Due Process
In United States v. Ghst, 10 5 the Tenth Circuit considered the question of
whether pre-indictment delay caused by the Government, coupled with a
general pattern of unfair practices used by government agents to build a case
against the appellants, resulted in a denial of due process. The trial court
had dismissed the charges 10 6 against the defendants calling them "stale" and
holding that the appellants had been the victims of prejudicial pre-indict-
98. 596 F.2d at 411. See also United States v. Bettenhausen, 499 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1974).
99. 596 F.2d at 411. See United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir.), cert. dented,
429 U.S. 982 (1976).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1976) reads in part:
Whoever knowingly in a transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
uses or attempts or conspires to use any counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost,
stolen, or fraudulently obtained credit card to obtain money, goods, services, or any-
thing else of value which within any one-year period has a value aggregating of 51,000
or more;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
101. 598 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1979).
102. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
103. See 598 F.2d at 583 n.2 (citing Maze, 414 U.S. at 416 (White, J., dissenting)).
104. 598 F.2d at 584.
105. 594 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1979).
106. The court first addressed the issue of whether the Government could appeal the dismis-
sal. The Tenth Circuit commented that an appeal was possible only if jeopardy had not at-
tached. Due to the fact that the court resolved the case on the grounds of pre-indictment delay,
it reached no determination of the double jeopardy issue. Id. at 1376-77.
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ment delay by the Government. 0 7 The Tenth Circuit held that the findings
of the trial court were supported by the record. But the court noted, " 'proof
of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due proc-
ess claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the
delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.' "o108 Further, the court noted
that more than mere negligence on the part of the Government is required
before the prejudice to the defendant can rise to the level of a denial of due
process sufficient to justify dismissal of an indictment. 10 9
Citing numerous faults with the government agents' handling of the
investigation; ite., the fact that the Government's files on the case were scat-
tered "among many people and offices," the fact that government officials
had not listened to nor read various materials alleged to contain evidence
exculpatory to the defendants, and the fact that a government agent had cut
off a transcript of a tape shortly before an exculpatory statement was made
concerning one of the appellants, the court found grounds sufficient to affirm
the lower court's dismissal of the charges against the appellants." 0
B. Se/f-Incrimination
In United States v. Bridwell,' 1' a physician challenged his conviction for
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. 1 2 One of the grounds he
urged on appeal was that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence
certain of his statements concerning his drug inventories, which were made
to investigators during the course of an audit of the doctor's office. The
appellant contended that he should have been given a Miranda warning
prior to the questioning by the agents. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argu-
ment, noting that Miranda v. Arizona' '1 applied only to custodial interroga-
tions. 114  The court analogized Bridwell's case with Beckwith v. United
States," 5 in which the court rejected arguments that the Miranda warnings
should be given once the investigation had "focused" upon a defendant or
that the warnings are required when a subject is placed under "mental re-
straint." 16 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence against Bridwell
was properly admitted.
107. Id. at 1377.
108. Id. at 1378 (citing United States v. Lavasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)). See Comment,
Criminal Procedure. Due Process Requires Dismissal of Charges Where Government Pre-lntctiment Delay
Prudtices Defendant, 61 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1977).
109. 594 F.2d at 1378. See also United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Revada, 574 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1978).
110. 594 F.2d at 1378.
111. 583 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1978).
112. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976). Dr. Bridwell was also convicted of distributing
controlled substances in violation of § 841(a)(1) and of failure to maintain accurate records
regarding the dispensing of the drugs in violation of § 842(a)(5).
113. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114. 583 F.2d at 1138. The court commented that the Miranda court had held the warnings
must be given when a suspect "'has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of actions in any significant way.' " Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). See also Note,
Crimtnal Procedure-Defining "Custodial Interrogation"for the Purposes of Miranda, 57 OR. L. REV.
184 (1977).
115. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
116. 583 F.2d at 1138. See also Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 345.
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The court did, however, find error in the trial court's allowing into evi-
dence the testimony of a government agent that the defendant had refused
to sign a form waiving his Miranda rights, holding that such was improper
evidence of a defendant's silence, because of his fifth amendment rights.
1 17
But the appellate court held, that based upon the trial court's immediate
instruction to the jury to disregard the above mentioned testimony, and the
strong evidence of the accused's guilt, the error was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and, therefore, would not justify reversal of the physician's
conviction. 118
The Tenth Circuit dealt with a somewhat different fifth amendment
problem in United States v. Scott. 119 There, an appellant's statement to federal
agents was used by the Government to impeach his testimony at trial. The
appellant alleged that before the statement could be used to impeach him,
the Government was required to show that the statement had been volunta-
rily given. Indeed, the appellant cited Wheeler v. United States1 2 0 which held
in part that "it is reasonable to require the Government to meet the burden
of showing that the statement was voluntarily made after the accused had
been fully advised of all his rights and had effectively waived them in ac-
cordance with the standards prescribed by Miranda."'' But the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that the matter had been resolved to the contrary by the Supreme
Court in Harris v. New York 122 which held that statements made by a defend-
ant subject to custodial interrogation could be used to impeach him even
though the requirements of Miranda had not been met. 123 Thus, the court
held that Wheeler was no longer controlling in such a situation and that, in
the absence of a specific allegation or evidence of coercion or duress, the
Government was not required to prove that a statement was voluntarily
given before its introduction for impeachment purposes.
124
C. Double Jeopard
In United States v. Hujinan,'2 5 the appellant entered into a leasing agree-
ment with a Chicago company whereby he leased a tractor-trailer unit for
hauling goods from Illinois to California. The cargo, which was also part of
the leasing arrangement, consisted of canned hams and ham hocks. During
the course of the trip the appellant, apparently without authority, sold the
hams and ham hocks for his private gain. The defendant was located and
subsequently charged with theft of government property.
26
Sometime after the case had been set for trial, the Government discov-
ered that title to the cargo had not yet vested in the United States at the
117. 583 F.2d at 1138-39.
118. Id. at 1139.
119. 592 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1979).
120. 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967).
121. 592 F.2d at 114.
122. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
123. 592 F.2d at 1141.
124. In Scott the court found no evidence of coercion or duress. Id. at 1142.
125. 595 F.2d 551 (10th Cir. 1979).
126. Id. at 553. The theft charges were filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 642 (1976),
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time the defendant allegedly sold the ham. Thus, the Government moved to
dismiss the theft of government property charge and filed new charges alleg-
ing that appellant was guilty of theft from an interstate shipment. 127 On the
trial date the Government renewed its motion, but the court ordered a jury
impaneled in the cause sworn. After this was done the Government advised
the court that it could not prove that the hams had belonged to the United
States. As a result the court granted judgement of acquittal for the defend-
ant. 128
Later the appellant was tried and convicted of the theft from an inter-
state shipment charge. He argued (1) that conviction on the second charge
had subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment;
or in the alternative (2) that the Government was collaterally estopped from
introducing evidence at the second trial of any element of which he had been
acquitted of on the theft of government property charge. 1
29
In response to the double jeopardy claim, the Government, citing Unied
States v. Appawoo,' 3 0contended that it was entitled to appeal from the previ-
ous judgement of acquittal, since the acquittal allegedly had been improp-
erly granted, and that the court should have heard the motion to dismiss
before the jury had been impaneled.'
3 1
The Tenth Circuit ruled against the Government on this point by dis-
tinguishing Appawoo from the instant case on the ground that no appeal
from the preceding acquittal had been made by the Government. Rather,
the Government was, in a subsequent proceeding, attempting to attack the
validity of the acquittal on the theft of government property charge.' 3 2 The
Government's second contention, with respect to the appellant's double
jeopardy claim, was that the respective charges were separate and distinct,
and thus there would be no violation of the appellant's right not to be sub-
jected to double jeopardy. The court agreed, and held, in overruling the
appellant's first point that each of the statutes in question contained an addi-
tional element requiring proof not required in the other.133 Thus, trying the
appellant on the subsequent charge did not violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy.134 At the same time, the court declined to adopt the "same
transaction rule" urged by the appellant, which would allow the prosecution
to charge only one crime per any given incident of criminal activity by a
given defendant.
135
The court then addressed the appellant's collateral estoppel claim, not-
127. 595 F.2d at 553.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977). Appawoo was consolidated on appeal with United
States v. Casey, 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977).
131. 595 F.2d at 554.
132. d.
133. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See a/so Cox v. Gaffney, 459
F.2d 50 (10th Cir.), cert denid, 409 U.S. 863 (1972).
134. 595 F.2d at 554-55.
135. Id See United States v. Addington, 471 F.2d 560, 568 (10th Cir. 1973); Birch v. United
States, 451 F.2d 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Note, DoubleJeopardy. Mu/lip/e Prosecutlions
Aritgfrom the Same Transaction, 15 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 259 (1977-78).
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ing that the standard for review was one of rationality, "with a practical
frame with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings."' 136 Thus the
court carefully examined the lower court record and determined that, as the
Government had urged, the only issue to which the collateral estoppel claim
could apply was the issue of the government's ownership of the ham. Since
this issue was not an element of the theft from an interstate shipment charge
the appellant's fifth amendment claims failed and his conviction was af-
firmed. 137
In United States v. Rtch,' 38 the Tenth Circuit dealt with a somewhat dif-
ferent double jeopardy question. In Rich, the appellant was charged with
committing fraud on a bankruptcy trustee. 139 His first trial ended in a mis-
trial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. At retrial, a jury was
selected without the appellant being present but with his consent. Then,
before the trial could proceed any further, the Government was granted a
continuance because its key attorney could not be present to begin the
trial. 140 For about six weeks neither the Government nor the appellant at-
tempted to move the case to trial. One day the appellant's attorney met the
judge in the hallway of the federal courthouse and the men went to the
judge's chambers. The trial judge asked the defense attorney if he really
wanted to try the case. The defense attorney replied that he did not and
that he felt his client was innocent and should never have been charged.
The judge instructed his clerk to prepare an order discharging the jury. Ap-
pellant's counsel told the judge that if the jury was discharged he would
oppose his client's retrial on double jeopardy grounds.' 4 ' The judge made
no reply and the jury was discharged, without notification of the Govern-
ment's attorneys.
In a subsequent hearing, the appellant moved for dismissal of the in-
dictment against him on the grounds of double jeopardy and upon a claim
that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial in contravention of
the sixth amendment.1
42
The Government submitted that the retrial was not barred by the
double jeopardy clause because, in his conversation with the trial judge, ap-
pellant's attorney had impliedly consented to the jury's discharge. Further,
the Government argued that the double jeopardy issue had to be resolved in
its favor because the conversation between the defense counsel and the trial
judge had brought about a termination of the prosecution of the appellant
136. 595 F.2d at 555.
137. Id. at 555-56. Set Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Ashe held that whenever an
ultimate issue of fact has been litigated in a defendant's favor, it may not be relitigated by the
prosecution in a subsequent proceeding against the defendant. See also Collateral and Equitable
Estoppel ofFederal Criminal Defendants, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1221 (1976); Note, Crinznal Laic-
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel and the Mutually Exclusive Offense Rule, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
691 (1975); and Rich, Collateral Estoppel- A Constitutional Cuarantee, 50 B.U. L. REV. 604 (1970).
138. 589 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1978).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
140. 589 F.2d at 1026-27.
141. Id. at 1027.
142. Even though the appellate court ruled that Rich could not be retried, it did note that
the trial court had erred in holding that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Id.
at 1033-34.
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without a factual determination of the latter's guilt or innocence on the
charge. 1
43
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the general rule was
that jeopardy attaches with the impaneling and swearing of a jury.' 44 The
court, however, acknowledged that there were exceptions to this general
rule. The Tenth Circuit stated that, absent prosecutorial or judicial miscon-
duct or bad faith, the trial judge may declare a mistrial, even against the
wishes of a defendant when such action is warranted by "manifest neces-
sity."'1 45 But the court noted that none of the many policy reasons behind
the ban on double jeopardy were applicable to the appellant in this case. He
had not been subjected to the embarrassment, expense and ordeal which
many defendants face after their trials had begun. Nor could it be argued
that the swearing and impaneling of the jury had subjected Rich to intense
mental anguish since he had not been present when it was selected.146 Nev-
ertheless, the court held, citing Cnit v. Bretz, 14 1 that the appellant could not
be retried. 148 After noting that one of the major interests which the double
jeopardy clause seeks to protect is the right of the accused to have a particu-
lar chosen jury decide the case, the Tenth Circuit held that Crzst made it
plain that:
[J]eopardy attaches in a criminal trial when the jury is empaneled
and sworn and that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a subse-
quent prosecution of a defendant whose previous trial has ended
with the discharge of the jury before it has rendered a verdict un-
less: (1) findings of "manifest necessity" justifying the trial court's
discharge of the first jury appear by express declaration of the
court, regardless of the terminology of the order or are apparent
from the trial court record, or (2) the defendant consents to the
trial court's order discharging the jury upon either the Govern-
ment's or the trial court's motion, or waives the right to later object
thereto. 149
The appellate court then noted that there was no evidence that the trial
judge had acted in bad faith or that the decision to discharge the jury had
been dictated by manifest necessity. After examining the statements made
by the defense counsel to the judge, the court concluded that the statements
would hardly be considered consent or waiver of a double jeopardy objec-
tion.S ° Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held that the appellant's attorney had
not expressly nor impliedly consented to the trial court's action. Even if the
attorney had, retrial would still be precluded since the attorney was not em-
143. Id. at 1027.
144. Id. at 1028. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); United States v. Fay, 553
F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1977).
145. 589 F.2d at 1028. See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); Simmons v.
United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
146. 589 F.2d at 1029-30.
147. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
148. 589 F.2d at 1030. See also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
149. 589 F.2d at 1031-32. See generally Comment, Crinminal Law---Double Jeopardy--Retrial Af-
ter Sua Sponte. Declaration of Mistnal Over Defendant's Objecttn Prohibited Where Record Discloses a
Viable Alternative to Mistrial, 10 Rtr.-CAM. L.J. 457 (1979).
150. 589 F.2d at 1032.
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powered to waive such a fundamental right for his client without first in-
forming him and receiving permission to give such consent. 15 1 Thus, the
Government was barred from retrying the appellant on the same charge.
In United States v. Padila,152 the Tenth Circuit had occasion to address a
claim by the appellant that the U.S. Attorney's Office was not abiding by
the Petite policy 153 set down by the U.S. Department of Justice. In Padilla,
the appellant was charged by the State of New Mexico with trafficking her-
oin. The appellant, pursuant to a plea bargaining agreement with state
prosecutors, pleaded guilty to one count and was given a three year deferred
sentence. The state did not prosecute the remaining five counts. Thereafter
the state prosecutor became an Assistant U.S. Attorney. 154 Subsequently,
appellant was indicted by a federal grand jury on five counts of possession
with the intent to distribute and one count of the distribution of heroin.'
55
The indictment was based upon the same transaction which had been the
foundation of the aforementioned state charges.
On appeal, the appellant asserted three grounds for the dismissal of the
federal charges against him: (1) the plea bargaining agreement between
himself and state prosecutors was binding on the Government since the then
state prosecutor became the Government attorney responsible for prosecut-
ing the appellant in federal court; (2) the double jeopardy clause precluded
the government from trying him on the federal charges because they arose
out of the same transactions which were the subjects of the state charges to
which he had pleaded guilty; and (3) his rights had been violated by the
failure of the Government to follow its own Petite policy.
The Tenth Circuit noted that there was no evidence that the state plea
bargaining agreement had been designed to encompass the possibility of a
subsequent federal prosecution, and therefore ruled against the appellant on
that point. 156 With respect to the appellant's double jeopardy claim, the
court, quoting extensively from United States v. Lanza,' 57 held: "We have
here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources capable of deal-
ing with the same subject-matter within the same territory. . . .Each gov-
ernment [state and federal] in determining what shall be an offense against
its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the
other."' 5 8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the federal prosecution
was not precluded by the fact that state charges had been filed and resolved
against the defendant, although both arose out of the same incident.
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the Petite policy argument. That pol-
icy, promulgated by the Justice Department, dictates that following a state
151. Id.
152. 589 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1978).
153. See text accompanying note 158 in~fa.
154. Id. at 483.
155. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
156. 589 F.2d at 484.
157. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
158. 589 F.2d at 484 (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). See also
Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties, and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cmii. L. REV. 591
(1961); Pontikes, DualSoereignty and Double Jeopardy, A Critique ofBartkus v. Illinois and Abbate
v. United States, 14 W. REs. L. REV. 700 (1963).
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prosecution there should not be subsequent federal prosecution for offenses
arising out of the same transaction in the absence of "compelling federal
interests."' 59 Also, the decision to commence a federal prosecution in such
an instance should be made only with the approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. The court first chastised the U.S. Attorney's Office for not re-
vealing in its brief whether the permission of the Attorney General had been
forthcoming, or for that matter even sought. Since the court had no way of
determining that issue, it proceeded assuming that permission had not been
given.' 6° Still, the court held, failure of the prosecutors to abide by the Petite
policy would not result in the dismissal of the charges against the appellant.
Citing several recent Tenth Circuit cases, the court held that:
[T]he Petite policy does not confer an enforceable right on the de-
fendant in the absence of government request for dismissal. We
. . .called attention to the previous line of decision on this subject,
noting that in each instance in which Petite was applied it had
been invoked at the request of the United States and not over the
government's objection. . . .We also pointed out that it was a pol-
icy statement of the Department of Justice; that it was based upon
the Attorney General's determination that fairness required it; and
that it was not a regulation but simply a housekeeping provision.
The Attorney General's statement, to be sure, was distributed to
the U.S. Attorneys. . . .It followed then that the failure to obtain
the Attorney General's approval resulted in there being no enforce-
able right in the defendant.
161
Judge Logan concurred, but only because he believed he was bound by case
law. 162 He noted that the instant case showed just why the Petite policy had
become necessary and advocated that the Government should be required to
follow the policy, in part, to avoid unfairness to a defendant. '
6 3
Thus, it appears that appellants will continue to raise Petite policy chal-
lenges to their convictions despite a solid reluctance on the part of the appel-
late courts to grant relief on those grounds. But it is also apparent that not
all appellate judges feel judicial restraint should rule the day when the Gov-
ernment violates the Petite policy.
In United States v. Bowzh'ne, 16 4 the defendants were tried on a conspiracy
charge. t6 5 After several days of trial, the trial court dismissed the charge,
holding that the evidence indicated there had been more than one conspir-
acy. But the judge specifically held that retrial of the defendants was not
barred by the dismissal. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dis-
missal of the conspiracy charge and then evaluated the case to determine if a
159. 589 F.2d at 484.
160. Id. at 485.
161. Id. (citing United States v. Valenzuela, 584 F.2d 374, 376 (10th Cir. 1978)). &e also
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184 (10th
Cir.), cer. dened, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
162. 589 F.2d at 485 (Logan, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 486. See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121 (1959).
164. 593 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1979).
165. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976).
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subsequent retrial was barred on double jeopardy grounds.' 66
The appellate court held that retrial was not precluded. In doing so,
the court relied upon several recent cases which held that when a mistrial is
declared at the request of the defendant, retrial is not barred, as contrasted
with the situation when the mistrial is granted as the result of the Govern-
ment's evidence, or due to prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching.16 7 In
Bowline, the Tenth Circuit reasoned the mistrial was declared as a result of
the invalidity of the charge and the lower court's decision did not go to the
merits of the case. Further, the mistrial was not the result of misconduct or
overreaching on the part of the prosecutor.168
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Holloway stated his belief that retrial of the
defendants was barred by the double jeopardy clause. Relying on the court
record, and the fact that the basis for the trial court's declaration of a mis-
trial was that the evidence indicated there had been more than one conspir-
acy. Judge Holloway concluded that the declaration of mistrial had gone, at
least partially, to the merits of the case. Thus despite the lower court's belief
that retrial was available, the judge felt the mistrial was the result of the
Government's failure to prove the single conspiracy set out in the indict-
ment. 169
In a companion case United States v. Leonard,170 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the question of whether the mistrial declared by the trial court was
due to prosecutorial misconduct. The essential facts were the same as in the
Bowhne case, and the same defendants were involved. In Leonard, however,
the double jeopardy issue arose out of a somewhat different situation. There,
the trial court granted the defendants a mistrial on the basis that the prose-
cutor had failed to comply fully with both statutory and judicial discovery
orders. 17' The trial court, however, noted that it believed the prosecutor
had not complied with the discovery orders because he was not " 'informed
about the law,' "172 and not because he acted in bad faith. Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit primarily focused its analysis on whether the trial court's find-
ing of lack of bad faith was supported by the trial record. From the record
the appellate court concluded that the prosecutor had not intentionally
failed to comply with discovery orders in an attempt to provoke a mistrial or
to prejudice the defendants.1 73 While not actually reaching a determination
with respect to whether the trial court's evaluation was correct, the Tenth
Circuit held that even if the actions of the prosecutor in this case could be
said to have been in bad faith, that fact alone would not support a decision
166. 593 F.2d at 947-48.
167. Id. at 948. See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424
U.S. 600 (1976).
168. 593 F.2d at 948-49.
169. Id. at 949-51 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
170. 593 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1979).
171. Id. at 953. The Government attorney had failed to comply with the Jencks Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). See generally Comment, Expanding Defendant's Discovery: TheJencks Act at
Pretn alt1eangs, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 419 (1975); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecu-
tor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 112 (1972).
172. 593 F.2d at 953.
173. Id. at 954.
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that retrial of the defendants was precluded on double jeopardy grounds.
Citing United States v. Dinitz,17 4 the court held that the bad faith must have
had the impact of provoking the mistrial request. In the instant case, the
court could not find that the decision of the lower court was erroneous.
1 75
The defendants in United States v. Horn 176 were convicted of submitting
false exemption statements to their employers, 177 claiming they had incurred
no federal income tax liability for the 1976 taxable year. The defendants,
who were husband and wife, were tried jointly but after the jury had deliber-
ated about three and a half hours the jury foreman sent the court a note
stating that the jury appeared to be deadlocked.
178
Upon receiving the note the trial judge recessed the proceedings for the
night. The jury resumed its deliberations at about 9 a.m. the following
morning after the judge read the jury a formal Allen charge. 1 79 Less than
two hours later the jury was brought back into the courtroom and the judge
declared a mistrial due to the jury deadlock. The judge did not ask the jury
foreman if the panel had made any progress towards reaching a unanimous
verdict that morning nor did the judge poll the individual jury members to
determine if the jurors felt a consensus might be reached.
On appeal the defendants argued that their retrial on the same charges
was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The de-
fendants contended that no "manifest necessity" had existed which justified
the trial judge sua sponte declaring the mistrial. 1
80
After reviewing many of the cases which had attempted to interpret the
term "manifest necessity,"'' the Tenth Circuit concluded that, in the case
at bar, two factors were controlling: 1) the shortness of the jury deliberations
in this case;' 8 2 and 2) the fact that the trial judge, at the time of the declara-
174. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
175. 593 F.2d at 954-55.
176. 583 F.2d 1124 (10th Cir. 1978).
177. 26 U.S.C. § 7205 (1976).
178. 583 F.2d at 1125.
179. Se- Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
180. 583 F.2d at 1126.
181. See, e.g., Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978) (seven criteria listed:
(1) a timely objection by defendant; (2) the jury's collective opinion that it cannot agree; (3) the
length of the deliberations of the jury; (4) the length of the trial; (5) the complexity of the issues
presented to the jury; (6) any proper communications which the judge has had with the jury;
and (7) the effects of possible exhaustion and the impact which coercion of further deliberations
might have on the verdict).
The evolution of the proper standard of review of mistrial declarations has gone from the
initial recitation of "manifest necessity," United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824);
through a period of permitting the trial court great discretion, Gori v. United States, 367 U.S.
364 (1961) and Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); up to a recent attempt to
require the trial judge to undertake a search for procedural alternatives to declaring a mistrial,
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); and finally back into confusion with a decision
seeming to overemphasize the public interest in prosecuting alleged criminals, possibly to the
point of derogation of the accused's right to have his trial completed before a particular tribu-
nal, Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). The Tenth Circuit, however, chose not to deal
extensively with Somervitle, and instead followed a line of cases stressing the trial court's obliga-
tion to conduct an affirmative inquiry of the jury as to the state of its deliberations. Eg., United
States ex ret Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973).
182. 583 F.2d at 1128, 1129. United States ex ret. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516
F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975).
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tion of a mistrial, had failed to determine that the jury was hopelessly dead-
locked.' 83 Since neither review of the record nor consideration of the factors
listed above lead the Tenth Circuit to believe there had been a showing of a
"manifest necessity" mandating the declaration of a mistrial, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court's holding that the defendants could be retried




In Twyman v. Crisp,'8 5 the Tenth Circuit considered three substantive
claims of an Oklahoma prisoner before affirming the decision of the trial
court denying the prisoner relief. Prisoner Twyman had alleged that he was
denied: adequate medical care; due process because of his reclassification
from medium to maximum security without an adequate reclassification
hearing; adequate access to prison law library facilities through hour restric-
tions; and access to the court by virtue of the prison's postage stamp policy.
At the outset the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a prisoner's claim of
denial of adequate medical treatment is a valid claim to raise in federal
court. The appellant's contention was that he had ulcers but that prison
officials had taken him off of his "bland diet" thereby subjecting him to cruel
and unusual punishment.'8 6 The court noted that in order to state a cause
of action upon which relief may be granted "a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs."' 8 7 After turning to the record in the case, which indicated
that any change in the appellant's diet was the result of administrative over-
sight or misunderstanding, the Tenth Circuit concluded that there was no
evidence of deliberate defiance of a medical order prescribing a special diet
for the appellant.18a Furthermore, the court noted that the appellant had
not carried his burden of proof, not only in respect to the deliberate conduct
requirement but also on the issue of the seriousness of the appellant's medi-
cal need for the special diet.'
8 9
The court also decided the reclassification issue in favor of the
Oklahoma prison officials. Pointing to the fact that under Oklahoma law
the Director of Corrections has "total discretion" in the area of prisoner
transfers, the Tenth Circuit held that the appellant had "no legitimate claim
of entitlement to remain in the general prison population" and that the deci-
sion to transfer the appellant to the maximum security section was "com-
pletely within the sphere of authority of prison officials."' 90
With respect to access to the prison law library, the Tenth Circuit stated
183. 583 F.2d at 1127, 1129.
184. Id. at 1129.
185. 584 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1978).
186. Id. at 354. Set also Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970).
187. 584 F.2d at 355 (citing West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1978)).
188. 584 F.2d at 355.
189. Id. Set Dickson v. Colman, 569 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971).
190. 584 F.2d at 355-57.
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that the appellant had not been able to show that he was prejudiced by
restricted access. The only evidence of prejudice presented by the appellant
in this regard was that because of the restrictions he had been forced to seek
continuances in certain cases. While this allegation might be true, the court
stated, it did not rise to the level of prejudice which would entitle Twyman
to relief. Indeed, the court noted that many practicing attorneys for a vari-
ety of reasons also are forced to seek court continuances.' 9'
With respect to the prison's stamp policy, the appellant relied upon the
recent Supreme Court decision in Bounds v. Smth' 92 which stated, in part:
"It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense
with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to au-
thenticate them, and with stamps to mail them."'
93
The Tenth Circuit noted that a literal reading of Bounds would tend to
support the appellant's claim. However, observing that the Oklahoma
prison in question made adequate provision of stamps for indigent prisoners
and that the appellant had been unable to show he had been substantially
prejudiced by the stamp policy, the court held that prisoners do not have an
unlimited right to free postage with respect to stamps for mail to be sent to
courts. As for the interpretation of the language in Bounds, the Tenth Circuit
found it best to leave that function to the Supreme Court.'
94
Possible remedies for the overcrowding in Oklahoma prisons were ex-
amined in Battle v. Anderson.195 This case grew out of a series of long-term
problems in the Oklahoma prison system. The trial court failed to grant the
state a continuance to permit preparation for a compliance hearing on the
overcrowding issue. After an extensive review of the lower court record, and
after remarking that it appeared the Oklahoma prison officials were comply-
ing with the trial court's initial order regarding overcrowding in good faith
and as rapidly as possible, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the lower
court.' 96 The appellate court concluded that it could not reach the merits of
the case since it was possible the trial court had not provided an adequate
opportunity for the prison officials to prepare for the hearing which was the
subject of the appeal.
B. Sentencing
In United States v. Davidson,19 7 the appellant, a prisoner at a federal
prison in Oklahoma, was convicted of assaulting a fellow inmate with the
intent to commit murder and of conveying a knife from place to place within
the prison.' 98 The trial judge sentenced him to ten years imprisonment on
the assault charge and a five year term on the conveying a knife count, the
191. Id. at 357. See also United States v. Evans, 542 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1976).
192. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
193. Id. at 824-25.
194. 584 F.2d at 359. See Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). Contra Craig v.
Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656 (D. Nev. 1975).
195. 594 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1979).
196. Id. at 792.
197. 597 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1979).
198. 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 1792 (1976).
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two sentences to be served concurrently. The court did not, however, specify
whether these sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively with the
bank robbery sentence which the appellant was then serving. The sentenc-
ing took place shortly before noon and the appellant was in the process of
being returned to the prison to serve the terms when the court ordered him
to appear before it to correct the oversight of the trial judge. The vehicle in
which the appellant was travelling was turned around and about one and
one-half hours after the initial sentencing the appellant was brought before
the court where the assault and conveying sentences were pronounced to run
consecutively with his bank robbery sentence. 199
On appeal, the appellant challenged the sentencing procedure, alleging
he had been subjected to double jeopardy. The Tenth Circuit, however,
disagreed and affirmed the sentencing of the trial court. The court drew a
distinction between judicial and executive custody, with the sentence not
commencing to run, and therefore jeopardy not attaching, until a convicted
person is received by the institution at which his sentence is to run.20
United States v. Ahgoom 20 1 presented an issue concerning sentencing
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA). In Ahgoom the trial court
sentenced the youthful appellant to an eight year prison term for his convic-
tion on an unlawful possession of firearms charge.20 2 Thus, the appellant
was not given the benefit of the more lenient FYCA statute. The appellant
thereafter filed for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The Tenth Circuit stated that the trial court had apparently ignored
Dorszynski v. United States2 °3 which had been handed down by the Supreme
Court several months prior to the sentencing of Ahgoom. Dorszynski held
that before a trial court could sentence a youth offender under the more
punitive adult sentencing provisions, the court must expressly find on the
basis of the court record that sentencing under the FYCA would not benefit
the defendant. 2 4 In the instant case, however, the only trial court finding
had been that the appellant's case minimally required an eight year sen-
tence.20 5 The Government argued that this finding showed the trial judge
had made an implicit finding that no benefit would be derived from sentenc-
ing the appellant under the FYCA. But the Tenth Circuit distinguished
several cases cited by the Government to that effect on the basis that they
were pre-Dorsynski decisions.2 0 6 Therefore, the court remanded the case to
the trial court for resentencing and the lower court's express findings as to
the possible benefits of sentencing the appellant under the FYCA.
199. 597 F.2d at 231, 232-33.
200. Id. at 233. See Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1964); Walton v.
United States, 202 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916 (1969). See also Pugh and Carver, Due Process and Sentencitg" From
Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEX. L. REV. 25 (1970).
201. 596 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1979).
202. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976).
203. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
204. Id. at 444.
205. 596 F.2d at 434.
206. Id. at 434. See McKnabb v. United States, 551 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1977); Coleman v.
United States, 532 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1976).
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C. Post- Trial Procedure
In United States v. Lucas,20 7 the Tenth Circuit dealt with the question of
whether an untimely pro se notice of appeal filed with the trial court con-
veyed jurisdiction to the appellate court to hear the appeal. The facts of the
case indicated that the appellant filed his pro se notice of appeal with the
district court twenty days after the date of judgement finding him guilty of
bank robbery. Thus, his filing was ten days overdue but still within the
thirty day extention period under rule 4(b).208 The Tenth Circuit, noting
that a determination was needed by the lower court of whether the late filing
of the notice was due to excusable neglect, remanded the case to the district
court where the appellant could file a motion for an extension of time to file
his notice of appeal.
20 9
D. Post-Conviction Relief
The issue in United States v. Talk2 1° was whether successive motions by a
prisoner made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 were barred by Supreme Court
Rule 9(b) when there had been an intervening parole hearing for the appel-
lant.2 1 ' Talk was convicted of rape on an Indian reservation 21 2 and, at his
first section 2255 hearing he alleged that the trial court which had sentenced
him had wanted him to be eligible for parole prior to serving a third of his
sentence. The hearing court denied his motion. After that, the appellant
received another parole hearing but was again denied parole prior to serving
a third of his sentence. The appellant then filed another section 2255 mo-
tion, again alleging that he should be paroled prior to serving a third of his
sentence. The hearing court dismissed the appellant's motion as successive.
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the lower court's decision, held that rule
9(b) was broad enough to bar the second motion as successive since his prior
motion had been determined on the merits and thus the motion in the case





In United States v. Barron,2 1 4 the Tenth Circuit dealt with the affirmative
defense of entrapment. The facts indicated that one of the defendants, Bar-
ron, was involved in the sale of drugs to federal undercover agents. He was
tried and convicted of possession with the intent to distribute
207. 597 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1979).
208. FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
209. 597 F.2d at 245-46.
210. 597 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1979).
211. Id. at 249-50.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976). The appellant was sentenced pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4208(a)(2) (1976).
213. 597 F.2d at 250-51.
214. 594 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1979).
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methamphetamine. 21 5 On appeal, he alleged that his conviction should be
reversed because he was entrapped into committing the crime by the govern-
ment agents. The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by inquiring into the
assertion that the defense of entrapment had been established by Barron as a
matter of law. Citing United States v. Gum/l, 216 the court set out the rule of
law as "whether there is undisputed evidence which shows conclusively and
unmistakably that an innocent person was induced to commit the act com-
plained of by trickery or fraud of a government agent."' 217 Further, the
court stated that in order for the appellant to establish entrapment it must
appear that he was "an innocent dupe" and that the agents were the prime
movers in causing him to commit the crime in question.
2 18
The Tenth Circuit held, however, that the evidence presented at trial
indicated that Barron was involved in the planning and preparation of at
least one of the drug transactions with which the appellants were charged.
Thus, the court held that the evidence had failed to establish, and, in fact,
was totally inconsistent with Barron's allegation of entrapment.2 1 9 The
court also noted that the conduct of the government agents in the present
case could not be said to have been "generally outrageous." It did hold,
however, that the appellant could, and did, have the entrapment issue sub-
mitted to the jury.
220
In United States v. Szycher,2 2' the appellant was charged with possession
with the intent to distribute cocaine. 222 The appellant's entrapment claim
arose out of the allegations that while dealing with federal undercover drug
agents he became frightened and was afraid not to comply with their re-
quests that he furnish them drugs. Also, the appellant claimed he had been
induced to enter into the drug deals with the agents as the result of the
activities of an informer whom the Government had recruited while the in-
former was in government custody on drug related charges.
At the conclusion of the evidence at trial, the appellant made an oral
motion to dismiss the charges, later supplemented by a written motion, as-
serting that the actions of the informer were so outrageous and illegal as to
rise to the level of a denial of due process. The trial court denied the appel-
215. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1976).
216. 522 F.2d 20, 23 (10th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Rosenfeld, 545 F.2d 98 (10th
Cir. 1976). For general discussion of the doctrine of entrapment see Murchison, The Entrapment
Defense in Federal Couris. Modern Developments, 47 Miss. L.J. 573 (1976); Note, Criminal Procedure-
The Entrapment Defense-Determination of Predisposition, 11 LAND & WATER L. REv, 265 (1976)
(citing Wyoming cases), and Note, The Entrapment Defense-What Hath the Model Penal Code
Wrought?, 16 Duo. L. REv. 157 (1977-78).
217. 594 F.2d at 1349.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1349-50. See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); United States v.
Williams, 488 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1973).
220. 594 F.2d at 1349-50. See United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976).
221. 585 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1978).
222. In addition to the defense of entrapment, the appellant challenged his conviction on
the ground that there was no rational basis for the classification of cocaine as a Schedule II
controlled substance. The court rejected this argument, commenting that it had been raised
and found to be without merit on many previous occasions. Id. at 444-45. See also United States
v. Maryland Savings Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4 (1970); United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d
1279 (1976).
[Vol. 57:2
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
lant's motion, and while noting that the informer had, as alleged by the
appellant, apparently used cocaine in the presence of the appellant and the
government agents, that this activity did not rise to the level of entrap-
ment.2 23 The trial judge further stated that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the Government to sustain its burden of showing the appel-
lant's predisposition to commit the crime charged and that the issue of en-
trapment had been properly submitted to the jury.
224
The Tenth Circuit, noting that government agents can "employ appro-
priate artifice and deception to ferret out illegal activities," held that the
decision of the trial court with respect to the appellant's motion was not
clearly erroneous and it therefore affirmed the decision of the lower court.
22 5
The appellant also challenged the trial court's jury instruction on the
entrapment issue. The appellant contended that the Government was re-
quired to show, not only a predisposition on the part of the appellant to
commit the crime charged, but also, that in the absence of any government
involvement that the appellant would still have been likely to commit the
crime. Therefore, the appellant asserted that the trial court had erred in not
so instructing the jury. The Tenth Circuit rejected this broad interpretation
of entrapment and declined to adopt such a definition of the defense.
226
B. Trial Court Discretion
The practices of Government witnesses were examined by the Tenth
Circuit in United States o. Priest.2 27 In that case the appellant was charged
with illegal making, possession, and transfer of a sawed-off shotgun.228 He
was tried b a jury and convicted of all three counts. The Government's
undercover agents, who purchased and witnessed the purchase of the firearm
from the appellant, testified at trial that shortly after the sale they had made
a written record of "their recollection of [the] events."'229 The writings were
transcribed into typed reports and the handwritten reports and notes were
thereafter destroyed. The record revealed that at least one of the witnesses
compared the notes and the typed reports and testified that the reports accu-
rately reflected the material contained in the notes.
2 30
The defense attorney was allowed to examine the typed reports, but at
trial, he objected to the fact the original notes had been destroyed. Based
upon this complaint, the defense counsel moved to strike the testimony of the
witnesses whose notes had been destroyed. The trial court advised the Gov-
ernment that it disapproved of the practice of destroying the notes, but exer-
cising its discretion, refused to strike the testimony of the Government
223. 585 F.2d at 447-48.
224. Id. at 447-49.
225. Id. at 449.
226. Id. at 449-50. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Accord Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
227. 594 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1979).
228. These offenses violated 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(fd,e) (1976) respectively.
229. 594 F.2d at 1384.
230. Id. at 1385.
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witnesses.2 31 The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court had acted correctly,
since there was no indication that the witnesses, in destroying the notes, had
acted in bad faith nor that the appellant's defense had been prejudiced by
this practice.
232
Another assignment of error by the appellant in Priest dealt with the
refusal of the appellant's offer of proof that a potential defense witness, if
called, would testify that the appellant had acted as an informant for a state
law enforcement agency and had provided it with valuable information con-
cerning a number of crimes. The trial court rejected the offer as irrelevant
and immaterial to the case at bar. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that
the admissibility of this sort of evidence was peculiarly within the realm of
discretion reserved for the trial court and, finding no abuse of discretion, the
appellate court affirmed Priest's convictions.
233
One of the issues in UnitedStates o. Watson2 34 was whether the trial court
had abused its discretion in admitting into evidence tape recordings of cer-
tain telephone conversations incriminating the appellants. At trial, the ap-
pellants' attorneys objected to the use of the tapes on the ground that they
were unintelligible and inaudible. The Tenth Circuit first noted that unless
the tapes were so unintelligible as to render the recording as a whole untrust-
worthy, then the admission of the tapes was a matter "within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. '235 In concluding that the trial judge had not
erred in admitting the tapes into evidence, the appellate court stated it had
listened to the tapes and found that they were not so unintelligible that they
could be said to be untrustworthy.
2 36
Next, the appellants contended the trial court had erred in providing
the jury with transcripts of the tapes to aid the jury in understanding the
substance of the conversation. Evidence was offered as to the accuracy of the
transcripts. Furthermore, the trial judge had instructed the jury that the
transcripts were to be used only to aid it in understanding the tapes and
were not to be considered as evidence. This limiting instruction was re-
peated by the court on several occasions during the appellant's trial.
23 7
Also, the Tenth Circuit noted that the transcripts had not, in fact, been in-
troduced into evidence. Therefore, the use of the transcripts was held to be
within the proper bounds of the trial court's discretion.
238
In United States v. Bowers,239 the Tenth Circuit faced a situation where
the Government had not adquately complied with discovery and, thus, had
231. Id.
232. Id See also United States v. Stulga, 584 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Martin, 565 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dupree, 553 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1977).
233. 594 F.2d at 1385. Accord United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 904 (1977).
234. 594 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1979).
235. Id. at 1335. See also United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Jones, 540 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977).
236. 594 F.2d at 1336.
237. Id.
238. Id. See also United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962
(1975).
239. 593 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979).
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violated a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. 240 The Government, rather
than providing the defendant with the discoverable material replied merely
that the material would be made available to the appellant prior to trial. At
trial, the judge allowed the admission into evidence of the materials in ques-
tion even though the Government had not discharged its affirmative duty to
advise the appellant of its possession of the material.
24'
The Tenth Circuit, after noting the Government's response had failed
to comply with discovery requirements, held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in allowing the items to be admitted into evidence.
Since the appellant had been unable to demonstrate that the admission of
items resulted in "substantial prejudice" to him, his conviction was af-
firmed.
242
C. Evidence of Prior Convictions
In United States v. Gili/and,243 the Tenth Circuit dealt with the propriety
of certain questions asked by the Government of a defense witness concern-
ing criminal convictions of the appellant some 14 to 34 years prior to the
offense for which the appellant was on trial. The appellant was convicted of
transporting a stolen automobile across state lines in violation of the Dyer
Act. 244 At trial, the defense called the appellant's stepson as a witness to the
alleged purchase of the vehicle in question by the appellant.
On cross-examination the Government asked the stepson questions con-
cerning the appellant's character. The witness testified that appellant's
character was good. The Government then asked the witness if he were
aware that the appellant had twice been convicted of Dyer Act violations
and twice of forgery, all of the convictions being over ten years old. Later in
the trial, the appellant and the appellant's wife took the witness stand and
these prior convictions were again raised in questioning. On appeal before
the Tenth Circuit, the Government argued that the questions asked of the
stepson were justified because that witness was attempting to testify for the
appellant as a character witness.
245
The Tenth Circuit, quoting rule 404(b), laid out the general rule that
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity there-
with."'246 If the defendant, however, makes good character an issue then the
Government is permitted to use evidence of the defendant's prior convictions
to rebut the character evidence, the court stated. But in the case at bar, the
Tenth Circuit held, these were not the facts. Rather, the Government had
attempted to turn the stepson, initially an eyewitness to the alleged purchase
240. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
241. 593 F.2d at 379. See also Rice, Criminal Defense Discovery. A Prelude toJustice or an Interlude
for Abuse, 45 Miss. L.J. 887 (1974) (citing Mississippi cases); Note, Crimtnzal Procedure-Discoverq-
Movement TowardFull Disclosure, 77 W. VIR. L. REV. 561 (1974-75) (citing West Virginia cases).
242. 593 F.2d at 379. See also United States v. Hodges, 480 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1973).
243. 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1978).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976).
245. 586 F.2d at 1386-88.
246. Id. at 1388 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
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of the car by the appellant, into a character witness for the appellant by
asking the witness questions about the appellant's good character. 24 7 Thus,
contrary to Michelson v. United States,248 the Government had introduced evi-
dence concerning the appellant's prior convictions without the accused hav-
ing put his character at issue. Therefore, the Government improperly
brought out evidence of the appellant's prior convictions.
249
The Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. Burkhart,250 a Dyer Act case
where the Government brought out evidence of the defendant's prior Dyer
Act convictions some 4 and 15 years prior to the charges for which he was on
trial. The Burkhart court held:
First, the accused is required to defend charges which are not de-
scribed in the information or indictment. As a result he is required
to defend past actions which he may have in the past answered and
with respect to which he may have even served his sentence. Thus,
he is in effect tried as a recidivist though such a charge is not a part
of the federal criminal code.
25 1
Since in the instant case the prior convictions were even older than
those rejected in Burkhart, they were even less relevant, the Tenth Circuit
held.25 2 Moreover, the appellate court held that any defect in the Govern-
ment's actions had not been subsequently waived by the appellant when he
took the witness stand to testify in his own behalf. Because the convictions
were over ten years old they could not be used to impeach the appellant
unless the trial court determined that the prior convictions were of especially
high probative value outweighing any possible prejudicial effect and unless
the appellant had been given prior written notice of the Government's intent
to use such evidence. After examining the record, the Tenth Circuit found
neither of the tests had been met. Therefore the appellate court reversed the
appellant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
2 53
D. Suftciengy of the Evidence
In United States v. Smurthwaite,2 54 a physician practicing as a weight con-
trol specialist was convicted of eleven counts of illegally dispensing and dis-
tributing controlled substances. 25 5 The appellant challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence and specifically the fact that, at the close of the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief, there had been no evidence concerning the usual course
of practice of a doctor in his field. At the close of the Government's case, the
appellant made a motion for judgement of acquittal on the above ground
but the trial court deferred ruling on the motion. Afterward the Govern-
ment produced, as a rebuttal witness, a doctor who did testify as to the usual
course of practice for a naturopathic physician.
247. 586 F.2d at 1388-89.
248. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
249. 586 F.2d at 1389.
250. 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972).
251. Id. at 204.
252. 586 F.2d at 1390.
253. Id. at 1390-91.
254. 590 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1979).
255. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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The Tenth Circuit noted that the standard for reviewing whether to
grant the appellant's motion for acquittal was to consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government. 256 This, coupled with the fact that
the appellate court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
allowing the Government to produce rebuttal evidence which should have
been introduced in the Government's case-in-chief, was sufficient to sustain
the appellant's conviction. The evidence showed appellant had prescribed
diet pills to persons who were not overweight, that he had indicated he knew
his patients were not using the drugs for weight control but rather for par-
ties, and that most of the time he saw his patients only for a short time and
did not usually give them a physical examination before prescribing the
drugs.257 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that even if the Government
had wholly failed to produce any medical evidence on the course of medical
practice in the appellant's area, the decision of the lower court would still be
affirmed. This was because, as the court stated quoting United States V. Bar-
tee:2 58 "[T]he jury is not bound by such expert testimony and may, of
course, consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the prescrib-
ing as related by lay witnesses."
'259
E. Rule 10(c)
In United States v. Smaldone,26° the appellants urged the Tenth Circuit to
set aside their convictions on the basis that the court reporter had lost her
notes and, therefore, had been unable to transcribe the testimony of two of
the appellants. After it became apparent that the court reporter could not
locate the notes, the trial court invoked rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. 26 1 Pursuant thereto the appellants prepared a state-
ment of the lost evidence and a hearing was held at which the Government
made objections and amendments to the statement. The trial court then
approved the narrative as a substitute for the testimony of the two appel-
lants, and it was made part of the court record for appellate review.
The Tenth Circuit, noting that the gist of appellant's argument was
that reversible error was committed merely because of the lost notes, held
that rule 10(c) had been adopted for just such a situation. The entire pur-
pose of the rule was to provide a method for reconstructing a missing record
when an actual transcript could not for some reason be obtained.262 There-
fore, the conviction was affirmed since the statement provided a report
equivalent to that which would have been available had the preparation of a
transcript been possible.
256. 590 F.2d at 891. See also Speers v. United States, 387 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 956 (1968).
257. 590 F.2d at 890-91.
258. 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973).
259. 590 F.2d at 892 (quoting Bartee, 479 F.2d at 488).
260. 583 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1978).
261. FED. R. App. P. 10(c).
262. 583 F.2d at 1134. See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Morgan v.
Massey, 526 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1976).
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F. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
In United States v. Andrews,26 3 the Tenth Circuit addressed the applica-
bility of the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The charges
against the appellant had arisen out of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
The court stated that the rule with respect to the exception is that testimony
which is otherwise hearsay will be admitted only after the existence of a
conspiracy is established by independent evidence. 264 Noting that the essen-
tial element of conspiracy is agreement to violate the law and that once a
conspiracy is established only slight evidence is required to implicate a co-
conspirator, the Tenth Circuit rejected the appellant's claim that the in-
dependent evidence of conspiracy was inadequate.
265
After reviewing the evidence the court held that the evidence of the
conspiracy was sufficient to allow the introduction of hearsay statements
made in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the other evidence
against the appellant was not strong.
266
G. Privileges
Interspousal privilege was the issue in United States v. Trammel.26 7 In
Trammel, the wife of one defendant was allowed to testify against all of the
defendants at their joint trial on charges of importation of heroin and of a
related conspiracy count.26 8 Trammel objected at trial to his wife's testi-
mony, basing his objection on a claim of interspousal privilege. Mrs. Tram-
mel was named in the indictment against the defendants as an unindicted
co-conspirator and she was given immunity from prosecution in exchange
for her testimony. This testimony dealt with the acts of her husband rather
than their private communications.
With great difficulty, the Tenth Circuit held that the interspousal privi-
lege was inapplicable on these particular facts and affirmed Trammel's con-
viction. The court began its analysis by distinguishing Hawkins v. United
Slates269 since in that case the witness-spouse was not subject to prosecution
for the same crime as that with which her husband was charged. But, in the
instant case, the court relied heavily on the fact that Mrs. Trammel was
liable for prosecution, prior to the grant of her immunity, for the crimes
about which she testified. 270 Thus, the court reasoned, to hold that she
263. 585 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1978).
264. Id. at 964. See Lowther v. United States, 455 F.2d 657 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
857 (1972).
265. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), (b) and 801(d) (2) (E). See also United States v. Petrozziello,
548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977). Cf United States v. Krohn, 573 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
deied, 98 S. Ct. 2857 (1979).
266. 585 F.2d at 965-66.
267. 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
268. 21 U.S.C. §§ 962(a), 963 (1976).
269. 358 U.S. 74 (1958). In Hawkins the Supreme Court recognized that the common law
husband-wife privilege was applicable in federal cases.
270. 583 F.2d at 1168-69. The confidential marital communication privilege bars introduc-
tion into evidence of confidential communications between spouses, United States v. Apodaca,
522 F.2d 568, 570 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Note,.Immuniyfiom Prosecution and the FijM Amendment:
An Analysts of Constituional Standards, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1972).
[Vol. 57:2
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
could not testify would have resulted in the loss of her immunity and, there-
fore, the policy reason for the privilege of fostering domestic tranquility
would not, in this instance, be served by allowing the appellant to prevent
his wife from testifying.27t Citing the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court
held that the existence of a privilege must be determined " 'in the light of
reason and experience.' ",272 Here, the court pointed out Mrs. Trammel's
avoidance of prosecution, which was based on her promise to testify against
the defendants, and her use by the other defendants as a pawn in the crime
as reasons for ruling the privilege inapplicable in this case. 273 Furthermore,
the court stated that the Trammels were not a "family" in the usual sense of
the word, but rather, that their marriage had been a vehicle for criminal acts
which were "despicable and completely alien to anything conducive to the
preservation of a family relationship built around the legal status of mar-
riage."'2 74 Therefore, the court held, Trammel represented a situation in
which the interest of the public in bringing the defendants to justice out-
weighed any possible benefit to be gained by upholding the appellant's
claim of privilege.
2 75
Judge McKay dissented, stating that while the majority had noted the
general rule, they had adopted the exception. 276 Further, he predicted that
the decision of the majority would lead to undesirable consequences; specifi-
cally, in situations where spouses were accused of conspiracy regarding tax
matters. The dissenting judge also warned that the ruling would give gov-
ernment prosecutors almost unlimited discretion to "determine which shall
be worth saving and which shall not have the benefit of the common law
privilege." 277 This would be the result because the prosecutor could deter-
mine to whom and when grants of governmental immunity would be given.
Judge McKay also criticized the majority since, in his opinion, the decision
would do violence to the family:
And the home is, after all, a more important contributor to law
and order than is prosecution. If the homes fail, no number of
prosecutors, judges or jails could stem the tide of ensuing crime.
While the Trammel home is perhaps far from an ideal one, the
principle established in his case applies to all accused couples and
makes us unwitting partisans in the continuing assaults on the sta-
bility of the home-the root of true stability in any society.
278
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's criminal law and criminal procedure decisions dur-
271. 583 F.2d at 1169-70. See United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
272. 583 F.2d at 1170 (citing FED. R. EvID. 501). See also Baker v. United States, 329 F.2d
786 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 853 (1964).
273. 583 F.2d at 1170. The court characterized Mrs. Trammel as a "conduit" who was
merely "used" by the conspiracy. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1170-71.
276. Id. at 1171-72 (McKay, J., dissenting).




ing the survey period were, almost without exception, merely the application
of existing precedent to varying fact situations. Of the cases reviewed in this
survey United States v. Erb2 7 9 is certainly interesting due to its extreme fact
pattern but it is questionable if the decision breaks new ground in the area of
warrantless searches. United States v. Trammel,280 however, presents a differ-
ent situation. If affirmed by the Supreme Court, that decision would create
a significant new exception to the existing evidentiary marital privilege, ap-
plicable in all of the circuits and, perhaps, could be adopted by at least some
states.*
David M Conner
* The Tenth Circuit's decision in Trammel was unanimously affirmed
by the Supreme Court on February 27, 1980.
279. See notes 42-54 and accompanying text supra.
280. See notes 267-278 and accompanying text supra.
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OVERVIEW
The term of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals covered by this survey
has resulted in a number of interesting decisions. This overview will en-
deavor to emphasize certain of the more significant cases and discuss others
only briefly.
I. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
A. Concurrent Jurisdiction---The Pullman Doctrine
The Pullman doctrine,' more properly termed the doctrine of absten-
tion, was applied in Western FoodPlan, Inc. v. MacFarlane2 to preclude a collat-
eral attack in the federal courts on proceedings then pending in the
Colorado courts. The action filed in the federal district court, 3 as described
in Western's first amended complaint, was substantially identical to the
counterclaim in intervention urged by Western in the state proceeding.
4
Both pleadings alleged, inter a/ia, that rule 102, Colorado Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, was in procedure and substance in conflict with the Colorado Consti-
tution as well as the United States Constitution.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the decision of the district court that
federal abstention, in light of the circumstances, should be practiced. Cited
in support of this conclusion was Rai/road Commission v. Pu//man Co. ,5 from
which the following quotation was abstracted:
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue
by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow
by a state adjudication. [citations omitted] The reign of law is
hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus
supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court.
6
Viewing the case at hand, the obvious potential existed that the state
proceeding would dispose of the controversy on state constitutional grounds,
or otherwise. Under such circumstances, the federal courts should not at-
tempt to "forecast" the outcome of the state litigation, but should abstain
until that litigation culminated.
7
1. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
2. 588 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1978).
3. The action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
4. In the state proceeding, Western intervened in an action filed by the Attorney General
pursuant to CoLo. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101 to -114 (1973 and Supp. 1978). Western counter-
claimed and alleged, tuer a/ba, that a writ of attachment, levied and executed pursuant to Colo-
rado Rule of Civil Procedure 102 upon a corporation controlled by Western, was void.
5. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
6. Id at 500.
7. 588 F.2d at 780. The principle of abstention should be distinguished from the Siler
doctrine, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), which calls for a federal
court to treat an issue by reference to state law when doing so may avoid the need to decide a
federal constitutional question. I MOORE'S MANUAL § 20711], at 2-25 (1978).
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However, because the district court had dismissed the action after realiz-
ing the need for abstention, the Tenth Circuit remanded with directions to
reinstate the action and hold it in abeyance pending the completion of state
court proceedings.8
B. State Proceeding as an Element of a Federal Crime: The State's
Characterization Controls
One of the more controversial opinions rendered by the Tenth Circuit
during this survey period was United Slates v. Stober.9 The issue in Stober was
whether the defendant had been previously "convicted" as that term is used
in section 922(h) of the statutory codification of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, under which he was charged.10
Prior to his indictment for violation of this federal act, Stober had en-
tered a plea of guilty in a state prosecution in order to avail himself of the
benefits of the Oklahoma Deferred Judgment Procedure. I I The conse-
quences of Stober's participation, and specifically his entry of a guilty plea,
in the Deferred Judgment Procedure comprised the issue considered by the
Tenth Circuit. The government asserted that under federal law the conse-
quences of Stober's guilty plea fell within the ambit of the term "convicted;"
hence the issue more narrowly defined was whether state or federal law
should determine whether Stober had been convicted.
12
On the basis of expert testimony, decisions of the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals,' 3 and the statutory language itself, the Tenth Circuit de-
cided that no conviction results under the Deferred Judgment Procedure.' 4
In view of this conclusion, the court ruled that the evaluation and character-
ization by the state of the Deferred Judgment Procedure should be determi-
native of the consequences of participation in the system for purposes of the
federal act. 15 Accordingly, the court found that Stober had not been previ-
ously "convicted" within the contemplation of the federal act; never having
been convicted by the court which tried him, he could not be "convicted" by
8. 588 F.2d at 781. See Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1941).
9. No. 77-1854 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1979) (Doyle, J., dissenting). This opinion was reissued
after a rehearing and affirmed with minor alteration the previous decision issued December 1,
1978. Judge Doyle rewrote his dissenting opinion which, although rendered somewhat more
persuasive, advocated essentially the same legal conclusions as his previous dissent. Judge Mc-
Williams concurred in the dissent.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976). That section provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person . . . who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to receive any
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce."
11. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991c (West Supp. 1979).
12. According to § 991c of the Oklahoma statute, id, the accused must enter a guilty plea,
but the court does not enter any judgment based thereon unless the mandatory two year proba-
tionary period provided in the act is violated. Upon successful completion of the probationary
period, the accused is discharged without a court judgment of guilt, and the plea of guilty is
expunged from the accused's record.
13. Hefner v. State, 542 P.2d 527 (Okla. Crim. 1975); Belle v. State, 516 P.2d 551 (Okla.
Crim. 1975).
14. No. 77-1854 at 3-4.
15. Id at 4.
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the federal courts.'
6
Judge Doyle's dissent voiced strong opposition to the majority's reason-
ing and result. Judge Doyle asserted that Braswell v. Unted States,1 7 which
was by his reading a case closely on point in principle at least, had reached a
contrary conclusion which should have been binding upon the majority
under principles of stare decists. In Braswell, it was contended that the de-
fendant had been "convicted" of a crime of violence for purposes of the Fed-
eral Firearms Act' 8 as a result of having taken advantage of the Texas
rehabilitation statutes. These statutes allowed the presiding judge to enter
an order suspending sentence; however, no final, appealable order resulted
from that action.' 9 In referring to the Firearms Act, the Court in Braswell
stated:
It would indeed be a strange construction of the statute which
would impose its sanctions on those under indictment and not yet
tried but would not include within its prohibition those convicted
of crimes of violence and receiving suspended sentences. There is
no contention that appellant was not convicted, and the Texas
Statutes relied on constantly refer to the "conviction" of the de-
fendant who is to have the benefits of the Act.
20
The statutory intendment argument embodied in this passage, and
paraphrased in Judge Doyle's dissent, is not without superficial appeal. Per-
haps more significant is the reference in the quoted passage to Texas law,
and the state characterization of the consequences of accepting the benefits
of the rehabilitation statutes. The fact that the state of Texas considered one
availing oneself of its rehabilitation program to have been nonetheless "con-
victed" apparently controlled the application of the federal statute, and is
therefore consistent with the reasoning of the majority in Stober.
Disagreeing with the majority's conclusion, Judge Doyle adverted to the
Braswell court's disposal of the defendant's claim that because the state char-
acterized the order entered under the Texas procedure as non-appealable,
the previous finding that a conviction resulted under the procedure should
be legally unsupportable.2 ' To Judge Doyle, the Braswell court's refusal to
allow this characterization to control application of the federal statute indi-
cated the impropriety of the majority result in Sober.
This reasoning does not accord adequate significance to the fact that
the Braswell court, under the federal statute being applied, was constrained
to limit its inquiry into state law to a determination of whether a "convic-
tion" occurred under the Texas procedure. Judge Doyle also chose not to
acknowledge that the Braswell court dealt with a statutory procedure sub-
stantially different from that considered in Stober. Under the Texas scheme
considered in Braswell, the accused's plea was accepted and a judgment en-
tered thereon, merely suspending sentence; whereas the Oklahoma statute
16. Id at 8-9.
17. 224 F.2d 706 (10th Cir. 1955).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 902(c) (1976).
19. 224 F.2d at 709 (citing Fitch v. State, 235 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951)).
20. 224 F.2d at 710.
21. Id at 709.
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mandates that no judgment enter on the plea, no sentence result, and that
the plea itself be expunged eventually from the accused's record.
22
Judge Doyle next discussed United States v. Place,23 in which the Tenth
Circuit rejected the notion that merely because the State of California in-
dulged in an ex post facto classification of a crime according to the length of
the imprisonment to which the defendant was eventually sentenced, that
classification should control application of a federal act concerned with "a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year .... *24
In Place, the Tenth Circuit stated that in construing the above-quoted
phrase, "the only purpose in looking to State law . . . is to determine the
maximum penalty which could have been imposed . . ." (emphasis in origi-
nal).2 5 Again, the Tenth Circuit made a controlling inquiry into state law in
order to satisfy the elements of the federal act. Moreover, the court stated in
Place that "the term 'convicted' must be given a nonrestrictive interpreta-
tion. Once guilt has been established by plea or verdict, and naught but
sentencing remains, a defendant has been 'convicted' within the meaning of
that word in question 8.b. ' '26 The cases cited by Judge Doyle simply do not
provide convincing support for his dissent; the unique attributes of the
Oklahoma Deferred Judgment Procedure require the conclusion reached by
the majority in Stober that no "conviction" had been shown, and therefore a
necessary element in the statutory crime was lacking.
27
C. Service of Process as Substantive Law.: Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co. Revisled
One of the most significant cases discussed in this survey is Lindsey v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp. 28 As will be explained, the probability looms that the
reasoning and holding of the Tenth Circuit in this case must eventually be
tested in the United States Supreme Court.
The issue in Lindsey was whether, in a diversity action, a state statute of
limitations in which the requirement of service of process is given a substan-
tive role or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 in which service of proc-
ess is purely procedural, shall determine whether an action has been timely
filed. The distinction was vital in Linidse since application of the state serv-
ice of process rule would mandate a dismissal of the action for failure to
comply with its requirements within the limitations period;30 however,
22. See note 12 supra.
23. 561 F.2d 213 (10th Cir. 1977).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976).
25. 561 F.2d at 215 (quoting McMullen v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1348 (C.D. Cal.
1972), afd, 504 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1974)).
26. 561 F.2d at 215.
27. Seealso Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1974); United States v. Dotson, 555
F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
28. 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir 1979). See also Rose v. K.K. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597
F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1979); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1979).
29. Specifically, FED. R. Civ. P. 3 and 4(d)(l).
30. Lindsey's attorney attempted to file the action under the pseudonym "John Doe" on
April 22, 1979, the last day permitted by the Oklahoma one-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to the false imprisonment, assault and battery, and slander allegations in the complaint.
However, the "John Doe" filing was ruled unacceptable, so the plaintifi's real name was in-
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should the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply, the action would be
deemed to have commenced within the limitations period.
3 1
The district court held that the case was governed by Ragan o. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co. ,32 in which it was decided that because state law
created the cause of action under which the suit was brought, the federal
court could not give that cause a longer life than it would have had in state
court.
3 3
Ragan is, however, inconsistent with a subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sion, Hanna v. Plumer.3 4 In Hanna, the Court held that federal law should
control; the act of Congress in authorizing the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure evidences Congress' intent that these rules should
displace any inconsistent state rules in a diversity action.
For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (aug-
mented by the necessary and proper clause) carries with it congres-
sional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in
those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
3 5
Unfortunately, the court in Hanna did not expressly overrule Ragan,
36
which, perhaps not coincidentally, was a decision originating in the Tenth
Circuit. That fact eventually persuaded the Tenth Circuit that Ragan, both-
ersome as it might be, was still good law and controlling, at least in this
circuit. Therefore, the court reaffirmed in Lindse the Ragan result, and held
that a federal court applying the forum state's substantive law in a diversity
case must apply the forum state's procedural law as well if such application
would change the outcome of the case. Since the Oklahoma statute con-
strued in Linds contained as an integral component a limitations period
within which the summons must issue, and Lindsey failed to toll the statute
by assuring issuance, the summary judgment granted by the trial court was
affirmed.
37
serted on the complaint, which was then timely filed. The summons was not filed until April 29,
1976. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1978) specified, in pertinent part, that:
An action is deemed commenced . . . as to each defendant, at the date of the sum-
mons which is served on him. . . . An attempt to commence an action shall be
deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof. . . when the party faithfully, prop-
erly and diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt must be followed
by the first. . . service of the summons. . . within 60 days.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court."
32. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
33. Id at 533-34.
34. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Id at 472. The Court criticized certain of the tests previously used to delineate the
boundary between substantive and merely procedural rules, such as the "outcome determina-
tive" test and the "integral relation" test. Id at 466, 475.
36. But see Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna, 380 U.S. at 477.
37. The trial court erroneously applied the Ragan rule to a cause of action for malicious
prosecution which accrued subsequently to the allegations of slander, false imprisonment, and
assault and battery. Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the malicious
prosecution cause of action on grounds not considered by the trial court. Because counsel for
both litigants thoroughly briefed the issue, and the relevant facts had been clearly established,
the Tenth Circuit was able to conclude that malice, an essential element of the action, was not
present. 592 F.2d at 1124.
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Lindsey may well prove to be the pratfall for many an unsuspecting at-
torney in the Tenth Circuit. Nonetheless, absent some word from above,
Ragan will remain alive and well in the Tenth Circuit.
II. FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. Appeal as of Right by a Non-Party
The Dietrich Corp. v. King Resources Co. 3 8 deals with the appeal of Ted
Fiflis39 from certain orders of the trial court by which the court purported to
determine the extent of Fiflis' compensation for the services he rendered as a
consultant to the two firms serving as lead counsel for plaintiffs in the princi-
pal litigation. 40 Fiflis attempted, by way of motions, to intervene in the ac-
tion, to secure a new trial and amendment of judgment, or to obtain relief
from judgment, but received adverse rulings on all motions.
4 1
Prior to any consideration of the substantive issues raised by the appeal,
the Tenth Circuit had to determine a basis upon which Fiflis, a non-party in
the principal litigation, could appeal. That basis lay essentially in the pecu-
liar circumstances confronting Fiflis: he was directly affected by the trial
court's limitations upon the fee he might receive from the law firms; and the
law firms which had previously represented Fiflis' interests did not appeal
from the lower court's rulings. Hence, in the view of the Tenth Circuit, Fiflis
could properly be characterized as an aggrieved party whose property inter-
est could be protected only by allowing him to intervene after the judgment
and take an appeal.
42
B. Rule 4(a)-Premature Notice of Appeal
Century Laminating, Ltd v. Montgomey 4 3 demonstrated the Tenth Circuit's
38. 596 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1979). This case is connected with the complex and volumi-
nous litigation generated by the financial collapse of King Resources Company. The lawsuits
with which this particular case is concerned were consolidated for pre-trial proceedings in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado. In re King Resources Co. Sec. Litiga-
tion, 342 F. Supp. 1179 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1972).
39. Fiflis, at the time of the underlying litigation, was a professor of law at the University
of Colorado, hired in connection with this litigation to act as a consultant in the area of his
specialty, legal accounting and the liability of accountants. Retained by the two firms serving
as lead counsel for plaintiffs, he was to receive compensation for his service in accordance with a
contingent fee agreement. However, while Fiflis is and was a member of the Illinois State Bar,
he was not, at the time of entering into the agreement, licensed to practice law in Colorado.
Holding that by virtue of this fact Fiflis was a non-lawyer in Colorado, the trial court disallowed
any contingent fee arrangement as being in violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
40. Fiflis and the law firms agreed upon a $125.00 per hour compensation rate in lieu of
the contingent fee, which the trial court rejected as being in excess of the typical hourly rate of
payment for Colorado attorneys.
41. 583 F.2d at 424.
42. Id. See alo 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 203.06 (2d ed. 1975). The appeal proved
fruitful in this case. The Tenth Circuit decided that Fiflis was a lawyer in Colorado within the
contemplation of the canons, specifically D.R. 3-102 (prohibiting lawyer or law firm from shar-
ing legal fees with a non-lawyer). Significant to the court was that the unlicensed attorney not
be held out as an independant source of legal advice, and the interposition of a licensed attorney
as the party singularly liable to the clients and subject to the discipline of the courts. 583 F.2d
at 426 (citing Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 1966)).
43. 595 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1979).
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hard-line stance on adherence to technical jurisdictional requirements by the
court's refusal to hear a prematurely filed appeal. Specifically, according to
the court of appeals, when one of the motions enumerated in rule 4(a) is
timey filed,44 any judgment previously entered does not become final until
the motion is ruled upon; the filing of a notice of appeal during the time the
motion is under consideration is completely ineffective, exposing the defec-
tively filed appeal to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
In order to reach this result, the court followed the established rule4 5 in
the Tenth Circuit which provides that a trial court will not be divested auto-
matically of its jurisdiction where the circumstances reveal an untimely filing
of the notice of appeal, or the notice refers to a non-appealable order.
46
III. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Rule 22-Interpleader
Subsequently to interpleading into the registry of the Federal District
Court for the District of Utah the surplus from a forced sale of Major Oil
Corporation's Roosevelt, Utah refinery, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
issued a refund check to Major for the amount claimed in Major's 1975 cor-
porate income tax return.4 7 The trial court ruled that this refund should
also have been interpleaded by the IRS, and accordingly ordered Major to
deposit the refund proceeds, along with interest at the rate of six per cent
from the date of refund, into the court registry for distribution to creditors.
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Major Oil Corp. ,48 was called upon to
determine whether the trial court had properly exercised subject-matter ju-
risdiction over the refund proceeds, and whether the conclusion that this
44. In the instant case, a FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was filed May 19, 1977, and was still under consideration by the district court on June
10, 1977, when the notice of appeal was filed.
A rule 4(a) motion essentially implores the trial court to review its judgment and, depend-
ing upon the disposition of the motion, might well vitiate any need for appeal. According to the
express language of rule 4(a), the appellant would have had a full 30 days, measured from the
date on which the order denying the motion for judgment n.o.v. was entered, within which to
file his notice of appeal.
45. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. dented, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
46. 595 F.2d at 567. See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 204.12[1], at 950 (2d ed. 1975).
The Tenth Circuit decided one other FED. R. App. P. 4(a) case, United States v. Van Cott,
Bagley, Cornwall, McCarthy, 588 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1978). That case held that where an
action is brought under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976), and the United States
declines to participate in the suit as is its option under 31 U.S.C. § 232(c) (1976), the time for
appeal under rule 4(a) is only thirty days rather than the sixty days appellant would have had if
the United States were a party.
47. Scarcely one year prior to the refinery seizure, Major had been released and discharged
from all of its debts except as provided in a "Plan for Arrangement." The sale of the refinery by
the IRS for delinquent income, excise, and employment taxes resulted in a surplus of
51,950,359.35. Only ten days prior to this sale, in an unlikely coincidence, Major had applied to
the IRS for an extension of time within which to file its corporate income tax return for the
fiscal year ending September 15, 1975. A three month extension was granted, however, Major
managed to file its return, accompanied by a claim for refund stemming from a 1974 loss carry-
back, a mere two days following sale of the refinery. The refund of $94,287.39 was issued di-
rectly to Major.
48. 583 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1978).
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refund should become part of the interpleader res was correct.4 9
The jurisdictional challenge hinged on Major's contention that the trial
court could not properly exercise control over monies "not or'ignal part and
parcel of the funds constituting the subject matter of the interpleader ac-
tion" 50 at its inception. The trial court had reasoned, by analogy to Segalv.
Rochelle5i and Kokoszka v. Be/ford,52 that the source of the refund proceeds
was an off-set against taxes which were owed, but delinquent; that the same
delinquency had precipitated the seizure and sale of Major's refinery, and
had generated the surplus fund initially comprising the interpleader res; and
that these events were so interrelated that the refund could not be considered
to have been generated by a transaction separate from the sale of Major's
property.
53
The Tenth Circuit expressed its agreement with the trial court's reason-
ing and held that the tax refund was property to be included in the inter-
pleader res. The court chose further to rest its decision on the disparate
equities inherent in the positions of Major and the other claimants to the
interpleaded fund. Major had moved for and was granted an order re-
straining its creditors from initiating or prosecuting claims in either the
courts of the State of Utah or the federal district court for the District of
Utah.54 Given the scope of the restraining order granted Major, the infer-
ence that Major was attempting to bar its creditor-claimants from access to
the refund proceeds in order to preserve those monies for itself was unavoida-
ble. Hence, Major had violated the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" and
could not avail itself of the protections provided by the "equitable remedy"
of interpleader.
55
Further, the Tenth Circuit explained that at the time the IRS filed the
interpleader action both the refinery sale surplus and the as yet unclaimed
refund monies were in its "custody and possession," 56 and therefore could
correctly be characterized as components of the same interpleaded res. Cou-
pled with rule 22,5 7 which does not require that the interpleaded fund be
deposited with the registry of the court, the above reasoning enabled the
Tenth Circuit to dispose of all of Major's contentions on appeal, and affirm
the trial court.
49. Id at 1155.
50. Id at 1157.
51. 382 U.S. 375 (1966) (income tax refund received subsequently to filing of petition in
bankruptcy was property to which trustee entitled).
52. 417 U.S. 642, 645-48 (1974) (income tax refund is property which passes to trustee
since it is "sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past," Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. at 380,
and is neither conceptually related to, nor the equivalent of, future wages for the purpose of
giving the bankrupt a new start).
53. 583 F.2d at 1156-57.
54. Id at 1154.
55. Id at 1158.
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1976).
57. The remedy provided by rule 22 is in addition to the remedy of 28 U.S.C. § 1335
which would have required deposit into the registry of the entire sum in controversy.
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B. Rule 23-Class Actions
Another progeny of the King Resources Company's financial downfall
was Dietrich Corp. v. Kig Resources Co. 58 This class action concerned the at-
tempt of certain members of the class, represented by Chester Baird as
trustee of the King Resources Company Employee Profit Sharing Retire-
ment Plan (the Baird class), to secure participation in a settlement plan ne-
gotiated for the plaintiff class and concurrently preserve claims in addition
to and purportedly distinct from those to which the settlement plan per-
tained. The complaint on behalf of the entire plaintiff class in King Resources
broadly alleged fraud and deceit in connection with the sale of stock, in vio-
lation of federal and state securities laws.59 The Baird class asserted that its
claims were in common with the claims of the consolidated class only to a
limited extent, and on that basis maintained that the Baird class be allowed
to execute a conditional release preserving the allegedly distinct claims.
6 °
The Tenth Circuit held that the Baird class claims were totally encom-
passed within the claims asserted for the consolidated class; therefore, al-
lowing the Baird class to realize its proportionate share of the settlement
distribution in addition to whatever might be recoverable on its "distinct"
state claims would be contrary to the terms of the settlement plan. Accord-
ingly, the trial court's allowance of the conditional release was reversed.
6'
C. Rule 37-Deposition of a Non-Party
In First National Bank v. Western Casualy & Surey Co. ,62 the Tenth Circuit
relieved Earl Davis, a national bank examiner employed by the Comptroller
of the Currency and not a party in the underlying litigation, from the un-
pleasant prospect of spending 30 days in jail and paying a fine of $1,000.00
on a civil contempt citation. Davis, a resident of Denver, Colorado, was
served with a deposition subpoena from the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado.6 3 During the course of the deposition, Davis re-
fused to answer certain questions basing his refusal upon instructions from
his employer, the Comptroller. When neither Western Casualty, the depos-
ing party, nor Davis would compromise on the issue, the deposition was ad-
journed prior to termination.
Upon Western Casualty's motion, an order issued from the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Wyoming directing the Comptroller or his rep-
resentative to appear and show cause why his office "should not authorize its
personnel to appear at depositions to be scheduled. . . and give all relevant
58. 583 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1978).
59. Id at 1144-45. King Resources Company was undergoing financial reorganization
pursuant to Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976).
60. Id at 1145.
61. Id at 1149. The Baird class did not protest the settlement plan and "opt out" of the
class; had it done so, the court would have been required to protect its claim in accordance with
11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (1976). Id
62. 598 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1979).
63. The action was brought in the United States District Court for the District of Wyo-
ming. Apparently, counsel for Western Casualty caused the subpoena to issue pursuant to FED.
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
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testimony . . . ." Davis was also ordered to appear and similarly show
cause concerning his refusal to respond to any and all propounded ques-
tions. 64 The Comptroller and Davis made a special appearance through
counsel in an attempt to contest the court's jurisdiction; however, their ob-
jections were overruled. Thereafter, an "Order Compelling Discovery" was
directed solely at Davis, who was to appear before the court in Wyoming to
conclude his deposition. 65 Davis failed to appear in the court, and was held
in contempt.
The Tenth Circuit, in its deliverance of Davis, determined that the Wy-
oming court did not have jurisdiction over Davis, and reversed the contempt
order and commitment. Apparently, the district court had been laboring
under the misapprehension that its actions were appropriate according to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45(e)(1), which pertains to subpoenas for
attendance at hearing or trial. 66 In fact, though, since Western Casualty was
endeavoring to compel Davis to continue his deposition, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 37 applied. According to that rule, applications for orders
to and sanctions upon a deponent who is not a party must be made to the
court in the district in which the deposition is being taken.
67
D. Rule 56--Summag Judgment
A motion to dismiss pursuant to any of the enumerated grounds in rule
12(b) is a procedure similar in result to the interposition of a motion for
summary judgment in accordance with rule 56; if granted, either motion
results in an abrupt termination of a plaintiff's action. These motions are
different essentially in that the court may not consider matters outside the
pleadings in ruling upon a motion to dismiss but may consider evidence ob-
tained through pre-trial proceedings and by way of affidavit in evaluating a
motion for summary judgment. If this distinction is not observed and mat-
ters beyond the pleadings are considered by the court evaluating a motion to
dismiss, rule 12(b) mandates that the motion so made be treated as the mo-
tion for summary judgment it has effectively become, and handled in ac-
cordance with the procedures specified in rule 56.
Oho v. Peterson, Lowy, Roll, Barber & Ross 68 involved a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted,69 supported
by a memorandum brief in which the statute of limitations was asserted in
bar of Ohio's action, and to which a complaint filed by the State of Ohio in
a previous action concerning the same controversy as in the case at bar, but
impleading different defendants, was attached as an exhibit. The trial court
had clearly relied upon this exhibit in granting the motion to dismiss, with-
64. 598 F.2d at 1204. At the abortive deposition, Western Casualty had verbally requested
that certain documents be produced. The "show cause" order referred to these documents as
well.
65. Id
66, Id at 1205.
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1), (b)(l). See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2287 (1969).
68. 585 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1978).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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out informing the State of Ohio that the motion was being treated as one for
summary judgment in opposition to which Ohio could present any matters
pertinent under rule 56 to demonstrate a material issue of fact. The Tenth
Circuit reversed the ruling of the trial court, pointing out that the trial court
may, in its discretion, deign to consider matters beyond the pleadings
presented in connection with a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 70 But, ac-
cording to that rule, consideration of such extraneous material transforms
the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, and requires compli-
ance with rule 56.71
E. Rule 60(b)-Rehieffrom Judgment or Order
V TA., Inc. v. Airco, Ltd 72 presented the Tenth Circuit with an opportu-
nity to explain some of the bases upon which a motion for relief under rule
60(b) may be made. 73 Significantly, a motion based upon any of the enu-
merated grounds, with one exception, must be made within specified time
constraints after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
74
However, though not obvious from the language of rule 60(b), a motion for
relief based upon a contention that the order entered was void is subject to
no time limitation at all. A void judgment may be regarded as a nullity;
hence, a rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief can be considered to have been made
within a reasonable time regardless of when actually made. 75 This observa-
tion notwithstanding, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of
appellants' rule 60(b)(1) motion since appellants contended that the trial
court's judgment was erroneous, rather than void.
7 6
70. In a case dealing with a related issue, Downes v. Beach, 587 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1978),
the Tenth Circuit considered whether, upon a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
must go beyond the specific demonstration of a material issue relied upon by the party opposing
summary judgment, and evaluate other evidence in the record. The Tenth Circuit held that the
trial court has discretion to search beyond the evidence proffered in resistence of the motion, but
is "not rrquired to consider what the parties fail to point out." Id at 472.
71. 585 F.2d at 456 (quoting 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, § 1336 at 683 (1969).
72. 597 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1979).
73. Also decided by the court during this survey period, and illustrative of FED. R. CIv. P.
60(b), was In re Stone, 588 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978) (in order to obtain relief from default
judgment under rule 60(b)(l), movant must show justifiable grounds, which the court will eval-
uate on the merits, and must demonstrate existence of a meritorious defense by alleging exist-
ence of sufficient facts which, if true, would constilute a defense to the action).
74. FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b) provides six reasons for which the extraordinary relief embodied
in that rule may be obtained. The rule specifies that a motion based upon any of reasons (1)
through (3) must be made within one year from the date of judgment, order or proceeding was
entered or taken, and that motions based upon any of the remaining grounds must be made
within a reasonable time. In V TA., the Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court that motions
based upon 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6), filed 16 months after judgment, were untimely. 597 F.2d at
224.
75. 597 F.2d at 224 n.9.
76. 597 F.2d at 226. Voidness may result from a lack ofjurisdiction, an obvious usurpation




F. Rule 69-Sate Procedure Apphes to United States
The Tenth Circuit, in International Paper Co. v. W/"rtson,77 applied rule
69's mandate that state "procedure on execution, in proceedings supplemen-
tary to and in aid of a judgment, and in aid of execution" be followed in
federal diversity actions. 78 This circuit follows the rule that the foregoing
mandate binds even the United States when seeking entry of a deficiency
judgment after foreclosure of a mortgage; 79 hence, the trial court's ruling
that the Department of Housing and Urban Development was precluded
from seeking a deficiency judgment because of its failure to comply with
Oklahoma's procedure was affirmed. 80
G. Rule 83-Rules Governing Local Practice
Martinez v. Thrity Drug & Discount Co. 8 ' reaffirms the authority of dis-
trict courts to make and amend rules governing practice before these courts,
so long as such rules are consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The District Court for the District of New Mexico had promulgated a
rule authorizing the court to impose jury costs against parties and their
counsel under circumstances where the court's clerk has not been notified of
a settlement or dismissal of an action before twelve noon of the last business
day preceding trial; provided with such notification, the clerk could advise
jurors that they need not attend court.8 2 The parties in Martnez stipulated
to a dismissal of the action on the morning of the first day scheduled for the
trial,8 3 and the district court's clerk assessed plaintiff and her counsel jury
costs amounting to $1,026.72. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district
court's rule effectively promoted the objective of efficient court administra-
tion, and upheld the assessment of jury CoStS.
8 4
77. 595 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1979).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a).
79. The court recognized that the circuits are not in agreement on this issue, citing, e.g.,
United States v. Merrick Sponser Corp., 421 F.2d 1976 (2d Cir. 1970).
80. 595 F.2d at 562 (citing United States v. Inciardi, 258 F. Supp. 837 (W.D. Okla. 1966),
a fd, No. 9502 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1967) (Small Business Administration subject to provisions of
Oklahoma statute defining manner of computing amount of deficiency judgment); Reconstruc-
tion Fin. Corp. v. Breeding, 211 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1954) (Reconstruction Finance Corp. sub-
ject to provisions of Oklahoma statute concerning manner of obtaining deficiency judgment)).
81. 593 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1979).
82. Id. at 993.
83. The stipulation provided that any assessment of costs "shall be borne solely by the
Plaintiff and that the Defendant shall not be liable therefor." Id at 993. The Tenth Circuit
noted that it could have decided the issue based solely on that stipulation, yet proceeded to
dispose of the issue on other grounds. Id at 994.
84. Id at 994 (citing Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Serv., Inc., 422 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1970) (courts
have broad discretion in applying rules to promote court efficiency); Woods Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 337 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1964) (rules promulgated under FED. R. Civ.
P. 83 are binding on parties before the court and have same force and effect as law); Brewster v.
North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1972) (rulemaking power extends to alloca-
tion of costs under FED. R. Civ. P. 83); 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77[8] at 1749-50
(2d ed. 1976)).
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H. ResJudicata-Unappealed Determi'nation of Lack ofJurisdiction
The determination of a jurisdictional issue on its merits which results in
a dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction and further constitutes a
deprivation of jurisdiction to all courts of the State, is res judicata in an
action between the same parties and involving the same issue, although initi-
ated in the federal district court by virtue of diversity.8 5 This principle was
applied in Eaton v. Weaver Manufacturing Co. ,86 which examined the effect of
an unappealed holding by an Oklahoma court that in personam jurisdiction
over a particular defendant was lacking.8 7 The federal district court had
ruled that the state court's ruling on the jurisdictional issue "was not based
upon the characterization of Volkswagen South's activities, but the absence
of a nexus between any contacts with this state and the claims asserted."8 8
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that the unappealed state court judgment




National Insurance Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 90 is a well-reasoned
case in which the Tenth Circuit determined whether, in a diversity action, a
federal court may exercise pendent party jurisdiction over several defendants
against which alternative claims below the requisite jurisdictional amount 9 '
were made, and as to whom there was no independent basis of federal juris-
diction after dismissal of the claim upon which diversity jurisdiction was
properly based.
Initially, the Tenth Circuit noted certain familiar decisions in which
pendent jurisdiction has been applied and explained.9 2 The court then con-
85. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). Since, for purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion, a federal court is merely another court of the state, the state court's decision cannot be
relitigated. Id. at 187. See also Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). Rather, an
appeal should be taken, or absent availability of appeal, a method provided by statute should
be followed. See Stevens Expert Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Stevens, 267 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1954).
86. 582 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1978).
87. The Oklahoma court did not articulate its reasons for ordering the dismissal, but did,
subsequently to entering its judgment, write a letter and execute an affidavit in an attempt to
clarify the judgment. After discussing the propriety and efficacy of an order nunc pro tunc, the
Tenth Circuit refused to consider the letter and affidavit. These items constituted neither an
order nunc pro tunc, nor matters reviewable when construing an unclear order. Id. at 1254-55.
88. Id at 1255.
89. See also Stewart Sec. Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 597 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing, on rehearing, that where an action brought in the Federal District Court for the District of
Oklahoma had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because an Oklahoma state court already
had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proposed federal proceeding, the unap-
pealed dismissal operated as a bar to relitigation of the same issue on the grounds of res judi-
cata).
90. 595 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1979).
91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
92. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1975) (concerning constitutional and congressional
grants of judicial authority) and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (setting
forth the requisites of pendent jurisdiction).
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sidered the more immediately pertinent case of Owen Equipment &Erection Co.
v. Kroger,93 in which the Supreme Court stated that the question of federal
jurisdiction must be analyzed at two levels:
[A] finding that federal and nonfederal claims arise from a 'com-
mon nucleus of operative fact,' the test of Gibbs, does not end the
inquiry into whether a federal court has power to hear the
nonfederal claims along with the federal ones. Beyond this consti-
tutional minimum, there must be an examination of the posture in
which the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute
that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order to deter-
mine whether 'Congress .. .has expressly or by implication ne-
gated' the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal
claim. 9 4
Applying this analysis to the situation in National Insurance, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that because Congress had conditioned the existence of
federal diversity jurisdiction upon the presence of both the requisite amount
in controversy and diverse citizenship, 95 jurisdiction over the pendent claims
was lost upon dismissal of the only claim possessing these attributes. There-
fore, the judgment of the trial court in which the defendants had been found
liable on the "pendent" claims was reversed.
9 6
B. RemovalJursdiction
In Debry v. Transamerica Corp. ,97 the Tenth Circuit embraced the "volun-
tary-involuntary" test98 to control the availability of removal jurisdiction.99
The court explained that where the plaintiff in an action in state court
changes the circumstances relevant to jurisdiction by voluntary action, such
as by dismissing a non-diverse defendant to create a diversity situation, or as
in Debry, by revealing that the residence'0° of one of the plaintiffs has
93. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
94. Id at 373.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
96. 595 F.2d at 548-51. The Tenth Circuit decided two other cases in which the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction was discussed: Mendoza v. K-Mart, Inc., 587 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1978)
(federal claim based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and alleging state action by virtue of
New Mexico shoplifting statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16-19 to -23 (1978), not so insubstan-
tial as to be unable to support pendent state claims where courts disagree on federal issue
posed); and McMann v. Northern Pueblos Enterprises, Inc., 594 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1979)
(since no subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674
(1976), over alleged claims against subcontractors because of protections of Miller Act, 40
U.S.C. § 270a-270d (1976). no pendent jurisdiction over non-government defendants).
97. No. 77-1894 (10th Cir. May 31, 1979). This opinion was withheld from publication
pending action by the court on a petition for rehearing. The petition was denied November 28,
1979.
98. See IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.168[3.-5] at 487 (2d ed. 1979).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1976).
100. The use of the term "residence", rather than citizenship as specified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (1976), provoked a strong dissent from Justice McKay. An additional point of disa-
greement between the majority and Justice McKay concerned the means by which the defend-
ants "ascertain" that the cause has become removable. The plaintiff had stated in deposition
that he had returned to Salt Lake City from California. The defendant contended that,
notwithstanding the statements in deposition, it had no notice of the change of circumstance
whereby diversity occurred until receipt of an amended complaint, some four months after the
deposition. The majority agreed with the defendant's contention because submission to discov-
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changed, the action may then be removed to federal court within thirty days
after receipt by the defendant "of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is
one which is or has become removable."' 0'
Christopher Mammdl
ery proceedings is not a voluntary act and the plaintiff had been "reluctant and evasive" in his
deposition, thereby preventing defendant from ascertaining the existence of diversity. No. 77-
1894 at 18.





During the 1978-1979 survey period, there was a significant increase in
the number of labor cases handled by the Tenth Circuit. This overview will
provide a brief summary of those cases which have been selected for official
publication.
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT1
A. Interference with Union Activities: The Organizational Campai n
In NLRB v. Nationaljewish Hospital & Research Center,2 the Tenth Circuit
upheld an order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) directing
that the hospital cease and desist the promulgation of an overly broad no-
solicitation rule.3 The rule, which prohibited employee solicitation on be-
half of labor organizations in areas of the hospital accessible to patients, was
defended on the basis of the hospital's interest in patient tranquility.
In order to bring its view into harmony with a recent Supreme Court
decision, 4 the court was compelled to substantially revise its own contrary
precedent; in St. John's Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB,5 the Tenth
Circuit had found that the Board lacked the expertise necessary to determine
whether solicitation might have a disturbing effect upon patient health.
In NLRBv. Beth Israel Hospital,6 the Supreme Court held that strict rules
against solicitation could be applied only to immediate patient care areas.
To determine whether solicitation would be permissable in other areas of the
hospital, the Board was required to balance the likelihood of the disruption
of patient care against the organizational rights of the employees.
7
In light of Beth Israel, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the mere possibil-
ity of patient disturbance was insufficient to justify the prohibition of solici-
tation. The court held that the burden was on the employer to show positive
evidence of a disruptive effect, and that this burden had not been met.8
Again addressing a no-solicitation situation, the court of appeals in
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976).
2. 593 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1978).
3. Absent special circumstances, unreasonable interference with union solicitation is pre-
sumptively an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Beth Israel Hospital, 437 U.S. 483, 493 (1978).
However, the Board itself has recognized that hospitals have special needs which justify a modi-
fication of the general rule. See St. John's Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc. v. Laborers' Int'l
Union of North America, 222 NLRB 1150 (1976).
4. NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
5. 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977). In St. John's, the Tenth Circuit permitted a ban on
solicitation in all areas of the hospital to which patients had access.
6. 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
7. Id. at 505-07.
8. 593 F.2d at 913.
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NLRB v. St. Joseph Hospital9 determined that there was no legitimate evi-
dence of such special circumstances'0 as might justify a ban on union solici-
tation and distribution in the hospital cafeteria and parking lot. The court
noted that the hospital relied solely on conclusory statements made by an
administrator that the rule was necessary to prevent the disruption of patient
care activities. Such general statements were held not to represent positive
evidence of a harmful effect such as was required in Beth Israel.
The Tenth Circuit, however, refused to issue broad guidelines applying
to union solicitation in hospitals generally. Instead, it remanded the cause to
the Board to define the immediate patient care areas in which solicitation
can be strictly prohibited. I I
In NLRB v. Presbyterian Medical Center,12 the Tenth Circuit applied Beth
Israel to a no-access rule and found that it also violated employee rights.
The rule in question prohibited employees from being on hospital premises
except during working hours or while in attendance at authorized, hospital
functions. As justification, the employer gave reasons of security, limited
parking space, abuse of overtime, and interference with productivity.'3
The appellate court emphasized that business-related factors were insuf-
ficient to justify a no-access rule (or a no-distribution, no-solicitation rule).
Justifications must be based upon the necessity to "avoid disruption of
health-care operations or disturbance of patients."'1 4 Inasmuch as the prof-
fered justifications did not meet this test, the Board ruling was upheld.
At issue in HeadDivision, 4MF, Inc. v. NLRB' 5 was a charge of unlawful
discrimination in the enforcement of a company no-distribution rule. Head
maintained that where the rule was consistently enforced against every em-
ployee, no unlawful discrimination existed when the employer itself engaged
in distribution. 16
The Tenth Circuit cited NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America1 7 for the
narrow proposition that distribution by the company can be equated only
with distribution by supervisory personnel.' 8 Reasoning that a leadman was
an employee rather than a supervisor, '9 the court upheld the Board determi-
nation that the rule had been unlawfully enforced against some employees
but not against others. The fact that distribution was made at the request of
an agent of the company was discounted as immaterial.
9. 587 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1978).
10. See note 3 supra.
11. 587 F.2d at 1065. The Board's order was deemed too vague and overbroad to be en-
forced.
12. 586 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1978).
13. Id at 167.
14. Id at 168.
15. 593 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1979). The rule provided against " 'circulation or distribution
of written material in working areas or on working time.'" Id at 976 (quoting the opinion of
the Administrative Law Judge, 228 NLRB No. 180 (1977)).
16. 593 F.2d at 977 (citing NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357 (1958)).
17. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
18. 593 F.2d at 978.




In addition, the court of appeals found that this and other unfair labor
practices constituted an "operative part" of an ensuing strike. Even though
the union had not raised the unfair practices issue during negotiations, suffi-
cient evidence supported the trial court determination that a contract dis-
pute was not the sole cause of the strike.
20
Plasttcrals, Znc. v. NLRB2 ' is notable chiefly for a comprehensive discus-
sion of the standards to be applied in determining whether there has been a
violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) where wage increases
have been granted or withheld during periods of critical union activity. The
NLRB found that Plasticrafts had violated the neutrality of a union election
when it suspended all wage increases for the duration of the campaign. Plas-
ticrafts appealed, arguing that unlawful anti-union animus must be shown
in order to establish a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 22 and protesting
the fact that the Board had failed to hear proffered testimony.
The Tenth Circuit refused to follow those cases which might be con-
strued to require a finding of anti-union motive in every 8(a)(1) case, and
upheld the general rule: Where there exists a clearly apparent status quo
with respect to wage increases, any change in that practice in response to
protected union activity constitutes a violation, regardless of motive.2 3 Since
no anti-union animus need be shown, the court further held that it was not
error that the Board refused to hear company testimony regarding motive.
Were the status quo not "clearly apparent" to the employer, motive would
become important. The Tenth Circuit also rejected Plasticrafts' contention
that the Board must show some change in employee behavior attributable to
the incident.
24
The underlying question in Kustom Electronzcs, Inc. v. NLRB 25 was
whether the Board had erred in finding that employees who had been laid
off six months prior to a union election were nonetheless eligible to vote in
that election. The case arose from an NLRB holding that the company had
committed an unfair labor practice26 when it refused to bargain with a re-
cently certified union. Kustom, in defense of its action, argued that the
union was improperly certified in that it did not represent a majority of
employees eligible to vote.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Board that the proper test for a
determination of eligibility to vote is whether laid off employees had, at the
time of the election, a "reasonable expectation of replacement within a rea-
20. 593 F.2d at 981. "In determining whether a strike is an unfair labor practices strike,
the NLRB is not limited to a consideration of what the Union stated at negotiation sessions or
in public. The perspective of the striking employees may properly be deemed of controlling
significance." Id at 981 n.18.
21. 586 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1978).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization and
other concerted activities.
23. 586 F.2d at 188. The court emphasized that the practice must not only be an estab-
lished one, but must also be "clearly apparent to an objectively reasonable employer." Id
24. 586 F.2d at 190. The violation occurs when employer conduct t&nd to be coercive,
whether or not individual employees are successfully coerced.
25. 590 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1978).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5) (1976).
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sonable time in the future."'2 7 That employees may have been told when
laid off that the dismissal would be permanent was held not determinative,
since it was their understanding at the time of the election that counted. In
particular, the court found that the Board's refusal to entertain the union's
unfair labor practice charges stemming from the layoffs did not ipso facto
establish that employees could not reasonably expect to be recalled. Rather,
the issue was held to be but one of the many to be considered by the Board
in making its factual determination.
28
B. Refusal to Bargain
29
In NLRB v. Albion Corp. ,30 the Tenth Circuit upheld a Board decision
that the company had violated section 8(a)(5)31 of the NLRA by refusing to
recognize and bargain with the union. The court found that even though
outright refusal to bargain had lasted but five days, the timing of the refusal
being coincident with a threatened strike, combined with company conduct
prior to that time, was sufficient to constitute a "continuous course of con-
duct"'32 in violation of the Act.
Although evidence was sparse, 33 the court further upheld a Board de-
termination that an ensuring strike was caused, at least in part, by Albion's
refusal to bargain. 34 The Tenth Circuit thus concluded that unlawful terms
had been imposed as a condition of reinstatement for striking employees.
The company had presented a strong case to show that the conditions were
the product of sound business judgment, 35 but the court held as controlling
its decision in NLRB v. Wichita Television Corp. 3 6 that "[s]triking employees
are upon request entitled to reinstatement if unfair labor practices are the
cause or one of the operative causes of their strike."
'3 7
Because new evidence was proffered having bearing upon the question
of Albion's good faith and financial plight, the order was partially remanded
for further proceedings with respect to liability.
In NLRB v. Ethan A//en, Inc. ,38 the court of appeals was asked to enforce
an order requiring that the employer recognize and bargain with a duly
27. 590 F.2d at 821 (citing Marlin-Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 586, 588 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 594 (1941); NLRB v. Hondo Drilling Co., 428 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Jesse Jones Sausage Co., 309 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1962)).
28. 590 F.2d at 822.
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1976).
30. 593 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1979).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
32. See Machinists Local v. Labor Board, 362 U.S. 411, 416 (1959).
33. Evidence that the strike was motivated by the refusal to bargain consisted primarily of
a statement by a union steward to employees shortly before the strike vote that "we have no new
contract and none had been discussed." 593 F.2d at 940. From this, the Tenth Circuit inferred
that employees were aware of the company refusal to bargain. Id
34. There appears to be an inconsistency in the court's reasoning. It is difficult to see how
a refusal to bargain can both cause a strike and be caused by it.
35. The employer gave the following reasons for restrictions on the employees' return to
work: the company's financial plight, a show of potential violence on the picket line, and sabo-
tage which had previously occurred. 593 F.2d at 943.
36. 277 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960).
37. Id at 584.
38. 596 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1979).
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certified union. Ethan Allen had based its refusal to bargain on allegations
that the union election was invalid, having been tainted by pro-union con-
duct on the part of supervisory personnel. The Board, adopting the report of
its director, had rejected the allegations and entered summary judgment for
the union. The issue presented to the Tenth Circuit was whether the Board
need hold an evidentiary hearing prior to the adoption of a regional direc-
tor's report requiring an employer to recognize and bargain with a union.
In upholding the Board, the court observed that the only exception
which had been timely filed was couched in such general terms as to raise no
real issue of fact. Unless exceptions raise serious and substantial issues, no
evidentiary hearing need be held.
39
In W & WSteel Co. v. NLRB,40 the Tenth Circuit refused to enforce a
Board order which held that the company was a "successor employer" 4 1 for
bargaining purposes, and which granted W & W's request for a decertifica-
tion election. In its resolution of the issue, the court determined that the
successor employer relationship did not exist where the employer could show
a rational basis in fact for its doubts about union majority status.
Analyzing NLRB v. Bums International Security Services, Inc. 42 vis-a-vis the
facts before it, the court found substantial evidence to support a doubt of
union majority status at the time the plant was acquired. Special stress was
laid upon the fact that the unit election had been held more than two and
one half years prior to the takeover. Under such conditions, the court ob-
served, the plant did not constitute an " 'unchanged bargaining unit'" rep-
resented by a " 'recently certified bargaining agent' " as was required in
Burns.
4 3
The court's analysis emphasized that a rational factual basis must exist
in order to support a doubt of union majority status. There was no elabora-
tion of the standards applicable to a determination that the doubt was in
"good faith," but the Tenth Circuit seemed to imply that once the factual
basis had been demonstrated, it would be up to the Board to show lack of a
good faith doubt.
C. Interference with Union Activities
Timpte, Inc. v. NLRB 44 involved a distribution problem of a different
type. Timpte had dismissed an employee for his refusal to abide by com-
pany directives that he refrain from using profanity and indecent language
in the literature he handed out as part of his campaign for union office. The
NLRB directed that the employee be reinstated, and held that where the
matter concerned legitimate union-related business, the company had no
right to control even " 'vulgar language, insults directed against manage-
39. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(l) (1978).
40. 599 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979).
41. Where the successor employee relationship exists, there are continuing obligations
under the collective bargaining agreement so long as the certification remains valid. NLRB v.
Geronimo Services Co., 467 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1972).
42. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
43. 599 F.2d at 939.
44. 590 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1979).
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ment and inflammatory appeals.' "45
Section 7 of the NLRA states that employees shall have the right to
engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of. . . mutual aid or protec-
tion."'46 Section 8(a)(1) makes it a violation for an employer to "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section [7] .... .47 Discussing concerted activities in general, the court
characterized all concerted activities as " 'protected unless unlawful, violent,
in breach of contract, or indefensible.' "48 The Tenth Circuit found gener-
ous support in the opinions of other federal district courts for its charactriza-
tion of the employee's activities as "indefensible. '49 Since the activity was
not protected under the NLRA, the court denied enforcement of the Board
order.
In Chmax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB,50 the employer petitioned for review
of a Board decision that it had violated the Act 5' by refusing to allow a
union representative to consult with an employee on company time prior to
an investigatory interview which might culminate in discipline of the em-
ployee. Both Climax and the NLRB relied on NLRB v. J Weingarten, Inc. ,52
a recent Supreme Court decision holding that denial of representation dur-
ing such an investigatory interview was a violation of an employee's right to
engage in concerted activities.
The Tenth Circuit, maintaining that investigation should not be adver-
sary in nature, refused to enlarge the Weingarten decision. The court con-
cluded that prior consultation might interfere with legitimate company
interests. The evidence presented conclusively demonstrated that union offi-
cials had urged employees not to provide needed information. 53 Such a pol-
icy could be particularly devastating where safety is a major concern, as it is
at Climax.
In addition, the court noted that none of the employees had requested
representation during the investigation. To insist that an employer donate
company time when employees chose not to consult representatives on their
own time was adjudged to place an unfair burden on the employer. Of
course, the court added, the company must set the interview date so as to
allow sufficient time for prior consultation on the employee's own time
should he so desire.54
NLRB v. Process & Pollution Control Co. 55 involved a Board order di-
45. Id. at 873 (quoting the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
47. Id. § 158(a)(1).
48. 590 F.2d at 874 (quoting NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977)).
49. NLRB v. Garner Tool & Die Mfg., Inc., 493 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Fibers
Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311 (1st Cir. 1971); Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965); Maryland Drydock Co. v.
NLRB, 183 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1950).
50. 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1976).
52. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
53. 584 F.2d at 363-64.
54. In dicta, the court observed that the right to union representation at the interview itself
exists only if the involved employee requests representation. Id at 365.
55. 588 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1978).
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recting that the company hire, with back pay, a job applicant allegedly re-
fused employment because of union activities. The Board further directed
the company to cease from interfering with the exercise of the self-organiza-
tional rights of its employees. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected com-
pany allegations that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence
and limited itself to a consideration of evidentiary matters.
The company charged that the Board had erred when it refused to con-
sider evidence which showed previous hiring of persons believed to be union
members. The court agreed since anti-union animus was a basic considera-
tion in the decision and had been established only by circumstancial evi-
dence. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that any evidence which might tend to
show an employer's course of conduct with respect to unions would be useful
to the assessment of intent. "Bona fide beliefs held by a person, as well as his
actual knowledge, are relevant in determining his intentions and motiviation
for his actions."
'56
In addition, the court upheld a company objection to the admission of
certain hearsay. Although recognizing that the rules of hearsay are less rig-
orously imposed upon the NLRB than upon courts, the Tenth Circuit main-
tained that they must be applied unless circumstances make their observance
"impracticable.
57
D. Union Hiring Halls
Neither the law nor court decisions forbid hiring halls operated by the
union, so long as they are not operated so as to discriminate against nonun-
ion members.
In NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 322,53 the
Board found unfair labor practices where the union and the employer oper-
ated a hiring hall in a manner which effectively denied access to nonunion
job applicants. Through a contractual arrangement, job applicants were re-
quired to register at the hall in order to obtain employment. While the
union-operated hall was not the exclusive method through which the com-
pany could get employees, applicants hired "at the gate" were employed
only temporarily and were subject to discharge when qualified applicants
became available through the referral system.
The Tenth Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board
charge of discrimination. During a period in which the company was admit-
tedly in need of employees, nonunion job applicants were turned away from
the hiring hall with a statement that no work was available. The facts indi-
cated that with few exceptions, all union members were referred for employ-
ment while only three out of a total of 175 nonmember applicants received
56. Id at 790. The court further addressed the breadth and scope of the Board order,
directing that should a violation be found on remand, the order should be modified so as to
limit prohibitions to violations similar to the one found. Id
57. Id at 791. The court found no showing that it would have been difficult to have the
witness appear in person rather than receive her testimony second-hand.
58. 597 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1979).
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referrals.59 Finding the discriminatory acts of the union chargeable to the
employer, the Tenth Circuit held that both were in violation of the Act.
6 °
Additionally, the court took note of a pattern of discrimination and required
that the parties take affirmative action in order to provide equal access to the
hiring hall.
In Robertson v. NLRB, 6 1 the court of appeals addressed the legality of a
contractual provision which required, inter a/ia, that a job applicant previ-
ously have worked for a unionized employer in order to secure preference in
employment opportunity. The primary issue in the case involved a statutory
construction of section 8(0(4)62 of the NLRA, which the Board had read as
permitting the contractual provision.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the Board's analysis. It pointed out that the
precise language of the statute permits only the use of objective criteria in a
job referral system. Thus, a hiring hall could condition referrals upon the
training of applicants, or even upon length of service with the immediate
employer. The court determined, however, that priority based upon prior
employment with any company party to a union agreement was implicitly
discriminatory.
The Tenth Circuit further recognized that while preference in referral
could theoretically be secured without having been a union member,63 the
hiring hall provision could foreseeably exert pressure upon nonunion appli-
cants to join. Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right not only to
bargain collectively, but also to refrain from so doing.64 The court con-
cluded that upholding the contractual provision would penalize those appli-
cants who chose to exercise that statutory right.
E. Union Duty of Fair Representation
In Bell v. IML Freight, Inc. ,65 the Tenth Circuit significantly relaxed the
criteria which govern an individual union member's right to challenge the
jurisdiction of a committee created by a collective bargaining agreement.
The dispute arose out of a company decision to integrate a dual seniority
system into a single list. In adherence to the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the matter was submitted to a joint employer-union commit-
tee which then approved the proposed change. Bell, alleging a loss of
seniority due to the change, filed suit under section 30166 of the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act, claiming that the committee had exceeded its au-
thority under the collective agreement.
59. Id at 1328 n.4. The three nonmembers who received referrals were found to have
specific qualifications which may have accounted for the exception made in their case.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(l)(A), (b)(2) (1976).
61. 597 F.2d 1331 (10th Cir. 1979).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0(4) (1976).
63. The contract provision in question did not require that the employee, in order to have
preference, have been a union member, but only that he have worked for an employer who had
a collective agreement with the union.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
65. 589 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1979).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
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The Tenth Circuit places great reliance upon the rule governing arbi-
tration awards as providing a guideline to determine standing in actions
which challenge the jurisdiction of contract-created committees. 6 7 "The
general rule is that a fairly represented employee may not attack an arbitra-
tion decision made in the context of a collective bargaining agreement. '68
The court of appeals, however, rejected unfairness of representation as a
prerequisite to judicial review in situations where the union is placed in a
position of having to support the rights of one group of employees over those
of another. In so doing, it called attention to a Third Circuit decision
69
which had recognized, in a different context, the inadequacy of union repre-
sentation of two groups with conflicting interests. The court there had
granted standing because of inadequate representation. The Tenth Circuit
agreed with this view. Reasoning that the affected employees would other-
wise be left without a remedy, the court granted them the right to present
their position.
Firer v. Safeway Sores, Inc. 70 arose as an appeal under the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act 7' from an arbitration decision. Fizer challenged the
validity of the decision, claiming that Safeway had wrongfully discharged
him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. He further claimed
that the union had breached its duty to fairly represent him during the arbi-
tration proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment for both
defendants.
In upholding summary judgment for the union, the court of appeals
reaffirmed its policy against interference in internal union affairs72 and
noted that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust internal remedies as required
by the union constitution. Indeed, the plaintiff had made no official ap-
proach at all to the union. 73 Vague allegations of union indifference were
held insufficient to show that such efforts would have been useless. The
Tenth Circuit stated that the plaintiffs claims failed to meet the " 'clear and
positive showing of futility' " standard 74 which governs in attempts to cir-
cumvent exhaustion requirements.
On the other hand, the court rejected summary judgment for Safeway,
maintaining that failure to exhaust union remedies could not be urged by
the employer as a defense in a suit for wrongful discharge.
75
67. 589 F.2d at 504.
68. Id (citing Andrus v. Convoy Co., 480 F.2d 604, 606 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 989
(1973)).
69. Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968).
70. 586 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1978).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
72. 586 F.2d at 184 (citing Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 915 (1973)).
73. 586 F.2d at 184.
74. Id. at 183 (quoting Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 915 (1973).
75. Exhaustion of union remedy can be used by the employer as a defense in some situa-




Fabricut, Inc. v. Tulsa General Drivers76 involved a company appeal from
the district court's affirmation of an arbitration award. Pursuant to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, a dispute involving an employee's discharge for
refusal to work overtime was submitted to arbitration. Finding that the
company did not have just cause for the dismissal, the arbitrator reduced the
penalty to a one month suspension, and directed reinstatement of the em-
ployee. Fabricut then sued to set aside the award, asserting that the arbitra-
tor had exceeded his contractual authority.
Although the merits of an arbitration award are generally beyond judi-
cial review, 77 courts will not uphold an arbitration decision where it can be
shown that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority under the collective
bargaining agreement. 78 The question faced by the Tenth Circuit was
whether that authority had been abused where, in considering a contract
violation with no stated penalty, the arbitrator substituted his own penalty
for the one previously imposed by the employer.
In deciding that the arbitrator acted within the bounds of his authority,
the Tenth Circuit applied principles which it had earlier adopted. 79 In par-
ticular, the award may not be contrary to the express language of the agree-
ment and must have rational support.80 The court felt that this test had
been met. An analysis of the various contract provisions showed none which
mandated discharge as a penalty. Nor was the contract found to give the
employer discretion to choose a penalty when none was authorized. Ra-
tional support for the decision was inferred from "the entire agreement, its
context, and intent."81 In the opinion of the court, the arbitrator, rather
than changing the contract, was making it workable.
G. Board Remedies
Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB8 2 arose as a challenge to a Board
decision finding that the company had discharged an employee in violation
of the Act8 3 and requiring that the employee be reinstated with back pay.
Dayton did not deny the violation, but argued that the remedy was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. In particular, the employer charged that
findings of 27.5% permanent partial disability in the employee by the State
Industrial Court relieved it of any obligation to reinstate.
84
The court ruled that Board findings control on issues before it, even
76. 597 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1979).
77. Id at 229.
78. The standards of review applicable to arbitration decisions were set out by the
Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960). "[The arbitrator] does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice ....
[H]is award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement." Id at 597.
79. Mistletoe Express Serv. v. Motor Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1977).
80. Id at 694.
81. 597 F.2d at 230.
82. 591 F.2d 566 (10th Cir. 1979).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1976).
84. 591 F.2d at 569.
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where the findings of a state agency are inconsistent. 85 It observed, however,
that in the instant case the issues before the Board differed from those
presented to the State Industrial Court. Ample evidence supported the
Board in its determination that, despite the findings of the Industrial Court,
the employee was capable of performing his job. Citing a strong policy
favoring limited review of Board decisions, the court upheld the remedy im-
posed.
In addition, the Tenth Circuit examined the procedures used by the
Board to determine an award of back pay. The court commended the usual
NLRB practice which utilizes a two-step process in unlawful discharge cases.
Initially, the Board determines whether an unfair practice has been commit-
ted, and if it has, whether reinstatement with back pay is an appropriate
remedy. The second step involves a hearing on the amount to be awarded,
preceded by notice to the affected parties. Such notice provides the em-
ployer with an opportunity to present evidence which might affect his liabil-
ity. Finding that these safeguards had not been observed in the hearing
being reviewed, the court refused to honor the award.
H. Employee Benefit Trust Funds
In Denver Metropolitan Association v. Journeyman Plumbers,86 the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided several issues which will have a significant bearing upon the
future development of industry-wide employee benefit trusts. An employers'
association brought an action challenging contributions made to various
funds by employers who were not members of the association. In its action,
the association alleged that the union and fund trustees had violated the
collective agreement as well as certain statutory provisions8 7 in their admin-
istration of the trust funds. The district court entered summary judgment
for the defendants on the issue of contract violation and held that the associ-
ation lacked standing to challenge alleged statutory violations.
Examining first the contractual claim, the court of appeals applied the
usual principles of contract interpretation to determine the intent of the par-
ties. The court found that the language of the various agreements clearly
and unequivocally demonstrated a contemplation that nonassociation mem-
bers be allowed to adopt the agreement. 88 Prior bargaining history, past
practices, and the nature of the industry were cited as further support for the
court's determination.
After deciding that the association had standing,89 the Tenth Circuit
85. Id at 570 (citing NLRB v. Western Meat Packers, Inc., 368 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Stafford Trucking, Inc., 371 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1966); 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976)).
86. 586 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1978).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
88. 586 F.2d at 1370. The association had argued that a third party cannot be added to a
contract without the agreement of both original parties. The Tenth Circuit agreed, but re-
minded the association that consent can be given in advance.
89. The Tenth Circuit overruled the district court's contention that the association was not
within the "zone of interest to be protected by the statute." Association of Data Processing
Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The court reasoned that since the association
was a party to the trust agreements involved and had the ability to name the employer trustees,
it had sufficient interest to meet the test. 586 F.2d at 1372.
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considered association arguments that nonmember employer contributions
violated statutory requirements that nonmember employer contributions vi-
olated statutory requirements that "payments are to be made as specified in
a written agreement," and that "employees and employers [be] equally rep-
resented" in fund administration.90 The court called attention to the writ-
ten provisions in collective agreements between the unions and outsiders
which require contribution to the trusts and held that these, through incor-
poration, met the written agreement test. The Tenth Circuit disposed of the
equal representation argument with comparable facility. Rejecting em-
ployer interpretation that the statute requires equal representation by each
employer, the court construed it to mean only that representation of employ-
ees equal that of employers.
91
The Tenth Circuit noted a remote possibility of abuse of the arrange-
ment by a strong union, but concluded that this possibility was outweighed
by the benefits of the industry-wide trust.
II. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
9 2
In Schwager v. Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania,9 3 the Tenth Circuit provided a
comprehensive discussion of the guidelines and standards to be used in estab-
lishing a prima facie case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).94 The plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, brought an
action alleging unlawful discharge because of his age. The company de-
fended its action on the basis of economic considerations which necessitated
an overall company reorganization.
Stating that the purpose and structure of the ADEA is similar to that of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,95 the Tenth Circuit applied the guidelines
laid down in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.96 It determined that under the
Supreme Court standards, the plaintiff had established a prima facie case,
thus shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to show a nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the dismissal. In the court's opinion, this burden had been
met. The court found ample evidence to support district court findings that
the discharge was motivated by legitimate factors other than age.
In Kentroliv. Frontier Airlines, Inc. ,97 the court again addressed itself to
the procedure to be used, in establishing age discrimination under the
ADEA. The plaintiff appealed from a trial court dismissal of his suit for
90. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
91. 586 F.2d at 1374-75.
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
93. 591 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979).
94. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1976).
96. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that "(1)
he or she is within the protected age group; (2) he or she was doing satisfactory work; (3) he or
she was discharged despite the adequacy of his or her work; and (4) the position was filled by
employees younger than the age of the plaintiff." 591 F.2d at 61.
97. 585 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1978).
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wrongful discharge because of age. He claimed procedural error in that the
trial judge, granting a defense motion to dismiss for failure to establish a
prima facie case, considered evidence presented by the defense.
The Tenth Circuit sensibly refused to find prejudice, even though in so
doing it was forced to modify its own contrary precedent. 98 "We do not,"
stated the court, "believe it critical here to determine which process of rea-
soning the trial court followed-rejecting the plaintiffs case because of [sic]
prz'mafacte showing had not been made, or holding that the defendant pre-
vailed because the evidence demonstrated legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for the defendant's actions."
99
In Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania,'00 the court focused its atten-
tion on the statutory requirement that, whenever possible, the ADEA be
enforced through a process of conciliation and voluntary compliance.' 0 '
The Secretary of Labor had filed an enforcement suit, alleging age discrimi-
nation against seven former employees of Sun Oil. The district court dis-
missed, holding that the plaintiffs insistence on a waiver of the statute of
limitations as a condition to further efforts at negotiation violated the intent
of the ADEA.
The court of appeals, agreeing that the defendant was under no obliga-
tion to waive the statute of limitations, recognized that the Act mandated a
complete exploration of all avenues of informal compliance before the insti-
tution of court action. 0 2 In the opinion of the court, however, outright dis-
missal conflicted with the humanitarian purposes of the Act. The Tenth
Circuit ordered the matter stayed pending further conciliation efforts.
III. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
10 3
The sole question addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Tripper v. Smith 1
0 4
was whether an employee benefit plan, which was terminated prior to the
effective dates of the Act, was covered by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).10 5 The plaintiff argued that while termination of the
plan occurred prior to the effective dates, distribution proceedings under-
taken by the trustees subsequent to that time brought the plan within ER-
ISA.
The Tenth Circuit could not agree with the plaintiffs broad construc-
tion of the Act. In the court's opinion, neither congressional intent nor the
wording of ERISA made it applicable to a plan which has not continued in
98. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (lOth Cir. 1975). In Rih, it was held that
only after a preliminary determination that a prima facie case existed should the trial court
admit the defendant's evidence.
99. 585 F.2d at 970.
100. 592 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1979).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
102. Comparing age discrimination to racial discrimination, the court cited EEOC v. Zia
Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978) for the proposition that a good faith effort on the part of the
Secretary to effect compliance is a prerequisite to a stay order.
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
104. 592 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir.. 1979).
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
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existence as an "operating" plan. The court held that a "terminated plan
the corpus of which is in the process of liquidation before the effective dates
in ERISA is not a 'plan' as contemplated in the Act."'
10 6
L}'nne McGowan
106. 592 F.2d at 1113.
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OVERVIEW
Few cases were decided by the Tenth Circuit in the natural resources
and lands area; all nine cases selected for publication are presented in this
section. The areas of litigation in the 1978-79 term included mining law,
water pollution, public lands, and Indian lands.
I. MINING
The two cases in the mining law area arose out of the efforts of the
federal government to invalidate existing mining claims. Both opinions fo-
cused primarily on the question of whether the claims contained "valuable
mineral deposits," 1 an element which must be shown if the locator of the
claim is to receive a patent under the federal mining laws. Although the two
opinions touched upon many of the same issues such as "value" and "mar-
ketability," the facts and the legislative histories regarding the type of min-
eral controlled.
A. Shell Oil Co. v. Andrus
2
Plaintiffs Shell Oil and D.A. Shale, Inc., owners of unpatented oil shale
mining claims, were applying for patents on the claims. To qualify for pat-
ents, the plaintiffs had to prove the claims contained a "valuable mineral
deposit." The Tenth Circuit cited the rule established by the Supreme
Court in Cole v. Ralph3 that the locator of an unpatented mining claim has a
vested property interest if the claim is properly located. The primary issue
was whether present or pre-1920 Interior Department standards were to be
used to determine what constitutes a "valuable mineral deposit." The court
held that the Interior Department could not apply present standards to
claims located prior to 1920 which would therefore retroactively invalidate
the mining claims. 4 Because the oil shale deposits constituted a "valuable
mineral deposit" prior to 1920 when the claims were staked, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that Shell Oil and D.A. Shale, Inc. had a vested property interest.
The court stated that a ruling by the Interior Department could not depart
from the old standards and apply present standards; such a ruling would be
beyond executive authority. 5
The Shell Oil case might have an impact on future mining litigation in
regard to retroactive application of department rulings. However, one lower
court recently has construed narrowly Shell Oil by limiting the case to the
facts, ze., that departmental rulings and congressional actions have treated
I. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 29, 35 (1976). See Vlautin, To Lease or To Locate, 19 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. 393 (1974).
2. 591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 78-1815 (June 4, 1979).
3. 252 U.S. 286 (1920).
4. 591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 78-1815 (June 4, 1979).
5. 591 F.2d at 603-04.
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oil shale in a manner different from other minerals. 6
The litigation commenced in September 1964 when the Secretary of the
Interior asserted that certain oil shale placer mining claims which had pat-
ent applications pending were invalid. The Secretary of the Interior argued
that the claims contained no valuable mineral deposits either at the present
time or prior to 1920 when the claims were located. Five months of hearings
were held in front of an administrative law judge who determined that the
oil shale claims owned by Shell Oil and D.A. Shale, Inc. were valid and that
the patents should issue. 7 The Interior Board of Land Appeals reversed the
decision of the administrative law judge thereby upholding the government's
claims.8 Shell Oil and D.A. Shale, Inc., as plaintiffs, filed a petition in the
federal district court requesting a review of the Secretary's order cancelling
the disputed claims. After the district court determined the claims were
valid,9 this appeal came before the Tenth Circuit.
To prove the "valuable" element under federal mining laws, the locator
must show that the mineral deposit meets either the "marketability" test
whereby the mineral can be "extracted, removed and marketed at a
profit,"' 1 or the closely related "prudent man" test whereby the mineral is of
such quantity and quality that a prudent man would continue mining the
mineral." However, oil shale deposits did not meet either the "marketabil-
ity" or the less onerous "prudent man" test prior to 1920. The Tenth Circuit
stated that oil shale deposits would have to have been considered "valuable"
prior to 1920 under other standards such as then existing Interior Depart-
ment actions, practices, instructions, or decisions.'
2
By referring to the Department of Interior records from 1915 to the
present, the Tenth Circuit determined that oil shale deposits had been desig-
nated as "valuable" by the Interior Department and by Congress even
though no market existed at the time the claim was located and even though
a prudent man would not have mined the mineral at that time. For exam-
ple, the portion of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 which placed oil shale
under a leasing system instead of the previous location system specifically
stated that the validity of pre-1920 oil shale placer claims was not to be
6. In a later coal mining case with similar facts, the federal district court rejected plain-
tiff's contention that Shell Oil stood for the proposition that "an administrative agency . . .
cannot retroactively apply a rule that represents a complete departure from a long-standing
administrative practice." The court based its conclusion first, on the fact that special congres-
sional approval was given to the Interior Department's handling of oil shale claim location in
Shell and secondly, on the fact that the mining claims in Shell had been located 50 years previ-
ously. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, No. 77-0225 (D. Utah June 15, 1979).
7. 591 F.2d at 598.
8. Id The court cited the decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals at 16 IBLA 112
(1974).
9, 426 F. Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1977), afd, 591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1815 (June 4, 1979).
10. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 600 (1968). Note that this Court-determined
standard though valid, does not apply to coal and other specified minerals since 1976 because
regulations requiring lease applicants to meet a "present marketability" standard have been
codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3520.1-1(c) (1978).
11. See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
12. 591 F.2d at 599.
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impaired.' 3 And the Interior Department, following the congressional man-
date, patented other pre-1920 oil shale claims after the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 became effective.' 4 Also, a 1927 departmental decision held that oil
shale deposits could be designated "valuable mineral deposits" based on the
fact that oil shale would in the future constitute a very valuable resource and
therefore an immediately profitable market was unnecessary.' 5
In addition to the departmental actions, congressional actions affirmed
that oil shale deposits were to be considered valuable. A congressional inves-
tigation in the early 1930's motivated after a General Land Office official
attacked departmental guidelines for issuances of oil shale patents focused
specifically on these guidelines. Congress made no changes to the "valuable
mineral deposit" requirement as a result of the hearings even though Con-
gress has the authority to alter departmental standards. 16 In addition to its
reliance upon the foregoing history, the Tenth Circuit also relied on their
opinion in Brennan v. Udall. 17
The Tenth Circuit concluded that lands containing oil shale deposits
were "valuable mineral deposits" and could be validly located prior to the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.18 Therefore, because there were unpatented
mining claims which had been properly located, the Tenth Circuit relied on
the Supreme Court ruling of Cole v. Ralph '9 to hold that Shell Oil and D.A.
Shale, Inc. had a vested proeprty right in the oil shale placer mining claims.
The Tenth Circuit also noted that a mere change in the philosophy of a
department was not enough to invalidate the claims. 20 The original rules,
instructions, and interpretations of the Interior Department that oil shale
was valuable had been given "contemporaneous construction" in 1920 by
the Interior Department. These departmental standards further had the
"express and implied acquiescence" of Congress and no later reenactment of
administrative rules was made by Congress after its investigation. Rather,
the silence of Congress evidenced an affirmative adoption of the depart-
ment's interpretation of the then existing requirements needed to obtain a
patent. 2 1 The later policy changes by the department which no longer re-
gard oil shale claims as a "valuable mineral deposit" were due to a change in
the philosophy of department personnel only.22 By trying to apply new
standards retroactively, the Tenth Circuit stated that "the changes here
sought to be made by the Department as to 1920 standards incorporated in
13. 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1976) (amended 1978) states that lands valuable for certain minerals,
including coal and oil shale, are subject to disposition under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
"except as to valid claims existent on February 25, 1920."
14. 591 F.2d at 599-601.
15. 591 F.2d at 599 (citing Freeman v. Summers, 52 L.D. 201 (1927)).
16. 591 F.2d at 601-02.
17. 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967) (Tenth Circuit held that the
Interior Department for over 50 years has classified lands containing oil shale deposits as a
"valuable source").
18. 591 F.2d at 599.
19. 252 U.S. 286 (1920) (title dispute over mining claims on which patents were to issue).
20. 591 F.2d at 603.
21. Id at 603-05.
22. Id at 603.
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the mining laws are well beyond executive authority."'23 The oil shale min-
ing claims were therefore held valid based upon the pre-1920 designation of
oil shale as a valuable mineral deposit.
B. Hallenbeck v. Kleppe
24
In Hallenbeck, the Tenth Circuit again discussed the "valuable mineral
deposit" requirement of the federal mining laws.25 Because this case in-
volved sand, gravel, and gold rather than oil shale, which had been given
special treatment in the Shell Oil case, the Tenth Circuit based its holding on
the "prudent man" and "marketability" tests often used by courts in deter-
mining a "valuable mineral deposit."
The Department of the Interior initiated the litigation by contesting
patent applications on seven placer claims located by plaintiffs prior to 1955
in Lake County, Colorado. An administrative law judge declared the claims
invalid because the claims did not contain a "valuable mineral deposit."
The plaintiffs then commenced their suit in federal district court to enjoin
the government from doing any work on the claims and later amended the
district court complaint to challenge the decision of the Interior Board of
Land Appeals which had affirmed the administrative law judge. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to the government, stating that the
administrative finding of the invalidity of the claims was supported by sub-
stantial evidence and should therefore be upheld.
2 6
The first issue discussed by the Tenth Circuit on appeal was the plain-
tiffs' argument that the doctrines of laches and estoppel should apply to the
federal government. The Tenth Circuit stated that the general rule is that
the defenses of laches and estoppel are not applicable to the federal govern-
ment in cases regarding public lands. 27 The rule may, at times, be relaxed;
but in this case, there was no showing of the necessary elements to establish a
foundation for laches.
28
The plaintiffs' second contention that there was sufficient evidence to
support their claim of a "valuable mineral discovery" merited the bulk of the
Hallenbeck decision. The Tenth Circuit used both the "prudent man" and
the "marketability" tests because the minerals at issue were both metallic
and nonmetallic.
The court stated that the locator of a rare mineral claim must meet the
"prudent man" test to establish a "valuable mineral deposit." The test is
met when development of the mineral deposit would be pursued by a person
of ordinary prudence.29 The "prudent man" test, usually applied to rare
23. Id at 604.
24. 590 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1979).
25. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 29, 35 (1976).
26. 590 F.2d at 854-55.
27. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (determination of state and federal
rights to certain submerged lands off the coast of California).
28. 590 F.2d at 855.
29. Id at 856.
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metallic minerals, is a complement of the well-known "marketability" test, 30
usually applied to minerals of widespread occurrence. After presentation of
conflicting evidence by the parties, the admininstrative board concluded
that no prudent man would presently develop the Hallenbecks' claims for
gold.
As to the nonmetallic minerals of sand and gravel on the placer claims,
the plaintiffs presented evidence showing that such minerals had been sold
from neighboring claims; there was no evidence of sales from the contested
claims. The Tenth Circuit, applying the "marketability" test, held that ac-
cording to the evidence presented, no readily available market existed for
sand and gravel from plaintiffs' claims. 3 ' Further addressing the plaintiffs'
arguments as to the existence of a future market, the court required that
"there be, at the time of dzscoveqy, a market for the discovered material that is
sufficiently profitable to attract the efforts of a person of ordinary prudence
... . [t]he question of marketability is one of fact."
'3 2
The plaintiffs' other arguments 1) that the government failed to carry
its burden of proof, 2) that valuable mineral deposits on adjoining property
were not fully considered, and 3) that the misapplication of the law by the
administrative law judge was prejudicial error necessitating a trial de novo
were also rejected by the Tenth Circuit. The administrative and district




Two cases interpreting specific provisions of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act 34 were decided by the Tenth Circuit. The first case in-
volved reporting requirements of the Act and the second case discussed the
definitions of point and nonpoint sources.
A. Ward v. Coleman
35
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), notification
must be made to the appropriate federal agency of any discharges of oil or
other hazardous substances into the navigable waters of the United States.
36
Ward, operator of a drilling site from which oil had overflowed into a creek,
contended that these self-reporting requirements violated his fifth amend-
ment rights because information from the report was later used in assessing
civil fines.37 The Tenth Circuit, adhering to the doctrine that privileges
under the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment should be liber-
30. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 600 (1968) (patent on federal lands was de-
nied based on theory that quartzite was not a "valuable mineral deposit").
31. 590 F.2d at 856-58.
32. Id at 859 (emphasis added).
33. Id at 858-60.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976) (amended 1978).
35. 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979).
36. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(3), (5), (6) (1976) (amended 1978) regarding Congressional
declaration of policy against discharges of oil or hazardous substances.
37. 598 F.2d at 1190.
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ally construed, agreed with Ward.38 However, the court did not go so far as
to invalidate the self-reporting requirements or the civil penalties sections of
the FWPCA, stating that "it is permissible to assess civil penalties . . . pro-
vided that the evidence used to establish the discharge is derived from a
source wholly independent of the compelled disclosure ....
The litigation commenced when Ward, after discovery and immediate
clean up of the oil overflow, submitted his statutorily required report to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA notified the Coast
Guard because the spill involved navigable waters and the Coast Guard sub-
sequently assessed a civil penalty against Ward. After refusing to pay the
fine, Ward filed suit in the federal district court and moved to convene a
three-judge court. The federal government also filed suit to collect for the
penalty. The two cases were consolidated. ° Ward's motion for summary
judgment and request for a three-judge court were denied. In a subsequent
trial, the jury upheld the fine and found for the federal government.
4 1
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the issue of the three-judge court.
Under now repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2282, a three-judge court had to be con-
vened where certain types of injunctions which could have the effect of para-
lyzing an entire regulatory scheme were requested. 42 However in Ward, the
Tenth Circuit determined that the validity of portions of the FWPCA itself,
and not the regulatory scheme, was under scrutiny. Therefore, the trial
court's decision to refuse convening a three-judge court was affirmed.
43
The next issue addressed was whether the civil penalties contained in
the FWPCA were, in reality, criminal penalties. If this question was deter-
mined affirmatively, then the self-reporting requirements under the FWPCA
could be drawn into question. 4 Analysis of this criminal/civil issue was bro-
ken into three parts: 1) whether congressional intent could be found in the
statutory language, 2) what scheme was used to enforce the statute, and 3)
whether congressional intent could be ascertained based on indicators enu-
merated earlier by the Court in Kenned, v. Medoza-Marlttez.
45
The Tenth Circuit looked first at the statutory language which directs
the Coast Guard to automatically assess a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per
offense. Factors considered to determine the amount of penalty to assess in-
cluded the size of business, the ability of the business to continue, and the
seriousness of the violation.46 Even though the collected monies went into a
fund for regulating and remedying later oil spills, the Tenth Circuit held the
38. Id at 1194.
39. Id
40. Id at 1188-89.
41. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Okla. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 598 F.2d
1187 (10th Cir. 1979).
42. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (the seven tests were used to de-
termine whether sanction of losing citizenship for leaving country during wartime was penal or
regulatory in nature).
43. 598 F.2d at 1189-90.
44. Id at 1190.
45. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976) (amended 1978).
[Vol. 57:2
LANDS AND NA TURAL RESOURCES
penalty to be "based on a retributive and punitive motivation," 4 7 .e., seri-
ousness of the violation.
Turning to the administrative enforcement scheme, the court again dis-
cussed the considerations used in determining the amount of penalty assessed
but looked at the federal regulations and Coast Guard policy instead of at
the statutory language. Again, the Tenth Circuit found the penalty based
on "punitive considerations.
'48
In conclusively determining that the penalty was criminal rather than
civil in nature, the court next applied the traditional tests set out by the
Supreme Court in Kennedy to the fact pattern.49 The tests to which the court
gave considerable weight in deciding that the penalty was of a criminal na-
ture were 1) whether the statute furthered an aim of punishment-retribution
and 2) whether, because of the strict liability of the statute, the behavior
regulated under the statute is already a crime. Both questions were decided
affirmatively.
Based on this three-part analysis of the criminal/civil issue, the Tenth
Circuit held that the notice which Ward was statutorily required to file
could not be used to determine either liability or the amount of the civil
penalty. However, the self-reporting requirements and civil penalty portions
of the FWPCA were not set aside because civil penalties could still be as-
sessed from evidence completely independent of the necessary report. The
case was reversed and remanded to determine the question of independent
evidence.
50
B. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.5 1
In Earth Sciences, the Tenth Circuit ruled that certain activities such as
mining could include point as well as nonpoint sources even though the stat-
ute seemingly defined mining activities as nonpoint sources. Therefore, the
FWPCA could control these activities because it is designed to regulate pol-
lution emitted from an identifiable point source. The United States filed
this action alleging three violations of the FWPCA after a toxic substance
used by Earth Sciences in its gold leaching operations was discharged into a
nearby creek after an early thaw had caused both the primary and the re-
serve sump pumps to fill to capacity. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) first referred the matter to the Colorado Department of Health but
later the EPA filed a notice of violations of 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) 52 under the
FWPCA identifying an open ditch between the pumps and the creek as a
point source. 53 Earth Sciences complied with the resulting EPA order by
47. 598 F.2d at 1191.
48. Id at 1192.
49. Id at 1193.
50. Id at 1194-95.
51. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979). See generally Miskovsky & Van Hook, Regulation of Forestry
Related Nonpoint Source Pollution Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9
NAT. RESOURCEs LAw. 645 (1976).
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (1976) whereby "the discharge of any pollutant is unlawful."
53. A point source is defined as "[alny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, in-
cluding but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
19801
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constructing a larger reserve sump pump and by assuring the EPA that it
would monitor any seepage around the pumps. Thereafter, the United
States filed suit in the federal district court.
54
The issue which concerned the district court was whether the hazardous
substance was discharged through a point source as opposed to a nonpoint
source as defined under the FWPCA, because the Act only regulates hazard-
ous substances discharged from a point source. Earth Sciences contended
the discharge was from a nonpoint source for which a regulatory scheme has
not yet been developed. The district court had interpreted a federal guide-
line requesting the EPA to develop a regulatory scheme for nonpoint sources
such as mining activities as creating an exemption.5 5 The district court
therefore decided that pollutants from mining activites are always discharges
from nonpoint sources and dismissed the action.
56
On appeal, the federal government successfully argued that discharges
from mining activities could be conveyed through a point source even
though the discharges may initially be from a nonpoint source. Therefore,
based upon this reasoning, mining activities were capable of regulation
under the FWPCA.
The Tenth Circuit looked to the legislative history of the FWPCA in
determining that Congress meant to classify nonpoint sources as polluting
runoffs caused by rainfall which were difficult to isolate to any one pol-
luter.57 And further, because the purpose of the FWPCA was to protect
navigable waters as fully as possible, the congressional intent was to broadly
define a point source.
58
The opinion briefly discussed Earth Sciences' other arguments. First,
even though the government never adequately pinned down the point
source-variously referring to the sump pump, a well, or a container-the
Tenth Circuit had no trouble finding that the entire leaching system consti-
tuted a point source. Secondly, the court held that the stream need not be
navigable to be controlled by the FWPCA; rather, the body of water into
which a pollutant is discharged must only somehow affect interstate com-
merce. The Tenth Circuit then ruled that civil suits and administrative ac-




Three cases were decided by the Tenth Circuit regarding public lands.
Dissimilar issues were considered in the three cases: quiet title actions
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1976) (amended
1977).
54. 599 F.2d at 371.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1314() (1976) as amnded by Pub. L. No. 95-217. The administrator of the
EPA is to issue guidelines for identifying and controlling pollution from mining activities and
other activities such as agriculture and construction.
56. 599 F.2d at 371.
57. Id at 372.
58. d at 371-73.
59. Id at 374-76.
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against the federal government as to a public road, value of sand and gravel
deposits in a condemnation action by the United States, and the constitu-
tionality of the Antiquities Act.
.4. Kinscherff v. United States° °
In a brief opinion, the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs bringing quiet
title actions against the United States6' must have some type of interest in
the property: a right claimed as a member of the public is not a sufficient
property interest.
62
Plaintiffs Kinscherff and others owned land upon which the federal gov-
ernment had built a road to reach a dam. The government would not allow
plaintiffs to use the road to bring in equipment to develop their own land.
The quiet title action was brought to allow the public to use the road and to
allow use by the property owners under the theory of an implied easement.
The district court dismissed the litigation for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion.
In a short reference to the legislative history, the Tenth Circuit stated
that Congress intended that only a "typical" quiet title action, as defined by
state law, could be pursued. Under New Mexico state substantive law only
plaintiffs with an interest in the title to the property are able to bring quiet
title actions; in this case, the "public" had no property interest. 63 Further,
the state statute governing public roads states that after a road has been
open to the public for one year the right-of-way vests in the state. 64 Suppos-
edly, vesting of title in the state precludes vesting in the general public.
The court next addressed the implied easement issue and remanded the
case because factual determinations had not been made as to the existence
and extent of an implied easement. The Tenth Circuit did state that an
easement is a property interest which can be determined under the federal
quiet title statute.
65
B. United States v. 494.10 Acres of Land
66
The Tenth Circuit determined that the value of sand and gravel under-
lying property condemned by the federal government may be considered in
setting compensation for the land only if demand for the sand and gravel
will come in the near future.
67
In a condemnation proceeding commenced by the United States for
flood control, the administrative agency determined the land's "highest and
best use" was for agriculture. No value was assigned to the underlying sand
60. 586 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
61. The federal government has waived its sovereign immunity in quiet title actions under
28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (1976).
62. 586 F.2d at 160-61.
63. Id at 160.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-2-5 (1978).
65. 586 F.2d at 161.
66. 592 F.2d 1130 (10th Cir. 1979).
67. Id at 1132.
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and gravel even though stipulations were made that the land contained sig-
nificant amounts of these materials. The administrative agency had given
considerable weight to the testimony of one witness who stated that no extra
monies would be paid for farmland with deposits of sand and gravel. The
district court affirmed the administrative finding based on the theory that
only clearly erroneous decisions should be overturned.
68
The court stated that the appropriate test for determining fair market
value is the willing buyer/willing seller standard whereby value is estab-
lished by an arm's-length transaction. The value assigned by an agency
must include all elements which a willing buyer and a willing seller would
take into account. One element is the "highest and best use," either existing
presently or in the near future. Because the use of gravel from the property
was speculative, not likely to occur in the near future, the court ruled that
payment based on agricultural categorization accounted for all valuation
factors. Since the disputed fact had been considered and ruled on by the
administrative agency, the evidence was not reweighed. The condemnation
award and district court decision were affirmed.69
C. United States v. Smyer
70
A claim by defendants convicted under the Antiquities Act 7' that the
Act was void for vagueness was denied. The Act protects old ruins and arti-
facts on government property.
The events leading to this litigation began when forest rangers found
freshly dug holes at an archaeological site. The roads leading to the site were
posted with signs warning that the excavation was protected by the Act. A
truck found at the site was inventoried and towed away by the rangers. Arti-
facts were later taken from defendants' homes either without objection or
under a search warrant. Defendants were subsequently found guilty of vio-
lating the Act.
72
On appeal, defendants contended that the terms "ruin" and "object of
antiquity" contained in the statute were vague and uncertain. The Tenth
Circuit disagreed stating that "measured by common understanding and
practice, the challenged language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as
to the proscribed conduct. 7 3 The Act therefore gave someone reasonable
notice that digging up 800-900 year-old artifacts, as defendants did, was ille-
gal. Also, the court ruled that defendants were adequately warned by posted
signs that they were in a national forest, and therefore on government land
where the Act applied. 74 The district court convictions were affirmed.
75
68. Id. at 1131.
69. Id at 1131-33.
70. 596 F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976) states that "[any person who shall appropriate, excavate, in-
jure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or montiment, or any object of antiquity" on
government lands without permission may be fined or imprisoned.
72. 596 F.2d at 940-41.
73. Id. at 941.
74. Id
75. Id at 942-43.
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IV. INDIAN LANDS
Two cases involving Indians and their lands came before the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Both decisions focused on interpretation of federal statutes and delega-
tion of power to either the Indian tribe or to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The first concerned liquor licensing on a reservation and the second involved
the award of federal highway contracts to Indian companies.
A. United States v. New Mexico
76
The Tenth Circuit held that Indian nations, through a federal delega-
tion of power, and not the states, were empowered to regulate the sale of
alcoholic beverages on Indian lands.
77
By treaty, the Mescalero Indians of New Mexico are entitled to exercise
sovereign powers within their reservation with the exception of the federal
government's power as trustee. The tribe had adopted a liquor ordinance
78
under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1161. 79 The Indians commenced selling
liquor at two bars on the reservation without a state license. The state later
contended that the tribe was subject to state liquor laws and commenced this
suit. The trial court determined that the tribe had sole jurisdiction over the
sale of liquor on the reservation based on the ordinance and the financial
burdens which would be placed on the tribe by the state licensing require-
ments.
80
The issue raised by the state on appeal was whether the language in 18
U.S.C. § 1161 required complete conformance of the Indians' liquor laws
with those of the state. Relying on United States v. Mazurie,' the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that Congress had the authority to delegate generally liquor regu-
latory power to an independent governmental unit such as the tribe. In
contrast, if the federal government intended to delegate any of its power to
the states Congress would have to set forth clearly the authority being dele-
gated.8 2 Specific authority to control liquor sales on the reservation was not
granted to New Mexico. The court briefly discussed arguments made by
New Mexico based on legislative history and the twenty-first amendment,
but these arguments were not persuasive. The trial court decision was af-
firmed.
8 3
B. Glover Construction Co. v. Andrus
8 4
In Glover, the Tenth Circuit held that a federal highway construction
contract could not be awarded to an Indian construction company without
76. 590 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 63 (1979).
77. Id. at 326, 329.
78. 30 C.F.R. 3553 (1978).
79. Indians are allowed to use and sell liquor if the ordinances conform to those of the state
in which the transaction occurs. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976).
80. 590 F.2d at 325-26.
81. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
82. 590 F.2d at 328.
83. Id at 329.
84. 591 F.2d 554 (10th Cir. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-48 (July 10, 1979).
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public advertising for bids.8 5
The facts leading to the litigation were undisputed. The federal govern-
ment, in reliance on a memo issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, invited only Indian firms to bid on a contract for constructing
a five-mile highway.8 6 No public advertising for bids took place even
though advertising was required under the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA).8 7 The district court held that the
contract awarded to the Indian firm was invalid and that the government
would have to advertise publicly for bids on all federal highways. 88
The federal government on appeal contended that the memo's interpre-
tation that only Indian firms were allowed to bid on contracts with the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs was correct. The interpretation had been based on the
premise that the Buy Indian Act8 9 was an exception "otherwise authorized
by law" under the FPASA; public bidding was therefore unnecessary. In
affirming the trial court, the Tenth Circuit used the following rules of statu-
tory construction: if an express exception is made, other situations are not
saved from the statute's operation;9° construction of a statute must be made
in light of conditions existing at the time of statutory enactment; 9 1 and the
common meaning of the words is to be given to the statutory language.
92
Legislative history also pointed to congressional intent to exclude highway
construction projects from the Buy Indian Act; the purpose of the Act was
rather to purchase Indian "supplies" and "products."
93
In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge McKay reasoned that the policy of
the Buy Indian Act was to promote Indian productivity and that the rules of
statutory construction had been applied in a rigid manner not in keeping
with the remedial purpose of the Act. Relying on legislative history, Judge
McKay found "clear purpose" to exempt any Indian products from the
FPASA requirements.9 4
Jo Anna Goddard
85. Id. at 559.
86. The memo interpreted 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1976) (Buy Indian Act) and concluded that, if
available, only Indian companies could bid on any contracts to be awarded by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. 591 F.2d at 555.
87. 41 U.S.C. §§ 252, 253 (1976).
88. 591 F.2d at 556.
89. 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1976).
90. 591 F.2d at 557.
91. Id at 561.
92. Id.
93. Id at 560-61.





During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit considered
four intellectual property cases involving patents and unfair competition.
The court did not consider cases or issues involving trademarks and copy-
rights.
A. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc.
Initially, in Black, S'valls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabr'cation, Inc. ,'
the court addressed claims based on patent infringement and unfair compe-
tition. The case involved a device designed to heat industrial fluids uni-
formly. Plaintiff, Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., commenced the action in the
United States District Court for the District of Oklahoma following the de-
parture of a former employee (head of its heater sales group) who began
immediately to underbid plaintiff in the industrial fluid heater market.
The district court ruled for the defendants on the infringement issue
and granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the unfair competi-
tion issue. Issues regarding unfair competition were tried before a jury
whereas patent validity and infringement issues were considered by the
court. The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit arguing: (1) the trial
court erred in not permitting a jury trial on the patent validity and infringe-
ment issues; (2) the trial court's finding on the infringement issue was errone-
ous; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to warrant jury consideration of
claimed trade secrets; therefore, the directed verdict was improper.
Judge McKay's opinion held that the trial court acted properly in try-
ing an infringement issue without a jury where the plaintiff specifically
waived in open court its right to a jury trial on this issue. 2 The trial court's
finding on the infringement issue was also upheld by the Tenth Circuit be-
1. 584 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1978).
2. Id. at 949. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
When trial by jury has been demanded . . . the action shall be designated upon the
docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1)
the parties or their attorneys of record, . . . by an oral stipulation made in open court
and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a). Both the trial court and the Tenth Circuit found that the parties orally
stipulated to have the infringement issue, because of its technicality, tried before the court.
The Tenth Circuit did find that the plaintiff reserved its right to a jury trial on the patent
validity issue. However, there was no error on the part of the trial court in refusing a jury trial
on the validity issue because in deciding the infringement issue against the plaintiff, the court
treated the claimed patent as though it were valid even though not formally ruling on the
validity issue. In doing so the court said, "[w]here the court properly finds no infringement, it
would be improper to rule on the validity of the patent. Under such circumstances '[tlo hold a
patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a hypothetical case.' " 584 F.2d at 950 (citation
omitted).
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cause the record3 established that the finding was not "clearly erroneous." '4
In so holding, the court quoted with approval from an earlier opinion:
" 'The question of infringement is one of fact and, upon review, the trial
court's findings thereon will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous
... . Therefore, our power of review is limited to determining whether,
under correct legal standards, the findings of [noninfringement] are sup-
ported by the record.' "5
Because the jury had deadlocked on the unfair competition issues, the
trial court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict. The Tenth
Circuit noted that the standard for reviewing the propriety of a directed
verdict is:
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by
the trier of the fact . . . [viewing] the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion for the directed
verdict was addressed and. . . [giving] such party the benefit of all
inferences which the evidence fairly supports, even though contrary
inferences could reasonably be drawn.
6
The court stated that before the plaintiff could prevail on its claim of unfair
competition, it must show the existence of a trade secret; that the defendants
acquired the trade secret through a confidential relationship; and that the
trade secret was used without authority from the plaintiff.
7
The court found that several of plaintiffis claimed trade secrets could be
discovered through examination of its patent, its heaters, or information
which had been published. However, the court did hold that the identity
and application of a certain outside heat transfer coefficient and the pricing
information for estimating the man-hours and materials necessary to build a
heater and useful to calculate a bid price were potential trade secrets war-
ranting jury consideration for resolution of the claim of unfair competition.8
3. The record revealed that there were substantial design differences between defendants'
heaters and those of the plaintiff. 584 F.2d at 950.
4. Id.
5. 584 F.2d at 950 (quoting McCullough Tool Co. v. Wells Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381,
401 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denzed, 383 U.S. 933 (1966)).
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a). To no type of case is this portion of rule 52(a) more appropriately applicable than
to patent cases where the evidence is primarily the testimony of experts. Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 274 (1949), aj'don rehearing, 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
6. 584 F.2d at 951 (citations omitted).
7. Id. A trade secret is:
a formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's busi-
ness and which gives him an opportunity to gain an economic advantage over compet-
itors who do not know or use it. A trade secret must have a substantial element of
secrecy. While it need not be patentable it must contain elements which are unique
and, not generally known or used in the trade.
Id (citation omitted). Sem also Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 455
(10th Cir. 1973).
8. Id at 951-53. The court found that a jury could reasonably infer that the outside heat
transfer coefficient was useful to the defendants as a starting point for quick and confident
development of a competitive heater. The court also stated that a jury could infer that the
defendants could not have successfully bid on a job without a prototype but for the verified
starting point here established. It was further noted that because of defendant's previous em-
ployment with plaintiff and an absence of evidence showing an independent source for the
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Because these matters were not submitted to a jury, the lower court's deci-
sion on the unfair competition issue was reversed and the case was remanded
for consideration of the two claimed trade secrets.
9
B. Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp.
In Deere &Co. v. Hesston Corp. ,"o the Tenth Circuit considered an appeal
from a declaratory judgment action where the plaintiff, Deere & Co., sought
to have defendant's patents on a hay wagon and loader declared invalid.
After plaintiff designed and manufactured a hay wagon in competition with
that sold by the defendant, the plaintiff was notified that defendant consid-
ered its patents infringed. Plaintiff commenced an action in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah arguing that defendant's pat-
ents were: (1) invalid and therefore not infringed; (2) obtained through
fraud on the Patent Office; and (3) invalid because of the sale of a prototype
of the machine. The defendant denied plaintiffs allegations and counter-
claimed alleging infringement.
The trial court found all defendant's patents to be invalid because they
were obvious1I and known to the public 12 longer than one year before the
date of the patent application. 13 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision.'
4
Regarding fraud on the Patent Office, Judge Doyle recognized the "but
for" standard, ie., fraud is present if the Patent Office would have rejected a
patent application but for a material nondisclosure or misrepresentation.
15
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial judge's findings that the Patent Office
would not have rejected defendant's application even though the defendant
failed to disclose the prior art contained in an earlier machine and that there
was not willful, intentional, wrongful, or reckless conduct in the failure to
disclose. 16
The Tenth Circuit approved of the trial court's reliance upon Graham v.
coefficient, a jury could determine that the defendants' discovery of plaintiff's trade secret was
unlawful. Id at 952.
The court stated that the ability to predict a competitor's bid could give a distinct advan-
tage to the one possessing that information. It was found that a jury could reasonably infer that
the defendants' immediate success in underbidding plaintiff was due in part to defendants' use
of plaintiff's pricing information. Id
9. Id at 953.
10. 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979).
11. Nonobviousness is a standard of patentability imposed by one section of the Patent
Act:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
12. A person is entitled to a patent unless "the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States . Id at
§ 102(b).
13. 456 F. Supp. 520 (D. Utah 1977), affd, 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979).
14. 593 F.2d at 963.




John Deere Co. 17 for application of the nonobviousness standard of patenta-
bility. "Obviousness under § 103, it was said in John Deere, is to be deter-
mined in the light of the prior art by studying the differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue and by resolving the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art."1 8 The court also noted with approval the trial court's
careful scrutiny of obviousness in connection with a combination of patent
claims, 19 and affirmed its holding that the defendant's patents did not
achieve a synergistic result that would be nonobvious to a person reasonably
skilled in the art.
20
Finally, Judge Doyle ruled that the trial court did not err in refusing to
grant plaintiff its request for attorney's fees. 2 ' The lower court's finding that
this case was not extraordinary and therefore did not warrant the granting of
attorney's fees was upheld.
C. Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Products, Inc.
In Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Products, Inc. ,22 the
Tenth Circuit considered an appeal from an action for infringement of a
design patent for the ornamental design of a boat. 23 Initially, the action was
brought by Sidewinder Marine, Inc. in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado which held that the patent was invalid, thereby
mooting the question of infringement. 24 This holding was based on grounds
that the design was obvious in light of the prior art
25 and was not original.26
Plaintiff appealed the decision of invalidity arguing: (1) the district court
failed to give its design patent the proper presumption of validity and de-
fendant failed to overcome that presumption;2 7 (2) the district court erred in
applying the "ordinary designer" standard rather than the "ordinary intelli-
17. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
18. 593 F.2d at 961. The court also recognized the Supreme Court's secondary tests of
nonobviousness: commerical success, long felt but unsolved need in the industry, and failure of
competitors to develop the device sought to be patented. Id The court did note that commer-
cial success without invention does not by itself suffice to establish nonobviousness. Id. at 962.
19. Id The court noted from Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976) that in order to
establish patent validity for a combination of old elements, there must be a synergistic effect,
ie., an effect greater than the sum of the several initial effects taken separately. 593 F.2d at 962.
Moreover, a "patent is supposed to add to the sum of useful knowledge,. . . and patents are not
to be sustained when their effect is to subtract from former resources freely available to skilled
artisans." M. at 963.
20. Id Both the district court and Tenth Circuit based their decisions on the fact that the
defendant's patents combined old elements which continued to function as they previously did
with no new and different function. Id
21. Id
22. 597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979).
23. The design was that of the "Super Sidewinder" speed boat which gained immediate
popularity and success in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
24. 418 F. Supp. 224 (D. Colo. 1976), aj'd, 597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979).
25. Id at 227-28. The nonobviousness standard is imposed at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See
note 11 supra.
26. 418 F. Supp. at 231. An additional requirement for design patents is that they be new
and original. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
27. In support of this argument, the plaintiff cited 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976) which provides
in part that a patent once issued "shall be presumed valid," and that "[t]he burden of establish-
ing invalidity ...shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."
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gent man" standard in assessing the obviousness issue; 28 and (3) the district
court's findings on obviousness were improper.
At the outset, Judge Holloway noted that the burden on an alleged
infringer to rebut the presumption of patent validity is great, requiring the
alleged infringer to introduce "clear and convincing" evidence in this re-
gard. 29 It was noted, though, that this presumption is significantly weak-
ened where the patent has been issued without consideration of prior art not
submitted to the Patent Office. 30 The court held that this presumption was
significantly weakened in light of boat designs and analogous car designs
submitted by the defendant at trial which the Patent Office had not consid-
ered when the patent was issued. 3 ' The court cautioned, however, that over-
coming the presumption of validity does not, by itself, invalidate the
patent.
3 2
In connection with the presumption issue, the plaintiff argued that a
prior determination of the patent's validity33 is strong evidence of its validity
in this case. Judge Holloway responded by noting cases giving a prior adju-
dication of patent validity "comity," "great weight," and "respectful consid-
eration,"' 4 but held that such adjudication does not, absent estoppel,
supplant the court's duty to try cases according to the law and present
facts-particularly where, as here, relevant prior art was not considered by
the court in the prior adjudication.
3 5
Relevant to the district court's findings on obviousness, the Tenth Cir-
cuit cited Graham v. John Deere Co. 36 and Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp. 37 for the
appropriate standard.3 8 In connection with this standard, the Tenth Circuit
held that
explicit findings in the exact terms of the Graham criteria are [not]
required, "[s]o long as it is clear that the court has grappled with
the problem presented," and its findings are "sufficient to provide
[us] with a clear understanding of the. . . court's reasons so as to
28. This issue is given detailed consideration in the text accompanying notes 62-76 infra.
29. 597 F.2d at 205 (citing Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294, 298 (10th Cir. 1974)).
30. 597 F.2d at 206.
31. Id at 206, 207.
32. Id at 206 n.6.
33. In Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Burns, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the
court upheld the validity of the Super Sidewinder patent, found it to be infringed, and awarded
plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages totalling $35,150 as well as reasonable attorneys'
fees.
It is significant to note that an initial determination of a patent's validity does not bar
nonparticipants in that determination from subsequently asserting the patent's invalidity.
Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1971). An obverse proposition--that an initial determi-
nation of a patent's invalidity may be used on the basis of collateral estoppel by one facing a
charge of infringement in a subsequent action-has been established by the Supreme Court.
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
34. Those cases affording a "high presumption of validity" to a patent the subject of a
prior favorable validity adjudication were distinguished on the basis that the same court had
previously upheld the patent in question. 597 F.2d at 206-07 n.7.
35. Id at 206-07. The Burns court did not have before it some of the significant analogous
automobile designs here submitted by the defendant.
36. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
37. 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979).
38. 597 F.2d at 209. The standard'is noted in the text accompanying note 18 supra
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present an adequate review."
'39
As with findings of infringement, a trial court's findings on obviousness are
not to be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous."'40 Based on the dis-
trict court's record and other factors presented by the defendant, e.g., similar
boat designs and analogous car designs, Judge Holloway ruled that the trial
court's findings on obviousness were not "clearly erroneous. '4 ' Accordingly,
the district court's decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
D. True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp.
Finally, in True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp. ,42 the Tenth Circuit
addressed an appeal from actions for infringement of a patent covering a
one-piece rail anchor used by railroads and a patent covering an automatic
press used to manufacture the rail anchor. In its unreported opinion, the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado held that both
plaintiff's (True Temper) patents were invalid on the bases of full anticipa-
tion in the prior art4 3 and obviousness to a person of ordinary skill in the
art.4 4 The district court further held that True Temper's inequitable con-
duct before the Patent Office in seeking both patents barred their enforce-
ment against the alleged infringer and that even if the patents had been
deemed valid and enforceable, CF&I's devices did not infringe on True
Temper's claims under the patents. Defendant's request for attorney's fees
was denied by the district court, and both parties appealed to the Tenth
Circuit. The plaintiff sought reversal of all holdings adverse to it, and the
defendant sought reversal of the denial of attorney's fees.
At the outset, Judge Holloway noted that the exercise of fraud, inequi-
table conduct, or bad faith in seeking a patent before the Patent Office may
result in the patent's subsequent unenforceability. 45 After discussing the
case law pertaining to fraud on the Patent Office, the Tenth Circuit noted
that "intentional fraud on the Patent Office is not the only ground for with-
holding enforcement of patents" and adopted the view of the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals in Norton v. Curltss4 6 that patents should not be
enforced where " 'misrepresentations [are] made in an atmosphere of gross
39. 597 F.2d at 209 (quoting Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 391
(10th Cir. 1974).
40. 597 F.2d at 209. See also note 5 supra.
41. 597 F.2d at 209-10.
42. 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1979).
43. The novelty requirement is imposed by section 102 of the Patent Act: "A person shall
be entitled to a patent unless- (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for the patent ...." 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
44. Id at § 103. See also note 11 supra.
45. 601 F.2d at 501. The trial court's holding of fraud on the Patent Office was based on
findings that the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts to the Patent Office and submitted
evidence which was inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading. In affidavits submitted by the
plaintiff to the Patent Office after initial rejection of the rail anchor patent, it was not men-
tioned that an incomplete William3 rail anchor, prior art in the industry, was used in compari-
son tests to establish the superiority of plaintiff's anchor. Moreover, the affidavits did not
disclose that the partial Williams anchor was machined whereas plaintiff's complete anchor was
forged. Id at 501.
46. 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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negligence as to their truth,' . . . [citations omitted] or where there is reck-
less conduct in representations to the Patent Office. . . . ",47 The court also
particularly noted the cases where test results and similar data were submit-
ted to the Patent Office, demanding a higher standard of fraud on the Pat-
ent Office than mere avoidance of intentional fraud. 48 Because the test
results submitted in plaintiffs affidavits to the Patent Office contained mate-
rial omissions and were seriously misleading, 49 the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court's finding of fraud on the Patent Office and affirmed the rail
anchor patent's unenforceability. 50 As such, the court did not consider the
district court's findings on patent invalidity and noninfringement as to the
rail anchor patent.
In consideration of the patent covering the apparatus and process for
producing rail anchors, the Tenth Circuit confined its review to the district
court's rulings on obviousness and fraud on the Patent Office. In determin-
ing whether the district court's ruling on obviousness was "clearly errone-
ous," Judge Holloway applied the standard of Graham v. John Deere Co. ,5 also
followed in Sidewinder Martne, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Products, Inc. ,52
and recognized the statutory presumption of validity for an issued patent.
53
The court noted that the presumption of validity was seriously weakened by
defendant's introduction at trial of prior art more pertinent to plaintiff's
process but not cited in the application to the Patent Office. 54 Ultimately,
Judge Holloway ruled that the district court's findings on obviousness were
amply supported by the record.
55
The court also stated that for a combination of known elements to be
patentable, the result must be synergistic. 56 Since the plaintiffs process took
47. 601 F.2d at 501. A comparison of this standard with that articulated by Judge Doyle
in Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp. is provided in the text accompanying notes 77-86 info.
48. Id at 501 (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Monsanto Co.
v. Rohm & Hass Co., 456 F.2d 592, 597 n.10 (3d Cir. 1972); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-
Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 881 (2d Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973)).
49. 601 F.2d at 500-05. In particular, the court referred to testimony by the defendant's
expert that he had conducted his own tests of the Williams design as compared with the plain-
tiff's design and arrived at significantly different results than were reported to the Patent Office
by the plaintiff. Id at 502-03.
In addition, plaintiff's argument that the information omitted from its affidavits was not
material to the examination of the patent application was rejected by the Tenth Circuit. Be-
cause the affidavits were intended to cure the Patent Office's initial rejection of the application,
the information contained therein or a lack of it was deemed by the court to be material. Id at
503.
50. Id at 505.
51. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
52. 597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979).
53. 601 F.2d at 505.
54. Id at 505. The newly introduced prior art consisted of (1) plaintiff's own fully auto-
matic system for manufacturing an earlier anchor, (2) its hand fed system for early production
of the new anchor, and (3) an automated press developed for the forging of crawler track links
and other such items. Id
55. Id In connection therewith, the Tenth Circuit noted that "explicit findings in the ex-
act terms of Graham are not required, '[s]o long as it is clear that the court has grappled with the
problems presented.'" Id at 506 n. II (citing Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom
Boats & Prod., Inc., 597 F.2d 201, 209 (10th Cir. 1979)).
56. 601 F.2d at 506. This holding is consistent with the court's previous holding in Deere




essentially the same steps in producing rail anchors as did prior art, mere
automation of the process was held to be obvious, ie., conceivable to a
worker of ordinary skill in that industry.
57
As to fraud on the Patent Office, the district court found that plaintiff's
failure to disclose its methods of manufacturing early rail anchors as prior
art was a serious omission which may have affected the Patent Office's deci-
sion on the patentability of the device.58 The Tenth Circuit held that such
findings would support unenforceability of the patent 59 and affirmed the
lower court's unenforceability ruling based on fraud on the Patent Office.
60
Finally, because the district court failed to consider fraud on the Patent
Office in connection with the denial of attorney's fees to the defendant, this
judgment was vacated and the issue was remanded to the district court for
reconsideration. 61 _
II. SIGNIFICANT MATTERS
The cases considered in this survey contained three significant points of
interest to the patent bar which merit additional and separate consideration.
Of importance is the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the "ordinary designer"
standard with respect to obviousness in design patents. Next, in separate but
similar cases, the Tenth Circuit applied two different standards in connec-
tion with fraud on the Patent Office. Finally, the Tenth Circuit's remand of
a case for the consideration of attorney's fees is significant.
A. Obviousness in Design Patents and the "Ordinagy Designer" Standard
In Sidewinder Marine, Inc., the Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument
that the "ordinary intelligent man" standard rather than the "ordinary de-
signer" standard should be applied in assessing the obviousness of a design
patent.6 2 There is a division among circuits as to which is the appropriate
standard, and this case represents the Tenth Circuit's initial consideration of
the issue and it's adoption of the more stringent approach.
6 3
To establish the patentability of designs, the Patent Act expressly re-
57. 601 F.2d at 506.
58. Id at 507.
59. Id (citing Admiral Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 296 F.2d 708, 716 (10th Cir. 1961)).
60. 601 F.2d at 508.
61. Id at 510. Further consideration is given to the attorney's fees issue in the test accom-
panying notes 87-104 zifra.
62. 597 F.2d at 207-09; The trial court, acknowledging a division among circuits as to
which standard is relevent as well as an absence ofjudicial guidance by either the Tenth Circuit
or Supreme Court, applied both standards to find plaintiff's design patent obvious. 418 F.
Supp. at 229-31. The trial court did, however, prefer the "ordinary designer" standard. Id at
228-29.
Because the Tenth Circuit could not conclude that plaintiff's design would be obvious
under both the "ordinary designer" and "ordinary intelligent man" standards, the court sought
to determine the applicable standard and proceed on that basis. 597 F.2d at 207.
63. The Tenth Circuit here takes the approach followed by the Second, Third, Sixth,
Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits in connection with the standard of obviousness appli-
cable to the design patent area. See Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 799 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 494 F.2d 383, 389 (6th Cir.
1974); Fields v. Schuyler, 472 F.2d 1304, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973);
Hadco Products, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1272 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
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quires satisfaction of the standards for patentability of inventions6 4 includ-
ing, iter a/ia, nonobviousness. 65 The Tenth Circuit noted that in dealing
with utility patents, other courts have interpreted Section 103's "person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains" 66 to focus
not on some hypothetical ordinary intelligent person but rather on one "rea-
sonably skilled" in the art. 6 7 Thus, the court held that the proper standard
for determining the nonobviousness of designs is the "ordinary designer"
standard.68 The court felt that this standard (1) more closely parallels Sec-
tion 103's statutory mandate, and (2) provides a more objective reference
point concerning obviousness than the ordinary intelligent man standard.
69
The ordinary intelligent man standard was first followed by the Ninth
Circuit in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ,70 a significant
design patent decision. There the court held that knowledge of an ordinary
intelligent man is the standard by which to measure the obviousness of a
design. 71 The Ninth Circuit followed the lead of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in In re Laverne which held that under Section 103, it is only
necessary to determine obviousness to the ordinary intelligent man (because
the test is visual) to ascertain appearance of the design as a whole, requiring
no special skill. 72 However, the Tenth Circuit has chosen what appears to be
the majority view-the ordinary designer standard for determining the obvi-
ousness of design patents.
The ordinary designer standard is more stringent than the ordinary in-
telligent man standard in that the former requires a greater degree for inven-
tion to establish nonobviousncss. 73 For this reason, the district court in
applying the ordinary designer standard permitted previously existing auto-
mobile designs to be considered as developments in an analogous field of
which a boat designer could reasonably be expected to be aware. 74 The
Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's consideration of analogous car
designs75 and ultimately affirmed its finding that plaintiffs boat design was
obvious.
76
B. The Standard for Ascertaining Fraud on the Patent Oftce
In suits for patent infringement, unenforceability is a statutory defense
1023 (1972); G.B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Prod., Inc., 436 F.2d 1176, 1178 (2d Cir. 1971). See also 2
A. WALKER, PATENTS, § 161 at 757 (1964).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
65. See note 11 supra.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
67. 597 F.2d at 207-08.
68. 1d at 208.
69. Id
70. 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970).
71. Id at 299.
72. 456 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
73. 418 F. Supp. at 230.
74. Id at 229-30. The district court felt that under the ordinary intelligent man standard,
only prior boat designs would be relevant since "there is no reason to expect a layman to make
subtle comparisons between boat decks and the upper body designs of automobiles." Id at 229.
75. 597 F.2d at 207.
76. Id at 209-10.
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under the Patent Act.77 The exercise of fraud, inequitable conduct, or bad
faith in seeking a patent before the Patent Office may result in the patent's
unenforceability. 78 Any individual who is substantially involved in the
preparation or prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and
good faith toward the Patent Office requiring disclosure of information
which is material to the examination of the application.
79
Recall from Deere & Co. that the Tenth Circuit adopted the "but for"
test to determine if fraud on the Patent Office had been committed where
certain prior art had not been disclosed in a patent application.80 Under
this standard, fraud exists if the Patent Office would have rejected a patent
application but for a material nondisclosure. The principle was derived
from Norton v. Curtiss,8 a significant case considering fraud on the Patent
Office. In Deere & Co., the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's find-
ing that failure to disclose the prior art contained in two earlier haystacking
machines did not constitute fraud since the Patent Office would not have
rejected the application but for the nondisclosure.
82
In another patent infringement case, True Temper, the Tenth Circuit ap-
plied a somewhat different standard to affirm a lower court's decision that
fraud on the Patent Office had been committed where nondisclosures and
misrepresentations had been made in comparison test data involving the
new invention and prior art, and in identifying and describing prior art.
8 3
The court noted that intentional fraud on the Patent Office was not the only
ground by which to render a patent unenforceable and held that patents
could be deemed unenforceable where misrepresentations were made reck-
lessly or in an atmosphere of gross negligence as to their truth.
8 4
However, in comparing application of the "but for" and more exacting
"recklessness or gross negligence" standards for ascertaining fraud on the
Patent Office, the Deere & Co. and True Temper decisions can be reconciled.
First, the higher recklessness or gross negligence standard was applied to a
situation where test results and similar data were involved in the material
misrepresentations and omissions to the Patent Office. The Tenth Circuit
particularly noted that such cases require a higher standard than avoidance
of intentional fraud.8 5 Second, True Temper appeared to apply the "but for"
standard in connection with the plaintiffs failure to disclose its former meth-
ods of producing rail anchors as relevant prior art in its patent application
for a process to automatically produce rail anchors. The court noted and
77. 35 U.S.C. § 282(l) (1976).
78. See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Admiral Corp. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 296 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1961).
79. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1978). Information is material where there is a substantial lik-
lihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to issue a
patent. Id.
80. 593 F.2d at 960.
81. 433 F.2d 779, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
82. 593 F.2d at 960.
83. True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 500-05, 507-08 (10th Cir.
1979).
84. Id at 502.
85. Id
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affirmed the district court's finding that had the Patent Office been aware of
plaintiff's systems for producing earlier rail anchors, it may well have de-
cided differently on the patentability of plaintiffs new process.
8 6
Thus, it appears that where misrepresentation or nondisclosure involve
presentation of the prior art in a patent application, the "but for" standard
is appropriate for determining whether fraud on the Patent Office has oc-
curred. However, if test and similar data comparing the new-and prior art
are involved in the nondisclosure, a higher standard than avoidance of inten-
tional fraud, "the recklessness or gross negligence" test, will be applied by
the Tenth Circuit.
C. Attorney's Fees and Costs in Patent Infringement Cases
In True Temper, the lower court denied a motion for costs and reasonable
attorney's fees submitted by the defendant, CF&I Steel Corp., on the ground
that the case presented was not so exceptional as to warrant such recovery.
8 7
The trial court further ruled that each party was to bear its own costs.
88
CF&I appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit arguing, inter aha, that the
lower court applied the wrong legal standard in exercising its discretion
under the Patent Act to grant attorney's fees.8 9
At the outset, the Tenth Circuit noted cases where a plaintiffs motives
or tactics in bringing or maintaining his action may render the case excep-
tional, justifying an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant, e.g.,
where the plaintiff was aware of the obvious invalidity of his patent when
the action was commenced,90 or where the action once brought was vexa-
tious or unduly protracted. 9 1 The court accepted the district court's finding
that True Temper brought the action in good faith but held that there was
an additional factor to be considered in ruling upon the attorney's fees is-
sue.9 2 The Tenth Circuit requires that the patentee's conduct in seeking the
patent be carefully reviewed, as fraud on the Patent Office is sufficient to
make a case exceptional, as is conduct in excess of simple negligence but
short of intentional fraud.
9 3
Such conduct is a serious breach of the patentee's duty to the Pat-
ent Office. The party who succeeds in invalidating the unlawful
86. Id at 507-08.
87. Id at 497.
88. Id
89. "The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party." 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976). It is clear, however, that the trial court has considerable discre-
tion in deciding whether to grant attorney's fees. See, e.g., Maurice A. Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing
Co., 546 F.2d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977); Iron Ore Co. of Can. v.
Dow Chemical Co., 500 F.2d 189, 195 (10th Cir. 1974).
90. Tidewater Patent Dev. Co. v. Kitchen, 371 F.2d 1004, 1013 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 821 (1967).
91. Uarco Inc. v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 440 F.2d 580, 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 873 (1971). Seealso Parker v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 535 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 975 (1976); Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 263 F.2d 5, 24, 28 (5th
Cir. 1958).
92. 601 F.2d at 508.
93. Id at 509 (citing Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
407 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969)).
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patent performs a valuable public service. It is appropriate under
such circumstances to reward the prevailing party by giving him
attorney's fees for his efforts, and it is equally appropriate to penal-
ize in the same measure the patentee who obtained the patent by
his wrongdoing.
94
Because the lower court, in its application of Section 285, failed to con-
sider the additional factor of True Temper's misconduct in originally ob-
taining the patents, its judgment was vacated by the Tenth Circuit, and the
issue of attorney's fees was remanded. 95 In deciding to remand this issue, the
Tenth Circuit felt that the matter was one the trial court should initially
determine and refused to make its own findings.
96
The Tenth Circuit noted that it had previously recognized this addi-
tional factor for applying Section 285 of the Patent Act. 97 Thus, this princi-
ple is not new for the Tenth Circuit. However, the decision is significant for
comparison purposes in light of an earlier holding by the court in Halliburton
Co. v. Dow Chemical Co. that nondisclosure of prior art is insufficient to sus-
tain an award of attorney's fees unless the nondisclosure is done in bad faith
with intent to deceive.
9 8
lalhburton involved a plaintiff who was awarded a declaratory judg-
ment that the defendant's patent was invalid for obviousness. The lower
court had also awarded plaintiff attorney's fees, grounded on a finding of
fraud on the Patent Office for nondisclosure of prior art, but the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed the fee award. The Tenth Circuit further held that the award
of attorney's fees is compensatory rather than punitive and noted that the
party seeking the fees also commenced the action without being forced to do
so.99 True Temper is distinguishable as the defendant, rather than the plain-
tiff, sought attorney's fees. However, the True Temper court did note that the
Halliburton standard would be relevant on remand to the district court's con-
sideration of the issue as to True Temper's process patent where only nondis-
closure of prior art was involved.'o There was no indication whether the
Halhburton standard would be applicable to True Temper's misconduct in
the prosecution of its rail anchor patent involving material omissions and
misrepresentations of comparison test data.' 0 ' The awarding of attorney's
fees would seem to be justified in this instance as the Tenth Circuit looks
with disfavor upon omissions or misrepresentations in a patent application of
test data submitted to show the superiority of the applicant's device com-
94. 601 F.2d at 509 (quoting Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969)).
95. 601 F.2d at 509-10.
96. Id at 509 (citing United States v. Ariz. Canning Co., 212 F.2d 532, 535 (10th Cir.
1954)).
97. 601 F.2d at 509 (citing Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 514 F.2d 377, 381-82
(10th Cir. 1975); Q-Panel Co. v. Newfield, 482 F.2d 210, 211 (10th Cir. 1973)). In Q-Panel Co.,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court's denial of attorney's fees in a patent infringement case
where the circumstances leading to granting of the patent were "unusual" but did not constitute
unfair, reckless, or fraudulent conduct so as to make the case exceptional under the Patent Act.
98. 514 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1975).
99. Id at 382.
100. 601 F.2d at 509 n.15.
101. Id at 509.
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pared with prior art. However, this tangential issue remains unanswered.10 2
As to costs, the district court had directed that each party bear its own
costs, and CF&I appealed arguing that it was error and an abuse of discre-
tion to not impose costs upon True Temper. Based on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Tenth Circuit noted a presumption that the prevailing
party should recover costs unless there is some reason for penalizing him if
costs are to be denied. 10 3 Because the district court failed to adequately
explain its reasons for the denial of costs, the judgment was vacated, and the
issue was remanded to reconsider and express a ruling on costs. 104
Randallj. Feuersteh
102. The attorney's fees issue did not receive further district court consideration as the re-
manded case was settled out of court.
103. 601 F.2d at 509 (citing Popeil Brothers, Inc. v. Schick Electric, Inc., 516 F.2d 772, 775
(7th Cir. 1975)).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "costs shall be allowed as of course to
the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. ... FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).





During the period covered by this survey,' the Tenth Circuit decided
only three cases dealing with the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)2 or the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 3 All three cases involved allega-
tions of violations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 4 and rule lOb-5.5 Also
considered in these three cases were sections 17(a) of the 1933 Act 6 and
7(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, 7 regulation T,8 rule 17a-3, 9 and the federal Admin-
istrative Procedures Act.' 0
Although no startling concepts were introduced by the Tenth Circuit in
these cases, they may be of interest as illustrations of this Circuit's applica-
tion of principles previously discussed and accepted by this or other circuits.
I. WHERE CLAIMS ARE MADE UNDER THE 1933 ACT AND 1934 ACT BY
A BROKER'S CUSTOMERS, AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE ARE
NOT ENFORCEABLE
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore,' Mr. and Mrs.
Moore originally had alleged in state court negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, and violation of rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange by Merrill Lynch.' 2 After Mer-
rill Lynch removed the case to United States District Court as a diversity
action, the Moores alleged violation of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 13 sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act,' 4 and rule lOb-5.' 5 The Moores had signed
agreements which contained clauses agreeing to arbitrate; Merrill Lynch
won an order to arbitrate before the NASD in the district court and the
Moores appealed.16 The court discussed at length the decision in and policy
behind WIlko v. Swan,' 7 the leading case to deny enforcement of agreements
1. This survey covers cases in which opinions were filed from September 1, 1978 to May
31, 1979.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ii (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 17q(a) (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(c)(1) (1976).
8. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1978).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1978).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
I1. 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978).
12. Id. at 824.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). This action only concerned the agreement to arbitrate;
therefore, Judge Doyle in this opinion did not address his position that there are no implied
civil remedies under § 17(a). Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.
1964).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
16. 590 F.2d at 825; see note 28 infra.
17. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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to arbitrate under the federal securities laws. In Wilko, the Court had relied
upon the provisions in section 14 of the 1933 Act. 18 The Tenth Circuit,
relying on Wiko, also applied section 14 to void the arbitration agreements
and to obtain remedies under the 1933 Act in Moore. The 1933 Act disposi-
tion was limited to section 12(2) remedies, i.e., those which had been liti-
gated in WI1iko.' 9
The other questions, which had not been decided previously in this cir-
cuit and which were not as obvious as the application of the WI/ko rule to
claims under the 1933 Act, were whether the rule in Wiko applied to an
action brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and whether actions
brought under rule 10b-5 were subject to the Wiko rationale.
The court commented that the policy considerations did not differ for
remedies under either Act and that section 29(a) of the 1934 Act 20 is nearly
identical to section 14 of the 1933 Act.21 It also explained that since section
29(a) expressly included rules and regulations within its ambit,22 the Wiko
holding would also apply to actions brought under section lOb-5.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the contention that Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co. 23 was applicable. 24 Following the lead of other circuits,2 5 the
court limited the holding of Scherk, which enforced agreements to arbitrate
under the 1934 Act, to only those situations where international agreements
are involved. The court concluded its opinion by emphasizing the impor-
tance of rule lOb-5 26 and its belief that placing it in an "inferior position" is
nonsensical.
2 7
The agreements signed by the Moores limited their choices of arbitra-
tion panels to those composed of stockbrokers. 28 Although the concern was
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77n reads in full as follows: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision bind-
ing any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
19. 590 F.2d at 827; see note 13 supra.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) reads as follows: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
21. See notes 18 and 20 supra.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
24. 590 F.2d at 829.
25. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir.
1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1010 (1976); Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974).
26. "Rule lOb-5 is, after all, the most important remedy in both Acts." 590 F.2d at 829.
While it cannot be disputed that actions under rule lOb-5 may be the most numerous types of
actions brought under the securities laws, other provisions of the 1933 Act may be of greater
importance for plaintiffs for whom those actions are available. See, e.g., Section 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Act." An Alternative to the Recently Restrzcted Rule 1ob-5, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 340 (1977), for a
discussion of the advantages of actions under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act over those under rule
lOb-5, including the possibility of punitive damages and the availability of state courts as a
forum.
27. 590 F.2d at 829.
28. One agreement which the Moores signed contained the following clause:
Any controversy between us arising out of such option transactions or this agreement
shall be settled by arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Incorporated, or the New York Stock Exchange, or the American Stock Exchange,
only. I shall have the right of election as to which of the foregoing tribunals shall
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not articulated by the court in this opinion, the reluctance to force the reso-
lution of claims by investors against brokerage firms before a panel of stock-
brokers by this and other courts is understandable, especially where the
investor is unsophisticated.
29
II. EXAMPLES OF WHAT ARE NOT NONDISCLOSURE, MANIPULATION,
AND MISREPRESENTATION UNDER 10(B) AND 1OB-5
In Kin-Ark Corp. v. Boy/es, 30 a counterclaim was brought 3 ' alleging viola-
tion of section 10(b) 32 and rule lOb-5 33 in a stock-for-assets transaction.
34
A. Failure to Disclose
The first matter discussed in this case was an alleged illegal failure to
disclose that officers and directors of Kin-Ark had interests in investments
conduct the arbitration. Such election is to be by registered mail, addressed to Merrill
Lynch's head office .... postmarked within five days after the date of demand to
make such election. At the expiration of the five days I hereby authorize Merrill
Lynch to make such election on my behalf.
590 F.2d at 825 n.2. The Moores also signed an agreement with the following clause:
It is agreed that any controversy between us arising out of your business or this agree-
ment, shall be submitted to arbitration conducted under the provisions of the Consti-
tution and Rules of the Board of Govenors of the New York Stock Exchange, except
however if the controversy involves any security or commodity or transaction or con-
tract relating thereto executed on an exchange located outside of the United States
then such controversy, at the election of either of us, shall be submitted to arbitration
conducted under the Constitution and rules of such exchange (and if neither of us so
elects, arbitration shall be conducted under the provisions of the Constitution and
Rules of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange). Arbitration must
be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued by service upon the
other of a written notice of intention to arbitrate, naming therein the arbitration tri-
bunal.
Id.
29. The district court had found the Moores to be unsophisticated "businessmen" and the
circuit court accepted this finding: 590 F.2d at 825 n.I.
Agreements to arbitrate may be enforced where there are agreements between: (1) mem-
bers of stock exchanges, Coenen v. R.W. Presspich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972); In re
Revenue Properties Litigation Cases, 451 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1971); or (2) a stock exchange mem-
ber and its former employee, Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp.
1084 (D. Pa. 1973); but see Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974). Also,
there may be exceptions where an agreement to arbitrate is made after the claim has matured,
as opposed to agreements made to arbitrate unknown controversies which may arise in the
future, because the investor has the opportunity to investigate any disadvantages to litigating
the particular claim under arbitration when compared to a judicial forum; compare Fox v.
Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1975) with Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F.
Supp. 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); or where there is an intelligently negotiated agreement, Murtagh
v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1974); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston &
Beane, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The standard agreements attempting to require investors to arbitrate before brokers have
been criticized other than in the courts. See Arbitrations of Investor-Broker Disputes, 66 CALtF. L.
REV. 120 (1977).
30. 593 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1979).
31. Kin-Ark had sued for unpaid interest on a debt owed to Kin-Ark. One defendant
asserted that the note was usurious under Texas law; the circuit court agreed and imposed a
statutory penalty against Kin-Ark. 593 F.2d at 365.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
34. Kin-Ark purchased Boyles Galvanizing, Inc. All appellants were stockholders of the
company purchased by Kin-Ark which was then made a wholly owned subsidiary of Kin-Ark.
593 F.2d at 363-65.
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made by Kin-Ark 35 in a prospectus prepared for a public rights offering of
Kin-Ark stock shortly before Kin-Ark's purchase of the Boyles company.
The losing argument was that knowledge of management's interest in these
investments would have shaken confidence in "management's devotion to
the interests of its shareholders."'36 The court stressed the de minimis nature
of these investments to Kin-Ark in holding that there was no material omis-
sion 37 and therefore no violation. One investment constituted 0.72 percent
and the other 0.42 percent of Kin-Ark's total investments. 38 The valuations
appear not to have been computed for dates even close to one another in
time,39 and any test of the limits of materiality, at least in terms of a portion
of investments, is not determinable from this case because the total percent-
age of investments involved at the time the prospectus was issued, or at any
single time, is unknown. Indeed, the implication arises in this circuit by rea-
son of this case that the significance of an omission may be settled by using
the value of investments at the time they are purchased rather than at the
time a prospectus is issued for a public offering.
B. Manipulation of a Public Ofering
The next claim alleged manipulation of a public offering. Some holders
of long term debt in Kin-Ark accepted early payment and purchased Kin-
Ark stock at Kin-Ark's urging; Kin-Ark also redeemed convertible deben-
tures at a discount price and holders of the debentures purchased the same
amount of stock they would have been able to purchase if the debentures
35. Kin-Ark purchased 10% of Antipodes Exploration, Inc. (Antipodes), and two members
of Kin-Ark's management owned a total of 13.5% of Antipodes. Kin-Ark also acquired a 50%
interest in oil and gas leases in ajoint venture with T.L.M., Inc. (T.L.M.), of which Kin-Ark's
directors owned 12.5%. Id. at 366.
36. Id.
37. See Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule Iob-5?, 42 FORDHAM L.
REV. 243 (1973). It is possible that this could be considered material. One of the tests of mate-
riality which has been used is whether a reasonable person would attach importance to the
nondisclosed item. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The court in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) would not accept a test of materiality
which was based solely on its relationship to earnings (but the court did state that the test must
be conservative in order to limit meritless litigation). That a potential investor would attach
importance to the shared investments of the corporation and its management, even though they
are presently a small part of the corporation's investment, could be construed as reasonable;
though it may not directly relate to present earnings it could give the investor a persuasive
criterion for evaluating possible future handling of the corporation's affairs. Seegeneraly Steven-
son, The New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 72-82 (1976), for a discussion of the effective-
ness of disclosure on management's conduct and reasons for requiring disclosure in the context
of proposed rules and noneconomic standards of materiality. See also Kripke, Rule lob-5 L'abiAq
and "Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 (1971), for a criticism of common tests of mate-
riality which have been used, especially when phrased in terms of percentages.
38. The Antipodes investment was 0.72% of Kin-Ark's investment when it was made, and
that acquisition date is not specified by Judge Breitenstein in this opinion, while the T.L.M.
investment accounted for 0.42% of Kin-Ark's total investments in July 1969, the month the
public offering had commenced. At the time of the Antipodes investment, Kin-Ark's total in-
vestments were $5,564,845 while in July 1969 they totalled 510,653,773. 593 F.2d at 366.
The court did not discuss whether the Antipodes investment had appreciated or depreci-
ated by the date of the 1969 public offering nor did it offer any clue as to what percentage of
Kin-Ark's total investments the Antipodes investment later constituted.
39. In July 1969 Kin-Ark's total investments were almost double what they had been when
the Antipodes interest was purchased. See note 38 supra.
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had been converted at maturity at their normal rate.4° The court relied
upon two grounds for its holding that no rule lOb-5 violations occurred: (1)
the closing agreement signed by all parties recited the fact that the closing
was contingent upon sale of a required number of shares of stock and thus
there were no grounds for complaint when a sale of stock was made; and (2)
Kin-Ark had exercised "sound business judgment" in paying its debts and
selling the required minimum number of shares of stock. 4 ' The court also




Finally, the court dismissed an allegation of misrepresentation of
financial condition. Kin-Ark had not included in its prospectus a two-year-
old unfavorable real estate analysis of two investments; it did include a
"bleak and discouraging account," the large operating losses, and an ac-
countant's report which was qualified by reason of these investments. The
court emphasized the lack of alteration of the total mix of information which
the real estate analysis would have added.
43
III. SANCTIONS AGAINST BROKER-DEALERS
In Mawod v. SEC,4 4 Mawod, individually, and his firm, Edward J.
Mawod and Company, unsuccessfully sought to overturn the order of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which had revoked the firm's
registration as a broker-dealer and suspended Mawod from association with
any broker-dealer for one year.
4 5
The action originated over trading in a real estate corporation which
was substantially underfunded and the stock of which was publicly traded
after a Regulation A exemption had been filed. 46 Of 187,000 shares sold
during the initial offering, a total of 159,000 were sold to a friend of the
corporation's financial advisor, the president of the underwriter, and another
principal and trader. Although trading was inactive after the initial offer-
ing, a merger was arranged, to be pursued by one Strand. Mawod previ-
ously had prevented Strand from trading at his firm, but he permitted
Strand to use the firm's premises and facilities to trade this stock in a nomi-
nee account, although he asked someone to watch Strand. Another individ-
ual, O'Quinn, worked with Strand.47 O'Quinn and Strand created a market
for the stock through wash sales, matched orders, 4 3 and sales above the bid
40. 593 F.2d at 366-67.
41. Id. at 367. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. ii. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir. 1973), for another example of deference to the business judgment where claims were
made under the federal securities laws.
42. 593 F.2d at 367.
43. Id.; see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Hassig v. Pearson, 565
F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1977).
44. 591 F.2d 588 (1979).
45. Id. at 590.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 590-91.
48. The SEC defined wash sale as "one in which the ownership of the security remains
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and ask price. Later, fearing an inability to pay on the part of O'Quinn and
Strand, Mawod terminated the account and the prices for the stock then
fell.49
The SEC determined that the corporation was a shell which ordinarily
would not have had a market and that the matched trades and wash sales
were manipulative. Mawod and his firm were found by the court to have
aided and abetted the manipulation, which violated section 17(a) of the
1933 Act,50 section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,51 and rule lOb-5. 52 The court also
agreed that section 7(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, 53 regulation T, 54 and rule
17a-3 55 had been violated.
A. Regulation n6- and Rule 17a-3
Mawod argued that the O'Quinn account was a C.O.D. account
5 7
which permits thirty-five days instead of seven days for payments under
regulation T, but the court noted that Mawod and Company's policy for
years had been to make clear to their customers that C.O.D. accounts were
not available to any customers. 58 In its finding of a regulation T violation,
the court observed also that there was no evidence that Mawod was author-
ized to use credit balances in the O'Quinn-Strand account to cover stock
purchases.
59
The circuit court agreed with the SEC that Mawod and Company vio-
unchanged" and a matched order as "one placed with the knowledge that an offsetting order
had already been or is about to be placed." These are prohibited by section 9(a)(1) of the 1934
Act. 12 SEC DOCKET 363, 366 (1977). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 205 n.25
(1976), for a similar definition by the Supreme Court.
49. 591 F.2d at 591.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1976).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)(1) (1976).
54. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1978).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1978).
56. Regulation T is one of the regulations promulgated by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System under section 7 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976), controlling
margin requirements for credit on securities. It is enforced by the SEC and applies to every
broker-dealer. N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS, & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS
AND SECURITIES MARKETS 9.01-.03 (1977).
57. These are governed by 4(c)(5) of regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(5) (1978). For a
description of the types of accounts included under the control of regulation T, see Credit Regula-
tion in the Secunties Market.- An Analysu of Regulation T, 62 Nw. L. REV. 587 (1967).
58. 591 F.2d at 594. The court did not address the SEC finding that regulation T requires
prompt payment upon delivery within the 35 day maximum and is only applicable where the
mechanics of trade, and not the customer's willingness to pay, prevent earlier delivery. 12 SEC
DOCKET 363 (1977). In the past the SEC has only permitted transactions in a C.O.D. account
where the broker could show that mechanics of trade prevented earlier delivery by the broker.
In re John W. Yeaman, Inc., 42 SEC 500 (1965); In re Madison Management Corp., 42 SEC 390
(1964); In re Palombi Sec. Co., 41 SEC 266 (1962); In re Coburn & Middlebrook, Inc., 37 SEC
583 (1957).
The court dismissed arguments over the existence of credit balances in the account at vari-
ous times with the statement that whether a credit balance existed or not was irrelevant since
there was no authorization to use it. 591 F.2d at 593-94.
59. One court has found no duty for a broker-dealer to obtain a written margin agreement
where the customer understands the elements of that type of transaction. Bell v. J.D. Wine &
Co., 392 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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lated rule 17a-3(a)(9) under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act when it did not
enter in its records Strand's interest in O'Quinn's account. The court said
that control over an account is not the test. It noted, however, as persuasive
to show a violation had occurred the fact that Strand had admitted exercis-
ing some control over the account, along with the fact that checks were
made out by Mawod to Strand for the O'Quinn account, and that Mawod
was otherwise aware of the Strand-O'Quinn relationship.
B. Man'pulations
Mawod and his firm did not dispute that manipulation of the market
had occurred; they pleaded lack of knowledge of the cause. 6° The court
recited some of the facts and said it found sufficient evidence6 ' to support
the charge of aiding and abetting the manipulation. 62 (Matched orders and
wash sales are per se manipulation.) 63 The court also indicated its respect
for SEC "insight" and its reluctance to disturb SEC findings. Respect for
the SEC, which may have been a most persuasive factor,64 permitted omis-
sion of a lengthy analysis of the facts in this portion of the court's discussion.
C. Scienter
The court next dealt with the applicability of scienter. 6 5 The Supreme
Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder66 specifically left open the questions of
whether scienter6 7 applied to SEC actions for injunctions and whether reck-
lessness6 8 sufficed as scienter under securities laws provisions.69  The
60. 591 F.2d at 595. See Rule Iob-5 Liability Afer Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept of Aiding
and Abetting, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 218, 231-42 (1977) for a discussion of the knowledge necessary
for a violation.
61. The standard for support of an agency decision is substantial evidence under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77i of the 1933 Act and 15 U.S.C. § 78y of the 1934
Act, according to the Tenth Circuit, 591 F.2d at 593, although 15 U.S.C. § 77i does not use the
term "substantial."
62. The court does not address the SEC's discussion that deception is a violation as manip-
ulation even if no one in the market is damaged. 12 SEC DOCKET at 367-68. Creating the false
impression of market activity is manipulative. Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F.
Supp. 1349 (D. Tex. 1979). The Tenth Circuit did not set out the elements of aiding and
abetting but stated that knowledge and substantial assistance are necessary. In SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), the court set out these tests: (1)
another person has committed a securities violation; (2) the alleged aider and abettor has a
general awareness that his role is improper; and (3) substantial assistance of the violation. See
also 45 U. CHi. L. REV. at 225-42, supra note 60.
63. 591 F.2d at 595.
64. Other courts have indicated their respect for SEC opinions: SEC v. Parklane Hosiery,
558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (SEC receives benefit of all reasonable doubt); Rolf v. Blyth East-
man Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (SEC receives deference and its judgment
receives great weight).
65. 591 F.2d at 595-97.
66. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
67. The Supreme Court defined scienter as a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. Id. at 194 n.12.
68. The Supreme Court referred to recklessness only as a "form of intentional conduct."
Id. Recklessness has been defined as "carelessness approaching indifference" and "closer to
being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence." Hoffman v.
Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978).
69. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
1980]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court also specifically reserved any judgment on the elements of
aiding and abetting in Hochfelder.70 The unresolved questions of Hochfelder
have resulted in a great deal of commentary 71 and the court in Mawod dis-
cussed Hochfelder,72 but it did not discuss clearly why it felt Hochfelder ap-
plied. Mawod involved administrative sanctions by the SEC over broker-
dealers and associates of broker-dealers 73 and aiding and abetting viola-
tions.74 The references by the court to injunctive actions and to Hochfelder's
applicability are confusing 75 because Hochfelder is clearly limited to private
causes of action for damages, 76 and does not apply directly to SEC adminis-
trative enforcement actions.
The court noted that Hochfelder did "not express a view as to a public
action such as this one" 7 7 but said that since the SEC had assumed that
Hochfelder applied,7 8 the court would also so assume. 79 An additional factor
which was not discussed in Mawod was that the statutoiy standard in a disci-
plinary action by the SEC is "willful" '80 which itself has had court interpre-
70. Id. at 191-92 n.7.
71. Eg., Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977) (predicting the inclusion of recklessness within
scienter); Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions under Section 10(b) and Rule
/0o-5" A Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978) (noting that although courts state differ-
ent standards, injunctions are not being issued without a finding of scienter); The Scienter Require-
ments in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 419 (1977) (arguing in favor of a negligence standard in injunctive proceedings); New Light
on an Old Debate. Negligence v. Scienter in an SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 759
(1977) (arguing against a negligence standard in injunctive proceedings).
72. 591 F.2d at 595-97.
73. The SEC has these powers under § 15(b)(4), (6) and 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4), (6) (1976),
where there are willful violations or willful aiding and abetting in the violation of any of the
federal securities laws.
74. 591 F.2d at 590, 593.
75. Judge Doyle in the Mawod opinion stated that
[t]he cases are not in full accord on applicability of Hochfelder to a case such as this.
The prevailing rule would appear to be that willful or reckless behavior satisfies the
scienter requirement. SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Sanders v. John
Nuveen & o., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314
(6th Cir. 1974); Comment, Scrinter and SEClInjunctive Suis, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1018,
1025 (1977).
591 F.2d at 596. The law review article cited Coven, Cofe, and SEC v. American Realty Trust,
586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); it in turn was cited by the Tenth Circuit but as authority that no
scienter is necessary under § 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 591 F.2d at 596. These cases all concern
whether scienter is necessary in injunctive actions. Sanders, a class action, defined recklessness
conservatively and said that it "can be sufficient to constitute scienter." The Sanders discussion
may be considered dictum since the court found only negligence on the part of the defendant,
not recklessness. None of the cases cited above by the court dealt with SEC disciplinary pro-
ceedings.
76. "We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether a private cause of action for
damages will lie under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'
.425 U.S. at 193. See also text accompanying note 68 supra.
77. 591 F.2d at 596.
78. The SEC said that Mawod acted with recklessness and referred to Hochfelder in a foot-
note with the signal "Cf," SEC DOCKET at 371 n.50, which indicates that it "supports a prop-
osition direntfrom that in the text but sufficiently analogous to lend support." A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF CITATION 7 (Harv. L. Rev. Ass'n pub. 1976 (emphasis added)). Arguably the SEC
did not assume that Hochfelder applied but only strengthened its argument by an analogy in
what it considered an egregious case. See note 89 in/ia. Perhaps this is another example of the
courts' deference to the SEC. See note 68 supra.
79. 591 F.2d at 596.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976). See note 73 supra.
[Vol. 57:2
SECURITIES
tations differing from the Hochfelder standard."'
Other courts have discussed these issues directly. In Colns Security Corp.
v. SEC,8 2 the court recognized that the reasoning of Hochfelder, but not its
direct holding, may be applicable to SEC disciplinary proceedings against a
broker-dealer.8 3 Judge Friendly in Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SECa4 discussed the
difference between the "willful" standard as it had been applied by the SEC,
i.e., intentionally committing an act without proof of evil motive, and the
Hochfelder standard, ite., proof of intention to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud. He did not decide whether HocAfe/der applied to disciplinary proceed-
ings, although he noted the similarity between disciplinary proceedings and
private actions because both apply to past conduct. He distinguished in-
junctive proceedings from SEC enforcement sanctions because injunctive
proceedings deal with the threat of harmful future conduct,8 5 although both
injunctions and disciplinary actions are public actions.
The court in Mawod equated knowledge with willfulness and brought
willfulness within the Hochfelder scienter requirement of the 1934 Act, with-
out specifying that it was doing so, in order to bring enforcement proceed-
ings by the SEC within the scope of Hochfelder. References in the opinion to
cases and a comment dealing with injunctive proceedings, 86 without any ref-
erences to or discussion of enforcement proceedings or the policies behind
having the same or differing standards for cases brought for broker discipline
rather than for damages or injunctions, make it difficult to determine
whether the court intended one or both of the SEC injunctions and adminis-
trative enforcement actions to meet Hochfelder standards to be successful in
the Tenth Circuit.
In addition, the guidance as to recklessness meeting the scienter require-
ment is vague. The court did not define recklessness but it did define willful-
ness, and then stated that willfulness exists where reckless indifference
exists.8 7 Since the defendants in this case were found to be willful and there-
fore liable under the 1934 Act, by backtracking through the reasoning of the
court it appears that recklessness88 will support a violation of the 1934 Act in
this circuit in any type of action, tie., one for damages, one seeking an injunc-
tion, and one for disciplinary purposes.
8 9
The court discussed the arguments against requiring scienter under sec-
tion 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. It then simply stated it agreed with the SEC
ruling that Mawod acted recklessly and that that was in accord with
81. N. WOLFSON, note 56 supra, at $ 2.01.
82. 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
83. Id. at 826-27.
84. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1977).
85. Id. at 180-81 n.6. See also 77 COLUM. L. REV. at 433, 439, supra note 71, for comments
on differing treatments of scienter for injunctive and disciplinary actions.
86. See note 75 supra.
87. 591 F.2d at 596.
88. See note 68 supra.
89. Cf text accompanying notes 84 and 85 supra. The SEC has taken the position that




Hochfelder,90 but it did not say why recklessness was in accord with Hochfelder
under the 1933 Act when the Hochfelder Court had specifically refused to rule
on whether scienter included recklessness.9 ' We are left with the questions:
Did the court refuse to adopt a scienter standard but still find that reckless-
ness was sufficient for a violation? Or did the court, after discussing the
arguments against requiring scienter and without giving any reasons for re-
jecting those arguments, decide that scienter is required and decide, again
without giving its reasons, that recklessness is included within scienter?
Margaret Lynn Toal-Rossi
90. 591 F.2d at 596-97.




The Tenth Circuit considered a limited number of federal taxation
cases this year. All of the cases addressed fairly routine issues and followed
well-established legal precedents. However, an examination of the particu-
lar circumstances of the cases may clairfy the interpretation of the law by the
Tenth Circuit in the areas covered by these opinions.
I. BAD BUSINESS DEBTS
In Harsha v. United States, I an orthopedic surgeon had loaned and guar-
anteed money to a corporation whose sole purpose was to employ and reha-
bilitate a disabled patient. The court held that where such loans were made
to improve the patient's psychological well-being and not in good faith an-
ticipation of either advancing or preserving the profit motive expectations of
the doctor's medical practice, the losses sustained were non-business bad
debts. Non-business bad debts are deductible as short-term capital losses,
but business bad debts are fully deductible against ordinary income.
2
The key question on appeal was whether Harsha's losses were suffi-
ciently related to his medical practice so as to be fully deductible as bad
business debts, the proper standard of a "proximate" relation being whether
the taxpayer's dominant motivation in making the loans was to benefit his
trade or business. 3 To constitute one's trade or business for internal revenue
purposes, the activity must occupy a substantial amount of the taxpayer's
time and be undertaken in good faith for profit.
4
Because Harsha, by his own admissions, established that the loans and
guarantees were made absent any expectation of preserving the profit-mak-
ing activities of his medical practice, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court in granting summary judgment for the government. 5 The court indi-
cated that the key inquiry in assessing the question of dominant motivation
at the time loans or guarantees are made should revolve around the objective
facts rather than the taxpayer's subjective intent, but where the subject in-
tent is clearly not to benefit his trade or business, as was the case here, sum-
mary judgment against the taxpayer is proper.
6
1. 590 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1979).
2. Id
3. Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 166(a), and the Treas-
ury regulations interpreting it for application to individual taxpayers require that a taxpayer
claiming a "business" bad debt establish that he is engaged in a trade or business and that the
loss has a proximate relation to the conduct of that trade or business. 590 F.2d at 886.
4. 590 F.2d at 887 (citing Imbesi v. C.I.R., 361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966)).
5. 590 F.2d at 887.
6. Id at 886.
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II. TRIAL By JURY
United States v. Anderson7 involved the right to a trial by jury in tax cases.
The controversy arose mainly over an increase in gain which the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) said should be recognized from Anderson's sale of a
glass business to a corporation.8 Anderson refused and failed to pay the bal-
ance assessed at the district court level, arguing on appeal that it was revers-
ible error: (1) to deny him the right to a jury under the Seventh
Amendment; (2) to refuse to suppress evidence obtained by unlawful coer-
cion, threats and intimidation by the government; and (3) to deny his re-
quest that the amount sued for be defined other than in dollars because the
value of Federal Reserve notes is uncertain.9
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the judgment. The govern-
ment took the position that the defendant's demand for a jury trial was un-
timely insofar as it was filed more than ten days after his answer and
counterclaim, which the government unsuccessfully argued were his "final
pleadings."' 0 The court, refusing to consider the answer and counterclaim
to be final pleadings, held the demand was timely insofar as, at the time of
filing, questions about the sufficiency of the counterclaim alleging threats,
coercion and intimidation remained, and insofar as the issues raised in the
counterclaim were identical to those raised in the complaint."'
Satisfied that the demand was timely, the court found furthermore that
the trial court had acted correctly in deciding the issue on its merits rather
than rejecting it as untimely.' 2 On the merits, however, the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the trial court and determined that the nature of the issue
comes within the seventh amendment and entitles the defendant to a jury
trial. Of importance to the court were the following factors: (1) English
common law established the right; (2) the remedy sought was for a personal
judgment for taxes assessed; and (3) the factual issue of tax liability as
presented was appropriate for jury resolution.
13
The court did not address the coercion issue other than to acknowledge
that the trial court found it to lack merit. 14 It did reject arguments that the
claim not be assessed in dollars as groundless.' 5
7. 584 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1978).
8. The IRS found a greater benefit to the defendant through the assumption of his in-
debtedness by the corporation than he stated, and also disagreed with his basis in some equip-
ment and a building, among other things. Id at 370.
9. Id
10. FED. R. CIv. P. 38(b) provides:
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by serving
upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commence-
ment of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue.
11. 584 F.2d at 372-73.
12. Id. at 371.
13. Id at 373-74 (citing Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), and Damsky v. Zavatt, 289
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961)).
14. 584 F.2d at 371-72.
15. The court took judicial notice of the fact that federal reserve notes are valued in dol-
lars, citing both statutory and case law authority. Id at 374.
[Vol. 57:2
8TAXA TION
III. VALIDITY OF SUBCHAPTER S ELECTION
In Bruische v. Commi'szoner,16 the court considered the validity of a sub-
chapter S election, which allows the shareholders of an electing corporation
which qualifies to avoid the double taxation of a corporation.' 7 The taxpay-
ers, who initially had argued that their election was valid, reversed their
position by arguing that the election was invalid because the filing was un-
timely and lacked the necessary shareholders' consent.
A. Timehness
In addressing the timeliness of the election, the court determined
whether Treasury Form 2553 was filed within the first month of the corpora-
tion's taxable year. The corporation had shareholders on May 1, 1961, con-
ducted business by May 26, 1961, and filed its election on June 26, 1961.
Section 1372 provides that a subchapter S election must be made by a small
business corporation during the first month of its taxable year or during the
preceding month, and Treasury Regulations 18 establish that the first month
of the taxable year for a new corporation begins when the corporation has
shareholders, acquires assets, or begins conducting business, whichever oc-
curs first. Accordingly, the June 26 election was not within the first month
and therefore not valid for that taxable year. It was, however, upon the
finding of a July 1-June 30 fiscal accounting period, determined timely for
the following fiscal year beginning in 1962 under section 441.19
B. Consent
Nonetheless, even if timely, the election was still invalid for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1962, if not accompanied by the requisite shreholders'
consent. Since the original consent submitted had been returned as defective
and incomplete by the IRS with the admonition that the election would be
ineffective unless a subsequent proper consent was filed within twenty days,
the issue became an evidentiary one.
20
Neither the Tax Court nor the Tenth Circuit found any direct evidence
of a later properly filed shareholder consent. The court agreed that the
Commissioner's position, that the election was not invalid for lack of the
second consent statement, was presumptively correct because a copy of the
letter extending the time for filing was in the taxpayers' records but the
Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court that an inference of compliance
necessarily flows therefrom. 21 To prove the election invalid on the grounds
asserted, taxpayers had the burden of showing that no consent was properly
filed, which burden they met insofar as it is possible to prove a negative.
Explaining that the nonexistence of a document or the nonoccurrence
of an event can only be shown by inference from circumstantial evidence,
16. 585 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1978).
17. I.R.C. §§ 1371-79.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-2(b)(1), T.D. 6500 (1960).
19. 585 F.2d at 439.
20. Id at 440.
21. Id at 441.
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and since no verification of later consent could be found after the IRS dili-
gently searched its records, the court held that the taxpayers met their evi-
dentiary burden. 22 The case was remanded and the deficiency judgments
set aside.
2 3
IV. SECTION 38 CREDITS
United Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner2 4 addressed the issue of
whether regulations governing investment tax credit validly precluded the
taxpayer, a public utility, from taking a double tax credit. Under the appli-
cable state and federal regulatory provisions, 25 the taxpayer had capitalized
the depreciation on its construction equipment as part of the cost basis of the
newly constructed property and then used that basis to compute the invest-
ment tax credit. An investment tax credit was also claimed on the cost of the
same construction equipment when it qualified, resulting in essentially a
double credit for the same expenditure, once for the equipment and again as
the allocated cost of the constructed property.26 Both the equipment and
the constructed property were treated as section 38 property under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and were thus eligible for an investment tax credit.
2 7
The issue arose from the fact that transportation and construction
equipment have different useful lives and both qualify for section 38 prop-
erty credit. The court precluded the taxpayer from attempting to maximize
its investment tax credit by computing the credit in part on the equipment
and in part on the property constructed, while it gave the taxpayer the bene-
fit of the property's longer useful life.
28
The Tenth Circuit held that the purpose of the Treasury Regulations in
question 29 was clearly to prevent just such a double tax credit as was here
sought. Even though no specific statutory prohibition against it could be
found, the presumption is that statutes and regulations preclude a double
deduction.30 To the extent, then, that the ambiguities in the regulations
could be read to preclude the double credit, which was here reasonable and
consistent with the statutory language, the court upheld the regulations.
V. BONUS AND DELAY RENTALS FOR RESTRICTED TRIBE MEMBER
Clark v. United States3 1 concerned oil and gas cash bonus and delay
rental payments paid to a noncompetent, restricted member of the Five Civi-
22. Id at 442.
23. Id at 443.
24. 589 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2839 (1979).
25. Id at 1384. The applicable federal provisions are 26 U.S.C. §§ 38, 46(c)(1), (c)(l)(A);
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 46(a)(1), (3) (West Supp. 1979).
26. 589 F.2d at 1384.
27. Id at 1386.
28. The equipment was used to build facilities which qualified for investment tax credit as
section 38 property. The property and equipment here had useful lives in excess of eight years
at the time they were placed in service and were thus eligible for the maximum investment tax
credit. Id
29. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.46-3(c)(1), .48-l(b)(4).
30. 589 F.2d at 1387-88.
31. 587 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1978).
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lized Tribes on restricted, allotted Indian land. The issue was whether such
payments, when followed by oil production, were subject to federal income
tax as advance royalty. Clark, a Chickasaw Indian, had been allotted one
hundred sixty acres of land designated tax exempt for her life provided title
remained in her.32 During the period of her restricted status, an oil and gas
lease agreement had been made with respect to a portion of her homestead
and approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its capacity as her personal
guardian and trustee of her land and income.
33
The IRS contended that cash bonus and delay rental payments made at
the time of leasing a tract for oil and gas are taxed as ordinary income34 and
furthermore, when cost depletion is used, a distinction is made between those
situations where there is later commercial production and those where there
is not. 35 The IRS took the position that these general rules should apply in
the instant case. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court in
granting summary judgment for Clark.
The court, affirming its decision in Un'ed States v. Daney, 36 held that
these payments to a noncompetent, restricted Chickasaw on restricted, allot-
ted Indian land were not taxable as advance royalty even though oil produc-
tion followed. The fact that production was later obtained from this lease,
which might not have been the case in Dane), was seen as a distinction with-
out a difference, 37 and the plaintiff was allowed to recover the wrongfully
paid taxes plus interest.
38
The key question became whether or not a 1928 act 39 clearly removed
the tax exemption given the tribes with respect to this land4° when applied
to cash bonus and delay rental payments made for oil and gas leases.
The court conceded that the intent of the act could be read to support
either conclusion, but decided that the legislative history and public policy
mandated a construction of these acts to favor the Indians. Citing the fact
32. Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 408, § 1, 69 Stat. 666.
33. 587 F.2d at 466.
34. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
35. See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a) (1960).
36. 370 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1966).
37. 587 F.2d at 468.
38. The court mentioned briefly that arguably the government breached its duty to Mrs.
Clark insofar as it did not seek a refund of these taxes shortly after the decision in United States
v. Daney, 370 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1966). 587 F.2d at 469.
39. Section 3 of the Act of May 10, 1928, ch. 517, 45 Stat. 495 is worded as follows:
That all minerals, including oil and gas, produced on or after April 26, 1931, from
restricted allotted lands of members of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, or from
inherited restricted lands of full-blood Indian heirs or devisees of such lands, shall be
subject to all State and Federal taxes of every kind and character the same as those
produced from lands owned by other citizens of the State of Oklahoma; and the Secre-
tary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be paid, from individ-
ual Indian funds held under his supervision and control and belonging to the Indian
owners of the lands, the tax or taxes so assessed against the royalty interest of the
respective Indian owners in such oil, gas, and other mineral producturn. (Emphasis sup-
plied).
The legislative history indicated nothing related to federal taxes, but rather a concern solely
with the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax. 587 F.2d at 468.




that Native American Indians have consistently received different tax treat-
ment than other citizens, especially with respect to restricted lands, the court
concluded that absent clear and unambiguous inclusion in a taxation
scheme, ambiguities should be resolved in the Indians' favor.
4
1
VI. FIFrH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENTS
In UnitedStates v. Brown,42 the defendant taxpayer was convicted of will-
ful failure to file his individual income tax return. Brown had filed returns
which disclosed no information from which his federal income tax liability
could be computed, inserting words such as "unknown" or "Fifth Amend-
ment" in the blanks provided for dollar amounts. 43 Taking the position that
filing a return containing no information is tantamount to filing no return at
all, the court rejected the defendant's arguments that he could not be con-
victed of failure to file a return when he did file a return.
44
The court rejected Brown's attempts to employ the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination as a defense. While the fifth amendment
can be invoked to protect one from revealing an illegal source of income, it
does not protect one from disclosing the amount of such income on a tax
return.
45
As to the defendant's contention that he had been denied a speedy trial
under the sixth amendment and the Speedy Trial Act,46 the court articu-
lated several factors of inquiry. First, where the information was filed
against a defendant before July 1, 1976, as in this case, the Speedy Trial Act
did not apply.47 Secondly, despite the fact that thirteen months had elapsed
between the filing of the information against Brown and the trial, the court
was reluctant to find a speedy trial deprivation absent any prejudice to the
defendant. Since the delay was due to the judge's illness and overcrowded
dockets, the delay had not been sought by the government to prejudice the
defendant, and since the defendant had not demanded a speedy trial or es-
tablished that the delay prejudiced him, the Tenth Circuit found no viola-
tion of Brown's constitutional rights.
48
Brown further asserted unsuccessfully that evidence obtained from third
parties through IRS summons should be suppressed. The IRS had issued a
summons to Brown's bank to produce records material to his tax liability.
The court upheld the issuance of such summons even where an investigation
41. 587 F.2d at 467-68.
42. 600 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1979).
43. Id at 251.
44. Id at 252.
45. Id (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), and United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259 (1927)).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1976).
47. 600 F.2d at 253 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3163(b) (1976); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d
929, 932 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954 (1978)).
48. 600 F.2d at 253-54. The Supreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
invoked a balancing test with respect to the type of constitutional violation alleged here. In
weighing the circumstances, the Court considered four factors, not necessarily an exclusive list:
the length of the delay, the reason therefor, timely assertion by the defendant of the right, and
prejudice to the defendant.
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pursuing both civil and possible criminal consequences exists, explaining
that such summons can be used to aid an investigation which is seeking to
determine whether criminal conduct has occurred, but such summons must
be issued in good faith and prior to the recommendation to the Justice De-
partment for criminal prosecution. 49 No constitutional violations were
found insofar as bank records are neither owned nor possessed by the tax-
payer, because the incriminating evidence of third parties is not tantamount
to testifying against oneself, and because no valid expectation of privacy ex-
ists in bank records.
50
Brown also alleged a violation of his sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel, but the court found the argument to be merely an
excuse and delay tactic. Explaining that the sixth amendment does not con-
template lay representation, rather it anticipates representation by a person
authorized to practice law, the court looked to the facts: Brown had failed
repeatedly to get a lawyer with over a year to do so; in addition, appoint-
ment of counsel by the court just prior to the trial, and the fact that the
court had allowed Brown to represent himself were considered procedurally
sufficient, especially since the record failed to establish any mockery of jus-
tice or ineffectiveness of representation. 5'
Valerie Golden
49. 600 F.2d at 255 (citing United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 307 (1978);
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 521, 533, 536 (1971); United States v. Billingsley, 469
F.2d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 1972); I.R.C. § 7602, as amended in 1976.
50. 600 F.2d at 256. See general'y Mills, The ff/hA Amendment Pnri/ege and Other Protections
Against Self-Inmmination in Federal Tax Investigations, 43 Mo. L. REV. 677 (1978); I FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 506 (1973).
51. 600 F.2d at 256-58.
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
This is a new section in the Annual Tenth Circuit Survey. Presented
below are the case histories of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
which were discussed in the Fourth (September 1, 1976 through August
31,1977) and Fifth (September 1, 1977 through August 31, 1978) surveys and
which sought Supreme Court review.
I. SUPREME COURT REVERSALS
A. Harrah Independent School District v. Martin
In Harrah Independent School Distrit v. Martt' I the Supreme Court re-
versed a 1978 decision of the Tenth Circuit2 involving the dismissal of an
Oklahoma school teacher who claimed a violation of due process and equal
protection.
The Oklahoma school district did not renew the tenured teacher's con-
tract claiming she willfully neglected her duty.3 The respondent's contract
required teachers holding only a bachelor's degree to earn five semester
hours of credit every three years. In 1969, when respondent was hired, the
sanction for noncompliance with the continuing education requirement was
the withholding of salary increases. Respondent refused to comply with the
requirement and forfeited salary increases through the school year 1973-
1974. In 1973 the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a law mandating salary
increases for teachers regardless of compliance with the continuing educa-
tion program. The school board then notified the respondent that continued
noncompliance would result in the nonrenewal of her contract. Respondent
appeared before the school board in January 1974 and indicated she would
not comply with the requirements of her contract. In April 1974 the school
board voted not to renew the teacher's contract.
4
Respondent unsuccessfully sought administrative relief and judicial re-
lief in the state courts before bringing her action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma claiming she had been denied
her liberty and property without due process of law and equal protection of
the laws.5 The District Court dismissed the complaint and respondent ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding there had
been a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
6
1. 99 S. Ct. 1062 (1979).
2. Martin v. Harrah Independent School Dist., 579 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1978). For a
discussion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion in this case, see Consttiutional Law, Fifth Annual Tenth
Circuit Surv, 56 DEN. L.J. 417, 422-24 (1979).
3. Oklahoma's tenure statute provided that "willful neglect of duty" was grounds for
nonrenewal of a tenured teacher's contract. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 6-122 (West Supp.
1973).
4. 99 S. Ct. 1063.
5. Id.
6. 579 F.2d 1199.
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Reversing, the Supreme Court dealt briefly with the procedural due
process issue holding that respondent had been afforded all necessary proce-
dural due process by having the opportunity to appear with counsel before
the school board to contest the board's determination. 7 Turning to the four-
teenth amendment claims, the Court found no substantive due process viola-
tion because respondent's claim did not involve freedom of choice with
respect to "basic matters."
'8
The Supreme Court stated that the Tenth Circuit mistakenly relied on
the equal protection guaranty of the fourteenth amendment. Since no sus-
pect classification or deprivation of fundamental constitutional right was al-
leged, the rational basis test was the standard to be applied and the agreed
facts showed that the school board's action was rationally related to a state
objective and the respondent was not singled out for special treatment. 9
Mary H. Hurley
B. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs
In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs,I the Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit's decision in McCombs v. Federal Energy Regulatoy CommIsszon,
2
which had held that "abandonment" within the meaning of Section 7(b) of
the Natural Gas Act (Act) 3 did not require formal approval by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (formerly the Federal Power Commission,
hereinafter FPC).
Certificates of convenience and necessity had been issued by the FPC in
1954 and 1963 to McCombs' predecessors, allowing them to sell natural gas
to United Gas Pipe Line Company (United). In 1966 the producer notified
United and the FPC that the gas well was depleted, and no further gas sales
were made to United from the tract. McCombs subsequently obtained as-
signment of the gas tract lease and in 1972 discovered new gas reserves in the
same tract, though at different and deeper drilling sites. He then contracted
to sell this newly discovered natural gas to E. I. duPont de Nemours and
Company in intrastate commerce.
United, upon learning of the new gas discovery and McCombs' inten-
tion to sell it to a third party, filed a complaint with the FPC asserting its
right to the gas. The FPC upheld the administrative law judge's decision
that the certificates issued to McCombs' predecessors in interest were for the
entire amount of natural gas in the tract, including the newly discovered
reserves. 4 The FPC declared that McCombs' attempt to sell the gas to an-
7. 99 S. Ct. 1064.
8. Id. (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) as to "basic matters of procrea-
tion, marriage, and family life.")
9. Id. at 1064-65.
1. 99 S. Ct. 2461 (1979).
2. 576 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion, see
Lands and Natural Resources, Fifth Annual Tenth Cirtuit Survey, 56 DEN. L.J. 517, 531-34 (1979).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2465.
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other intrastate party violated the Act and ordered McCombs to deliver all
gas produced on the tract to United.
McCombs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, asking the court to set aside
the order. The Tenth Circuit reversed the FPC, reasoning that the depletion
of the original well, the removal by United of all its metering equipment at
the site, and the lack of production or sale of natural gas to United for sev-
eral years constituted "abandonment" in fact. 5 The Tenth Circuit also
noted that two letters by the FPC to the lessees of the tract, suggesting that
the lessees apply for abandonment approval, were tacit admissions by the
FPC that abandonment had occurred and that it need only be formalized
for the record.
6
In rejecting the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, the Supreme Court pointed
to the language in the original 1953 sale agreement which stated that all
"merchantable natural gas . ..now or hereafter" produced from the tract
would be sold to United. The Court further noted that there was no time
limitation on either of the certificates granted by the FPC and that United,
at the time of removal of its metering equipment from the original site in
1966, had stated it would reinstall the equipment, "if at some future date,
you have further gas to deliver to us at the above delivery point, which will
be subject to the terms of the above-captioned contract."
7
The point on which the case turned was the explicit and clear language
of Section 7(b) of the Act, which states that, "No natural-gas company shall
abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the
permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after
due hearing, . . .."8 The Court found this language did not permit a "de
facto" abandonment or a tacit approval of abandonment by the FPC. Mc-
Combs' predecessors had twice ignored letters from the FPC warning them
that no abandonment application had been made. Absent the application
and the statutorily required hearing, there could be no abandonment within
the provisions of the Act. 9
The Court also pointed to its own language concerning abandonment
proceedings in Sunray Mid-Contihent Oil Co. v. FPC,i° in which it stated: "[I]f
the companies, failing to find new sources of gas supply, desired to abandon
service because of a depletion of supply, they would have to make proof
thereof before the Commission under § 7(b). '" I The Court held that, under
the clear language of Section 7(b) and its own interpretation of this language
in Sunray, there could be no abandonment of a natural gas field without a
proper hearing before the Commission and specific FPC approval. The orig-
5. 570 F.2d at 1382.
6. Id. at 1379.
7. 99 S. Ct. at 2464.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2464, 2466.
10. 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
11. Id. at 158 n.25.
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inal FPC decision was reinstated.12
Steve Brown
C. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States
In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States' the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth
Circuit decision 2 that held Congress had impliedly reserved easements for
access to public domain sections of land in a land grant 3 to the Union Pacific
Railroad.
4
Petitioners were successors-in-interest to Union Pacific sections in Wyo-
ming. Because of the "checkerboard" scheme of the Union Pacific grant, it
was impossible for members of the public to enter a section of recreationally-
improved public domain land, which interlocked petitioners' sections, with-
out entering petitioners' land. After negotiations for public access over peti-
tioners' land failed, the Government cleared a road cutting across the corner
of one of petitioners' sections and invited the public to use the road for access
to the public land. Petitioners brought an action to quiet title against the
Government as to the section corner burdened by the road, and the Wyo-
ming District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment.5
The Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress must have im-
pliedly reserved easements permitting access to public domain sections when
granting lands to the Union Pacific because "[t]o hold to the contrary would
be to ascribe to Congress a degree of carelessness or lack of foresight which
• . . would be unwarranted."'6 The dissent argued that the Government's
failure to assert easements for 110 years constituted a persuasive administra-
tive construction of the Union Pacific grant which should be accorded great
weight, and that the majority had misanalyzed the case by not recognizing
the key issue - "whether the United States may take theprivate land for access
purposes without compensation."
'7
Reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court initially held that the
common law easement by necessity for which the Government had argued
was conceptually precluded. The doctrine of easements by necessity inher-
ently focuses on necessity at the date that a land grant is made. Since the
public land was unimproved in 1862, the doctrine did not, at that time,
reserve an easement for public recreational access and could not, in 1977,
12. 99 S. Ct. at 2470.
1. 99 S. Ct. 1403 (1979).
2. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1977). For discussion of the
Tenth Circuit's opinion, see Lands and Natural Resources, Fourth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 55 DEN.
L.J. 535, 538-39 (1978).
3. Act ofJuly 1, 1862, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 489-92, as amended, Act ofJuly 2, 1864, § 4, 13 Stat.
358.
4. 570 F.2d at 885.
5. 99 S. Ct. at 1409.
6. 570 F.2d at 885.
7. Id. at 889-90 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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retroactively reserve an easement.8 The Court additionally found the doc-
trine inapplicable because the Government's power of eminent domain pre-
cludes the existence of any "necessity" on the facts.9
After disposing of the argument for an easement by necessity, the Court
focused on the congressional intent underlying the Union Pacific grant. The
Court noted initially that the grant contained explicit reservations in favor
of the United States and its grantees, and that it would be anomalous for the
same Congress that had scrupulously carved specific exceptions out of the
grant to have knowingly intended for access easements to be reserved by
mere implication. The Court then stressed that, since the purpose of the
grant was to induce the grantee to risk a great amount of capital in con-
structing a vital public improvement, the rule of construction favoring the
Government as grantor could not be applied "in its full vigor" to the Union
Pacific grant. Rather, the grant was to receive a "more liberal construc-
tion."' 0 Under this liberal approach, the Court refused to devine any intent
to reserve easements from the passage of the Unlawful Inclosures Act. ' ' Fur-
thermore, the Court held Camfield v. United States' 2 inapplicable as being
predicated on a "nuisance" rationale not present in Leo Sheep.' 3
In conclusion, the Court discussed the unprecedented nature of the
Government's claim and the longstanding administrative construction of the
grant which was adverse to the existence of an implied reservation. ' 4 Given
the dearth of substance in the Government's intent argument, the Court
opted for fostering security of titles rather than an "ill-defined power to con-
struct public thoroughfares without compensation."' 5
David C Halford
D. United States v. Rutherford
In United States v. Rutherford,' the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Cir-
cuit opinion2 and upheld the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
agency's latest battle with supporters of the cancer drug laetrile.
The legal controversy has focused on whether laetrile is a "new drug"
within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 3 The
8. 99 S. Ct. at 1410. For an analogous rationale, see United States v. New Mexico, 98 S.
Ct. 3012 (1978), holding that an "implied reservation" of water for a national forest is limited in
scope by the purposes for which the forest was segregated from the public domain.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 1410.
10. Id. at 1411 (citing United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry., 150 U.S. I, 14 (1893)).
!1. Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act of 1885, 23 Stat. 321, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-66.
12. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
13. 99 S. Ct. at 1411-12.
14. Id. at 1413.
15. Id. at 1413-14.
I. 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979).
2. Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1976). This section defines a new drug as one that experts
"qualified by scientific training and experience" do not generally recognize as safe and effective.
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FDA classified laetrile as "new" and maintained that it was to be excluded
from interstate commerce.
4
When the dispute initially reached the Tenth Circuit, the court upheld
a district court injunction against the FDA on the grounds that the agency
had classified laetrile without making any formal findings. 5 The court of
appeals remanded and ordered the FDA to develop an administrative rec-
ord. After hearings, the FDA again concluded that laetrile was not generally
recognized as safe and effective, and was therefore a new drug.
6
Rutherford v. United States came before the Tenth Circuit 7 a second time
on appeal from a decision of the District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma which vacated the FDA ruling.8 The district court held: 1) the
FDA's findings that laetrile was not exempt under the "1962 grandfather
clause" 9 was arbitrary and capricious; t O and 2) prohibiting terminally ill
cancer patients from using laetrile was an unconstitutional invasion of pri-
vacy. I I
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit again upheld an injunction against the
FDA, but did not consider the district court's grounds. Instead, the decision
of the court of appeals was based on the inapplicability of the "safe and
effective" standard of the Act' 2 to laetrile use by terminally ill individuals.
Chief Judge Seth, for the Tenth Circuit, held that "safe and effective" had
no meaning for cancer patients who would die regardless of treatment.
13
In United States v. Rutherford,14 the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court
found effectiveness was not limited to the capacity to cure. "[A] drug is ef-
fective if it fulfills . . . its sponsor's claims of prolonged life, improved physi-
cal condition, or reduced pain."' 15 Similarly, the Court found "a drug is
unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by
the possibility of therapeutic benefit."'
16
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the clear
language of the statute and the legislative history indicated no special provi-
sions were intended for the terminally ill. 17 His opinion noted that, rather,
Congress intended that the FDA protect individuals with fatal illnesses from
fraudulent cures.18 In addition, the Court commented that an ineffective
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1976) prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of any
new drug unless an application filed with the FDA, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 355(b), is approved.
5. Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976). This decision is discussed
in Admi)nistratie Law, Fourth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 55 DEN. L.J. 391, 392-95 (1978).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
8. 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
9. The Drug Amendments of 1962 provided that drugs which were marketed before Oc-
tober 10, 1962 and which were generally recognized as safe were exempt from the "new drug"
test of 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1). 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) (note).
10. 438 F. Supp. at 1295.
11. Id. at 1299-1301.
12. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1976).
13. 582 F.2d at 1237.
14. 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979).
15. d. at 2477.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2475-76.
18. Id. at 2475.
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drug could be particularly unsafe for patients with potentially fatal diseases
if it caused them to reject conventional treatment. 9
The laetrile controversy, however, has not yet reached a final resolution.
The case was remanded to the Tenth Circuit for consideration of the consti-
tutional and grandfather clause questions raised in the district court.
20
SqTmour Joseph
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